R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

# THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME FIVE

DOCTOR EXIMIUS ET PIUS

**R. P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS**

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FROM THE PRINCE AND TREASURE OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

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# DISPUTATION XXX

## ON THE FIRST BEING, INSOFAR AS WHAT IT IS AND OF WHAT KIND IT IS CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON

Up to this point we have chiefly shown that God exists and have begun to declare in part what He is, for, as we have said, these two aspects in the knowledge of God cannot be entirely separated. Now it remains for us to deliver the remaining points which directly pertain to knowing what God is, and at the same time to declare what kind and how great He is; for in God there is no difference between quality or magnitude and essence. We suppose, however, that we cannot know these things about God by natural light as they are in themselves, because this cannot happen except through a clear vision of Him, which is not natural to man, as we shall also show below. Nor can all these things be demonstrated by us simply a priori concerning God, because we can only arrive at knowledge of Him through His effects. However, once one attribute of God is known from His effects, we can sometimes infer another from it a priori, according to our mode of conceiving divine things separately, and by eliciting one concept from another, as we touched upon in the previous disputation. These two modes of demonstrating must be observed and applied to individual divine attributes, insofar as it can be done.

Therefore, the first foundation and principle, as it were, of all things that are attributed to God is that He is a being necessary through Himself and has His being through His essence, which was demonstrated in the preceding disputation. Therefore, the very being of God is His quiddity; but what is included in this being or what is inferred from being through essence itself must now be examined.

## SECTION I
## WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF GOD TO BE A BEING ALTOGETHER PERFECT

1. I respond: It belongs to the quiddity of God that He be a being perfect in every respect, and this can be evidently demonstrated by natural light. To prove this, it must be supposed that something is called perfect to which nothing is lacking, from Metaphysics V. This can be understood either privatively or negatively. In the first way, that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking that is owed to it by its nature for its integrity or completion, and in this way many beings are perfect in their species or genera, yet they are not perfect simply in the entire breadth of being. In the second way, therefore, that is called perfect to which absolutely nothing of perfection is lacking; and in this way that being is called absolutely perfect to which every perfection is so owed and necessarily inheres that none whatsoever can be lacking to it either privatively or negatively, and in both senses it is said to belong to the essence of God to be simply perfect.

2. No privation of perfection can fall upon God. Indeed, not even any negation. And first, that God cannot privatively lack any perfection is most evident per se, because just as God exists from Himself, so from Himself He has all perfection owed to Him. From what superior being would He have it, since He Himself is the supreme being? Therefore He has it independently of everything else;

therefore He cannot be deprived by any other of all perfection owed to Him. Nor indeed can He deprive Himself of it, both because every thing naturally desires and retains the perfection owed to it, unless it is deprived of it by another more powerful; and especially because God does not have perfection of this kind from Himself effectively, but formally or negatively, because namely He does not have it from another, but from the formal eminence of His nature. And hence this part is especially confirmed from the actuality and simplicity of the divine being; for a most simple thing cannot be deprived of any perfection unless it is entirely destroyed; but the being of God cannot be destroyed, since it is simply necessary; therefore neither can it be diminished, since it is most simple and most actual; therefore it cannot fail to have simultaneously all perfection owed to its nature. And in this sense at least Aristotle touched upon this truth and its reasoning, in Metaphysics XII, chapter 7.

3. That every perfection is owed to this divine being, and therefore that God cannot entirely lack even negatively any perfection, is proved first, because the divine Scripture indicates this, when it says that the things that were made have life in Him (John 1), and when it calls Him every good (Exodus 33). Thus also the holy Fathers teach concerning God, Dionysius in chapter 5 of The Divine Names, and Irenaeus in book IV, chapter 37, when they say that God contains all things, or is all things, as Clement of Alexandria speaks in book I of The Pedagogue, chapter 9. Thus finally (which now concerns us) the philosophers have thought, as Cyril reports concerning Hermes or Mercury Trismegistus in book I Against Julian, near the end, and Suidas in Mercury, and Aesculapius to King Amnion, who speaks thus: "I implore God the Lord of all, maker, Father and enclosure of all, and all existing as one, and one existing as all; for the fullness of all things is one, and in one." And many similar things are read from Trismegistus in the Poimandres, especially at the end of chapters 5 and 15, where nearly all the words are found that Cyril reports; where from Plato also and Porphyry he adduces things not dissimilar.

4. Second, it is proved a posteriori from what was said above concerning the effects of God or the first being. For every possible perfection is either uncreated or created. If it is uncreated, it can exist only in the first being alone, because nothing is uncreated outside of it. If indeed it is created, therefore it must necessarily be from this first being as from the first and principal cause, because it was shown that nothing can exist besides it except from it; therefore it is necessary that every such perfection be in it in a more noble and more excellent way, because the perfection of the effect is necessarily presupposed in the cause, which from itself and by its own and sufficient power can communicate such perfection to the effect. For in what way could a cause give what it in no way possessed in itself? And this same reasoning concludes with the same proportion concerning any possible perfection that is true and real, whether it is actually found in some creature or not; for if it is possible, it cannot be except from God; therefore it is necessary that it now be in God in some way, because nothing can be from Him unless it is in Him in some way; therefore it belongs to the essence of God to include in Himself in some way every perfection of being.

5. The a priori reasoning of the conclusion. Second, this can be shown a priori, because God is the first being, as was shown; therefore He is also the highest and most perfect essentially; therefore it belongs to His essence to include in some way every possible perfection in the entire breadth of being. The first consequence is almost per se evident from the terms; for if God is the first being by causality and necessity of existing, it is necessary that He also be first by perfection. This has also been proved from the above from the fact that all inferior beings are more or less perfect according as they more or less approach this first being; nor can there be infinite regress in this inequality of things without there being given some supreme being, which is the head and measure of the rest, which cannot be other than the first being itself. Therefore it is supremely perfect. The second consequence made at the beginning may seem less evident, because it

can rightly be understood that it is most perfect of all and yet does not contain the perfections of all, just as man is the most perfect of all animals, and yet does not contain the perfections of all animals. But nevertheless that consequence is proved, first, from the preceding reasoning, because the first being is not perfect beyond others in just any way, but as their first principle; but in order that something be the principle of another, it is not sufficient that it be more perfect than it, as is evident per se, but it is necessary that it contain the perfection of that thing in itself in some way; if therefore the first being is most perfect as the principle of all things, it is not only more perfect than the rest, but also contains all perfections in itself beforehand.

6. Then it is proved by St. Thomas, I, q. 4, a. 2, from the principle proved above, that the first being is subsistent being itself through essence, therefore it includes in itself every perfection of being. We shall declare this reasoning and its proper force more conveniently in the following assertion. Now that consequence is proved in another way, because the first being is not only more perfect than all things that exist, but also than all things that can exist; therefore it is necessary that it be more perfect than all things, not in just any way, but as containing in itself the perfections of all things. The antecedent has been proved, because the first being is not only first among those that exist, but also among all possible things. Likewise, because, if another more perfect being were possible, either it would be a necessary being, and thus it would already actually exist, or it could be made by another, and this is not possible, because not by the first being, since it cannot make anything more perfect than itself; therefore a more perfect being is not possible in any way; therefore the first is the most perfect being of all possible things. The consequence, however, is proved, because, given any being whatsoever that exceeds others in perfection, yet does not contain the perfections of all, it cannot be more perfect than every possible being, because there can be another that is not only more perfect, but also contains the rest. For it cannot be said that this containment involves repugnancy or is

impossible, both because in sensible things we experience a quality or superior form containing the perfections of several inferior ones, and also because no reason for repugnancy or impossibility can be assigned, as will be more evident below in declaring the mode of this perfection. Therefore, in order that the first being be more perfect than every possible thing, it is necessary that it include in itself every possible perfection; for if any perfection were possible and lacking, that being would be more perfect which had that perfection simultaneously with all others. And for this reason Augustine and Anselm rightly said that God is such a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. And Gregory of Nyssa, in his book On the Making of Man, chapter 1, says that God is such a good that He surpasses every good that is comprehended by understanding and thinking; namely by thinking with such thought that does not involve repugnancy in the thing thought, but is about a thing truly possible. For indeed, if the thought is not of this kind, the thing thought will not be greater, indeed it will not even be a thing, but a being of reason and altogether nothing; but if something greater is truly conceived, it will be a possible being; therefore also necessary, because this is the first and highest perfection of the most perfect being; therefore that being will be God and not the other thing that was conceived as less perfect; therefore it belongs to the nature of God to be a being so perfect that a greater cannot be conceived, and consequently, to include in Himself every possible perfection; for all perfection is truly and rationally conceived in some true being.

7. Third, the same consequence can be declared and confirmed in this way, for the first being not only exceeds all other things individually, but also when taken together simultaneously, nor does it exceed them in just any way, but in the best possible way in the genus of being; but the best way of surpassing all other things taken together simultaneously is by containing in a more eminent way whatever is in all of them. This is explained otherwise, for when one thing is more perfect than others, yet does not contain the total

perfection of those things, although it is absolutely more perfect, nevertheless according to some aspect it happens to be less perfect, as the sun is simply more noble than the moon and nevertheless the moon exceeds the sun in some dignity or power. But truly the first being ought to exceed all other things both simply and in every nobility and perfection, so that it cannot be surpassed by anything either absolutely or according to any aspect, which mode of perfection and excess it could not have unless it contained every perfection in itself. But unless it exceeded all things in this way, it would not be the first being under every aspect and perfection of being, and consequently neither could every aspect and perfection of being flow from it.

8. Response to an objection. You might say: by this reasoning it would be proved that the first being ought to be such that it contains all the perfections of beings in itself just as they are in them, because all this perfection can be conceived in some being, and this mode of exceeding others is more perfect. It is responded by denying the consequence, because not all those perfections formally taken pertain to the consummate perfection of being, nor are all mutually compatible, nor compatible with exact and supreme perfection of a thing. Hence to declare this, theologians rightly distinguish twofold perfections of being; some they call simply simple; others, however, perfections secundum quid, or not simply. Of the former kind are those which neither involve any imperfection nor repugnancy or opposition with another greater or equal perfection. Hence it belongs to the nature of perfection simply that it be absolute and not relative, for relative perfection excludes another opposed to itself, which, as far as it is from itself, can be equally perfect. Then such absolute perfection ought to be one which includes no imperfection, nor is opposed to another better one. Hence from Anselm, in the Monologion, chapter 14, perfection simply is usually defined as that which in each thing is better itself than not itself, that is, which in an individual being or in the breadth of being, so to speak, is better itself

than anything repugnant, as Scotus well explained, In I, dist. 8, q. 1, ad 1, and Cajetan, On Being and Essence, chapter 2. But every other perfection, which is not of this kind, can be called secundum quid, or not simply, or in a certain genus.

9. All simply simple perfections are in God formally. Concerning perfections simply, therefore, it must be said that all are in God formally, because in their formal concept they involve no imperfection, but pure perfection, nor do they include repugnancy among themselves. Hence to have them thus, that is, formally, is better than to lack any of them, and therefore it belongs to the nature of a supremely perfect being in the entire breadth of being to include these perfections formally. Add that in these perfections a higher mode of containing them than formally cannot be conceived, because within their formal nature they include neither limitation nor imperfection, nor can a higher grade of being be conceived than that to which these formal perfections belong, such as living, knowing and others of this kind. But truly concerning perfections secundum quid or in a certain genus, it must be said that it does not pertain to the consummate perfection of the first being to include them formally, as the objection made rightly proves, because otherwise it would include repugnant and opposite things. Likewise often a perfection of this kind in its formal concept includes limitation, composition or another similar imperfection; therefore as such it cannot pertain to the consummate perfection of the supreme being. Therefore it pertains to the perfection of that being to contain all these perfections eminently; and this mode is consonant with the excellence of that being which has a grade and mode of being more eminent than every being in which these perfections are found formally, and therefore it ought to contain these perfections in a more eminent way than they are in made beings.

10. What it is for one thing to be contained eminently in another. What it is to contain one thing eminently in another, or its perfection, theologians dispute with St. Thomas, I, q. 4. Briefly, however, it must be said that to contain eminently is to have such

perfection of a superior nature that it contains by power whatever is in the inferior perfection, which cannot be better explained by us than in relation to causality or effect. Hence all perfections of creatures, insofar as they are eminently in God, are nothing other than the very creative essence of God itself, as Augustine said, book IV of Genesis According to the Letter, chapter 24 and following, and book IV On the Trinity, from the beginning, and tract I on John; Anselm, in the Monologion, chapters 34 and 35, and in the Proslogion, chapter 17; but the creative essence is said to be eminently all things, insofar as by itself alone and by its eminent power it can communicate those perfections to all things. Not that formally speaking and according to precision of reason to be able to make things is to contain them eminently; for we distinguish these by reason and believe this causal locution to be true: Because it contains eminently, therefore it can make them; but we explain that containment through relation to the effect, because we cannot accomplish this more conveniently and clearly.

11. For what some say, that to contain eminently the perfections of creatures is to contain whatever is of perfection in them, with imperfections excluded, is more obscure; for, when it is said that God contains whatever is of perfection in a creature with imperfections excluded, either eminently is understood, and thus nothing is explained, or formally is understood, and thus repugnancy is involved; for, with every imperfection excluded, the formal perfection of a creature as such does not remain, because in the intrinsic formal nature and concept of a creature imperfection is included.

12. Response to an objection. You might say that it follows from this that no created perfection is formally in God, because there is no created perfection which formally taken does not include imperfection. I respond that it is true that no created perfection, according to the adequate nature which it has in a creature, is formally in God, but only eminently; for created wisdom is not in God, for as such it is an accident and finite perfection, and the same is true of

other similar things. Therefore God is said to contain some of these perfections formally, because according to them He has some formal agreement with a creature, by reason of which that perfection according to the same name and the same nature or formal concept is attributed to God and creature, with the analogy that always intercedes between God and creature being preserved. When, however, there is no such agreement nor formal denomination, but only the efficacy of divine power, then we say that eminent containment intercedes. And thus in God there is no perfection formally, except either according to the proper concept of God, or at least according to a concept abstracting from God and creatures. There remained here another difficulty, because it follows that there are infinite perfections in God; but this will very easily be resolved from what will be said in the two following points.

## SECTION II

## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD IS INFINITE

1. Finite and infinite, according to Aristotle's testimony, are properly spoken of in quantitative magnitude; since therefore this does not exist in God, as we suppose, there cannot be discourse here about the infinite according to this property, but according to that metaphorical usage by which Augustine said, in book VI of On the Trinity, chapter 8: "In those things which are not great in mass, to be greater is the same as to be better." Again, the question is not understood as concerning infinity of duration alone; for it is most evident that God is eternal and consequently infinite in duration. This can easily be proven both from effects and from what has been said about God's being. For either the world is eternal, or it began in time; if it is eternal, then much more so is God, who is its first author and mover; but if it began in time, then it took its beginning from someone

who could not have begun, otherwise he would have taken his principle from another; since therefore we do not proceed to infinity, but stop at the first being, as has been shown, it is necessary that it be and always have been. Likewise because it has been shown that the first being is a being absolutely necessary, because it is not from another but from itself; therefore it cannot have a beginning or end of existing; therefore it is of infinite duration. Therefore the question is chiefly understood concerning infinity in essence and perfection, and consequently also in power of acting; for these two maintain proportion between themselves; whence infinity of power is shown a priori from infinity of essence, and a posteriori infinity of essence from infinity of power. But in what manner this infinity is to be conceived and in what it consists, has been sufficiently declared in the preceding disputation, section 1.

*Resolution of the Question*

2. It must therefore be said that it can be demonstrated by natural reason that God is infinite. Faith teaches this truth, namely that God is infinite, as is evident from Theology, Psalm 144; Baruch 1; and the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in the chapter "Firmly," concerning the Holy Trinity. And among the holy Fathers, Dionysius, book 9 On the Divine Names; Nazianzus, oration 38. And the philosophers have caught a scent of this, as Aristotle reports in book III of the Physics, chapter 4, although their meaning is not sufficiently established, as we shall immediately say about Aristotle himself. But this conclusion can be proved in the twofold manner set forth above, namely, either from effects, or a priori from some attribute previously demonstrated about God. In the first manner Aristotle proves in book VIII of the Physics, text 7, and book XII of the Metaphysics, text 41, that God is of infinite power from the fact that he moves for infinite time. Because (he says) infinite power is required to move for infinite time. This he proves by reduction to the absurd, because otherwise

two movers of equal power would move, one for finite time and another for infinite time. This argument has tormented the minds of many, since it immediately appears entirely ineffective; for to move for infinite time, even if we freely admit that such motion is possible, finite power suffices if it endures perpetually, provided it does not weaken or diminish or grow weary in moving; but it can have these conditions even if it is finite, provided it is incorruptible. For thus the same thing remaining the same is always naturally apt to do the same thing, as the sun to illuminate perpetually, if it were perpetual. Indeed, according to Aristotle's testimony, the sun or heaven is the cause of the perpetual succession of generations and corruptions, and similarly all intelligences move for infinite time according to him, although they are not infinite.

*The Mind & Reasoning of Aristotle is Examined*

3. Because of this difficulty, many doctors deny that it was Aristotle's mind to assert that God is infinite in power, but only in duration; for they consider it less problematic that Aristotle failed in his conclusion than in his proof. So thinks Gregory, In I, distinction 42, question 3, article 1; Ockham, Quodlibet III, question 1, and Quodlibet VII, questions 22 and 23; Marsilius, In I, question 24, article 2, and several others. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Aristotle in that place treats of infinite power in the force of acting and moving, for this is plainly evident from his discourse. For this reason he proves that God is of infinite power, so that he might thence conclude that he lacks magnitude; but this conclusion is of no moment especially in his opinion, since he posits that heaven and corporeal elements are eternal and infinite in duration. Then he proves that infinite power cannot exist in magnitude, because otherwise it would move in no time, which inference would be entirely impertinent if the discourse were only about duration; for power does not move more quickly because it endures longer. And thus St.

Thomas, Albert, Simplicius, and others understood Aristotle there. Whether Aristotle spoke of power infinite intensively in some respect and only in moving, or simply in acting, cannot be effectively proved from those passages. But what should be thought I shall say at the end of this point.

4. Scotus's exposition is disproved. Therefore Scotus responds differently, In I, distinction 2, question 1, and in Quodlibet, question 7, that Aristotle's medium in that argument is not a mover for infinite time in any way whatever, but by itself and independently. But, whatever may be the case about the efficacy of this medium, which we shall see below, it is certain that this was not Aristotle's mind, both because he makes no mention of that phrase "by itself" or "independently," and also because that argument proceeds equally in finite motion and in any action whatever. But Aristotle does not prove his intention from motion or action, but precisely from the infinite duration of motion. And finally that reduction to the absurd, that equal movers would move for unequal time, is not founded on the manner of moving by itself or by another, but only on the quantity of the effect. Add that Aristotle there argues from a purely physical medium and one previously proved in the same book; but the physical medium is that the first mover moves for infinite time, and this alone had been proved by Aristotle; but that it moves by itself and without dependence on another, this is not a physical medium, but rather metaphysical; nor had Aristotle made mention of this there. Especially since Aristotle there openly signifies that there are two movers in the same manner, such that one moves for finite time, another for infinite time; but there cannot be two movers by themselves and independently of a superior; therefore Aristotle does not place force in this manner of moving. Finally, even if it were true that infinite power is required to move by itself, this nevertheless is neither self-evident, nor proved by Aristotle, indeed not even attempted to be proved nor insinuated.

5. St. Thomas's exposition. St. Thomas there expounds Aristotle differently, saying he speaks of infinite motion on the part of the mobile, not on the part of space. On the part of the mobile he calls that motion infinite in which infinite time must be consumed before the whole mobile traverses any prefixed or designated terminus or part of space; but he calls motion infinite on the part of space that which through continuous repetition of the same mobile within the same space endures for infinite time. He says therefore that Aristotle's principle is that infinite power is required to move some mobile for infinite time on the part of the mobile itself. But if you object: Aristotle could not subsume that the first mover can move for infinite time on the part of the mobile, but only on the part of space, because he only acknowledged the motion of heaven, which he thought had lasted for infinite time, and as such to be from the first mover, but that motion can only endure for infinite time through repetition of the whole mobile through the whole space, St. Thomas responds in sum that Aristotle spoke directly and explicitly of this infinite time; but implicitly from this infinity he inferred the other, which is on the part of the mobile. So that his argument in force is this: God moves heaven for infinite time on the part of space; therefore he is of himself capable of moving for infinite time on the part of the mobile; therefore he is of infinite power. The consequence is clear, because the infinity of motion through repetition of space is per accidens, but on the part of the mobile it is per se; but what is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se; since therefore the first mover is the per se cause of the infinity of motion, infinity per se and not only per accidens should be attributed to it.

6. What difficulties occur in the exposition just related. In this exposition many difficult things occur. First, that this was Aristotle's mind, because he made no mention of a double infinity of motion or time, nor of the reduction of one to the other. Then, because, in order that motion endure for infinite time on the part of the mobile, it is necessary that the mobile be infinite; otherwise it could not endure

for infinite time without repetition and without the complete transit of the whole mobile through a designated point of space, especially if the same motion always perseveres, as is supposed; and thus St. Thomas posits that such a mobile ought to be actually infinite according to magnitude. But indeed, according to Aristotle's testimony, it is entirely repugnant for an infinite body to be moved; how therefore could he here have assumed that the first mover can move an infinite mobile? For this itself is to move a body for infinite time on the part of the mobile, especially since Aristotle expressly posits a finite mobile in his proof; for he says that mobile which is moved for infinite time through the removal of equal parts would finally be consumed; which would not be true if the mobile were infinite.

7. Secondly, even if we granted that Aristotle intended that kind of proof, it would not be less difficult to declare its force and efficacy. For first of all, what is the force of that inference: God moves heaven for infinite time on the part of space; therefore he can move for infinite time on the part of the mobile? For it is just as if it were inferred: He can move a finite body and continue that motion for infinite time; therefore he can move an infinite mobile. But this consequence seems to be able to be founded on no reason. Because, just as the increase of motion through repetition and revolution of the same mobile in the same space, or through increase of the mobile itself, is vastly different, so is the increase of power required on the part of the mover vastly different, nor is it licit to infer one from the other, since they are of different natures, indeed since one is not properly an increase, but duration of the same power. Whence that reduction of infinity per accidens to per se has no foundation here, indeed in force it is nothing other than to infer what is greater from what is less. For, speaking per se and (so to speak) from the object, it is less to move the same mobile for a longer time than to move a greater mobile. Whence in finite motions the inference would not be correct to conclude the power of moving a greater mobile from greater

continuation of motion of the same mobile. Finally the objection made above against Aristotle's argument proceeds in the same manner against this interpretation; for an angel can move heaven for infinite time on the part of space, and yet cannot move any body for infinite time on the part of the mobile; therefore neither in the first mover is it licit to infer one from the other.

8. But if perhaps it be said that an angel is not thus a per se cause of infinity of motion as God is, if by per se cause is understood an independent cause operating by itself, we fall into Scotus's exposition, and it must be rejected for the same reasons; but if it is understood as a cause truly and properly influencing the effect and by proper power, as a proximate principal cause, thus it is undeservedly denied that intelligence is a per se cause of infinity of motion; for it effects it by proper power and endures perpetually in it. Nor can it be explained in what consists the fact that God per se causes infinity and not an angel, because they differ only in that God effects as first cause and an angel as second, which difference is irrelevant to the present matter, as has been said. Indeed it is scarcely understood why infinite motion on the part of space is called per accidens, and on the part of the mobile, per se; for, if there can be any infinity in physical motion, it is only in circular motion through repetition around the same space, as Aristotle proved in book VIII of the Physics and book I On the Heavens. And, just as continuous motion or time is per se one by continuation, so, if it endured infinitely, it would be per se infinite by continuous circulation. But infinite motion on the part of the mobile is impossible; for, if the mobile is impossible, so also is the motion, book IV of the Physics, text 115. Why therefore is it called per se infinite? Or why from the power of moving for infinite time in one manner is inferred the power of moving in another manner? You will say: even according to our opinion, infinite motion on the part of space is impossible. It is answered that we argue in Aristotle's principles; but if infinite motion is also impossible in that manner, Aristotle's argument will be weaker even when interpreted in the said

manner, because neither is the antecedent true, nor the inference good.

9. Wherefore St. Thomas, I Contra Gentiles, chapter 20, article 8, to the 4th objection, declares this argument differently, saying it only proves that finite corporeal power of itself does not suffice to move for infinite time, because it cannot be moved unless moved, and of itself does not have the ability to be moved perpetually, since it is in potency to being moved and not moved, and therefore neither does it have of itself the power to move perpetually. Nevertheless neither does this interpretation appear sufficient. For first Aristotle does not immediately prove from the infinity of motion that the power of moving cannot be corporeal, but he proves it to be infinite and from infinity concludes afterwards that it cannot be corporeal, which inference we shall examine later; whence Aristotle here does not use that medium that a body does not move unless moved. Then this principle, if it is understood concerning actual and proper and physical or local motion, that is, that a body cannot locally move unless locally moved, is neither demonstrated nor true, because in motion of attraction often one body remaining unmoved attracts another, and in impulsion or expulsion this sometimes happens, though more rarely, as in living things in the expulsive power of excrement; and in the rebound of a ball it is probable that it is impelled by the wall which it violently touches, although the wall itself remains unmoved. But if that principle is understood more broadly concerning motion through aid or concurrence of a superior cause, thus it is not a physical principle nor is it proper to bodies, but common to all secondary causes. And finally in that sense it is the same to say that corporeal power cannot of itself move for infinite time, as to say that a body cannot move without the concurrence of a superior cause, and thus we fall into Scotus's opinion, who reduced the force of the argument to this, that no finite power acts independently of a superior, and thus finally Ferrara there reduces the exposition to

this, that only the first cause per se primarily and not through another causes infinite motion.

10. Finally Cajetan, in his lengthy work On the Intensive Infinity of God, constitutes the force of this argument in this, that God per se primarily, that is, from the force of his own and intrinsic perfection, causes the infinity of motion; but to cause infinite motion in this manner requires (he says) intensively infinite power. This he proves thus, because duration is being; therefore of some perfection; therefore greater duration, of greater perfection; therefore infinite duration, of infinite perfection; therefore he who causes it from the force of his own perfection ought to be of infinite perfection. But God causes infinite duration in motion in this manner; but intelligence or another finite agent cannot cause it per se primarily, that is, from the force of its own perfection, but from an annexed condition, that is, from the fact that it endures infinitely; just as heat of degree eight from the force of its intensity and perfection has the ability to heat to degree eight; but to heat for a day it does not have from the force of its perfection, but from an annexed condition, namely, because it endures for a day. But against this exposition the same difficulties occur as against the preceding ones. And first, as far as Aristotle is concerned, we can object to Cajetan what he himself deservedly objects to Scotus: It is remarkable that Aristotle did not express the medium of his argument; just as Aristotle did not assume as medium a cause moving by itself, as Scotus wanted, so neither a cause moving per se primarily, as Cajetan takes it, but precisely from the continuation of motion through infinite time he infers the infinite power of the mover. Likewise that deduction by which Aristotle proves that motion of infinite time cannot be from finite power is far different from the discourse which Cajetan makes; for Aristotle infers that two equal movers would move for unequal time. This kind of arguing cannot be applied to movers which per se primarily cause infinity or duration of motion in the manner in which Cajetan speaks. Indeed, if the matter is carefully considered, no created power (even according to Cajetan's

discourse) can per se primarily move for an hour, much less for infinite time, because from the force of intensive perfection alone it cannot effect either the duration of one hour by moving, but from an adjoined condition, namely, insofar as it also endures for an hour.

11. Cajetan's ineffective discourse for proving the intention. But further I add that Cajetan's discourse taken per se is ineffective. For first of all, what cause is there which can move for infinite time from the force of intensive power alone, prescinding it from its own duration? Certainly none, even if it be imagined to be maximally infinite. Otherwise if we imagined through impossibility an infinite motive power to endure for an instant of our time, it as such would be capable of moving for infinite time, which is plainly false. And the consequence is clear, because, given a sufficient and per se and primary cause, the effect can be posited. But if it be said that the duration of the cause is a necessary condition for persevering in action, even in a cause of infinite intensive power, therefore infinite continuation of motion is never thus done per se primarily by infinite power without requiring as a necessary condition the duration of the power; but in this manner and in no other perpetual duration in finite power suffices and is required for causing infinite motion; therefore in this there is no difference and without cause infinite power is demanded for causing infinite motion per se primarily. Nor can it be declared what is imported by that phrase "per se primarily," since by it the duration of the cause cannot be excluded as a necessary condition. Unless perhaps it be said that this duration is intrinsically included in a cause of infinite power, and therefore in such a cause this is not enumerated as a condition distinct from the power itself. But this is irrelevant to the matter of which we treat; for even perpetual duration can be connatural to finite power, with only this difference intervening, that in a thing simply infinite that duration is independent, but in finite power it is dependent, which difference is irrelevant to the present discourse, unless we return to Scotus's exposition, which Cajetan himself does not admit.

12. Furthermore, that ascent or gradation of Cajetan is fallacious, both because, although duration is a perfection, nevertheless greater duration is not always greater perfection. For in three ways one duration can be greater: in one way essentially, in which way eternity (aevum), for example, is a greater duration than time and eternity than eternity (aevum). And in this way greater duration is also greater perfection; whence it would more properly be called better duration, or of higher nature; but finite time is not exceeded by infinite in this way, as is evident per se. In another way one duration is said to be greater than another or than itself, only by comparison to an extrinsic measure true or imaginary, in which way an angel is said to have endured more today than yesterday, and in this way greater duration is not in itself greater perfection, but the same coexisting with greater succession. And thus, to cause greater duration in this way in an angel, greater power is not required, as is also evident per se. In another way it happens that one duration is greater than another through real addition of part to part of the same nature. And in this way a year is a greater duration than a day, and infinite time than finite, and thus greater duration is not greater perfection intensively, but only extensively (if nevertheless local motion or its duration merits the name of perfection distinct from its terminus). And this comparison is what pertains to the matter at hand. But from this increase of perfection in the effect it cannot be concluded that greater power is necessary, but the same more enduring, because it is only successive multiplication of the same or similar effect, for example, of similar circulation; but to multiply an effect successively, greater power is not required; for the same heat can produce similar heat successively to infinity. And it is confirmed first, because from the infinity of an effect greater infinity cannot be inferred in the cause than is in the effect; therefore, if the effect is only increased extensively in duration, from this standpoint it does not require infinite intensive power in the cause, but power infinitely enduring. And it is confirmed finally, because, if infinite power were necessary to move for infinite

time, because infinite duration is infinite perfection, infinite motion could in no way be made by finite power neither per se primarily, nor by a principal and per se cause. The consequent is false, because finite intelligence can effect such motion; therefore.

13. The posited conclusion cannot be proved by physical medium alone. I think therefore that the posited conclusion cannot be effectively proved through a purely physical medium or from motion. First indeed, because not only is it true that no motion has endured for infinite time, but I also think it more probable that it cannot endure for infinite time, although it can endure into infinity without end, not however without beginning, as was touched upon above. Secondly, because, even if we granted that motion has endured for infinite time, infinite power in the mover could not be concluded from this, as the arguments touched upon conclude. Nor does the reason by which Aristotle endeavors to prove that the finite cannot move for infinite time accomplish anything. For it is founded on this principle, that if the whole power moves the whole mobile through infinite time, part of the power will move part of the mobile in less time, and therefore finite time. But this principle is false, for, if part of the power moves part of the mobile proportioned to it through the same proportioned space and repeated in the same manner or traversing it so many times, it will be able to move it for as much time, speaking per se, as the whole power could move the whole mobile. Which Aristotle himself taught at the end of book VII of the Physics and it is evident from inverse proportion, and applying it to the motion of heaven, it can almost be seen to the senses. For if we imagine that one mover moved only the star of the sun from eternity and another moved the remaining body of the fourth sphere, each would move through infinite time. But what some say, that Aristotle spoke of power which is diminished by moving, is beside the point; for what would Aristotle infer for the matter at hand, if he supposed this? For he could not conclude that power to be infinite, but not to be wearied or diminished by moving. Wherefore I do not fear to say that Aristotle

did not argue correctly, where the matter is so clear and manifest. And Cano himself seems to have felt this, book XII On Places, chapter 5, where among Aristotle's errors he places that he believed all intelligences moving the heavens to be of infinite power, because they move for infinite time. Whence it also becomes probable to me that Aristotle, at least in that place, did not speak of active power absolutely infinite in the genus of being or in the force of acting simply, but only of infinite power in moving locally, which is only infinite secundum quid. For, even if we granted that infinite power can be concluded from that effect, it would not exceed this infinity, and, if he attributed infinite power to all movers of the heavens, it is not credible that he attributed greater; but he there speaks equally of all, for thence he concludes that all movers of the orbs are incorporeal, as St. Thomas notes there.

14. Someone will say: granted that infinite power of God cannot be proved from infinite duration of motion, it can nevertheless be proved from increase to infinity in velocity of motion. For thus Gregory thinks, In I, distinction 42, question 3, article 2, that the infinity of God can be demonstrated from the fact that he can move heaven faster and faster to infinity. But that this is possible he proves, because this effect does not involve repugnancy; therefore it is possible; therefore through some power; therefore that power is especially in the first being. And similarly he argues from other effects which he supposes to be possible, although this is not evident but rather obscure, as I shall say below when treating of the attribute of omnipotence. Whence some also judge that the argument made is not effective, because it is not sufficiently proved nor self-evident that that process to infinity in velocity of motion is possible or does not involve repugnancy. But, although we grant that this also is evident (as it certainly seems), nevertheless infinite power simply cannot be concluded from this, but only secundum quid, that is, in moving, which efficacy could be understood in finite power of a superior order, as is common in such processes to infinity.

*Another Argument Proposed, Taken from Creation*

15. Another argument therefore taken from another effect is usually considered more effective and proper to metaphysics, namely from creation, which I shall only outline, because its principles have been proved in what preceded. One principle is that God has the power to create, which from what has been said is evident, because it has been demonstrated that he has in fact produced this world, which could not be produced except through creation, since both matter itself and all things even incorruptible have been effected by him. Another principle is that infinite power simply is required for creating. This is not as evident as the preceding, but is nevertheless sufficiently consonant with reason, as has been proved and declared in what preceded. And especially this is indubitable concerning the power of creating which of itself embraces as adequate object everything creatable, because this object extends to infinity and surpasses any finite perfection determinately assignable; it therefore requires infinite force and perfection in the cause having such power.

16. But that the divine power is of this kind can be shown in many ways from things made. First, because in them God created all grades of things and in each various species, for whose production he did not need either any matter which would be presupposed to his action, or any other assisting cause, but his power alone, presupposing on the part of the effects only that it does not repugn them to be; therefore it is a sign that God could have made by the same power and facility everything that would not have repugned being and therefore whatever is creatable. Secondly, because in these beings which God created, he per se primarily produces participated being itself or participated being insofar as it is such being, because neither in itself nor in another does he presuppose such a nature of being; therefore it is a sign that this is the adequate object of that power and consequently that power extends to everything that can participate the

nature of being; but this is everything creatable. Thirdly, because, whatever God creates, he will never make an effect adequate to his power, nor equal to his perfection, and on the other hand his power always remains equally integral and perfect; therefore, with any effect made, he can create another being which more participates his perfection; therefore he can effect any creatable being.

17. Objection against the preceding argument. You will say that repugnancy seems to be involved in this argument; for, if God cannot create an effect adequate to himself, therefore he cannot make a thing simply infinite; therefore from the object of that power it cannot be concluded that it itself is simply infinite. It is answered by denying the final consequence; for God cannot create a nature or substance equal to himself, because this involves open repugnancy; for the most important excellence of the divine nature is that it be uncreated, independent and simply necessary being, which perfection whatever is created necessarily lacks. But excluding this equality, it does not repugn that created beings be made to infinity which more and more participate God's perfection. Whence neither on God's part can power be lacking, especially since it has been shown that every possible perfection is contained eminently in him. And this object suffices that that power be in itself simply infinite, not only because of the manner of acting from nothing, but also because of the breadth of the creatable, which can be extended or increased in perfection to infinity. Whence it is necessary that infinite power be supposed in the cause, both because the cause is superior and exceeding in perfection its whole object; and also because if it were finite, it could not progress beyond some certain terminus in its action. This argument therefore taken from the effect of creation not only as it has been made, but also as it is shown possible either from things which have been made, or from the manner in which they have been made, is sufficiently effective. But Scotus, In I, distinction 2, question 1, § "Having shown therefore," proves it from things which God made and continually makes, adding that he could endure perpetually in this effecting of

things. But Durandus, In I, distinction 43, question 1, adds that he could also conserve all of them simultaneously. But this which Durandus adds is less evident, and with all that granted, if the whole process stops within the species of things which have been made, infinite power simply cannot be concluded from it, but only finite power of a superior order, as Scotus also saw, unless something else is inferred from the manner of creation, as has been said above.

### *On the Method of Demonstrating the Infinity of God A Priori*

18. It remains to speak briefly about another way of demonstrating the infinity of God a priori from some attribute of His previously demonstrated. And in this way St. Thomas proves, in the Summa Theologica I, q. 7, a. 1, that God is infinite from the fact that He is being itself through essence, received in no essence but subsisting through Himself. The disciples of St. Thomas think that the force of this argument is founded on the fact that in God being is not distinguished from essence by the nature of the thing, whereas in creatures it is distinguished. And they believe that no being is made finite or limited except insofar as it is received in a finite essence, and conversely that essence is finite insofar as it is capable of finite being; for both act can be limited by potency and potency by act mutually in different genera of causes. Thus therefore they conclude that divine being, which is entirely unreceived, is infinite. And in this way Cajetan understands this argument there, and Capreolus, In I, dist. 43, q. 1, a. 1, and Ferrariensis, I contra Gentes, c. 43, and they defend it from the attacks of Aureolus, in the said dist. 43, and of Scotus, In I, dist. 2, q. 1, and Aegidius consents to this opinion, In I, dist. 43, q. 1, a. 1; Richard, a. 1, q. 1.

19. But I think this argument is not efficacious if it is founded on the principle that essence cannot be finite unless it is a potency truly and properly receptive of being itself, and conversely that being

cannot be finite unless it is truly received in essence as in a properly passive and receptive potency. For I think it is false that even in creatures essence and being are compared in this way, as I shall say at length in the following disputation. Therefore, in order for being to be finite, it suffices that it be received from another in such and such a measure of perfection, even if it is not properly received in some passive potency, and similarly a created essence can be limited by its intrinsic difference, even if it is not compared to being by the mode of receptive potency. For it has not yet been proven by any sufficient reason that a thing cannot be finite except in that way; for although things which have among themselves a mutual transcendental relation of act and potency can be said to be limited mutually in this sense, that the relation of one, from the fact that it is determined to another, is so finished that it does not remain indifferent to others, nevertheless, in an absolute thing, such as the essence of an angel, for example, it is very well understood that it can be finite without such a relation, from this alone that it has received such a degree of being and is distinguished from another.

20. How from the fact that God is being through essence, it is concluded that He is infinite. Therefore that consequence: God is being itself through essence, therefore He is infinite in perfection, seems to be founded proximately on this, even according to the mind of St. Thomas, that to be infinite in essence consists in a certain negation which indicates the absolute perfection of a thing and not any imperfection; but the first being, by the very fact that it is its own being through essence, is most perfect; therefore it also includes this perfection which is to be infinite absolutely. Whence St. Thomas, in the same Summa I, q. 4, a. 2, from the fact that God is subsisting being itself, infers that He is so supremely perfect that He includes in Himself every perfection of being. The force of this inference seems to be situated principally in this, that since God does not participate being or the nature of being from any other, but is from Himself and from intrinsic nature and necessity what He is, He cannot have in

Himself a diminished and only quasi-partial nature and perfection of being; therefore He is in some way including all being and the entire perfection of being. From the same principle therefore and by nearly the same proportion the infinity of such a being is concluded.

21. In what the infinity of God consists. First indeed, because this infinity consists in nothing other than in this: that the perfection of the first being is neither so precise and defined to one genus of perfections which we see distinguished in creatures, that it would include only that and not all others in that most eminent way which can pertain to supreme perfection; nor is it so limited in individual genera of perfections to some certain and definite degree which can be understood in a participated being, that it would not have that perfection in a more noble and excellent way than can be participated by a creature, even if it were participated more and more infinitely. But all this is included in the perfection of the first being, by reason of which it is said to contain in itself every possible perfection, as is evident from what was said in the preceding assertion. Therefore from that principle infinity is equally inferred, just as supreme perfection. Indeed, from this it also follows consequently that all the arguments by which we proved above the perfection of the first being, equally prove its infinity, because both the mode of perfection exposed by us is convertible with infinity rightly declared, and infinity, insofar as under that negation it indicates perfection, pertains to perfection absolutely and thus to the supreme perfection of being.

22. Secondly, the same inference can be proved, because being through essence has nothing from which it might be limited; for participated being can be limited either from the will of the one giving such perfection and not greater, or from the capacity of the recipient, whether that capacity is understood by the mode of passive potency, or only by the mode of objective capacity or non-repugnance; but in the first being, which is from itself its own being, no principle or reason of limitation can be understood; because, just as it has no cause of its being, so it cannot have in itself limitation either from the part of

a giver, or from another principle. You might say: just as the first being is from itself, so it can from itself and without another cause be limited to a certain genus or degree of perfection. It is answered that this is repugnant to a being necessary from within and having being from itself. This indeed can easily be proved a posteriori and from inconveniences from what has been said, either because in that way there would not be repugnance to granting many beings necessary from within, or because any being having limited perfection and as it were a part of being can emanate from the first being, or because such a being would not be supremely perfect, which with a truly non-repugnant conception could be conceived as possible.

23. A priori, however, it can only be proved by non-repugnance, or the negation of every cause or reason, on account of which the necessity of being as such would be limited to this genus of perfection rather than to another, and to this degree rather than to a better one. And truly this is a sufficient demonstration, unless someone wishes to be willfully obstinate, both because here no other reason can intervene a priori through a positive cause, since this being has no cause; and also because in every genus of possible perfection it was necessary that such perfection should have intrinsic necessity of being in some being; otherwise it would not have whence to take its beginning, or to flow to other beings, and the same is true of any possible degree of entitative perfection; therefore the very nature of being as such postulates that according to the entire latitude of possible perfection or truly conceivable, it should have necessity of being in some being either formally or eminently; but it cannot have this necessity as if divided and partitioned in several necessary beings, as was proved above; therefore it is necessary that it should have it as if congregated entirely in one being necessary through itself, and this itself is for that being to be infinite. In this way, therefore, from the fact that God is being through essence, it is rightly concluded that He is infinite in perfection.

24. Whether the infinity which we say befits God is possible and expresses perfection. But there still remains one difficulty both concerning the assertion posited and concerning its proofs, for all suppose that such an infinite being is possible; but this is neither self-evident nor proven in all the arguments adduced. For whoever would deny that God is infinite, would consequently deny that this infinity pertains to the perfection of being, on the ground that it is not possible. Rather, it seems to include some imperfection, because what is conceived to be infinite is apprehended as something confused and indeterminate and never sufficiently perfect, and therefore this property seems to be repugnant to a being in act and can only be attributed to a being in potency. And this is confirmed, for if there were granted one being actually infinite absolutely, other beings distinct from it could not be understood as possible, because an infinite being encloses everything in itself; just as, if there were a body of absolutely infinite magnitude, no other body could be understood outside of it. Whence conversely, by the very fact that one body is outside the place of another, it is understood to be finite locally; therefore, by the very fact that one being is outside the entity of another, it is finite entitatively.

25. It is answered that the arguments made not only prove that this infinity of the first being is possible, but also that it is absolutely necessary, so that any other finite perfection of being might be possible; nor can a being necessary of itself be reasonably defined or limited to a certain degree of perfection. Nor is it true that such infinity involves or indicates any imperfection, because infinity in the present case does not mean negation of consummated perfection, in the way that something inchoate and not yet perfect is said to be unfinished, for this is a great imperfection, but it means negation of limitation and of a term limiting the thing. Again, this is not infinity of quantity, which is by way of extension or multitude, in which to lack a term is like lacking intrinsic complement, and therefore it is not understood without imperfection and some confusion or

indetermination; but it is infinity of perfection entirely indivisible, which in itself is supremely actual and complete; concerning which matter it was said in the twenty-eighth disputation. To the confirmation the consequence is denied, because the infinity of the first being does not consist in multitude of being only, but in the exceptional perfection of one entity, and therefore, just as it does not remove the unity of that being, so it does not impede its distinction from any other being which does not attain to that perfection, and therefore St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3, touching nearly the same argument, responds nothing other than that God is distinguished from other beings, because He Himself is His subsisting being, but others are not. But Alensis, Summa I, q. 6, memb. 1, ad 9, rightly adds that something is not said to be finite because it is this and not another, but because it is terminated by another, or because it exists for the sake of another, or because it is perfected by another. By these words he declares not so much the proper formal nature of infinity as its signs, and in the third member he indicates the argument declared by us; the second indeed is conjoined with the third, for a thing which has no efficient cause cannot have a final cause either, and conversely, and therefore just as one who lacks an end has nothing from which to be limited, so does one who lacks an efficient cause. But the first member pertains to local infinity, as he himself also declares. Whence to the first example taken from bodies it is answered that it is partly similar, partly dissimilar. The similarity is in this, that if an infinite body were granted, from this precisely it would not be repugnant for other bodies distinct from it to be granted, because its infinity would not consist in multitude or aggregation of all bodies, but in the sole unity of its magnitude without term. The dissimilarity however is in this, that one infinite body would occupy all spaces, whence naturally it would not give place to other bodies; but God has no repugnance with other beings, because He is purest spirit. In the second example, however, there is no proportion or similarity, wherefore the consequence must be denied; for it is of the nature of an

infinite body that it occupy all spaces, and therefore, if a body is contained in one finite space, it is necessary that it be finite; but it is not of the nature of infinite being that it be all beings formally or identically, but that it be formally one being eminently containing the rest. Here immediately there occurred a difficulty about the multitude of God's perfections, whether it be finite or infinite, whose exposition will be evident from the following section. But other difficulties, which could arise from the infinite power of God, will be better treated in the final section.

## SECTION III

## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD IS PURE ACT AND A BEING ALTOGETHER SIMPLE

1. An affirmative response is given to the question. In all these questions I omit the opinions of those, especially the nominalists, who deny that these attributes of the divine substance can be sufficiently known or demonstrated by natural reason, because what we have touched upon concerning this matter in the preceding disputation, section 1, seems sufficient. And because they will be sufficiently refuted by the matter itself and by its proofs.

2. What is signified by the name of pure act. I respond therefore that it can be demonstrated by natural reason that God is pure act and a being most simple. This assertion must be proven from the divine perfection demonstrated in the two preceding sections, and therefore it is necessary first to declare what is signified by these terms and how the thing signified by them pertains to perfection. By the name of pure act, therefore, is signified that thing which lacks all potentiality, which is called act insofar as it includes being which is the ultimate or rather the first actuality of a thing. Hence here it is not called formal act or actuating, but existing in act in itself; it is called

pure, both to exclude objective potency or every state of existing only in potency, which is repugnant to a being necessary from within, as is evident per se (whence regarding this part this property is sufficiently demonstrated); and to exclude every true and real passive potency; hence regarding this part this property coincides with simplicity and must be proven simultaneously. Active potency, however, is not excluded by that term, for rather each thing acts insofar as it is in act; hence the very power of acting is a certain actuality, which rather deserves the name of strength or faculty than of potency. Because, however, it does not always act in act, therefore it is also properly called potency; but this kind of notion of potency does not pertain to imperfection, because to act in act is not always a perfection of the agent, as will be declared more broadly in what follows. And thus it is established that pure act beyond the actuality of the first being adds only negation, by which the perfection of that being is declared; concerning which negation nothing remains to be said, beyond what we shall say about simplicity.

3. Whether simplicity expresses perfection. Scotus and Cajetan contend about simplicity. For Scotus, In I, dist. 8, q. 1, ad 1, and Quodl., 5, whom Soncinas follows, lib. IV Metaph., q. 14, teaches that simplicity is a perfection simply speaking. Cajetan however, de Ente et essentia, c. 2, teaches that simplicity expresses no perfection, because it says nothing positive, but negation. The disagreement, however, seems to be rather in words than in reality. For it is certain that simplicity does not add any thing or positive mode above the thing which is denominated simple, but says only the negation of composition, because it cannot be understood what kind of positive mode that would be, or what necessity there is for imagining it. Likewise, because simplicity is either the same as a certain perfect and indivisible unity, or certainly they are distinguished not only by reason, but by proportional relation, because unity is opposed to multitude, simplicity to composition; just as therefore unity does not add something positive to the one thing, but only negation, so neither

does simplicity to the simple thing. Nevertheless it is true that through this negation perfection is circumscribed or indicated, both because the imperfection of composition is excluded, and also because, other things being equal, that which is more simple is more perfect, although absolutely it is not always the case that what is more simple is better; for a part is more simple than the whole, yet it is not more perfect; and similarly an accident is often more simple than substance, although it is in a lower order and grade of being; but remaining within the same grade, and other things being equal, simplicity indicates perfection.

4. From these things therefore it is easy to conclude the present assertion from what has preceded; for it has been shown that God is the most perfect being; but it is far more excellent to have the highest and consummate perfection in the most simple entity, than from the union of many things; therefore this mode of being must be attributed to the first being. You will say that the argument supposes that it is possible to have all perfections in the highest and perfect degree in a simple entity; but this has not been demonstrated and someone could deny it and nonetheless say that God is the most perfect being, because it is better to have all perfections with some composition than to be a simple being and lack so many perfections; but to conjoin both is impossible on account of various and almost opposite reasons of the perfections of being. For this cause indeed certain Catholics have also devised a formal distinction or one from the nature of the thing between divine perfections.

5. It is responded that, on the contrary, it is evident that there cannot be a most perfect being, if its perfection coalesces from the union of many perfections or distinct things or parts. First, because the individual components would be imperfect, both because none of them according to itself would include every perfection, and also because each would be incomplete or insufficient in the genus of being; therefore what would arise from them could not be perfect in every respect, because precisely this, namely to consist of imperfect

things, is a great imperfection. Second, because such a being would be dependent on its components. But to depend on another is imperfection; therefore.

6. Third, because in every composite of some things really distinct, those many things can be considered as many partial and incomplete beings, or at least, if one is complete, the rest which are joined will be incomplete, and each of them will also have its own being proportioned to itself, because (as I shall say more broadly below) this being is included intrinsically and with proportion in every actual entity; if therefore the first being consists of many partial entities, I ask whether each of them is simply first in the nature of being, that is, having its own proper being completely from itself and not from another, or whether one has being per se primarily from itself, from which the others flow. The first cannot be said; for the reasons by which we proved above that there cannot be given many beings necessary from themselves, convince not only concerning integral beings, but also concerning partial ones[1], indeed all the more strongly concerning partial ones, the more imperfect these are from their genus. And similarly the reasons by which we proved that in the being which is being itself through essence every perfection of being is included, prove that there cannot be understood many beings from themselves, and each imperfect and incomplete. Likewise, because in every composition one of the components is either supposed to the other, or is the principle of the other, or is more perfect than it; therefore it cannot be understood that many components have being per se primarily and from themselves. Finally, in every true composition at least one of the components depends on the other; but what depends cannot have being from itself; for the first real and physical dependence is from an efficient cause, under which I include the final, because it is more metaphorical and because the efficient operates on account of the end. I call it first both by converting the consequence, for whatever depends on something as on matter or

[1] convincunt, 1960; conveniunt, ed. Vivès. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 378.

form, it is necessary that it depend on some efficient cause, but not conversely; and because effective dependence expresses less imperfection than material or formal; but to be from itself expresses the greatest perfection; and therefore, if it excludes effective dependence, much more material or formal.

7. And from this last reason can easily be proven the other member of the prior disjunction, namely, that the first being cannot so consist of many components, that one is as if primarily and from itself, but the rest are from it; because already that whole composite is not a being from itself nor independent; for one cannot flow from another without some efficiency at least through natural resultance, given their distinction without any simple unity, so that we exclude the processions of the divine persons in the Trinity, concerning which there is another reason. Finally, what in that being is understood to be first and from itself, as such it is necessary that it be simple and contain every perfection in itself formally or eminently, otherwise the rest could not flow from it; therefore nothing can be added to it through composition.

## SECTION IV

## BY WHAT REASON IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITION IN GOD

1. Although the discourse made in the abstract and universal is efficacious, the matter will nevertheless become more evident, if by descending to the individual species of composition, we show that they are repugnant to the perfection of the first being; which can be done partly by applying the discourse already made, partly by other reasons. Since therefore we suppose from what was said in section I, disputation XXVIII, that the first being is also the first substance, composition could be imagined in it, either remaining within the

genus of substance, or passing to the genus of accident, which would be of substance with accident; but concerning the composition of accident with accident nothing need be said, because, the second genus of composition being excluded, this third necessarily remains excluded, as is evident per se; concerning the prior point therefore we speak in this section, but concerning the posterior we shall speak in the following. Substantial composition, however, can be conceived as fourfold real and one of reason, namely from being and essence, from nature and supposit, from matter and form, from genus and specific difference, or (which is the same) from species and individual difference, or from any higher and lower grade[2]. Besides these compositions, however, no other substantial one has been found thus far, nor can it easily be conceived, and whatever is thought or imagined, it is necessary that it be reduced to these, either under the notion of act and potency, or under the notion of integral parts; these therefore being excluded, every similar fiction will be excluded. Through these therefore we must briefly discourse.

2. Concerning the first, which is from being and essence, it is not now necessary to say what kind it is, until the following disputation; for whatever kind it may be, it is evident that it is not found in God, for it has been shown that the first being cannot have being from anywhere other than from its own essence, on account of which in Scripture he is said uniquely to be, indeed and in some way alone to be and other things in comparison to him as if they were not. And it is declared further, because God neither is nor can be understood to be in potency to being, because he is in act by absolute necessity; therefore being is not understood to come to the essence of

[2] "In the present text, only three kinds of real composition appear, instead of the four that had been announced. The agreement across all the editions we have consulted leads us to suppose that this is an error on Suárez's part; however, he himself corrects it on p. 384 [here, p. 19, line 914], when he adds the fourth composition, ex partibus integrantibus seu quantitativis ('from integral or quantitative parts')." Cf. BHF, vol. IV, p. 379. (Editors' note).

God as existing in objective potency to it. Nor indeed can it be compared to it as to a receptive potency; therefore it can in no way make composition with the essence of God, but is most formally that very essence. The prior consequence is evident from what has been said, and the posterior similarly from a sufficient enumeration of parts. The minor proposition however or the antecedent of the ultimate consequence is true first in every essence even created, as I think; for no essence can be compared to its proper being as receptive potency, because it would have to be supposed in the nature of actual entity, which involves repugnance. Then especially in God it is evident, because no properly receptive potency can be in him and especially potency to being; for every passive potency as such is reduced to act by some agent, as we shall declare more broadly concerning the third composition. But in God potency to being cannot be reduced to act by some agent; for either that agent would be extrinsic, and this is repugnant to the first being, or intrinsic, and this is repugnant to being itself, because some thing cannot be the cause of being for itself. And St. Thomas touches on this reason, I, q. 3, a. 4, and many things concerning this matter have been disputed by us theologically in tome I of part III, disputation XI.

3. Concerning the second composition we can scarcely demonstrate anything in particular from natural principles, because our faith teaches that with the unity of nature there is in God a Trinity of persons; which mystery cannot be investigated by natural reason. Hence neither will it be able to be proven that perfect simplicity and identity between the divine nature and person can consist with the distinction of persons among themselves. Nevertheless we believe with certain faith that that mystery derogates nothing from divine simplicity, nor is it against natural reason, although it is above it. Wherefore, abstracting from the unity or plurality of persons, or speaking under the name and notion of subsistence, natural reason teaches that God is not subsistent through composition or addition of any thing or mode really distinct from his essence, and thus there

cannot be composition in God from nature and supposit. For if there is discourse concerning subsistence as such, that belongs to the essence of God; therefore it does not make composition with that very essence. The consequence is clear, because composition from nature and subsistence intervenes only there, where subsistence is outside the notion and essence of the subsisting nature, as we shall show below when treating of this composition in creatures. And it is almost evident per se from the terms, for in every true and real composition one extreme is not included in the essential notion or concept of the other. The antecedent however is established by natural reason from what has been said, because God is essentially his own subsistent being; for, since that being is essentially from itself intrinsically necessary, it is also essentially most perfect; but the best and most perfect being is subsistent being, and it will be so much the better, the more it has included in its very essential notion of being the supreme notion of subsisting or being per se.

4. But if there is discourse concerning personality or suppositality, insofar as it includes all things which are strictly of the notion of person, thus the reason does not have place, on account of the mystery of the Trinity, by reason of which most theologians and the most learned think that the relations are not of the essence of God, although on account of divine simplicity they are not really distinguished from it. Which must be treated ex professo in another place. Wherefore, from the general reason of denying every imperfection in God, this composition also must be excluded above all. It is added moreover that, if we look at mere natural reason, a reason can scarcely be found for knowing this kind of composition even in creatures; nor a sufficient principle for distinguishing subsistence from nature, but from supernatural mysteries one has arrived at knowledge of it, as we shall see below when treating of created substance. Much less therefore could natural reason suspect this kind of composition in the first substance. Since therefore composition by itself sounds imperfection and no necessity and no

indication of this composition is found in the first being, it is evident that such composition cannot be attributed, precisely standing in natural reason.

5. Moreover, in created substances the nature is known to make composition with created personality and to be distinguished from its proper personality, because created nature from the force of its essence is in some way indifferent so that it may be per se or in some way in another, that is, so that it may be in its proper or in an alien supposit; I say however that it is in some way indifferent, because, although by its nature it postulates its proper supposit, nevertheless, the whole essence of the nature being preserved, it can lack that and be in an alien one, which is a manifest sign of distinction and composition; but this indifference is a certain potentiality and great imperfection; hence it has no place in the divine nature, which on this account is altogether determined to be per se in its proper supposit nor can it by any reason be in an alien one. For, although according to our faith the divine nature is common to three persons, nevertheless not through the mode of potential indifference to the mode of being per se or in another, but through the mode of infinite actuality, by reason of which it postulates three proper notions of subsisting incommunicably, so that it can neither be without them nor otherwise than with them; therefore the reason of distinction and composition of supposit with nature altogether ceases in the divine nature.

6. Finally there is an excellent reason, because, wherever suppositality makes real composition with nature not only according to our mode of conceiving, but also in the thing itself, suppositality is outside the essential notion of such a nature and the nature is outside the essential notion of suppositality, as is established in creatures and is manifest from the general notion of real composition, in which it is necessary that the extremes be distinguished in some way in the thing itself; but those things which are distinguished in reality, each of them is also outside the notion of the other in reality itself, as is established

from what was said above concerning distinctions of things. But the divine essence cannot be so compared to its supposit, otherwise being itself through essence would not be in reality itself of the essence of the divine supposit or of divine suppositality, and consequently that suppositality would not be essentially necessary being; it would therefore be participated being and would be made by some cause, or at least would naturally flow and proceed from the very essence of God, just as in creatures the supposit flows from the nature; but this is great imperfection, because otherwise the divine supposit as such would not be uncreated nor being through essence, but in some way made.

7. An objection is satisfied. You will say: by similar reason it would be proven that the second or third person of the Trinity is not being through essence, because they are through emanation from another. It is responded by denying the consequence, because one divine person proceeds from another in unity of essence, and it belongs to the essence of any person and of any divine personality to be being itself through essence, at least on the part of the thing, whatever may be the case concerning our mode of conceiving; and therefore any person and whatever is in it, is essentially being through essence and necessary; hence the emanation of one from another is not through imperfection of efficiency or dependence, but through simple procession and wonderful origin. But truly, if personality really distinct would flow from the divine nature, that would not flow in unity of essence according to reality, because what is really distinguished from essence is of another essence from it, and therefore according to itself would not be being through essence and its emanation would not be without some efficiency and imperfection. Nor does any special difficulty occur concerning this truth beyond those which regard the mystery of the Trinity, which transcends metaphysical consideration.

*The Exclusion of Composition from Matter & Form*

8. Concerning the third composition, the matter is also most evident; and first it can be demonstrated a posteriori that in God there is no composition of matter and form, because in him there is no fourth composition from integrating or quantitative parts; but every being consisting of matter and form also has quantity and integral parts, as was shown above in Disputation XIII, final section. But because (as I related there) some have invented another kind of matter that abstracts from quantity, therefore it must be proved generally and a priori that such composition from matter and form is repugnant to the first being. Because, of whatever nature or mode such matter might be imagined to be, it must necessarily be compared to form as subject or receptive potency of that form; otherwise it would have nothing in common with that matter which we acknowledge, nor would there be reason why it should be called matter, because matter signifies receptive potency of substantial act. But in the first being such potency cannot be found, because God is the first act or the first actual being; therefore he is also pure act; therefore the admixture of such potency is repugnant. The latter consequence is clear from the exposition of terms, for that is said to be pure in some respect which does not have an admixture of the contrary; since therefore potency is opposed to act, what is composed of potency and act cannot be called pure act. But the major proposition has been sufficiently proved in what precedes. The minor is proved because, given any being having a mixture of act and potency, another being can be understood which is more and prior act, namely, if it were stripped of that potentiality; therefore what is first act must also be pure act.

9. Objection. It can be said that in this discourse equivocation is committed by varying from receptive potency to objective potency, and conversely; for, from the fact that God is the first and necessary being, it can only be inferred that he is pure act, that is, not having a mixture of objective potency, for his whole essence is necessary. And this is correctly proved by that reasoning, because, if he had an

admixture of such potency, that being would be prior and more necessary which would be pure from such potency, indeed that alone could be said to be according to itself wholly actual being. From this however it does not seem to be correctly inferred that in such a being there is no composition from receptive potency, because either equivocation is committed, or what was to be proved is assumed in the antecedent. For if it is said that God is first act, that is, including in himself no receptive potency whatsoever, this itself is what was to be proved. Nor does this follow from the fact that God is the first necessary being, because even if he consisted of matter and form, that whole being could be understood to be according to itself wholly or according to both parts and their union a necessary being and pure act from objective potency, but not from receptive potency; just as conversely matter is called pure potency not from entitative act, but from formal act.

10. Resolution. It is responded that no equivocation is committed, but from the fact that God is the first necessary and actual being and being itself through essence, it is inferred that he is also such an act which in his essential being does not include receptive potency. First, because no such potency, especially substantial, can be being necessary of itself, which was proved above; both because it is a very imperfect being, and also because it is being dependent on act; therefore a being consisting of such potency cannot be pure act from the potentiality of being nor, according to itself as a whole, necessary being. Whence a second reason can be taken from the part of the other extreme; for either such form would be in its being dependent on such matter, and thus would be very imperfect more than the rational soul is, and could not be necessary being any more than matter itself; or it is independent in its being from matter, and thus that form would be prior act and that alone would be being through essence, to which consequently it would be repugnant to be the act of matter for the same reason that this is repugnant to God, as we shall immediately declare. Third, from the part of union or composition

there is the best reason suggested above; for such union and composition cannot be necessary of itself, but requires some efficient cause which is prior to the being composed resulting from that union; whence it is altogether repugnant that such a composite should be the first necessary and unmade being. The assumption (for the other things are clear) is declared because those parts cannot have from themselves and from their intrinsic nature that union, because, since matter is pure potency, it cannot have from itself this power over form, and therefore that matter, insofar as it is from itself, always needs something giving or effecting form in itself. On the contrary, however, if form is imagined to be such that from intrinsic necessity it is bound to matter, by this very fact it is very imperfect and dependent, and therefore cannot have from itself either being or union; for this composition is altogether repugnant to the first and most perfect being. To this could be added the reasons by which, in the aforementioned Disputation XIII, we proved that created intelligences lack this composition; for those will prove a fortiori concerning the first intelligence. And from that effect it is evidently concluded that the principle of intelligences is simpler and purer from this potentiality than the intelligences themselves are. And a similar argument can be taken from the simplicity and immateriality of the rational soul.

11. From other lower effects, however, I do not see that any efficacious argument can be taken to confirm this truth, because in all others this composition is found; and therefore, from them precisely it does not seem to be concluded that it is not found in their cause, unless perhaps by way of negation, namely, because, since this composition is in these effects on account of their imperfection, it should not be attributed to their supreme cause. Finally, from the creation of matter a natural reason not to be despised can be formed, for if the first being consisted of matter and form, it would not be active through its whole entity, but through form only, because matter is not active; but a being which is active only through the form which it has in matter is not active of another except by inducing form in

matter, or rather by educing form from matter; but it is not active of matter itself. This is clear both by physical induction and also by reason, because operation is proportioned to its principle and the mode of operating to the mode of being; since therefore God is effective of the whole being and of both matter and form, he is not active through form in matter, but through most pure act, by which he eminently contains form and matter.

12. Aristotle brings forward another reason[3]. For from the fact that God is eternal, he infers that he lacks matter. But if he understands this of eternal duration in any way or of any incorruptibility of a thing, he does not correctly infer; for according to his opinion heaven is eternal, and indeed could be, and is incorruptible, yet nevertheless it is not immaterial. If however he understands this of eternity taken most properly, thus he falsely applies that reasoning to all intelligences, for in that mode it is the same to say that a thing is eternal as to say that it is through itself and intrinsically necessary and altogether immutable in its being, which is proper to God; therefore that reasoning, in order to be of any value, should be applied to God alone, and coincides with that by which from the fact that God is his own being through essence it is inferred that he lacks all potentiality.

13. From these things therefore it is permitted to collect further that God can in no way inform matter truly and properly. And the reason is because either he would be a form apt and inclined by nature to inform matter, and this is evidently repugnant to divine perfection, for a form which is of this kind is an imperfect and incomplete being, instituted by its nature to constitute another being or complete nature; therefore it is repugnant to the first being to be such a form. Or he would be a form voluntarily (so to speak) informing and uniting to himself some matter or body, even if by his nature he does not postulate this; and this is repugnant both to the nature of form (for a perfect and complete substance cannot exercise

[3] XII Metaph., c. 6.

the proper function of form by informing matter, as we shall also say below concerning intelligences), and especially it is repugnant to the divine substance, which, since it is the most perfect essence and nature, cannot be united to constitute one nature, as theologians treat more broadly in the matter of the Incarnation; and therefore it cannot be united in the nature of form, which philosophers are accustomed to say, that God cannot supply the effect of formal cause through himself.

14. Philosophers asserting that God is the true soul of the world erred. Whence it is established that against the natural light erred the philosophers and gentiles who thought that God is the soul of the world or the formal principle of all things, or of man or of any other thing whatsoever, as Eusebius attributes to Democritus and Thales of Miletus, book XV of Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 6; and Augustine reports from Varro in book VII of the City of God, chapters 6 and 16, and book IV, chapters 11 and 12, the same from Virgil and others, and in book XIII, chapters 16 and 17 and 18, he attributes the same to Plato. Indeed even among heretics Abelard held the same opinion, as Bernard testifies, epistle 190; for he said that the Holy Spirit is the soul of the world; and Amalric said that God is the very essence of all things, as Turrecremata reports in Summary on the Church, book IV, part II of that work, chapter 25. All these things (I say) and similar delusions are errors, if these men spoke of proper form; for if by metaphor they had called God the soul, in that he is intimately in all things and because he confers being and operating or living on all things, not formally but effectively, thus the opinion would be true, although the words would need to be corrected. But here was suggested an objection concerning the mystery of the Incarnation, and the question whether God can enter into composition. The same concerning the blessed intellects, whether God is united to them as form; but these things pertain to theologians; now we suppose as certain that in neither of these mysteries does God become the form of a creature.

## Section IV

### *It is Shown that God is not Corporeal*

15. Concerning the fourth composition it must be said that from the very terms and from the reasons made up to this point it is established most evidently[4] that God is not a body and consequently does not have composition from integrating parts; for this composition exists only in bodies and quantified things. This truth was known to philosophers, as is established from Aristotle in Physics VIII and Metaphysics XII; and from Plato in the Timaeus, Justin reports in Dialogue with Trypho; and from Hermes Trismegistus, Cyril reports in book I against Julian, near the end. And it can be demonstrated a priori from what precedes, because composition from integrating parts exists only in things composed of matter and form; but in God there is no composition of matter and form; therefore. But because some have thought that this composition can be found in substance lacking composition from matter and form, as the Commentator and others said of heaven, it must be added that every substance which is so subject to quantity that it has parts coextensive to its extension is very imperfect, and will be more imperfect the more it is extended not only according to part, but also according to itself as a whole. Whence among corporeal things man is less imperfect than others, because, although he is extended according to some part, namely the material part, nevertheless not according to his whole substance; for he has a formal part that is unextended. But if some substance is imagined that is integral and complete and simple as regards the composition of matter and form, but subject to quantity and composed of integrating parts, necessarily that substance would be extended according to itself as a whole, and thus less perfect than the substance of man is; therefore the substance of the first being cannot be considered to be of this kind. Add that such a substance

[4] Vide D. Thomas, I cont. Gent., c. 21; August. de Haeres., num. 50 y 86.

could not be intellectual; for the operation of understanding necessarily abstracts from body and the dimensions of quantity. Wherefore, whoever would imagine God to be corporeal should at least think (lest he be altogether irrational) that God has an immaterial and intellectual part conjoined to some most noble and incorruptible body; and thus God cannot be thought corporeal without composition of some form with corporeal matter, because at least God must be thought more perfect than man; but he would not be more perfect unless he had at least an immaterial and intellectual form.

16. An escape route is precluded. But still someone could imagine a substance composed of integrating parts that are merely substantial, not however having this bulk of quantity, nor by nature subject to or postulating that quantity. Against this, however, can be brought first the reasons by which it is proved that such a mode of substance is impossible, from what was said above in Disputation XIII, final section. Then, whatever may be the case concerning absolute impossibility, this is most evident: that among those substances which have come to our knowledge, none is of this kind, but substantial composition and extension from integrating parts always has conjoined quantitative extension and corporeal bulk. From which physical induction it is at least concluded that it is vain and altogether irrational to imagine such a substance, and much more to attribute it to the first being. For such a substance cannot be most perfect; for by the very fact that it is divided or extended into parts, each of the parts and their union will be imperfect. Likewise each of the parts will have dependence on others and the whole on the part. Likewise its power would also be extended and consequently less one or less united, and therefore not supremely perfect. Likewise either that substance would be in other things or spaces with local extension, so that it would be whole in the whole and part in the part, or it would be without such extension, whole in the whole and whole in individual parts or points. If the first is said, it follows first that such a substance is not only

extended entitatively and in itself, but also in order to place and thus is quantified and corporeal; for we understand nothing else to be of the nature of body except that it has extension of parts filling diverse places or partial spaces by their nature. And then it follows that such a substance is not infinite in perfection nor immense, that is, according to itself as a whole present everywhere, all of which can easily be gathered to be repugnant to the perfection of the first being from what has been said, and concerning immensity specifically will be shown below.

17. But if that whole substance is in the whole and in individual parts, and this necessarily befits it by its nature and by virtue of supreme perfection, whence can distinction and composition of integrating parts be imagined in it? Since it is far more difficult to conceive such a substance composed of integrating parts and by its nature whole in the whole and whole in any part, than if it is understood as simple and indivisible; and on the other hand no trace or sign of such composition can be found, nor does it contribute to perfection, but rather displays great imperfection. And especially because it is specifically repugnant to an intellectual thing as such; for intellectual power as a whole is indivisible, whence it requires an indivisible substance; and thus it would result that the substance of God is not according to itself as a whole intellectual, but only by reason of some part, or by reason of some indivisible thing in which the power of understanding resides. Therefore such a fiction or thought concerning the substance of God is altogether absurd.

18. Whether it is demonstrated by purely physical reasoning that God is not corporeal. Other philosophical reasons are usually brought forward to prove that God is not corporeal; for, this being proved, all philosophers take it as established that he does not have composition from integrating parts. But, as I said in what precedes, purely physical means are not sufficiently efficacious for demonstrating divine things. Of this kind is that reasoning that a body does not move unless moved; but God is an unmoved mover; and

therefore he cannot be a body. For in this reasoning the major, understood purely physically, is neither demonstrated nor perhaps true, as I said above. But the minor cannot be demonstrated from physical motion alone, without metaphysical reasoning. Another reasoning seems more efficacious, namely, that God, since he is the first cause, influences all things; but in order that he may influence, he must be intimately in all things, for mover and moved must be simultaneous; but God could not, if he had a body, be intimately in all things, because he could not be intimately in bodies, since one body could not penetrate another. This reasoning, if it has any efficacy, takes it from a metaphysical medium, namely creation, or universal conservation and influence. But how great its efficacy is, we shall say below when treating of the immensity of God.

### *The Reasoning of Aristotle is Examined*

19. But there remains one celebrated and controversial reasoning on account of the authority of Aristotle, who uses it in Physics VIII, text 79, where he first supposes that God has infinite power; whether he correctly proved this, we have already seen; but since what he assumes is true, let us suppose it as if it were demonstrated. Then he supposes that infinite power of the first mover is not in infinite magnitude, because it is impossible for infinite magnitude to be given, as he supposes proved in Physics III, which seems to many not to be demonstrated; I however both admit that it is true and think that it is sufficiently proved. Therefore that infinite power cannot be in finite magnitude, Aristotle concludes thus, because it would follow that such power would move in no time or in an instant, which is repugnant to motion. He proves the consequence thus, because it is necessary that infinite power move the same mobile more quickly than finite power, whatever that power may be; therefore it is necessary that infinite power consume no time in its motion. The consequence is proved because, if it consumes some time, let there be

given some finite power which moves more slowly in greater time; therefore there will be some proportion between those two times; let that finite moving power therefore be increased with the same proportion, and thus finally there will be arrived at a finite power which moves in as brief a time as the infinite power; therefore in order that no such proportion can be given nor finite force can equal the infinite, it is necessary that the infinite move in no time.

20. Several difficulties concerning the reasoning of Aristotle that has been introduced. Against this reasoning various objections occur. The first is because, if it proves anything, it is not that God lacks magnitude, but that motive power that is infinite is simply impossible. The consequence is clear because that reasoning can be applied to infinite power outside magnitude just as within magnitude; namely, because it would move in no time, since otherwise the action of finite power would equal the velocity of motion of infinite power, which would be as inconvenient in infinite immaterial power as in material power. It can be responded that the reasoning is not the same, because power outside magnitude does not move as much as it can, but as much as it wills or as much as is fitting; but infinite power, if it were corporeal, would act according to the ultimate of its potency. But this response first cannot be accommodated to the opinion of Aristotle; for he thought that God does not act freely, but from necessity of nature, as we shall see within; therefore according to his opinion even the first incorporeal mover acts according to the ultimate of his potency; therefore he also would necessarily move in no time. But this objection would have some response, which Soncinas suggested in Metaphysics XII, question 41, according to the opinion of Aristotle that God acts from necessity of nature, not in a merely natural mode like an inanimate or irrational thing, but in an intellectual mode, because namely from necessity he judges what it is expedient to do and how, or how much, or when, etc., and with the same necessity he wills to operate thus as he judged it expedient, and therefore, although he operates from necessity of nature, he does not always operate as

much as he can, but as much as is expedient. But even admitting this interpretation, concerning which we shall see later whether it is according to the mind of Aristotle, from that reasoning, at most, it is had that the reasoning of Aristotle made above proves that God is not corporeal as a thing altogether inanimate or irrational, but not that he does not have a mind conjoined to body or magnitude. Therefore there could be a corporeal and intellectual mover, as many think concerning angels; and then, although he would be of infinite power, he would not act as much as he could, but as much as he would will or would be expedient. And thus finally Saint Thomas confesses in I contra Gentiles, chapter 20. From which it plainly results that Aristotle did not prove that intelligences are immaterial and incorporeal.

21. Second difficulty concerning the same reasoning. Then there is a second difficulty concerning that inference or condition: If infinite power were in magnitude, it would move in no time; because strictly it does not seem that this follows, even if we grant that power to be altogether material. And first, if we imagine it to be material and animal, such as is the motive power of a horse or lion, it would not be necessary to move in no time, because such power does not always act as much as it can, because it moves when applied through appetite, and appetite is excited through apprehension; but apprehension does not always move as much as it can, but as much as is expedient, or as it is represented to be expedient. Then, even if that power were material and acting altogether naturally, still it would not be necessary that it always act as much as it could; because it could move not immediately, but mediately; and thus its action could be modified in the proximate cause; for thus the Commentator in Metaphysics XII, text 41, says that the first mover does not move the first mobile in no time, because he does not move immediately, but by means of the proximate mover, whom he calls the soul of heaven and says to be of finite power. In which way he thinks he sufficiently defends the reasoning of Aristotle; yet he accomplishes nothing, for just as he himself says this of immaterial power, so the same could also be said of corporeal power.

For why could not that power also move only mediately and its motion be limited by the proximate mover? Indeed this could be said more easily of material power than of immaterial power, for since material power is merely natural, it can be altogether determined to that mode of moving, namely by means of another mover, and determined according to the capacity of that mover; but immaterial power, although de facto it moves by means of another mover, nevertheless, since it is free and indifferent, will be able to move immediately. But this objection, although it is efficacious ad hominem against the Commentator, nevertheless does not press absolutely, nor does the response satisfy, both because all mediate motion can be reduced to some immediate motion, and also because no reason can be given why, if that power is infinite, it cannot move immediately. On the other hand there is a peculiar evasion in material and corporeal power, because, since it is extended, it is not equally applied as a whole to the effect, and thus it cannot as a whole move primarily through itself, but through the proximate part, through which the more remote parts act; and therefore it would not act according to the ultimate of its potency, but according to the nature and mode of application, which would always be finite, and the most remote parts would contribute nothing to the action. Nevertheless, this objection also has a response, as will be established from what is to be said. But I argue further because, even if we granted that whole power to be equally applied, it does not follow that it acts in no time, because it is not necessary that infinite power extend to this effect, but it suffices that it can move in infinitely lesser and lesser time, so that it cannot in an instant, and in any lesser and lesser time it can move. Just as the power of creating, although it is infinite, does not therefore extend so that it can create an infinite thing, but so that it can create any finite thing, even if it is increased to infinity. For when in an infinite or supreme effect there is some repugnance or implication of contradiction, it would not be necessary that power, even though infinite, extend to that, because (if it can be so said) the impossibility of the effect resists it, or more

properly, because it is not of the nature of potency, however perfect, that it extend to the impossible.

22. What response can be applied to all objections against the reasoning of Aristotle. It is disproved. To this reasoning and in power to all the objections made, it can be responded that it is absolutely impossible to move in an instant; nevertheless, from the hypothesis that corporeal power infinite in moving is granted, it can correctly follow that infinite motion in velocity and therefore momentary motion can be granted, which nevertheless does not correctly follow, given infinite incorporeal power. But the reason for the difference can be given from Saint Thomas in Physics VIII, text 79, and I, question 25, article 2, ad 3, because a body moving another body is a univocal agent, and therefore it is necessary that the whole potency of the mover be manifested in motion; but an incorporeal mover is an equivocal agent, and therefore it is not necessary that its potency be manifested in equality of effect, as he says ad 2. Cajetan greatly values this response in his little work On the Intensive Infinity of God, ad 1, in the second solution, and he founds it on this, that the effect is not more worthy than its cause. But the response is difficult for me, because it seems to be founded either in a false proposition or altogether voluntary; for if it supposes that every body is a univocal agent, it supposes falsely, for the sun moves these lower things with the motion of alteration and nevertheless is not a univocal agent; and therefore it is not necessary that its active power be manifested in some supreme or adequate effect, as Saint Thomas says in the aforesaid solution ad 2. Or the solution is not founded on this universal proposition, but on that particular one, that a body having infinite power would be a univocal mover, and in this sense the foundation is voluntary, because it cannot be proved from the general nature of corporeal mover nor from its proper and special nature, for that body would be most noble, and therefore, if any would be an equivocal mover, especially that one. Whence it is surprising how Cajetan from that proposition: The effect is not more worthy than its

cause, infers that if any power is in magnitude, its adequate work can be received in magnitude. As if indeed from the nobility of effect or patient it happens that it is not capable of perfection or action adequate to the power of the cause, and it does not rather often come from ignobility. For that a creature cannot receive being adequate to divine power is because the creature is far more ignoble.

23. Thus therefore that the motion of a body is not capable of infinite velocity, although the motive potency is infinite, is not because the effect is more noble, but rather because it is more ignoble. And the aforementioned instance concerning the action of the sun is evident, for the power of the sun is power in magnitude, and nevertheless its adequate work cannot be received in magnitude, because it always acts as an equivocal cause. But if you say that the sun always acts on a body more ignoble than itself, the same will easily be said of the first mover, even if he is imagined to be corporeal. Add that, speaking universally, motion as such is a more ignoble effect than its cause or moving power; indeed it is not so much an effect as a way to an effect, which by its genus is imperfect being, because it is successive; from which it intrinsically comes that it cannot be whole simultaneously or in a moment; but motive power is permanent and therefore is whole simultaneously; and therefore it can be understood that such power is actually infinite, whether outside body or in body, although it cannot confer supreme velocity to motion. And I confirm with a proportional argument, for if infinite motive power existing in body infers that the body ought to be capable of infinite velocity, therefore the same infinite power existing in spirit will infer that such power can move spirit in an instant, which nevertheless Saint Thomas will not admit, since he denies that an angel can be moved in an instant, which, proportion being preserved, is true, as I shall immediately say.

24. If material infinite power were to move, with what velocity would it move. You will say: therefore with what velocity would that infinite material power move? For no certain or determinate velocity can be designated, otherwise that infinite power

could do no more than finite power, as Aristotle deduces. It is responded first that Aristotle falls into the same straits when he posits that God moves from necessity of nature, as I shall show below. Second, it can be said that although that power from itself does not determine absolutely certain velocity, nevertheless it is determined to move each thing according to its capacity; and thus it is quasi passively determined from the capacity of the mobile, just as the action of the sun is determined from the patient; for thus some philosopher would say that the first mover is determined to move the first mobile in twenty-four hours, because that very mobile postulates such motion as proportioned to itself. Cajetan indicates this response in the aforementioned question. Nevertheless it does not altogether satisfy, both because a natural agent does not moderate its action according to the natural appetite of the patient, but acts as much as it can according to the absolute capacity of the mobile, and also because the response is not universal to all motions, but only to natural ones, because to violent motion or to neutral motion (if this is granted) certain velocity cannot be determined from the part of the mobile. And perhaps, if each heaven is considered according to its private nature, it does not appetite so much velocity rather than greater or lesser, but only in order to universal nature or the good of the universe. Otherwise therefore it could be responded according to what was said above, that a corporeal mover cannot be applied according to itself as a whole, and therefore its motion is determined according to the mode of application. But this evasion also does not satisfy, for the power of which we speak must be intensively infinite; and therefore it cannot have its infinity from extension alone and infinite multitude of parts, for rather it is supposed to be in finite magnitude; therefore it must be infinite in intension or perfection of power; wherefore, although it were extended, it could be applied according to its whole intension; therefore from defect of application the velocity of motion could not be determined. Therefore the argument proves that such power cannot be determined to finite effect except from will or appetite of

the mover; but this, as I said, is not sufficient to conclude that the first mover is simply incorporeal. And therefore, at least as regards this part, I confess that reasoning is not efficacious.

25. Third difficulty concerning the same reasoning of Aristotle. Third, it can be further doubted concerning that reasoning, the conditional of Aristotle being admitted: If infinite power were in magnitude, it would move in no time, how much inconvenience there is in that consequent. For either Aristotle infers that it would move with successive motion and in an instant; and in this mode the consequent indeed involves open contradiction, but it does not follow from the antecedent, because the difference between infinite and finite power could be that what the latter does by successive motion the former does in an instant, not however by successive motion, but by instantaneous change. But if Aristotle infers only this, there are some theologians who do not repute this inconvenient. And first in the motion of alteration, which has succession from resistance of the patient, there is no inconvenience that infinite power move in an instant, or make the whole change which no finite power could make except successively. Rather Gregory in I, distinction 42, question 2, article 2, thinks by this argument it is evidently demonstrated that God has infinite power, because he can in an instant transmute hot into cold. Concerning local motion, however, an argument can be taken from the opinion of many theologians asserting that an angel can be moved in an instant; therefore it does not involve repugnance that the first mover can do the same in a body. Indeed Gregory, above, also thinks from this that the infinite power of the first mover can be demonstrated, because he both can infinitely accelerate motion and moreover can in a moment transfer one whole body from one place to another.

26. Concerning alteration motion the reasoning of Aristotle is examined. In this doubt concerning the motion of alteration according to intension, it is indeed true that no repugnance is involved in the whole transmutation from one contrary to another being made

in an instant, if power is not lacking in the agent, because the degrees of intension, through which the succession of alteration is usually made, do not conflict in the same subject, nor does the necessity of succession arise from this, but from resistance alone; and therefore, if this is none or if it is overcome by the power of the agent without any proportion, all degrees can be made in an instant, just as they can be simultaneously. In this motion therefore the reasoning of Aristotle does not proceed; nor from that reasoning can it be proved that infinite calefactive power, for example, is impossible in magnitude, or outside magnitude. Nor nevertheless do I judge it true that from the possibility of this instantaneous change the infinity of God is sufficiently demonstrated, both because, since concerning such change it is not established by experience that it is possible, rather the possibility of it should be proved from the infinite power of God than the infinity of God be demonstrated from its possibility. But if by possibility mere non-repugnance is understood, that proof supposes that God can do whatever does not conflict, which is to suppose that he is infinite simply. And also because from that change absolutely infinite power is not concluded, but only secundum quid, for example calefactive, or rather it is only inferred that power is of a superior order, which does not keep determinate proportion to powers of inferior order.

27. An exposition concerning local motion. Concerning the other part about local motion, it must be said that Aristotle speaks of such physical and local change by which a mobile thing passes through all the parts of space by means of all its parts, as we naturally see happen; for by natural light it cannot be known that another mode of changing place is possible for bodies, and therefore Aristotle most excellently infers as impossible that such motion should occur in no-time, because it intrinsically requires succession, since the same part of the mobile thing cannot simultaneously reach a distant part of space and pass through a proximate one. Hence it is not similar concerning the motion of a spiritual thing, which has no parts, whatever may be

the truth and understanding of that position. But that a body could in an instant abandon a whole place and acquire another whole one can (as I think) be done by divine power, yet I do not believe it can be known by natural reason, much less proven. For this can happen in two ways: one is by passing either according to the whole or according to parts from extreme to extreme, not touching the middle; the other is if simultaneously the whole mobile thing should exist in the terminus and in the whole intermediate space and in the individual parts of it. But both modes are so supernatural that, although for believers in other mysteries of faith, especially of the Eucharist and virginal birth and similar things, there is no doubt that it is possible, it nevertheless completely surpasses natural reason. Wherefore Gregory undeservedly proves the infinite power of God from this effect.(1) And thus far concerning this reasoning of Aristotle.

### *Composition by Genus and Difference is Excluded from God*

28. Concerning the fifth composition, I find nothing specifically said about God by Aristotle or the Commentator; however, what they thought about intelligences in general we shall discuss below. Among theologians, some believe that it derogates nothing from divine simplicity and pure actuality that God should be composed of genus and difference. Thus think In I, dist. 8, Gregory, Gabriel and other nominalists; and Marsil., q. 12, a. 2; Holcot, In I, q. 6, who affirm that God is constituted in the category of substance and agrees with other substances under that most general genus, and differs from them by his proper difference, and is thus constituted from genus and difference. St. Augustine seems to favor this view, V de Trinit., c. 8, 10 and 11, saying that certain categories are properly predicated of God; and Damascene, in lib. de Decret. primae institut.,

c. 7, where he says that God, angel, etc. are contained under the supreme genus of substance[5].

29. The Foundation. The foundation can be that from genus and difference there does not arise a true and real composition, but only a rational one, as is evident from what was said above; for we have shown that genus and difference are not distinguished by nature in one and the same thing which they constitute; but where there is no distinction in reality, neither can there be composition; however, rational composition, which should truly be called not composition but constitution, does not conflict with divine simplicity, because it is only an extrinsic denomination from our mode of conceiving. Hence, just as rational distinction does not conflict with the perfect and supreme identity or unity of the divine, so neither does rational composition conflict with simplicity; therefore no natural reason can be brought forward on account of which this composition should be denied to God, indeed not even a supernatural reason or authority. Because from these sources we have at most that God is supremely simple, as is handed down in c. Firmiter, de Sum. Trinit. et fid. Cathol., but this rational constitution does not derogate from divine simplicity. Hence in other similar matters it must necessarily be admitted; for theologians teach that a divine person is constituted by relation and essence rationally distinct, which necessarily produce a rational composition.

30. The Opposite Opinion is Asserted. The contrary opinion, however, is common and truer, which St. Thomas holds, I, q. 1, a. 5, and lib. I cont. Gent., c. 25, and almost all the remaining theologians In I, dist. 8; Albert., a. 32; Argentin., Bonaventure, Scotus, Richard., Durand., Capreol. and finally Ockham, although he considers it difficult; Henry, in I p., a. 26, q. 2, a. 28, q. 3; and it seems to be the clear opinion of Anselm, in Monolog., c. 26, saying: "That substance is included in no common treatment of substances, from whose essential communion every nature is excluded." And Cyril of Alexandria, lib. XI

[5] substantiae, 1960; substantiam, ed. Vivès. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 402.

Thesauri, denies that there is substantial difference in God: "Because this (he says) is found only in composite things, but God is most simple." Many found this opinion on the fact that genus and difference have some distinction in the thing itself, and consequently produce a composition not only rational, but also from the nature of the thing. If this were true, it would plainly conflict with divine simplicity, but because this is not true, the reason is not effective. Although Avicenna indicates this, VIII suae Metaph., c. 8, saying that genus is a part and therefore has no place in God, because God has no parts. But it can be answered that genus is not a part, but is conceived as a part; although there is no part in God, nothing nevertheless conflicts with something being conceived in God by way of a part. Other reasons are brought forward by the aforementioned authorities, especially by St. Thomas, I cont. Gent., c. 25, and by Scotus, dicta dist. 8, q. 3. There are nevertheless two which seem to have some force.

31. The first reason is that there is no univocal concept common to God and creatures; much less therefore can there be a generic one. But if there is no common genus to God and creatures, God cannot have any genus, because he cannot have that which is common to himself and other gods. This reason excellently concludes concerning God as God is, but it has some difficulty regarding the three divine persons, insofar as there can be given some concepts common to them according to respective aspects, in which they seem to agree univocally, like the notion of person, etc.; for no true reason of analogy can be devised there, whatever some may think. And therefore the notion of genus must be excluded from those common concepts, either because the notion of person does not pertain to the essential nature of the thing, even if in God they are not really distinguished; or because the divine persons are not essentially distinguished; for both of these are contrary to the notion of genus; or also on account of the following reason.

32. The second reason is that in God there cannot be or be conceived a difference properly so called; for it is of the nature of

difference, as Aristotle testifies, III Metaph., that it be outside the nature of the genus, that is, that it not include the genus in its precise concept; but it is impossible to so prescind in God some particular notion from a common one that neither is essentially included in the other. For, if that common notion is, for example, the notion of being, it is clear that it is included in any particular concept; but if it is substance, also whatever is conceived in God by way of difference must be substance. Nor can it be considered incomplete substance, for that very thing, whatever it may be, is uncreated being and essentially its own existence, and therefore by virtue of that formal notion which is conceived there, however precisely taken, it is that complete and most perfect being; therefore it includes in itself any superior concept however perfect. This is rightly explained in this way, for genus as such cannot express infinite perfection, since it is something formless and potential. Again, neither can proper difference express infinite perfection, since it does not include the perfection of the genus, which must necessarily be absolutely simple, if such a genus comprehends God; therefore from such genus and difference an infinite essence will not be constituted; therefore it is absolutely repugnant that an infinite essence, as such, be composed from genus and difference. Therefore, although in God some common notion can be conceived, at least analogous to God and creatures, and some determinate and proper notion of God, nevertheless there cannot be conceived in God a determinable notion and a determining notion so precisely that neither is essentially included in the other; for this is a mode of composition proper to a finite thing, which by virtue of its constitutive difference includes some limited and precise perfection; but that determination must be conceived in a simpler way, namely in that way by which above we explained the determination of transcendental concepts to more determinate concepts.

33. And according to this reasoning (which is undoubtedly sufficient for the capacity of the matter) there can easily be explained a certain argument which St. Thomas often uses, which is otherwise

considered difficult. For he proves that God does not consist of genus, because, if there were any genus in relation to God, it would especially be being; but being is not a genus. The first proposition can easily be established by us, because, if any concept can be common to God and creatures, certainly being most of all, which can easily be shown from what was said above concerning the analogy of being; for the reasoning made concerning being has a place in substance and in any other common predicate; and if, this notwithstanding, some univocal genus were given, being would also be univocal to God and creatures. Again, just as being is included in anything determining it, so any concept common to God is included in anything determining it to the notion of God; therefore either there is no genus in relation to God, or certainly the first genus will be being itself; but St. Thomas proves that major premise only from the fact that existence is the quiddity of God, but being signifies existence. Concerning this proof Cajetan and Ferrara, in the places cited, and Soto, c. de Substantia, say much; but I judge that it contains in virtue the reasoning made and has efficacy in this way, for the existence of God as such expresses the whole quiddity of God, so that in any proper and most simple concept of that existence the whole essential perfection of God is included, and therefore, if being is not a genus, there is no genus in relation to God.

34. The Reasoning by which Durandus Proves the Same is Judged Probable. Similarly, according to the aforesaid discourse, the reasoning has probability by which Durandus especially uses to prove that God is not in a category, namely, because God according to his proper essential and constitutive nature does not express a precise perfection of one category, but includes all things, formally indeed the natures of several, eminently however of all. Not that any categorical natures, as such, are found formally in God; for as they are constituted in a category, they include limitation and imperfection; as Dionysius said, c. 1 de Divinis nominibus, that God is above substance, and Augustine, VII de Trinit., c. 3, that God is called substance abusively; but that the formal natures and denominations of some categories

according to a more abstract nature and analogous agreement are attributed to God with propriety. This analogous agreement is sometimes with the first genera of categories, as is especially evident in substance and relation, sometimes with some species, like being wise, just, etc. In this sense Augustine spoke, in the aforementioned place cited from V de Trinit., which he pursues extensively in serm. 28 de Tempore. But other categories neither have this kind of agreement with God, but are only eminently contained in God and are only attributed to him by metaphor. Therefore, on account of this cause and the infinite eminence of that constitutive nature of God, he cannot be defined to any category, but is above all and outside all as the source of all.

35. The Foundations of the Opposite Opinion are Sufficiently Addressed. Finally, from the same reasoning it is easy to respond to the foundation of the contrary opinion; for although some rational constitution can be thought in God, nevertheless not this one which is through the composition of genus and difference; not because in created things genus and difference are distinguished by nature, but because they express natures so precise and limited that they conflict with divine infinity and simplicity. For from infinity it primarily comes about that in God there cannot be conceived a proper nature of genus and difference, and consequently that the simplicity of God is so great that it excludes proper composition not only according to reality, but also according to reason.

## SECTION V

## HOW IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS NO ACCIDENTAL COMPOSITION IN GOD

1. There can be no accident in God. We have spoken of substantial and essential compositions; it remains to speak of accidental composition. In this matter, although some philosophers

have erred by attributing certain accidents to God, as St. Thomas reports in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 23, from the Commentator on XII Metaphysics, text 39, nevertheless it can be shown by evident reasoning that there is no accident in God. This has been taught not only by theologians and the Fathers of the Church, but also by the better philosophers, as can be seen in Cyril of Alexandria, book XI of the Treasury, and Gregory of Nyssa, homily 5 on the Canticles, and Augustine, III On the Trinity, chapter 4 and following, and VII On the Trinity, chapter 5, and sermon 38 On Time, and Pope Leo, epistle 93, chapter 5. It is also taken from Aristotle and the Commentator, XII Metaphysics, whom we shall cite below when treating of other intelligences. But in order that the conclusion be proven by reason, it must be supposed that the discussion concerns physical accident that inheres intrinsically, for extrinsic denominations[6] contribute nothing to the present matter, as will be evident from what follows.

*First Argument*

2. The first argument for this truth can be taken from what we said above concerning the perfection of God; for, from the fact that God is his own being through essence, we showed that it follows that he is supremely perfect by virtue of such being; therefore he is not capable of accidents by which he might be perfected. For as Cyril correctly said above: Nothing can happen to what is perfect from itself; but the substance of God is perfect from itself; therefore nothing happens to it, for an accident is usually added to an essence because the essence is such that some perfection is lacking to it, which is supplied through the accident. You might say that some perfections are in God only eminently through the essence of God as infinite substance, and therefore that substance can be further perfected

[6] extrinsecae, 1960; intrinsecae, ed. Vivès. "La sustitución de extrinsecae por intrinsecae, tal como aparece, por ejemplo, en la ad. Vivès, carece en absoluto de sentido." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 407.

through accidents, so that it might also have those perfections formally, in which the perfection of the divine substance would not be increased intensively, but only extensively, which does not contradict divine perfection. And this is confirmed and clarified by the example of the divine relations, whose entire relative perfection is eminently contained in the divine essence as such; because nevertheless it is not contained in it formally (because otherwise the entire essence would not be absolute and common to the three persons), therefore it was necessary that, notwithstanding that eminent perfection of the divine essence, formal relative perfections be added (we speak in our manner), so that they might now be found in God not only eminently, but also formally; therefore something similar can be said of accidental perfections.

### *The Argument is Examined, & the Truth is Proven by Induction*

3. To exclude this evasion and objection, let us first accept what seems to be granted in it, namely that those perfections which are formally in God by virtue of his essence and substance cannot be found in him through accidents. For why would God need accidental wisdom, if by virtue of his essence he is formally supremely wise? And the same applies to other similar cases. This is especially true because, if these perfections are taken insofar as they can be accidental, the same reasoning will apply to them as to others which are contained in God only eminently; for by the very fact that it is an accident, it is no longer a perfection simply speaking; for the notion of accident does not express perfection simply speaking, as is evident per se. The objection therefore proceeds only concerning those perfections which God has by virtue of his essence only eminently; but these are either absolute or relative. Those which are absolute are therefore not in God formally by virtue of his essence, because they express some imperfection; whence it happens that they are incompatible both

among themselves and with greater formal perfections. But this same reason prevents them from being able to be formally added to the divine substance through accidents; therefore no absolute accidental perfection can be in God. The minor premise (for the other points are clear) is proven first, because for this reason such perfections taken formally do not pertain to the supreme and consummate perfection of the supreme and most perfect being, because it is of the nature of that being that it include no imperfection. Second, because these perfections taken formally do not lose their imperfection by being joined through accidents; rather in that way they involve more imperfections, both in the subject, because they require it to be potential, for it will be in passive potency to such accidents and thus will not be pure act; and also in their very entity, for they will have imperfect entity, since accidental entity is imperfect by its genus; and finally in the intrinsic incompatibility which such perfections taken formally have among themselves; for this is not removed because such perfections are accidental. Add that many of these perfections are such that it is incompatible for them to be formally present through accidents alone, as for example, the perfection which man as such formally expresses cannot formally belong to any thing through an accidental form.

4. Whether transcendental relations in God to creatures, and what perfection they express. If, however, those perfections are relative, they are understood to express either respect outward or to creatures, or inward, that is, to God or to the person of God. Concerning the former relations, the reasoning is the same as for absolute perfections, because either they are not in God really and formally, or, if some are formally, they are by virtue of substance and essence alone as such. For these relations can be understood as quasi-transcendental to creatures only as possible, such as are the respects of omnipotence, knowledge, simple intelligence, and similar ones. And these respects, whatever they may be, belong to God by virtue of his essence and substance; for if (as is perhaps true) they are only respects

according to speech, that is, according to our mode of conceiving and speaking, through them is explained only some absolute perfection simply speaking, which belongs to God by virtue of his essence, as has been shown. But if (as others wish) they are truly transcendental respects, which are absorbed in absolute things, and do not always require the actual existence of the term which they regard, thus also such respects will be said to pertain to perfection simply speaking or to be included in it, for example, in the notion of power or knowledge, without any imperfection or incompatibility with greater or equal perfection, and therefore they also belong to God by virtue of his essence and substance. Because every perfection simply speaking belongs in this way, as has been shown; therefore also whatever is of the nature of such perfection, or whatever is formally and essentially included in it.

5. Whether quasi-predicamental relations in God to creatures express perfection. But if there are understood in God quasi-predicamental relations to creatures as actually existing, such as the relation of Creator, Lord and similar ones, they are indeed attributed to God in the manner of accidents, but in truth they express no perfection at all in God, nor anything real which is in him beyond absolute perfections, but only extrinsic denomination or relation of reason, as theologians more frequently teach with the Master in I, distinction 30, and St. Thomas, I, question 13, article 7, against the nominalists, as will be evident from what we shall say below in the predicament of relation. But Cyril declared this elegantly in the aforementioned book XI of the Treasury, saying: It is certainly said wisely that nothing happens to the substance of God, since it is perfect in itself; but nevertheless, we are sometimes compelled to say these things as if they were accidents, even if they do not entirely happen to God, and to conceive them mentally in the manner of accidents. For what shall we say, understanding that before the production of this world God was creator, but not actually? But when the world was created, he is also actually creator, and this happened to him in some

way, although without any change in himself, but by the production of the whole from nothing he seems to have been made actually creator; he who by eternal and unchangeable will to create, when he eternally willed, produced all things. There are many such things, which seem to have happened to God as it were. And Augustine has similar doctrine in V On the Trinity, chapter 16, where he extensively and excellently declares that these denominations are said of God through the change of the creature alone, and thus through extrinsic denomination, just as money begins to be a price, or some thing begins to be a pledge without change in itself. Anselm has nearly the same in Monologion, chapter 24, and Dionysius, chapter 9 On the Divine Names. The reason is the same, namely, because either these relations and denominations express no reality or perfection in themselves, and thus can establish no accident in God; or, if in some things these relations are something, they include in their formal concept imperfection, by reason of which they are not formally in God by virtue of essence alone, and for the same reason they cannot be through accidents, namely, because they would bring the same or greater imperfections to God, as has been explained in other cases. And through these points the argument made is sufficiently confirmed and explained, and the evasion or objection which was made to the contrary is excluded.

6. It remained, however, to speak of inward relations, by whose example the objection was confirmed; but, because their consideration transcends the bounds of metaphysics, it must be said briefly that the proper perfection which those relations express (for I suppose they do express some) is not formally and essentially included in the essence of God as such, or as it is absolute and common, not on account of the imperfection of such relations, but on account of opposition and incommunicability. For the essence could not have been communicated to the Son, for example, according to its entire essential nature, if paternity were formally and essentially included in it. Therefore in the essence as essence is eminently contained the perfection of all those relations. Nevertheless, it was

necessary for those relative perfections to be formally in God, and to be quasi-added (to speak in our mode of conceiving) to the formal perfection of the essence, not so that some perfection might accrue to it, nor so that some accident might be joined to it, but so that in that infinite nature there could be the constitution of a proper supposit subsisting incommunicably, and therefore that perfection is not accidental, but is properly called personal. For there is such perfection and eminence in that nature, that no absolute perfection could be entirely incommunicable in it; therefore, so that it might be quasi-determined to an incommunicable supposit, a relation was necessary. And also so that in that nature there could be distinction of supposits, and internal procession of one from another, which pertained to the fecundity and infinity of that nature. Although, however, in that ineffable mystery the relation as such is understood to formally add relative perfection, which was eminently in the divine essence, nevertheless not with any actual distinction which intervenes in the thing itself or is from the nature of the thing between the relation and the essence, but with perfect identity, as the more probable doctrine of theologians teaches, which, although human reason cannot comprehend, is nevertheless more consonant with the truth of faith. And for this reason also that perfection cannot be considered accidental, for, if in creatures subsistence, even if it is distinguished in the thing itself from nature, is not an accidental perfection but a substantial one, how much more will relative subsistence be a substantial and not an accidental perfection, since it both constitutes the person and is not distinguished in reality from the divine nature, indeed essentially includes it in itself.

*Second Argument*

7. For, if there were some accident in God, it would have to be either really or at least modally distinguished on the part of the thing from the divine essence; but this is impossible; therefore it is also

impossible for there to be any true accident in God. The major premise, understood physically and really, is clear, because, since God is the most perfect substance and most simple in his substantial being, as has already been shown, whatever is really in him and is not distinguished on the part of the thing from him, cannot be anything but substance. For what kind of accident can be imagined which has no being except substantial being? But if that major premise is taken logically and in relation to predications, and we exclude extrinsic denominations or those of reason, it is also evident, because, since God exists and endures from intrinsic necessity and is otherwise immutable, none of those things which belong intrinsically can be predicated of him in the manner of an accident, much less be a true accident. The minor premise is usually proven from inconvenience, because otherwise it would follow that there is true composition in God. But we cannot now use that argument, because this very thing is what we intend to prove, namely, that there cannot be such composition in God. It is therefore proven otherwise, because, if there were found in God an accident really distinct from his substance, he would have it either from some extrinsic cause, or from his proper essence through natural emanation from it. The first is plainly impossible. First, because it is against the nature of the first cause that it should receive anything from another cause, otherwise that other would be superior and prior, at least according to that aspect. Second, because, at least with regard to such perfection, God would depend on an extrinsic cause. Third, because such an accident would be common, not proper, whence, as far as it is concerned in itself, it could be absent and present; whence according to such an accident God would be mutable in himself, all of which are plainly against natural reason. The second also cannot be said. First, because that internal emanation would truly be some efficiency, because through it that accident would receive being which it does not have from itself; whence the being of such an accident would have to be participated and not being through essence; therefore there would be in God from eternity some quasi-

change or reception of another thing or participated and effected entity; but this expresses manifest imperfection.

8. Perhaps someone will say that that accident is neither made by an extrinsic cause, nor does it emanate from the internal essence of God, but is conjoined with the substance of God through itself and from intrinsic necessity without any efficiency. But this is also easily refuted from what was said above, both because being from itself and without efficiency cannot belong to two beings entirely essentially distinct, such as would be such an accident and the substance; and also because that accident would essentially be a being in another, which is a great imperfection; therefore it could not be a being from itself, which is the supreme perfection. Finally there is the general reason, because the substance of God would be in passive and receptive potency with respect to such an accident, which is incompatible with the first and pure act; therefore it is entirely incompatible for there to be any true accident in God.

9. But a difficulty immediately occurs, because, although in an accident really distinct the arguments made are sufficiently evident, concerning some accidental mode distinct from the nature of the thing they do not seem to be able to have such force, because for these modes efficiency or proper composition is not always required. And the difficulty is especially increased because many and serious theologians think that the divine attributes (especially intellect and will, and the perfections which pertain to these, such as wisdom, justice, mercy) are formally distinguished from the nature of the thing from the divine essence; who nevertheless would by no means admit composition in reality, nor effective emanation[7] of the attributes from the essence. But that opinion is commonly attributed to Scotus, In I, distinction 2, question 7, and distinction 8, question 4. Finally the difficulty is increased from the free acts of the divine will, which establish some thing in God, for truly in the thing itself God wills what

[7] dimanationem, 1960; denominationem aliae ed. et ed. Vivès. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 414.

he freely wills. But God cannot really will except through some thing, which is in him; but if it is some thing, it will also be some perfection, according to the principles established above concerning being and the good; but that thing and perfection will nevertheless be free to God, just as the act itself by which he freely wills, since they are the same; but a free perfection cannot in reality not be distinct from a necessary perfection. Therefore either the argument made proves that there are no free acts in God, which cannot be said, as I shall show below; or it does not prove that there cannot be perfections in God distinct from the nature of the thing and consequently accidental.

10. To the objection it is responded that not only accidents really distinct, but also those which are modes truly distinct from the things which they affect, are made in such things through true efficiency, that is, through proper action, if they are adventitious and extraneous modes, or at least, because they are made with the thing itself, they flow from it through internal resultance, if they are intrinsic modes and quasi-proper passions. The first can easily be shown by induction, for the term of local motion is made through true efficiency, and there is true production of artificial things, and nevertheless through these and similar actions distinct things are not made, but modes; and many think the same of the intensification of qualities, and concerning the rarefaction of quantity this is more probable. And the reason is because these modes are truly something real; therefore, if they did not exist before, they require a true efficient cause and action so that they may begin to be. And from this first part the second is easily proven, for a mode which is necessarily conjoined with a thing, if it is made through the same action with the thing itself, it is necessary that it have a true efficient cause, in the way that the inherence of an accident is made with the accident itself; but if it is not made through the same action, therefore by natural order it presupposes the thing made of which it is the mode; therefore so that such a mode may be added to such a thing, some efficiency is necessary.

11. Hence therefore ascending to divine things, if the divine substance as such were understood to exist through itself without any action, because it is its own being, but nevertheless not to have from itself every intrinsic and real mode of being but that some could be added, it would be plainly necessary for such a mode to be made through some efficiency, at least according to natural resultance. Nor is composition and efficiency less necessary, for composition is truly nothing other than the conjunction of distinct things through real union; but a mode is united to the thing of which it is the mode and is something actually distinct from it; therefore from both results something truly composite in reality. And it is confirmed, because, if such a mode is separated from the thing which it affects, either in reality or in thought, it cannot be understood but that that thing remains more simple than that which is constituted from the thing and the mode; therefore it cannot be denied but that there is some composition in the thing itself, although it is not as great as that from distinct things; just as modal distinction is true distinction in reality, although not as great as that between distinct things.

## SECTION VI

## WHETHER THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES ARE PROPERTIES OF GOD, OR OF HIS ESSENCE

1. The other objection raises two serious theological questions, namely, concerning the distinction of the divine attributes, and concerning the free acts of God; this latter is to be treated extensively below in section 9. At present we shall speak of the former, insofar as it can be defined by natural reason.

*Resolution*

2. I think it must be said absolutely that the divine attributes, insofar as they express something real and positive in God, are distinguished neither actually among themselves in reality, nor from the essence of God. This opinion St. Thomas taught in I, question 13, article 4, and In I, distinction 2, question 2, where also Durandus, Richard, Ockham, and Gabriel; Capreolus, and Gregory, distinction 8; Marsilius, question 12; Henry, Quodlibet V, question 1. And without doubt it is the common opinion of the ancient Fathers, Dionysius, Leo, Augustine and Anselm, and others whom we have cited; for they not only deny that there are accidents in God, but also teach that these names which in us signify accidents in God signify his essence; and therefore they also add that not only concrete, but also abstract forms of such names are predicated of God. Whence Pope Leo elegantly says: No man is truth, no one is wisdom, no one is justice, but many are participants of truth, wisdom and justice; but God alone is in need of no participation, of whom whatever is worthily thought in any way, is not a quality, but essence. Thus also Athanasius, in the Oration against Idols, at the end: That very power of the Father is through itself, that light, that truth, etc. And this mode of speaking through abstracts is most frequent in the other Fathers, indeed also in Scripture, where God is called life, truth, wisdom, etc., John 14; 1 Corinthians, and 1 John 5. And finally I think this plainly follows from that definition of faith which teaches that God is entirely simple, in the chapter "Firmly," On the Supreme Trinity and Catholic Faith. See Dionysius, chapter 5 On the Divine Names; Irenaeus, book II Against Heresies, chapter 18; Justin, question 144; Cyril of Alexandria, I Treasury, chapter 8; Augustine, XI On the City of God, chapter 10, and book XII, chapter 2, and VI On the Trinity, chapter 7, and XV On the Trinity, chapter 6; Bernard, book V On Consideration to Eugene, and sermon 80 on the Canticles, where he also reports the Council of Rheims.

3. The conclusion is proven by natural reason. But, omitting theological foundations, I think this truth can be evidently

demonstrated by reasons. First a priori from what was said about the perfection of the first being; for it has been shown from the fact that he is his own being through essence, and is essentially supremely perfect, and in his very being encloses every perfection; therefore, just as the perfections eminently contained in God, as they are in him, are not other than his essence, so the perfections simply speaking, which are in God formally and are called his attributes by us, are not other than his essence. We shall press and clarify this argument a little below. Second, from the inconveniences mentioned, because such perfections cannot belong to God without some true composition and natural resultance, potentiality and other imperfections; nor do I see what would be lacking to these attributes for the true nature of proper passions, if they adhered to God in this manner. Wherefore also the philosophers understood that this mode of distinction and composition is alien to divine perfection, as is gathered from Aristotle, XII Metaphysics, texts 37, 39 and 51, whom the Greeks and Arabs have followed, as we shall also see in what follows[8]. Plato had sensed the same in the Phaedo and in the Timaeus, and Alcinous wrote from his doctrine those excellent words, which Louis Vives reported concerning chapter 6 of Augustine in book VIII On the City of God: The same God himself, supreme, eternal, ineffable, perfect through himself, is divinity, essence, reason, truth, harmony. Nor do I enumerate these in such a way as to separate them among themselves, but rather I consider all as one. Wherefore it is not credible that Scotus really disagreed from this certain doctrine, but used the name of formal and ex natura rei distinction in another sense, as we indicated above when treating of distinctions and modern disciples of his teach more extensively; for it does not now pertain to us to examine what he thought. But the arguments which are treated by theologians concerning this matter, either only rely on our mode of conceiving, and are easily solved from what we said above about the distinction of universal nature from particulars, or, if there are any that are proper

[8] Vide Capr., In I, dist. 8, q. 4, a. 1.

and of some moment, all touch the mystery of the Trinity, and therefore we leave them to the theologians.

### *That All Attributes Are of the Essence of God*

4. But it can not undeservedly be doubted whether these attributes are not only essence, but also of the essence of God itself. For these are not all the same, since the divine relations are the divine essence itself, according to sound doctrine, and yet they are not of the essence of God as such, according to the truer opinion. And in creatures the individual difference is not distinguished in reality from the individual nature, and yet it is not of its essence. Therefore some theologians say that the attributes are not of the essence of God according to their formal natures, although they are not distinguished from it in reality. Because these attributes belong to God by reason of his essence, and thus are truly demonstrated of God through his essence itself; therefore they are not of the essential nature of God. Likewise one attribute is not of the essence of another; otherwise they would be entirely confused among themselves; therefore neither is the essence of the nature of those; therefore neither conversely are they of the essence of God as such.

5. But these arguments are of no moment. Whence in the same way I think it certain and evident by natural reason that all these absolute perfections, as they are in the first being, are of his essence. That argument plainly proves this, because God, by virtue of his necessary being, is from himself essentially supremely perfect being; therefore precisely this being conceived according to that which is of his essence, includes every possible perfection; therefore the attributes which signify these perfections simply speaking are so contained in God, that they are of his essence. This argument is confirmed and clarified, for those perfections which are in the essence of God only eminently, as they are in him, are most formally of the essential concept of God, in the way we said above with Augustine and Anselm

that the creature in God is nothing other than the creator essence itself, because namely that eminence or eminent perfection which God has in himself, by reason of which he is said to eminently contain inferior perfections, is the essential nature of God itself and thus of his essence; therefore also those perfections which are formally in God, as they are in him, are of his essence.

6. The antecedent is evident, both because God contains all inferior things, insofar as he is the first being necessary from himself, in which his essential nature consists; and also because, if that eminence were not of the essence of God, it would be necessary to understand in God another essential nature prior in nature, than is that eminence, because the first nature of each being is that which is essential to it. I shall therefore ask whether in that prior nature all things are eminently contained, or not. For if this is affirmed, then in the essential nature of God itself is admitted the eminential containment of such perfections and another eminence is superfluously and falsely feigned which is not of the essence of God. But if this is denied, it follows that that essential nature is finite in the genus of being, since by virtue of it all things are not contained in such a being either formally or eminently. It follows next that such eminence can by no means belong to God, because it does not belong formally by virtue of the essential nature, as is said; nor can it belong consequently or concomitantly, because nothing belongs to any essence intrinsically and from its own properties in this way, except what is eminently or virtually contained in the essence of things itself. But that eminence itself cannot again be eminently contained, lest we proceed to infinity, and because in that eminence there is no imperfection or reason why it ought to be eminently contained and not formally; therefore we must stop at the essential nature itself by which God formally and essentially has that he is eminently all things which are or can be.

7. But the first consequence has the same force and can be shown by a similar discourse almost. First, because perfections simply

speaking are related to the essence of God in the same way as that eminent perfection by which God eminently contains inferior perfections, for in the same way they are formally in God and have equal identity and intimate conjunction with the essence of God. Second, because these perfections simply speaking as such are not first in God eminently rather than formally, but only formally, because they include no imperfection, or nature which it is necessary to abstract from them so that they may be contained in the essential nature of God, nor can there be a higher or more eminent mode of containing these perfections than the formal one; therefore, since they must necessarily be contained in the first and essential nature of God, because otherwise that nature would not be simply infinite, it results that they are formally contained in it; therefore it is similarly concluded that they are of his essence. Whence it is further confirmed, for God is the most perfect being and in the most perfect mode as much as can be conceived; but it is a more perfect mode, if all these things are included in the essence of God as of his essence, than if they are only adjoined or concomitant to the essence, for in the former way God is understood to be infinitely and supremely perfect by virtue of the precise essential concept; in the latter way by no means, because nothing is understood to be supremely perfect, unless it is formally affected by all perfections simply speaking.

8. Finally it is clarified in this way, because these perfections are not in God as something accidental, even in the manner of a proper passion, as has been demonstrated in what preceded; therefore they are of the substance of God; but whatever is substantial in something, is either the nature itself, which is maximally of the essence; or the singularity of the nature, which in God is also of the essence, as was shown above, although in creatures it is not of the essence; or the personality or proper nature constituting the person as such. But these perfections which we signify through attributes do not pertain to the proper constitutives of the persons; therefore no mode

remains by which they can be of the substance of God, unless they are also of the essence or essential to God.

9. Not everything that is the same in reality with the essence is of the essence. And hence is clear the solution to the reason for doubting posited at the beginning. For I confess that in general being the same in reality with the essence and being of the essence are not convertible, for to the former it suffices that there be no distinction in reality, but to the latter it is necessary that the essence of the thing cannot be fully constituted with that being excluded which is said to be of the essence; and consequently that this very thing is so included in its nature, that such an essence cannot be found in anything without whatever is said to be of the essence of such a nature being of its essence. And in this there is a great difference between the divine relations and these attributes; for, with the relations excluded, the essence of God is conceived as fully constituted, and therefore each person taken individually, is formally and essentially constituted fully and perfectly God through the same absolute essence without the other relations. Whence it happens that the formal perfection of the relation is first according to nature contained eminently in the essence rather than formally adjoined to it, because, although in the relation formally there is no imperfection, there is nevertheless something which does not pertain to perfection simply speaking, namely, opposition with another relation, and therefore in it eminential containment has place besides the formal; but this is adjoined for the constitution of the person, not for the complement of the nature. And therefore in it is rightly understood that it is not of the essence, but inseparably and with supreme identity accompanies and quasi-terminates the essence. But all these things are found in a far different way in the essential attributes, as has been declared, and therefore in them being essence is not different from being of the essence.

## Section VI

### *All Attributes Belong to the Essence of Each Individual Attribute*

10. From this it is further concluded that these divine perfections or attributes are so related among themselves that all belong to the essential nature of each individual attribute, and the whole essence of God belongs to the nature of each individual attribute. Consequently, although many are distinguished by us through reason, in reality there is only one most simple perfection, which as a whole is the adequate essence of God. Anselm elegantly declared this in his Monologion, chapter 16, saying: "What then, if that supreme nature is so many goods, will it be composed of so many goods? Or rather, are they many goods to us, but one good signified by so many names?" And below: "Since therefore that nature is in no way composite, and yet is in every way all those goods, it is necessary that all those things are not many, but one: therefore each one of those is the same as what all are together," etc., which he develops at length. The reason is clear, because all those attributes cannot belong to the most simple essence in the way we have said, without having among themselves the same identity and (so to speak) the same essential relationship. Likewise, because each attribute is infinite, not only in the perfection of some genus, but simply in the genus of being, for it is being necessary of itself and being itself through essence; therefore it is necessary that in its essential nature it includes the essence and all other attributes, which Cajetan rightly noted in De Ente et essentia, chapter 6, question 12.

11. Objection. You will say: either we speak of these things according to reality, or as they are conceived by us. In the former way all these things are indeed true, yet these are not proper modes of speech, for we properly speak of things as we conceive them. Otherwise we would also have to say that relations belong to the essence. Likewise, we would have to confess that justice as justice is

mercy, and that God shows mercy through justice and punishes through mercy; and (which is the chief point of objections) that the Son proceeds through the will and the Holy Spirit through the intellect. But if the latter mode is chosen, thus all the things said seem false; for justice, as conceived by us, prescrinds from every other perfection; therefore the remaining attributes cannot be included in the essential nature of justice as thus conceived. Similarly, in the very question we are treating, we suppose God as essentially conceived with attributes set aside, to whom we afterwards add or attribute the attributes; therefore we conceive the essence as prior to the attributes; therefore we do not conceive the attributes as belonging to the essence of that.

12. How what we conceive of God is rightly to be attributed to God. It is answered that the discourse concerns the very things that are conceived by us in God, as they are conceived by us, yet in such a way that this reduplication does not designate the mode of conceiving on our part, but on the part of the thing conceived. For it must be considered that, although more perfect and divine things are imperfectly conceived by us, because they are conceived in the manner of those things from which we receive knowledge, nevertheless they are not conceived with error and falsity, because we do not attribute to the conceived things the imperfection of our mode of conceiving, but rather under that mode we conceive their true perfection. Thus therefore we conceive such to be the nature of God, that we judge that in the thing itself all the attributes and perfections belong to its essence, which we apprehend separately and through various concepts.

13. The objection is sufficiently answered. To the former part of the objections, we deny that it follows from what was said that the same must be said of relations, because we also truly judge that relations in the thing itself do not pertain to the constitution of the essence, but of the persons, which we cannot judge of the attributes. And similarly, when it is said that justice as justice is mercy, or intellect

as intellect is will, if the discourse concerns the things themselves as conceived, those expressions are true; because the sense is that the thing which is conceived under the aspect of justice or intellect formally and essentially includes the aspect of mercy, will, etc. But if the discourse concerns things as they are distinctly and expressly conceived by us, thus those expressions are false; for our mind through inadequate concepts divides a thing that is in itself absolutely indivisible, and then, although the thing is in itself absolutely the same, nevertheless it does not fall under individual concepts according to its whole adequate nature, and therefore, if the reduplication is made in relation to our concepts, what is attributed to another cannot be attributed to one, because the same thing is not conceived under the same expressed relationship through one concept and through another. And for the same reason those expressions are false in all rigor: God shows mercy through justice, the Father generates through the will.

14. How opposite predications are made of the one most simple entity of God. For it must be noted that, although the divine perfection is in itself absolutely one, it does not always operate according to its adequate nature. Just as the light of the sun, although it is in itself absolutely the same insofar as it eminently contains heat, dryness and other effects, when however it heats, it does not operate according to its adequate perfection; and therefore it cannot be truly said then to act insofar as it eminently contains dryness or other qualities, because this is as it were accidental to that effect; but per se insofar as it eminently contains heat, and therefore it is truly and properly said to heat insofar as it eminently contains heat. Hence, if we would distinguish by reason in light the power of heating, drying, etc., and impose diverse names on them, it would be truly said that light heats through the power of heating, not through other powers; because through those words and concepts light is signified, not according to itself, but according to an inadequate relationship to effects and as it contains them virtually. Thus therefore what we say of

God must be understood. What is clear in effects ad extra, because no effect is adequate to the divine power, and therefore we truly say God creates man through the idea of man, not through the idea of a horse, not because these ideas are distinct in reality, but because, although there is one eminent exemplar so representing individual things as if it were proper to each one, nevertheless it does not per se produce each thing except insofar as it represents that thing; but that it represents others is as it were accidental to such an effect. And this per se relationship is signified in those expressions. Hence the same reason applies to those expressions: justice shows mercy and mercy punishes, because neither effect is per se adequate to the divine power.

15. Why in the divine the Son is not produced through the will, but through the intellect, contrary to the Holy Spirit. And (to give this in passing to theologians) the same must be said of the origins ad intra, for, since in God the Father there is one and the same nature of intellect and will, nevertheless it is not the principle of any origin or person according to this whole adequate nature, but it is the principle of the Son insofar as it has the power of understanding, and to that power as such that origin or procession is adequate; but it is the principle of the Holy Spirit insofar as it has the power of loving. Because therefore by the names intellect and will that power is signified according to these precise and inadequate natures, therefore the origin of the Son cannot be attributed to the will nor the origin of the Holy Spirit to the intellect. And this same thing is what is usually said in other words, namely that these powers or attributes, although not actually, are virtually distinct, and one attribute is the principle or reason of operating or producing something, insofar as it is virtually distinguished from another; and therefore what is proper to another, as it is virtually distinguished from another, cannot be formally and per se attributed to one. For these attributes to be virtually distinguished is nothing other than either to contain distinct effects virtually, or to have unitedly and simply in itself what are distinct in others, or to be an eminent power or reason, which can be the

principle which or by which of diverse actions or processions. Hence, although this virtual distinction is not a distinction in reality, but eminence, it is nevertheless a foundation with respect to our distinctly conceiving that power according to proper and per se relationships to distinct effects or terms, and therefore it is also a sufficient foundation of diverse expressions, as has been declared.

16. How the justice of God, as conceived by us, prescinds from mercy. To the other part of the objections, when it is said that the justice of God, as conceived by us, prescinds from every other perfection, it is answered that this is true of simple prescision as regards the express knowledge or consideration of the one conceiving, because he truly thinks of nothing else expressly except the nature of justice. But it is not true of exclusive prescision, because one who thus thinks does not consider that justice to be only justice, or to include no other perfection in its essential nature. Indeed, not even according to purely prescissive abstraction are other attributes so abstracted from justice that they are not included in its concept at least implicitly, because, if the justice of God is conceived, the concept of justice in general does not suffice, but something must be added by which the proper concept of divine justice is made; let it be therefore justice through essence or simply infinite; therefore in this concept it is implicitly contained that such justice essentially is every other perfection.

17. How the divine attributes, which are affirmed of the essence, prescind from it. And hence it is also easily understood in what way the essence of God is conceived with attributes set aside, when we compare it with those or attribute these to it. For they are set aside from the express and distinct perfection of such an essence and of its whole perfection, not however from implicit inclusion, so to speak. For I conceive the essence of God through the common concept of being or essence adding some negation or perfection by which it becomes proper to God, such as conceiving an essence simply infinite or actual of itself, through which concept I do not distinctly

consider what perfections belong to the essential nature of such a nature; and in this way they are said to be set aside through such a concept; nevertheless, they cannot be excluded or set aside implicitly or confusedly, because they are essentially contained in the perfection of that conceived thing. But afterwards through proper concepts of justice and mercy, etc., they are explicitly considered and compared among themselves or with the essence or predicated, for our diverse mode of conceiving suffices for this. Hence, when we say that it belongs to the essence of God that he is just or wise, we do nothing other than explain what would be implicitly contained in that concept.

18. Finally, hence the reasons of the contrary opinion are easily resolved; and it is declared how attributes are said to belong to God by reason of essence, how one can be demonstrated through another, and for what reason in this essential mutual containment of attributes and essence there is no confusion or repugnance. For the essence is not said to be the reason of the attributes according to itself, but according to our mode of conceiving; because when we conceive the essence through some inadequate concept, joined with some difference or mode at least negative proper to God, insofar as he is the first necessary being and through essence, from this concept or from such a mode of being we infer that such or such a perfection must necessarily be attributed to that being, because that reason, for example, of being from itself requires such a perfection. Nevertheless, just as in this way we infer the attribute from the essential reason, so also we infer that attribute, not in any way whatsoever, but essentially to belong to such a being, and consequently we also infer that the essence is not the reason of the attributes in the way that in creatures the essence is usually the principle of properties, but only because in its simple nature, which is confusedly conceived by us, there is necessarily contained whatever perfection we afterwards conceive of the same essence through various concepts.

19. How through one attribute of God another is demonstrated a priori. And in the same way we demonstrate one

attribute through another, and we apprehend that as prior and as the reason of the other, which taken according to itself and as it abstracts from God and creatures has some reason of priority or presupposition to another, as can be seen in intellect and will and similar things. Hence there is no confusion in reality, but supreme and essential identity and simplicity. Neither is there repugnance, because all these perfections taken according to themselves and abstracted from created conditions do not necessarily postulate any distinction, nor do they include anything by reason of which it would be repugnant that all attributes belong to the nature of individual attributes. But that it may seem less incredible or admirable that such great unity is found in divine simplicity, we can take some example from creatures by which we may further explain or shadow forth this thing. For rational, for example, is the essential difference of man, one and indivisible, which when conceived as joined to the genus, the whole essence of man is conceived. But to explain this difference, we can divide it into several concepts. For let us conceive man to be discursive (taking this word proportionally, not as it is taken from the proximate principle, but from the essential root, and as it signifies a relationship to the third operation of the intellect), and again let us precisely conceive man to be compositive and divisive, and again to be simply apprehensive. All these concepts surely explain nothing other than what was formally contained in rational, but they explain as if through parts what in rational is one and simple, and they declare distinctly what is apprehended by us confusedly through one concept; and this suffices that we reason and infer one from another. In this manner therefore the distinction of the attributes of God and their comparison to the essence as adequately and confusedly conceived must be conceived by us, as has been sufficiently declared.

20. What perfection the attributes of God, which we express through negation, signify in him. It only remains to be noted that all the things said are understood of the attributes of God insofar as they posit positive perfection in him; for there are many attributes that are

declared by us through negation, and by reason of negation alone are distinguished either among themselves or from the essence, and in these it is clear that the negations themselves are not of the essence of God nor is one negation properly of the essence of another; but the foundation of these negations is in itself absolutely one and the same. And the perfection that is declared through one negation is the same as the perfection that is declared through another; and in this way it is evident that such attributes belong to the essential nature of God and of individual attributes among themselves. Of this kind however are all the attributes of God that signify no relationship to action or act, but only through various negations declare the eminence of the divine substance, such as being from himself, pure act, absolutely simple, infinite, immense, incomprehensible, ineffable, and if there are similar ones, of which it is most evident that they signify the same positive perfection, and that all are included in individual attributes formally and essentially. But other attributes that signify an order to act, such as those that pertain to intellect, will and power, seem more to be signified in the manner of properties; but in these also what we have said is true, and it will be established more clearly when something will be said about individual attributes in particular.

## SECTION VII

## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD IS IMMENSE

1. First it is necessary to understand what is explained by the name of immensity; for often immense is taken for the same as infinite. In which signification enough has already been said about the thing itself signified. Immensity therefore strictly taken signifies a relationship to place or the presence of God in all things. And in this way it is a peculiar attribute, by reason of which God is said to be everywhere. And in this sense it does not seem so manifest by natural

reason that God is immense, for many of the ancient philosophers defined God to a certain place.

*Various Opinions of the Philosophers*

2. For Aristotle, in Physics VIII, final chapter, text 84, indicates that there were two opinions of the ancients concerning the place where God is, namely either to be in the center, or in the circumference, because these (he says) are as it were two principles of celestial motion. And those who placed God in the center perhaps thought that to be a suitable place, so that from there he might diffuse the rays of his efficacy everywhere. But Aristotle himself prefers the other opinion to this and seems plainly to descend to it. And in De Caelo I, chapter 3, text 22, he says thus: "All men who have an opinion about the gods, and all who think gods exist, both Greeks and barbarians, have assigned the supreme place to the gods, because the immortal is fitted to the immortal;" and in De Generatione II, chapter 19, text 59, he says that these lower things cannot be perpetually conserved the same, because they are far distant from the principle itself; and he says similar things in De Caelo II, chapter 12, text 68. Which passages, if they are considered by themselves alone, could easily be explained of distance of nature and not of place; but another passage stands in the way (if however it is Aristotle's) in the book De Mundo ad Alexandrum, where this is expressly explained of local distance, and it is said that it is much more fitting for God, residing in heaven, to bring salvation to all from there. And it is explained by the example of a human king or leader, whom it does not befit to be present by himself in all places or affairs, but to stand in one place and govern the universe from there. And thus Justin Martyr, in his Paraenetic Oration to the Gentiles, attributes that book to Aristotle, and also ascribes this opinion to him, where he also indicates that Plato placed God in the fiery sphere; Eusebius also, in book III De Praeparatione, relates that the Egyptians attributed a celestial dwelling

to God. Finally the Commentator, in disputation XIV against Algazel, at the final doubt, calls childish the opinion of those who thought God to be in all things.

### *True Resolution of the Question*

3. Nevertheless it must be said that by natural reason it can be demonstrated that God is immense and consequently is everywhere. This truth, as has been said of others, can be shown either entirely a posteriori from effects, or a priori from some attribute previously demonstrated. St. Thomas taught the former way, I, question 8, article 1, where, from the universal influx and action of God, he infers that God is everywhere really present and intimately in all things. For every agent must be conjoined to the patient on which it operates. But God is the universal efficient agent of all things and in all things that are; therefore he is intimately present in all things. The major is taken from Aristotle, Physics VII, chapter 2, saying that the mover and the moved must be together, which is true in every agent, as was seen above, disputation XVI. But the minor is established from disputations XXI and XXII, where it was shown that God both conserves all things by continuous action and acts immediately in the action of all secondary agents. And Paul seems to have suggested this reason, Acts 17, in those words: "That they should seek God, if perhaps they might feel after him and find him; though he is not far from each one of us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being;" and in Psalm 138 the same reason is suggested in those words: "If I take the wings of the dawn and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there your hand will lead me and your right hand will hold me." For by these words David wished to signify that God is present there, just as in the immediately preceding he had said: "If I ascend to heaven, you are there; if I make my bed in Sheol, you are there." He therefore considered it the same to say: You are there, or you will lead me, or you will hold me there;

certainly for no other reason than because operation has real presence joined to it.

*St. Thomas's Argument is Examined*

4. How and in what way Scotus attacks it. Nevertheless to Scotus, In II, distinction 2, question 5, and In I, distinction 37, and there Ockham, Gabriel, and others not only has that not seemed a demonstration, but not even a sufficient reason. First, because that principle that the mover and the moved must be together has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated; for Aristotle adduces no a priori reason for it, indeed not even a general a posteriori reason[9], but only proves it by some rather uncertain induction which seems to fail in some particular cases, and in others is so obscure that it is not established by experience.

5. Second and chiefly, because, although we grant that condition to be necessary in finite agents, in God, who operates with infinite power, there is no reason why it should be necessary; for, just as from the limitation of power it comes about that a finite agent operates in a limited sphere and not beyond, so the necessity of real presence and conjunction with the patient can come from limitation of power. Hence Aristotle, in the said book to Alexander, when he had related that some of the ancients felt that God is in all things for this very reason, that namely he effects all things; for these are Aristotle's words: "There is an ancient report, and indeed hereditary among all mortals, that all things are constituted for us by God and through God. Nor indeed does any nature suffice by itself, deprived of the salvation which he brings. Therefore" (note the inference) "some of the ancients were led to say that all these things are full of gods;" when therefore Aristotle had related this opinion, he adds that it is more fitting to the divine excellence that, residing in one supreme place, he

[9] [a priori… rationem], ed. Vivès om. "Las palabras entre corchetes faltan en la ed. Vivès y en bastantes otras." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 432.

accomplishes all things from there. He signifies therefore that, although in inferior and imperfect causes there is that necessity of conjunction or proximity to the effect so that they can act on it, yet in an eminent and infinite cause there is no such necessity.

6. And it is confirmed first, for in natural agents this necessary condition can be understood as antecedent to action, because they always presuppose a subject on which they act, whose proximity and application must necessarily be presupposed; but in God, at least as regards the first and principal action most proper to him, which is creation, this condition cannot be presupposed to action, because on the part of the effect nothing is presupposed in which God must be in order to act on it; therefore from this action or its effect this condition cannot be inferred a posteriori. But if it is said that in this action of God this condition is consequent, not antecedent to the action itself, it follows first of all that from this divine action the existence of God in things is not inferred, but that consequence must be shown from elsewhere. For the force of that inference could not be taken from causality, nor from conditions required for causing; therefore another middle term must be sought whence it is proved that from such action of God such presence follows.

7. It is confirmed second theologically, because now in fact by divine power it comes about that some cause operates immediately on what is distant, as I proved in the matter of the Incarnation concerning Christ's humanity; therefore this condition is not so necessary for acting that it is altogether repugnant to operate without it; therefore, if we impossibly imagine God with the whole infinite active power intensively, which he now has, to be in one definite place, nevertheless he could act in distant places, because such a mode of acting does not involve repugnance in itself; therefore it would not be repugnant to infinite power if it were not otherwise immense; therefore precisely from the action of God in some place real presence and existence of God in that place does not follow. Some respond that from the action of God this presence is inferred not in any way whatsoever, but with

the proper conditions of God joined in acting, namely, that he acts as first, principal and most perfect agent; for from this it follows that he acts with infinite power and consequently is where he operates. And almost the same thing results which others respond, that from the action of God in some place it immediately follows either that God is there, or that he operates with infinite power; if the first is granted, the intention is achieved; but if the second is granted, from this very thing the other is also inferred, because infinite power brings with itself this presence to the thing on which it operates not from indigence, but from perfection. Nevertheless this response first of all diverts from the proposed intention, because it does not demonstrate the ubiquity of God from action, but from infinity, which pertains to the later way of demonstrating to be treated below. And then that consequence is not per se evident, in which immensity is inferred from infinite power for acting; for these are as it were quantities of different natures, just as intension and extension; for the infinity of active power is as it were intensive, but immensity is as it were infinite extension, whence it is not evident that the latter follows from the former unless it is referred to some other prior middle term.

8. Third, the difficulty is principally increased, because, although every immediate agent must be conjoined to the effect, not however each one in the same way. For there is a certain immediate agent (as they say) by immediacy of the supposit, another by immediacy of power; of the former it can be admitted that it must be conjoined to the patient through itself, but of the latter by no means; for it suffices that its power be conjoined to the patient; therefore from the action of God it cannot be definitely inferred that God is immediately in all things through himself, but either through himself or through his power. Unless perhaps it is supposed that God acts in all things immediately by immediacy of the supposit, which is not evident, indeed is denied by many even Catholics and Thomists. Some respond that, even if God acts immediately by immediacy of power, it is sufficiently inferred from this that he is present to his effects through

his substance, because his power is not other than his substance. But on the contrary, for there is both proper or innate power of the agent, and there is diffused power, just as in the sun light is innate power, but some influence is diffused power. Of the former it is true that the power of God is the substance of God; nevertheless, when it is said that he acts immediately by immediacy of power, if this is to be distinguished from immediacy of the supposit, it cannot be understood of proper and innate power, but of diffused power. But this is not the same as the substance of God, as is evident per se; therefore from the action of God it cannot be inferred that God is in all things through his substance or innate power, which is the same thing, but only through diffused power.

9. Fourth and finally, although we grant all that this argument intends, namely that God is in all the things he makes, still the immensity of God would not be sufficiently proved, for by that discourse at most it is proved that God is in this whole world; but from this it does not result that God is immense, for this whole world is finite; if therefore God is concluded in it, he is not immense; but that he is not concluded in it cannot be proved from the action of God; therefore immensity of God is not sufficiently proved from that.

10. How the testimonies of Scripture adduced for St. Thomas's argument by Scotus and others are to be weakened. But to the testimonies of Scripture by which that argument was confirmed, the authors of this opinion can respond. First, granted that Paul and David use that argument, it is not therefore evident, for sacred writers often use arguments either probable or more frequently received among those to whom they write; for in the same place Paul also uses the testimony of Aratus, which is weaker; or certainly, even if we freely grant that argument to be made certain from the testimony of Scripture, it does not however follow that it is evident. Again (which pertains more to the matter) it is not established that this is the sense of those passages, for the former passage from Acts can be understood not of the real presence of God in us through essence, but of presence

through power and providence, so that it is the same not to be far from us as to care for our affairs and not to have committed them to oblivion, which Paul rightly proves, because he supplies us with life, motion and being itself. And to this also that of Aratus leads: "For we are also his offspring," which words he could have adduced in no sense so that he might infer from them the real presence of God in us. But that he has special care and providence for us, he rightly infers from the fact that we participate in his divine nature in some way. And Theophylact seems to signify this exposition in that passage saying: "He signifies his providence, and formation, and exercise, namely that we are created by him," etc. And Bede there expounds Paul with these words of Augustine: "The Apostle shows (he says) that God operates incessantly in the things he created; for since we are other than he, we are in him for no other reason than that he operates this, and this is his work by which he contains all things, and by which his wisdom reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly; through which ordering we live, and move, and have our being in him." But the other passage from Psalm 138 seems to press less, because there David only intends to show that no one can escape the divine gaze; for thus he had said a little before: "Where shall I go from your spirit, and where shall I flee from your face?" Which presence in all things through knowledge or intuition of all things, he immediately proves from the presence of God through essence, saying: "If I ascend to heaven, you are there; if I descend to hell, you are present." For, although the reason of intuiting all things in God is not real presence to all places, nevertheless, with respect to men it was most evident that those things which happen there where he himself is cannot be hidden from God. Then he proves that from the efficacy of divine power in the cited words: "If I take the wings of the dawn," etc. And third he proves that from the infinite knowledge of God: "Because darkness will not be darkened from you," etc. From the fact therefore that God operates all things in us, the Psalmist rightly infers that we cannot be hidden from God, since God operates through his knowledge; but he

does not infer from this that God is really present in all things. Nor does he prove this in the above words, but only affirms it.

### *The Defense of St. Thomas's Argument & Response to the First Objection*

11. Despite these objections, theologians commonly embrace that argument, In II, dist. 17, where Bonaventure, Albert, Durand, Giles, Richard, Argentino, and Capreolus; Henry, in Summa, a. 30, q. 5, and Ferrara, III cont. Gent., c. 68. Therefore, I believe it should be said that this argument is sufficiently efficacious and more consistent not only with the philosophers, but also with the holy Fathers and the true sense of Scripture (as we may grant to theologians in the meantime). All these points will be established by examining each of the objections that have been made. In order to respond to the first objection, it must be recalled what we said when disputing about causes, namely that it can be understood in two ways that no agent can effect something in or upon a distant thing. First, that it influences nothing at all in a distant thing except through something proximate, so that it acts immediately and by itself only upon a thing proximate to it. Second, that it cannot begin an action except from a proximate thing, so that it cannot act upon something distant except by a kind of continuous action through what is proximate and the entire medium up to the extremity, and it would be contradictory to act immediately upon a distant thing while acting upon nothing in the entire medium. The first meaning, whether it be true or false, which we leave undetermined in that place, pertains nothing to the present demonstration; for it is not to be founded upon that principle explained in that sense, because indeed it would be a very weak foundation and, at minimum, very doubtful. Therefore, it is the second meaning that pertains to the present matter, and in this sense that principle is physically quite certain on account of the experiences and arguments that we adduced in the aforementioned place. And

although we acknowledge that this has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated, if we are speaking of rigorous demonstration, nevertheless for our intention and (as I think) for all the learned men who use that argument, it suffices that it be proven as efficaciously that God is everywhere as it is proven that efficient causes do not act immediately upon distant things in the sense explained.

### *The Reason Why Even an Infinite Agent Must Be Conjoined to Its Effect, & the Resolution of the Second Objection*

12. The second objection is also to be resolved from what has been said in the cited place; for there we showed that this conjunction which an agent requires with what is acted upon or with its effect is not founded upon the fact that the agent is finite and of limited power, but upon the nature of an agent as such. For if it were founded only upon limitation of power, there would be no reason why all finite agents would require equal proximity to what is acted upon or to the effect, because not all are equal, although all are finite. Hence, just as all have a finite sphere of activity because they have finite power, yet they do not have an equal sphere because they do not have equal power, so also this mode of acting upon a distant thing by first reaching what is proximate would not equally suit every finite agent, but at most it would be common to all that they cannot act immediately at whatever distance, but only at a finite distance, and what is more limited acts at a lesser distance. But that nothing at all can act except by beginning action from a proximate thing is not why it should necessarily suit every finite agent because it is finite, if the nature of an agent as such does not demand this. This is clarified by turning the argument in this way: for if an efficient cause as such does not demand this conjunction with its effect or its action from the fact that it is an efficient cause, but because it is finite, then if we imagine there to be a cause of infinite power in a definite place, it could immediately act upon distant things while acting upon nothing

proximate, because there is nothing that would prevent this. Indeed, by the same reasoning it could act at whatever distance infinitely, because infinite power ought not to have a limited sphere, and it is otherwise supposed from the nature of an efficient cause that such immediacy or proximity is not necessary; therefore, for the same reason, maintaining proportion, a finite agent, since it has a certain sphere extended up to a certain distance, could within that sphere immediately act upon distant things, even though it does not act upon what is proximate.

13. Therefore, with whatever evidence or certainty we gather from those things we experience in natural agents that all determine this mode of acting for themselves, with that same certainty it is certainly to be gathered that this necessity does not arise from limitation of power, but from the very nature of an agent. For just as form, insofar as it is form, requires for its formal effect union and lack of distance with matter, nor could any form, even if it were imagined to be infinite, give its effect without that proximity; or just as a final cause requires proximity through cognition for its causality and cannot otherwise exercise it, even if it be maximally infinite, so an agent as agent requires proximity and immediacy with what is acted upon or with its effect for acting, without which it cannot act, even if it be infinite. I add that this can much less suit an agent of infinite power, because acting upon distant things, although in some agent it might seem to be a perfection, nevertheless cannot be a perfection simply, but only supposing imperfection; absolutely, however, it is much better to be entirely without distance from one's effect, so that it has supreme perfection in acting and supreme dominion over its effect not only from the power of acting, but also from the mode and disposition or proximity. Hence the author of that book "On the World" to Alexander greatly erred, thinking that it pertains to the perfection of a governor to exist in only one place and to influence even distant places by his efficacy; for this pertains to a certain perfection of men, supposing their imperfection; absolutely, however, it is not a

perfection, and it is much better to be present by oneself to all one's effects, if this can be done without distraction or diminution of one's power. From these things, therefore, the second objection is sufficiently resolved.

### *Whether in a Spiritual Agent Local Presence Precedes Action*

14. The response of some. In the first confirmation of that objection, there is touched upon the objection that Scotus makes[10] against St. Thomas, that either he begs the question in his proof, if he supposes that God is in things through operation as through the formal reason of existing in them, as St. Thomas generally holds about spiritual things, or he proves nothing unless he admits another presence of God in things prior to operation. To this the Thomists respond that God indeed has no presence in things prior to operation, and nevertheless the principle is not begged in the said argument, because it proceeds either from a formal cause to its effect, or from a foundation to a relation, as if we prove that some body is in a place because it is quantified, or that it is similar because it is white. Against this response, however, proceeds the difficulty touched upon in the said confirmation, for in natural agents from action is concluded and demonstrated the presence or proximity of the agent as something prior and presupposed to action; therefore, since that argument is taken from proportion to natural agents and from those things we experience in them, either it ought to conclude the presence of God as prior and prerequisite to action, or it certainly concludes nothing.

15. The response of others. Therefore others respond and concede to Scotus that some presence prior to action is necessary, but this is not presence to things themselves, for since things exist only through God's action, presence to things before action cannot be understood, but it is presence to the space in which are the things that

[10] In II, dist. 2, q. 5.

God effects. Hence in this prerequisite condition there is indeed a difference between God and other natural agents: that these require real presence to what is acted upon or to what is movable, which God does not require, because he necessarily supposes no subject acted upon for his action; but proportion is maintained, because just as a natural agent requires presence to the subject upon which it is about to operate, so God requires presence to the space in which he is about to create. But to this response it seems to be an obstacle that that space is nothing, but is only feigned by us in imagination, and therefore we also call that space imaginary; how therefore can it be feigned that God before the creation of things is present to this space? Otherwise he will also be present to things themselves, even if they are nothing, because that space is equally nothing. Furthermore, what is the necessity of this presence to imaginary space? For in natural agents it is rightly understood that proximity to what is movable can be a necessary condition for acting, because that proximity is something real, and therefore the agent is about to operate by educing form from the potentiality of what is acted upon; but truly presence to imaginary space can be nothing real, but only something as imaginary as the space itself; nor is God about to operate from space, educing an effect from its potentiality.

16. The true resolution of the difficulty. It is responded that this difficulty (about which we shall say more immediately) seems to be taken more from our manner of speaking and words than from the thing itself. For concerning the matter it must be said that before God's action there is necessarily presupposed on God's part such a mode of existing or such a disposition (to speak in our manner) of his substance, that on his part he so exists that without change of himself he can intimately and really be in whatever thing, if he wishes to create it, and God has this mode of being from the force of his immensity. But because we cannot conceive this disposition in spiritual substance except through relation to space, because God from the force of the aforesaid disposition is of himself apt for existing in whatever

corporeal spaces, even if they be extended infinitely, therefore we cannot conceive that disposition and immensity of the divine substance except through the mode of a certain extension, which we necessarily explain through relation to bodies; and when either in reality or in mind we separate real bodies, we necessarily apprehend as it were some space apt to be filled by bodies, to which the entire divine substance is present, and entirely in the whole, and entirely in its individual parts, through which presence we signify nothing other than the aforesaid disposition of the divine substance.

17. Hence therefore to the previous objection it is said that although space is nothing real, nevertheless its apprehension or imagination is useful to us and almost necessary for declaring the aforesaid disposition of the divine substance, and for this reason alone God is said to be present to space before things themselves, because indeed he first has in himself that disposition, which is entirely independent of created things. Hence that presence, although as it is conceived and signified through the mode of relation it is nothing and merely a relation of reason, yet that absolute thing which through this relation we wish to declare in the divine substance is truly something in God himself, which we call his immensity. But we do not so conceive and declare this disposition or presence through relation to creatable things as such, as through relation to spaces, and therefore God is not said to be present to possible things as to imaginary spaces, which we so apprehend as if they existed, not through deception, because we do not affirm that they exist, but through simple apprehension, so that through comparison to spaces thus apprehended we may declare that disposition or mode of existing of the divine substance.

18. What presence is prerequisite in God for creation, what is subsequent. But that this disposition of the divine substance which we declare through presence to space is necessary for action (to respond to the other part of the objection) is rightly proven by that principle that the mover and moved must be simultaneous, not insofar as it is

merely physical, but insofar as it is elevated to metaphysical reasoning and scope. Because that necessity does not arise from the peculiar nature of mover and moved, indeed not even from the general nature of agent and patient, which is supposed for action, but from the dependence of effect and cause; for this is what requires that the agent be immediately conjoined to the effect into which it influences being. And therefore, although for acting the existence of the cause in the effect is not prerequisite, insofar as these words signify a relation of mutual presence, for this involves open contradiction, because such a relation arises from action, nevertheless there is supposed in the agent a foundation on its part necessary for such presence, and consequently for relation, whether of thing or of reason, whether mutual or not mutual. From this it is easily understood how presence or conjunction with the effect follows, and in what way it precedes God's action, especially speaking of creative action, in which the difficulty was posed. For if presence is taken for the relation to the thing itself created, or insofar as it involves denomination taken from its existence or subsistence in such a place, thus it follows God's action; but if it is taken only for the foundation on the part of the thing necessary, so that once the existence of the creature is posited there follows that relation or denomination by which God is said to be in the creature and the creature in him, thus such a foundation is supposed for action.

19. Scotus's objection is satisfied. And hence finally response has also been given to Scotus's objection, for this argument in some way proves a priori the existence of God in created things and real presence, as it includes mutual denomination taken from both extremes, because this follows upon action, as has been said. But a posteriori it proves that there is in God such a mode of existing, which he has from himself, by reason of which, as much as is from himself, he has this presence, if other things exist. And if Scotus wants only this when he says that presence prior to action must be admitted in God, we do not oppose it; for that is nothing other than God's own immensity, which he always had, even if nothing else existed. But that

such presence is admitted in God in no way prevents the argument made; indeed this is what we especially intend to demonstrate, for once this is posited, the consequence of other denominations or relations is self-evident, if other extremes are posited.

20. Whether God's instrument can act upon distant things. Concerning the other confirmation much could be said here, unless it had been disputed in the first tome of the third part, disp. XXXI, sect. 7; therefore it is briefly responded that this condition is required in the principal agent. Likewise also in every instrument that acts in a connatural mode. Nevertheless, in an instrument that acts in a supernatural mode and is assumed for acting by an infinite and immense agent, which can be present to the effect to be effected by itself, it does not contradict that the instrument be elevated to effecting an effect distant from itself, provided that it is not distant from the principal agent. Nor in this should God be compared with his instruments, because God cannot act except in a connatural and most perfect mode. And in this sense the response given there is not to be disapproved, namely that God's presence in effects does not follow from just any action, but from principal and connatural action, or that which rests upon proper power. But the deduction that is insinuated there, which reduces the force of this argument to God's infinity, is truly not to the purpose of this argument, especially according to the mind of St. Thomas and others, but is a new argument by itself, concerning whose efficacy we shall speak later.

### *From What Action His Presence Is Gathered, & the Third Objection Is Resolved*

21. Concerning the third principal objection it must be noted that there are several actions of God concerning creatures from which this attribute or presence of God can be gathered, which we can reduce to two headings. The first is of creative action, under which we comprehend conservation, because it is of the same nature, or rather

the same continued or persevering action. The other heading can be of governmental action, under which we comprehend every action by which God, either alone or with secondary causes, influences something in creatures already made, or operates something from them, whether that action pertains to the first distinction of things, or to ornament (as theologians speak), or to the propagation of the world and the perfection and operation of individual things, which is more properly called government. Speaking of the prior genus of actions and supposing what has been said above about creation, that third objection entirely ceases, because God alone can create immediately through himself, both by immediacy of subject and by immediacy of power; for he uses no power created by himself as a mediate agent for creating something else; therefore it is necessary that by reason of creation alone God be immediately through his substance and power in all created things. You will say: not all things are produced through proper creation, but many are made from preexisting matter. I respond: although this is true, nevertheless there is in all things something that has been created by God alone, at least prime matter, by reason of which it is necessary that its creator be in the thing that consists of such matter. And hence it also happens that for this reason it is proven not only that God is near to created things (so to speak) as if touching them only on the surface, but also that he is intimately in all of them as if penetrating them, because in all and especially in their most intimate parts there is something created by God alone. For in immaterial things there is only indivisible substance, which is entirely created by God; but in material things there is matter, and because form intimately and according to its whole self penetrates that matter, therefore the agent that creates matter must necessarily be intimately present to the entire created thing.

22. And this argument taken from creation seems to me the more efficacious, the more I believe it true that no action of God upon creatures is as evident as creation, because none is more necessary among those things that can be ascribed to God alone, as can be

shown from what has been said above both in section 2 of this disputation and in disputations XX, XXI, and XXII. Therefore, if Aristotle and other philosophers admit, as they truly do admit, that principle that an immediate agent ought to be conjoined to its effect, I do not see how they could have denied this presence of God in this entire universe, unless either by denying that this universe is created by God, but only governed by mediation of the motion of heaven, as many, though falsely, think Aristotle felt, or certainly by thinking that God immediately created only some thing, and through that thing another, etc., as Avicenna thought. Who nevertheless does not attribute creation to bodies, but only to intelligences, and therefore it is necessary that he confess that the lower intelligence, to which he attributes the creation of the entire corporeal world, is intimately present in that whole; he will not therefore be able to deny this perfection to superior intelligences, and much less to God.

23. The objection is dissolved. You will say: although God does not create one thing through mediation of another, it is not sufficiently gathered from this that God is immediately through himself in all things that he creates, because it is not of the nature of an agent that, if it acts upon distant things, it acts through what is proximate as through an instrument, or as through the power of acting, but it is only necessary that it act through what is proximate as through a medium, as if carrying the action. But truly in this way it can rightly be understood that God existing in heaven alone from there began the action of creating and as it were continued and poured it out through all intermediate bodies up to earth, and in this way reached distant places by creating, although he is not immediately in them, just as the sun reaches by illuminating or heating. It is responded: although the medium is not the entire reason of acting, it is nevertheless probable that it is necessary that what happens in a proximate place contribute in some way to acting in a distant place, so as thus to carry as it were the power of the first agent; and if this is true, the objection ceases, because nothing can contribute in this way to creating. Second,

whatever may be the case about this, no one can reasonably think that creation happens in that way; for the thing that is created depends per se and immediately upon God alone, and cannot depend upon an intermediate body, neither as upon a necessary condition, nor as upon something carrying such action. For since that action is from nothing and is done by infinite power, it cannot depend upon these conditions. Add that it is sometimes established by experience that this action by nature reaches distant places before proximate ones, and consequently does not reach those through mediation of these, which I shall immediately clarify.

24. Whence it is gathered that God is present to the entire world not only when he created, but also now. Someone will say again that by this argument it is at most proven that God in the beginning, when he created the world, was present to all things, but not that he always and perpetually is. It is responded that this can be gathered from that in two ways: first, because where God once is, he necessarily remains perpetually; therefore, although other things change there and succeed one another, God always remains in them. The assumption follows necessarily from what has been said above, because otherwise God would be changed according to some proper and intrinsic accident, which we shall explain more broadly in the following assertion. Second, because God in the same action by which he created things from the beginning in some way always perseveres, for he perpetually conserves immaterial things or incorruptible bodies by the same action by which he created them; but in other corruptible things he at least conserves matter by the same action by which he produced it; but for the same action the same presence or conjunction with the effect is necessary; therefore just as God from the beginning existed in all things that he created, so he perpetually exists in them by conserving them; for that these things depend upon God in being conserved has been proven above. And hence can be clarified what I said above, that it can be shown by some experience that God does not diffuse this creative or conservative action (which is the same

thing) from a distant place through intermediate bodies, but intimately exists in each individual thing by conserving it, first indeed because however much intermediate bodies vary or are multiplied, that action is nevertheless always the same. Second and more strongly, because when some intermediate body, for example air, is removed and water ascends to fill the vacuum, then the conservative influence of God cannot descend to the water through intermediate bodies; therefore it is a sign that it does not happen thus, but that God intimately exists in the water itself by conserving it. The assumption is clarified, for water is conserved by God by nature prior to its ascending to fill the vacuum; indeed it is probable that it is impelled by the same author of nature by whom it is conserved to ascend to fill the vacuum; therefore that conservation cannot descend to the water through that body with which it fills that intermediate space.

25. The third objection therefore seems to proceed especially concerning the other action of God concerning creatures; for since that action supposes a subject from which it is made, as much as is from itself, it would not contradict being made by God in distant places through power diffused to intermediate bodies. This mode of speaking is insinuated in the book "On the World" to Alexander. Indeed Aristotle also signifies the same in the places cited from II de Caelo and II de Generat., and for this cause he says that these inferior bodies receive less influence because they are more distant from heaven and consequently from the first mover. In this he also seems to think that the first mover is of limited power, because it cannot equally influence distant things as proximate ones, or at least he thinks it necessarily acts by such limited action and definite mode. And finally he thinks that the first mover does not influence these inferior things immediately and through itself. All of which is established to be false, whatever may be the case about Aristotle's mind, about which we shall speak below. It must therefore be considered that God can act upon things he has established in two modes: first, by himself alone, or as

immediate and particular cause; second, as universal cause influencing with secondary causes toward their actions.

26. Concerning the prior mode of action I think it cannot be sufficiently proven by natural reason that God immediately and through himself without secondary causes operates or has operated anything in things he has established, except through conservation or new creation (which only occurs in the rational soul), because in other effects that we experience, there is none concerning which it is evident that it can be done by God alone. For if it can be done by other causes, such as by elements, or by heavens, or even by angels, it cannot be established by reason alone that such an effect is not made through mediation of some created cause, but by God alone, or revelation is needed, as in those things we hold by faith. And hence it seems to follow that from this genus of action taken per se the presence of God in all things or places cannot be proven. But although it is not established that God operates thus, it can nevertheless be evidently proven that God can immediately operate in this mode in any place and from any thing, because this pertains to his omnipotence, about which we shall speak below. And in this way from this action not as already done, but as possible, the said presence can be gathered, for God already in fact has whatever is necessary on his part for doing whatever action is possible to him; for he does not need any change to attain that potency or necessary condition; but for him to actually act in this mode, that presence is necessary; therefore he already actually has it.

27. The posterior mode of divine action through universal influence with all secondary causes is better known by natural light, because it is simply necessary for all effects and actions that we experience, and because it is necessarily inferred from the dependence that all things have upon God in being conserved, as has been seen above. From this action therefore considered per se and precisely, the aforesaid presence of God in all things is sufficiently inferred. Nor can the difficulty touched upon in the third objection proceed against it,

for God cannot effect this action through mediate power diffused by himself, or through mediation of some created thing. Both because this concourse is proper to the first cause as such, and therefore it cannot be done through created power, for by this very fact it falls short of the proper perfection and nature of such concourse. And also because whatever such created power is imagined to be, it would also need the influence of the first cause, because this is intrinsic to every created power; therefore it is necessary to stop at some influence that the first cause provides through itself immediately in every action of a creature. Hence it is most properly said that God in this action acts immediately both by immediacy of power and of subject, as has been said extensively above, disp. XXII, and both reasons require immediate conjunction with the effect, because that power is not diffused, but intrinsic and of his substance. But through this concourse God does not so operate immediately as to exclude every other subject also immediately influencing in another order, namely of proximate and particular cause. But this in no way prevents the present intention, because each cause requires for the influence that it immediately provides in its order immediate conjunction with the effect and proportionate to the power and subject immediately influencing. Thus therefore from this divine action it is necessarily concluded that God through power intrinsic to himself, and through his substance and his subject, ought to be intimately present to all actions and effects of secondary causes. And thus satisfaction has been given to everything that was insinuated in the third objection.

### *Concerning the Fourth Objection: A Discussion of God's Presence in Imaginary Spaces*

28. The fourth objection does not cause much difficulty for those theologians who think that God is so confined within this universe that he is not outside it; indeed, they use that argument especially, because a spiritual substance exists only where it operates;

but God does not operate except in this world; therefore he is not outside it. They also add the argument touched upon above, because no thing exists in nothing; but outside this world there is nothing, for imaginary space does not exist, but is feigned by the imagination. Nor do they think this conflicts with God's immensity, because it does not pertain to God's immensity that he should be in nothing, or in fictitious things, or in beings of reason, but that he should be in all created things; but truly while he creates nothing, it is not necessary that he be in something or somewhere, but in himself, as Augustine says, book III against Maximus, chapter 21, and on those words of Psalm 122: "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, whence help shall come to me." And this opinion is held In I, dist. 37, by Capreolus, q. unic., a. 3, and Scotus, q. unica, and Durandus insinuates it, q. 1 and 2. Bonaventure also holds it, a. 3, q. 1, n. 22. Hence, concerning the fourth objection according to this opinion, it must be said that God's immensity is sufficiently proved from God's action, because it is proved that God is in all things that truly exist, and this alone belongs to the nature of divine immensity.

29. But something must necessarily be added to this opinion; for certainly, if God were so confined to this world that he neither actually is nor could be in a greater one, he would not be immense; for he would be enclosed by finite boundaries in his own way. Indeed, it is not contradictory for a spiritual creature to be made so perfect that it could really be present to the whole world and to any part of it; for one angel can now be present, for example, to this whole city, and another angel can be made more perfect, who would fill a greater place, and in this increase one can proceed infinitely beyond all proportion; therefore one could arrive at an angel who could be present to this whole world; therefore this is a finite perfection and does not suffice for God's immensity. Therefore it must necessarily be added that God is now in this world in such a way that, as far as it depends on him, he could be in a greater one, and in more and greater things infinitely. And this is most certain, both according to the doctrine of faith and in

natural reason, supposing God's infinite power in operating. For if his operative power is not limited to this world, neither can his real presence be. Nor do the authors of this opinion deny or can deny this; indeed, Capreolus declares this sufficiently expressly. Therefore it is necessary that they respond something further to the fourth objection made, namely, that from God's action actual presence in things made is immediately inferred, but mediately or consequently the power or aptitude on God's part to exist in all things which he can make infinitely is gathered, and his immensity consists in this. And thus it happens that from action, although it is actually concerned only with finite things, the whole immensity is gathered by amplifying or extending it to possible action.

30. From this last response (which is undoubtedly true), however, it seems clearly to follow that the former part of this opinion is false, and it must rather be confessed that God is now actually outside the world in infinite imaginary spaces. This opinion other scholastics and philosophers defend, such as Altisidorensis, book I of the Summa, chapter 16, and Major, In I, dist. 37, q. 2, and well Richard, there, a. 1, q. 4; Bonaventure, n. 1, q. 2. ad ult., and q. 3; Cajetan, on that passage of John 12: "I am the light, I have come into the world"; and Ferrara, VIII Physics, q. 4; and Soto indicates it, IV Physics, q. 2, ad 4; and Marsilio Ficino, book II On the Immortality of the Soul, chapter 6, where he says the Platonists also sensed this, which Eugubinus reports of Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers, book IV On Perennial Philosophy, chapters 1 and 2. Saint Thomas also favors this, Quodlibet XI, a. 1, saying that God is not only in those things which are, but also in those things which we can imagine. Augustine also expressly taught this, XI On the City of God, chapter 5, where, arguing against certain persons, he inquires thus: "Or perhaps shall we say that the substance of God, which places neither include, nor determine, nor extend, but concerning which, as is worthy to think about God, they confess incorporeal presence everywhere as a whole, is absent from such great spaces of places outside the world, so

as to be occupied in one place only and, by comparison with that infinity itself, in such a small place in which the world is? I do not think they will proceed into such vanities"; but immediately at the end of the chapter he says it is vain to think of infinite places outside the world, just as it is vain to think that infinite times preceded before the beginning of this world. He says this because it is indeed vain to think of those places as something real outside God, but not because it is vain to think that God existed with infinite duration before this time, and by the same reasoning is present by his immensity outside this world. For thus throughout that whole chapter Augustine contends that proportion must be preserved between time and place, so that, just as it cannot be denied that God existed before all times, so it cannot be denied that he is outside all finite places. The same he thinks in book I of the Confessions, chapters 2 and 3, and book VII, chapter 5, where he compares the divine substance to an infinite sea diffused everywhere through immense spaces, and says the world is like a finite sponge enclosed in it.

31. In nearly the same way the remaining holy Fathers declare divine immensity, and Scripture also favors this; for by this reasoning God is said, Job 11: "He is higher than heaven." Where Gregory says this must be understood not because of quantity, nor even because of perfection of nature alone, but because in the circumscription of spirit he transcends all things, whence in chapter 22 of the same book of Job it is said: "Do you not think that God is higher than heaven and is elevated above the summit of the stars?"; and III Kings 8: "The heavens of heavens cannot contain you"; and the Church sings: "Whom the whole world cannot contain." Whence Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 1, says that God is in heaven and on earth, in the world, around the world, above the world and above heaven; and chapter 9, "God (he says) is poured out externally above every magnitude and extends above." This also Gregory Nazianzen teaches ex professo, oration XXXIV, which is II On Theology. See Basil, homily 16; Athanasius, in the epistle of the Council of Nicaea, and the

oration against the followers of Sabellius; Nazianzen, Apology, I; Hilary, 1 On the Trinity, almost at the beginning, and on Psalm 118; Damascus, book II On Faith, chapter 6; Origen, book VII against Celsus; Jerome excellently, on chapter 66 of Isaiah, and on chapter 40 of Ezekiel; Gregory, homily 8 on Ezekiel; Ambrose, on that passage to the Ephesians 3: "That you may be able to comprehend what is the breadth, length, etc.," Bernard, book V On Consideration, in the sermon on the threefold coherence.

32. The reasoning is taken from what has been said, because God can operate outside the world without any change of himself; therefore he is already actually outside the world. The antecedent is evident from what has been said and will be established more from what will be said about God's power. The consequence is clear, first, because for a thing to be where it operates is not an extrinsic denomination resulting from the operation or its term, but rather is some property or condition prerequisite on the part of the cause; therefore this could not newly belong to God without change of himself; for only extrinsic denominations, or relations of reason which are founded on them, can be newly attributed to God, because they place no change in him; but to be present through his substance wherever he operates or can operate is not an extrinsic denomination, since it is like a condition prerequisite in him before action. And this is declared in this way, for before Christ's ascension, for example, there was no body outside the outermost sphere; but through the ascension it happened (according to a probable opinion) that Christ's body is above that sphere, so that Christ's feet are above its convex surface, and thus Christ's body is (or at least it is not contradictory for it to be) outside this whole world, filling that space which was not previously filled by a body. Now therefore God also is there present according to his substance; therefore he was also there present before from all eternity; therefore by the same reasoning he is outside heaven in all spaces which can be conceived there infinitely. The penultimate consequence is proved, in which lies the whole force; for if he were

not there present before, he could not have begun to be there present without change of himself, just as Christ's body could not have begun to be there present without some change, because it was not there actually in any way before. For there is the same reasoning in this regard; for just as Christ's body is not said to be there present by denomination from God's substance, but by something that is in it, whatever that may be, which is signified by the name of presence or Where, so also God's substance is not said to be there present by denomination from Christ's body, as seems evident in itself; for if we fictitiously imagine God's substance enclosed in some definite place, for example, in the starry heaven, it could not be denominated present there where Christ's body is by an extrinsic denomination from Christ's body; therefore it is denominated present from something that is in it; therefore it could not acquire that newly without change of itself. And this reasoning can be made in a similar way about the whole space which is now filled by the bodies of this world; for God is here now really present; therefore he also was from eternity for the same cause, namely because he could not have begun to be there newly without change of himself. Again, a similar argument can be made about another world which God could create, for that world would be outside this one and God would be there; therefore he would then be outside this world; therefore he also is now, for the same reason of immutability.

33. An evasion from the aforesaid reasoning is precluded. Some think they elude the force of this reasoning by this example: for God began to be newly in heaven and in any created thing, without change of himself. Nevertheless it is not similar, because to be in heaven includes an extrinsic denomination, or a relation of reason arising from the presence of heaven as emanating from God, from which emanation or presence only results in God a relation of reason or extrinsic denomination; but to be there where heaven or any other created thing is does not include an extrinsic denomination from that thing, but only that which is necessarily presupposed on God's part, so

that, by the very fact that another thing exists there and emanates from him, God is said to exist in it, which foundation could not be acquired by God newly without change. Just as God's coexisting with creatures under this denomination can begin newly, because it includes the existence of the creature and denomination from it or relation of reason to it; but the foundation which is supposed on God's part, so that he necessarily coexists with the creature by the very fact that it exists, cannot newly belong to God without change of himself, since it is nothing other than God's own existing.

34. And the reasoning taken from another possible world can be further pressed and confirmed; for God could so create another world outside this one, that they would not touch each other nor be contiguous, but separate and distant; then therefore God would be in both worlds; therefore in the intervening space, because those two presences in the two worlds cannot be understood in God as discrete. For if one angel cannot be in two discrete places unless it is somehow present to the intermediate space, how can this be attributed to God, who is entirely immutable, and maximally one and simple? There are those who respond that it cannot happen that another world be created outside this one, distant from it, unless some real body intervenes between them; otherwise it would be necessary that they be contiguous, because distance is something real and has some certain quantity and proportion, whence it cannot be understood without a real intermediate space. But this cannot be proved; for if God can create two worlds distant through an interposed body, let him therefore create them and immediately annihilate the middle body with the two worlds remaining unchanged; for why would this be contradictory? Therefore those worlds would remain distant without an interposed body; therefore they can be created in the same way, and in both cases the argument made proceeds. Furthermore, who would deny that God can, with the heavens preserved, annihilate the whole sphere of generable things and elements, with the whole middle space remaining empty? But then the moon, for example,

would be distant from the center of the world or from another star or part of heaven in the region corresponding to it in the other hemisphere; therefore distance does not require a real interposed space, although it is not understood by us except through order to quantity or line, which either is interposed or can be interposed; but the intrinsic foundation of distance, if it be declared by way of relation, is nothing other than one extreme being here and the other there circumscriptively or definitively.

35. Whether and how great a discord there can be among the related opinions. Therefore this opinion is undoubtedly true as to what it intends; I think, however, that the difference of these opinions among Catholic authors can be in the use of terms. Therefore, so that equivocation may be removed, it must be noted (which I insinuated above) that when it is said that some thing is somewhere or in some place, two things can be included in this expression: one is the intrinsic and absolute presence which the thing has there; the other is a relation to another thing, which it touches, either by quantity of mass, or by quantity of active power, or by relative presence of its substance or quantity. These two are necessary in bodies which are surrounded by a containing body; for the located thing is said to be in the circumscribing thing, by means of quantitative contact, and besides this it has in itself its intrinsic presence, which is explained by us through relation to the center and poles of the world, and this remains the same, even if the circumscribing bodies change or flow, indeed even if all things perished through divine power. And in the empyrean heaven this presence is found without a surrounding body, because this presence is not referred to another to which the thing is said to be present either through knowledge or through proximity of place, in which way that word is also usually employed, but it is taken absolutely and (if usage permitted) could be called "ad-sence" (adsentia), because it is nothing other than the thing being present there where it is said to be, which in a body cannot be an externally surrounding body, but something intrinsic, about which we will speak

more extensively concerning the category of Where. In this way, therefore, it must be understood in spiritual things, and especially in God, about whom we now treat, preserving difference and proportion, because God's presence is spiritual and entirely immutable and indefectible, but God's contact is virtual through his own proper action.

36. When therefore it is said that God is outside the world in imaginary spaces, if it be understood that he is there as if with a relation to something else which he touches, it is plainly false and impossible, and the authors of the first opinion could only have intended this, nor do their reasonings prove anything else. For God's virtual contact is to some true thing, which is not in imaginary space. And in the same sense it is true that God, before he created the world, was not in any place, but in himself. Finally, in the same sense it is also true that it does not pertain to God's immensity that he should be in an infinite place, indeed not even to be in place in this way at all, because immensity is an attribute intrinsically and necessarily belonging to God; but to be in place in this way includes God's free action. But if it be understood that God is outside the world only through his real presence without actual relation (so to speak) to any thing outside himself, thus it cannot be denied that God is outside the world; for this the second opinion proves both in the doctrine of faith and in natural reason.

37. But if in the same sense it be said that God is in imaginary spaces, this also is truly said. But those labor in equivocation who think that particle "to be in space" expresses a relation to space as to something distinct which is touched, and therefore they argue that this is contradictory, because space is nothing. Nevertheless this is not the sense of that expression, but that particle must be taken intransitively (so to speak), and it is best declared through order to our conception, because, where we conceive space by way of a void apt to be filled by a body, there the divine substance is most present and fills all that substantially. For, because we cannot conceive these spiritual

things except through order to material things, where there actually is no body, we conceive an aptitude that there should be one, and there we also understand God to be present. But for this mode of presence it is not necessary that space should be something besides God himself, since it is neither made nor really touched by God, but it suffices that it can be apprehended by us by way of some emptiness apt to be filled by bodies, so that through relation to it we can conceive and declare the aforesaid presence of God. This can be understood not obscurely from bodies themselves; for the body of Christ (pursuing the example placed above) existing outside heaven, is there really present without a circumscribing body and fills corporeally that space which it occupies, not because that space as distinct from Christ's body is something real, but because through the presence of the body itself corporeal and real space is made, which of itself was empty and nothing. In this way, therefore, that God's substance was there present before Christ's body was there present, it is not necessary for that space to be something real distinct from God's substance.

38. From God's eternity, immensity and our conclusion are most aptly explained. Finally, this is declared through the proportion of divine eternity to time, which Saint Augustine used in the cited place, and it is most apt for explaining the matter; for thus God is compared through his immensity to bodies, as through eternity to times; for immensity is equally infinite in its nature, as eternity in its; therefore just as eternity is in all finite times and infinitely exceeds them, so immensity is in all finite places and infinitely surpasses them; therefore just as God's eternity cannot be comprehended by finite times, but is also outside them, that is, before them and after them, so also immensity is related to finite places. Again, by this reasoning God is truly said to have existed before real time in every imaginary time, even if it be apprehended with infinite succession, in which imaginary time is not feigned to be something real, nor God to be in it through some real coexistence or relation, but we only use that comparison and apprehension to declare the infinity of the divine nature, because

we cannot declare that infinity except through order to quantity and succession, and because we truly understand that before any time there could have been another, and then God already existed and is always the same, even if one proceed infinitely; therefore the same must be understood in the same proportion and reasoning in true or imaginary spaces.

39. From which it is also understood what those temporal and local adverbs indicate when we say that God was from eternity here where the world is now created, or there wherever it could be created or then was when it could have been created by God before all real past time; for, just as that "then" does not signify some duration which actually existed, distinct from God, but signifies the very duration of God as apt to coexist with time or instant which could have been before, so that adverb "there" or "here" does not indicate a real place actually existing, but only God's presence through immensity as of itself apt to coexist locally with any body really existing there.

40. From what has been said, what is required for God's immensity is elicited. We conclude therefore from all that has been said that what is supposed in that fourth objection is true, namely that for God's immensity it is not sufficient that he actually be in all created things, and therefore from the action alone which he actually exercises concerning such things, God's immensity is not immediately sufficiently gathered; nevertheless however (as I was saying above), by extending the argument proportionally from actual action to possible action, it is excellently concluded that God is immense, because, if it is necessary that God be actually present where he actually operates, it will also be necessary that he be really present wherever he can operate. But whether he should be said to be locally where he does not operate, is a question of name, which we will briefly resolve below.

41. It remains that we say something about the testimonies of Scripture. And concerning the testimony of Paul, Acts 17, it is more probable that those words "he is not far from each one of us" should be

understood about local distance, and not about providence or care of our affairs, as Theophylact clearly exposed, whose testimony is not quoted integrally; for he says that in those words: "In him we live, move and have our being," God's providence toward us is signified, but not however in those: "He is not far from each one of us," but in these he says is signified that he is not far from us, which he asserts is gathered from the actions of providence itself; and he explains by a corporeal example, that just as air, in which we live and without which we cannot live, must be diffused everywhere and not far from us, so (he says) God is near, without whom we cannot live. Nor did Bede think otherwise in the cited place. More expressly however Jerome, on Isaiah 66, says that Paul brought forth those words to convince the Jewish error, who think that the invisible and incorporeal and incomprehensible God can be confined to the temple of Jerusalem. Whence he says those words of Paul are equivalent to these: "Do not I fill heaven and earth?"; and on Habakkuk 2, at the end, treating those words: "The Lord is in his holy temple," after other expositions he says: "Or certainly according to that, because the Spirit nourishes heaven and earth and seas and the universal world from within, and the mind infused through the members moves the whole mass and mingles itself with the great body, the whole world which consists of heaven and earth and is enclosed by the circles of the heavens, is said to be God's house. Whence also the Apostle confidently says: For in him we live, move and have our being." Finally, this interpretation is according to the proper signification of the words, but the other is metaphorical; therefore the former is to be preferred.

42. More apparently indeed it could be said that those words: "He is not far from each one of us" refer to the natural knowledge which we can have of him. For Paul had said that men were made so that they might seek God and feel after him, namely by knowledge and love, and he adds: "Although he is not far from us," that is, from our knowledge, since we live and exist in him, from which effects we can arrive at knowledge of him. Although the Apostle intends this,

nevertheless it cannot be denied that to explain more this facility of feeling after God by knowledge and love, he also wanted to commemorate that we have him within our very selves, because he is intimately in us, vivifying and preserving us effectively.

43. The testimony from Psalm 138 is explained to strengthen the same point. The other passage from Psalm 138, although it can probably be expounded in the way said above, nevertheless it is most probable that, when David says: "Where shall I go from your spirit, and where shall I flee from your face?", in the first word he understands the real presence of substance, in the latter knowledge. This exposition is had there in the name of Jerome, and the Anonymous, Jansenius and others have the same. When therefore he adds: "If I ascend into heaven," he responds to the first part, namely that no one can escape from God's spirit, because he is present everywhere. But he proves this when he adds: "If I take my wings at dawn." For from this he proves that God is in all places to which man can flee or fly, since unless with God helping and sustaining he cannot arrive there, as Jansenius declared there. Nevertheless it could still be responded to these testimonies that this is not affirmed in these places by way of inference or by approving the consequence, but only by affirming that it is so. Or even, if the inference be admitted (which seems more consonant with the letter), it could be founded not on that purely philosophical principle, that agent and patient must be simultaneous, but on proportion or parity of reasoning; for, if God operates in all things, therefore he also is in all things, since he is not less infinite in existing than in acting. However the inference be founded, presence is always gathered from action, and from infinite possible action immensity will be gathered, which we intend principally. And in this way Anselm insinuates the same reasoning, in the Monologion, chapter 22, at the end; Ambrose, book I On the Holy Spirit, chapter 7, at the beginning, where he proves the Holy Spirit to be everywhere, because he operates in all things, which Hilary also signifies, VIII On the Trinity, around the middle.

*From Other Divine Attributes Immensity is Proved*

44. Another way of proving divine immensity can be taken a priori from other divine attributes. To declare this I suppose that a spiritual thing, even if it be indivisible in itself, is not limited to exhibiting the presence of its substance at an indivisible point, but can have its substance really present in a divisible and extended place, which we know by experience in the rational soul, which is diffused through the whole body, and it is necessary that it be whole in the whole and whole in any part; whence we easily understand that this mode of presence belongs to angelic substance, which is more perfect; for, since that mode of presence is possible and, properly speaking, pertains to perfection, it is not to be denied to a superior substance, since it belongs to an inferior one. From which finally it is more evidently concluded that God has this mode of presence. But a difference must be added between the divine substance and other immaterial creatures, that creatures, even if they can occupy divisible spaces, are not however determined by natural necessity to exist in adequate places, but, just as the rational soul can be in a greater and smaller body and consequently can also be present to a greater or smaller place or space, so also angelic substance can be present to a greater or smaller place within its sphere, just as it also can operate in a greater or smaller place according to its liberty. But truly the divine substance is defined and determined by natural necessity so as always to be actually present wherever it can be, whether this presence be conceived and declared by us through order to real places, or to imaginary spaces. So however that with respect to imaginary space it be understood simply, but with respect to real places from the supposition that they exist; for they can not exist, according to God's will; but if they were not, neither would God be in them; if however they exist, God is necessarily in them. The reason for this is because this presence, insofar as it is something real in God, is not some thing

nor mode distinct from his substance by the nature of the thing; for this is incompatible with his simplicity, as is established from what was said above; therefore it belongs to God as necessarily as God's very substance; therefore just as God by natural necessity is eternal and always actually is in all times either true or imaginary, proportion being preserved, so also by natural necessity he is always actually present wherever he can be. This also pertains to his immutability; for angels are therefore locally mutable because they are not defined by natural necessity to a certain place, nor to an adequate place; but this mutability is incompatible with God, as we will see later; therefore it is necessary that he always actually have the adequate presence of his substance, which he can have on his part to any things or spaces.

45. God's presence, which is considered absolute from any real space, is enclosed by no boundaries. It remains that we prove that this mode of presence which naturally belongs to the divine substance cannot be limited to a finite place or space; for, this being demonstrated, it will be established that that substance is immense by its nature, because, as we said, immensity is nothing other than this presence, as far as it is on God's part, without any end or boundary. But that evidently follows from the attribute of infinity. And the inference can be declared in various ways; first, because, the more perfect a finite spiritual substance is, the more apt it is to exhibit itself totally present to a greater space, and, as perfection increases, the sphere of this presence increases; therefore, if the substance is infinitely perfect, its natural presence cannot be limited to a finite sphere; otherwise that inconvenience would follow which we insinuated above, namely, that finite and infinite substance would be equal in such a sphere, because no finite space can be designated to which as a whole a finite immaterial substance cannot be present, since in the perfection of such substance one can proceed infinitely, as we argued above in a similar argument.

46. Such presence expresses infinite perfection in God. Second, because this very presence is some perfection; therefore it

ought to be in God in the supreme degree of perfection of that order, because such perfection is not incompatible with any greater perfection; but the supreme degree of this perfection is that that presence should have no boundary of itself, but should be sufficient for filling all spaces or bodies with divine substance, even if they be increased infinitely; therefore God's infinite perfection requires this presence in this supreme degree of perfection. And it is confirmed, for, other things being equal, by the very fact that spiritual substance is apprehended as capable of such presence, it is conceived as more perfect than if it were understood as limited to finite space; therefore the divine substance is related in the former way, since it is such that better or more perfect cannot be thought. But if someone should say that that perfection or that mode of infinite presence is impossible, he could respond in the same way about any other divine perfection or infinite degree of it. Therefore it is necessary that contradiction or incompatibility be shown, which truly there is none; indeed, the intellect easily conceives this perfection as possible, indeed as most fitting to infinite nature.

47. No boundary can reasonably be set for such presence. Third, this very thing can be proved from what we have premised. For the divine substance could not be determined necessarily by any reasoning to one and the same immutable presence, if it could only exhibit it to finite space or body; for since this space is multiple and various, there would be no reason why it should naturally be determined to one rather than to another. For either we conceive that space as empty, and thus it is uniform and equally void; why therefore would the divine substance be defined to exhibit its presence in one part of it rather than in another? But if we consider real space filled with bodies, let us imagine God creating two or three worlds, why would he by natural necessity exhibit his presence to one of them rather than to another? Or, if it be supposed that he is in this world, since it is not contradictory for another more perfect one to be made, why would it be contradictory to transfer his presence there? And the

same argument can be made among the bodies of the same world, if this presence be imagined as determined and limited to some of them. Therefore that natural determination cannot arise except from infinity; for, because that presence is immense, and belongs to the divine substance in some infinite and ineffable way, therefore it always exhibits itself present to all things in the same way wherever and however they may be. Rather indeed if the divine substance were only apt to exist in a finite place, it would be a great imperfection to be as it were bound by natural necessity to that place or space, but it would be better to determine for itself by will the mode of presence or place in which it would want to be. But this otherwise detracts from immutability, and therefore does not pertain to perfection simply, but supposing some imperfection. And for this reason, in other immaterial substances, supposing the imperfection that they have limited places, it is much better to be able to move and transfer themselves from one place to another than to be immutable and bound to individual places.

### *What Aristotle & Other Philosophers Thought About God's Immensity*

48. From these considerations, therefore, it is demonstrated with sufficient evidence (as I believe) that it can be known by natural reason that God is immense. Nor should it be surprising that the ancient philosophers did not grasp the force of these arguments, because perhaps they did not think correctly enough about divine causality and universal action and infinite perfection, although it should not be thought that all were ignorant of divine immensity. For many philosophers as well as poets are cited by Clement of Alexandria, book V of Stromata, near the end; Lactantius, book I of Divine Institutes, chapter 5; and Cyril of Alexandria, book I against Julian, toward the end, as thinking correctly about the ubiquity of God. Among these, Hermes Trismegistus was preeminent, who acknowledged God to exist not only in this world, but also outside it

without any boundary, and therefore compared God to a perfect sphere, whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere. From Plato also and other philosophers, Ficinus and Eugubinus report many things, in the places cited above. And Cicero, in Academics I, says this was the opinion of the Platonists. That Thales of Miletus held the same view is gathered from Aristotle, book I On the Soul, text 86, where he reports that Thales said all things are full of gods. But concerning Aristotle himself, what he thought is doubtful, for in the places cited above he seems clearly to think that God exists in the circumference of the highest heaven. This indeed St. Thomas interprets as meaning that it should be understood in the manner in which we too say that God is in heaven in a special way, because there he shows himself in a singular manner. Thus St. Thomas says that Aristotle said God is in the place of heaven, because there he influences more and operates more efficaciously. Some also extend this explanation to the passage from the book On the World to Alexander. But if anyone should carefully consider that passage, he will see that it is a forced interpretation. To the passages taken from the Metaphysics and Physics VIII, it can be more easily accommodated, and therefore many even among the ancients interpreted Aristotle in this way, such as Simplicius, Physics VIII; Themistius, in Paraphrase of Metaphysics; Philoponus, On the Soul I, text 40; and among moderns Eugubinus, book IV On Perennial Philosophy, chapter 7; Vicomercatus, at the end of Physics VIII, and Toletus in the same place. This is supported by the fact that the same Aristotle, On the Heavens I, chapter 9, signifies that God also exists outside the ultimate sphere and there lives the most blessed life, although there he seems to speak universally about intelligences, concerning which we shall see below. It is also supported by the fact that the same Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals I, chapter 5, praises Heraclitus because, when he was sitting in a furnace room for the sake of warmth, he ordered his friends to enter, saying: "Since even in this place the immortal gods are not absent." Finally, it is supported by the fact that the philosophical principles by which we prove that God is in

every place are founded in Aristotelian doctrine. According to this opinion, therefore, it is necessary to deny that the book to Alexander is by Aristotle, which some moderns readily admit; however, this is not without difficulty, especially because of the authority of Justin, a most serious and ancient philosopher, as other careful and accurate investigators of antiquity have also observed; therefore the mind of Aristotle is quite uncertain in this matter.

### *The Difficulty About the Mode of Divine Immensity Is Explained*

49. One difficulty remains concerning the mode by which we have explained divine immensity, for we seem to attribute to the divine substance a certain disposition or mode of existing having actually a certain quasi-infinite extension, which we explain by comparison to infinite imaginary space. But this mode of existing seems to be repugnant to divine simplicity, because it cannot be understood without some distinction and composition of parts that compose that mode of existing, and consequently there must be some real distinction between that mode of presence and the substance whose mode it is. This is made clear by proportion to other immaterial substances; for when an angel has its whole substance present in an extended place, although in that mode of presence there is no extension on the part of the subject, which is indivisible, nevertheless some extension or distinction of parts is necessary in such a mode of presence in relation to the diverse parts of place or space, an evident sign of which is that the angel can cease to be present to one part of space and maintain presence to another; therefore it is a sign that those parts of presence are really distinct, otherwise one could not be destroyed while the other is preserved. Just as also in the rational soul united to the whole body we understand a mode of union to the whole body, although it does not have parts from the subject, namely, the soul, yet it has them through relation to the diverse parts of the body,

and the sign is that, when one part is cut off, for example, a hand, the soul loses partial union to that part of matter, while union to the remaining parts of the body is preserved; the same therefore should be understood proportionally in local presence. From which it seems further to be gathered that this presence to space is of such a nature and condition that it cannot through an indivisible entity or mode be present to or regard diverse spaces or diverse parts of space, but necessarily the partial and total presences must be distinguished or varied through relation to diverse spaces, whether total or partial. Indeed, from this it follows that whenever the relation to space is changed, the mode of presence is changed by losing one and acquiring another, because, namely, such a mode of presence is quasi-coextended with space and has its entity quasi-commensurate with it. From this, therefore, ascending to God, if the divine substance is understood by us as quasi-diffused through the whole extended space, it will also be necessary in that very presence, which is something in God, to understand a certain extension not on the part of God, but by comparison to the diverse parts of space, because that presence, insofar as it expresses a relation to this part, for example, where the center of the earth is, does not express a relation to that part where heaven is, and conversely.

50. The distinction between the mode of divine presence and all other created[11] modes. This difficulty has been posed only to declare the eminence of this divine immensity and the difference between it and all presences of created things, both corporeal and incorporeal, not only in that this presence of God is infinite while others are finite, but also in that this is entirely inextended and indivisible, while others are divisible and composite. For this latter point the argument made effectively proves, while the former is altogether necessary because of the supreme perfection and simplicity

[11] creatas, 1960; creaturas, ed. Vivès. "Al sustituir creatas por creaturas nos apartamos de la ed. Vivès, por creer que así lo exige la idea que se expone", Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 460.

of the divine substance. For it is not necessary that in this imperfection the divine presence should be similar to finite presences. Indeed, if in this it were similar to them, it could not be infinite; for in something formally extended and composed of parts, no more can an infinite entity without boundary be understood than there can be a magnitude simply infinite. But truly, because the divine presence is in itself entirely indivisible and inextended, whether it be conceived in itself absolutely, or by comparison to any extended body or space, therefore it is easily understood that it can be simply infinite in its intensity and perfection, and eminently in extension, because indeed, existing as indivisible, it so constitutes the divine substance present to extended places and spaces as if it were coextended with them.

51. From this is gathered another noteworthy difference between the divine substance and other immaterial ones; for others, when they are in an extended place, although they have their whole substance in the whole and the whole in any part, nevertheless they do not have their whole presence in any part, and the rational soul, although it is whole in the whole and whole in any part, nevertheless does not have its whole union with any part, which the argument made above sufficiently proves, because it can lose part of its union, and then it does not lose part of its substance; therefore it is a sign that where it has its whole substance it does not always have its whole presence. But truly the divine substance is so entirely wherever it is that there also it has its whole presence and immensity. This indeed, as it is worthy of admiration, so also is most worthy of divine eminence and perfection, because, since it has no parts in any of its perfections, it cannot have anything of its perfection anywhere, in whatever way it is considered, without also having the whole there; and therefore, wherever it exhibits itself as present, it exhibits its whole immensity. And from this it is also understood that, although sometimes we speak in our manner about this divine presence as if it were a mode or disposition of the divine substance, so that we might explain its infinite presence and immensity, nevertheless in truth it is not a mode,

but the very divine substance itself without any real distinction. And this is another difference between this presence and all created ones, for all others are accidental modes with respect to the substances in which they inhere, which local motion clearly manifests, for through it they can be acquired and lost; but truly in God alone this presence is the very substance and essence of God.

52. Whether God is locally present everywhere. Finally, it could be asked here whether by reason of this immensity God should be said to exist locally wherever he is present. But, given what we have already said, I think this question can only be about terminology, and therefore I omit it; for from what we shall say below about the category of location, it will be clear how one should speak about this both concerning God and other things; for that question can be common to angels and also to some bodies. I only note that, if that local existence expresses an intrinsic and accidental denomination, in this way it can in no manner belong to God, as is clear from what has been said, and in this also God differs from creature; but if it expresses only an extrinsic denomination taken from some contact, either proper or metaphorical, in this way God is truly said to be locally in the whole universe, but not outside it. For, insofar as he confers being on all things, he is said to be in all things by touching them and filling them with his power, and in this way St. Thomas says, I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1, that God is in place through contact of power; but in this way God is said to be locally in things not by circumscription, which is proper to bodies, nor by definition, which implies limitation, but in a more eminent way, which we signify when we say God is everywhere. Finally, if local existence expresses only an intrinsic denomination taken from substantial presence absolutely and simply involving no accident, in this way God can be said to exist locally through his immensity, not only in the world, but also outside the world, and not only from the creation of the world, but also from eternity; but this local existence is not existence in something other than in himself; it declares, however, such a mode of existing of that substance that by

reason of it it is naturally fitted to be intimately present and undistant from any other thing, wherever it exists or comes to be, and in whatever mass of bodies, even if it should be increased to infinity. So much so that, if per impossibile something should begin to exist without God's action, nevertheless it could not be distant from him, because of his immensity, but they would necessarily exist simultaneously, and quasi-penetratively according to their substance and entity. Although in that case God would not be said to be in that thing locally, because he would not touch it by any contact, even metaphorical, but he would be said to be there where that thing was, just as, if two bodies penetrate each other, one indeed is where the other is, nevertheless one would not be the place of the other, nor would one be in the other, properly speaking. But because the hypothesis is impossible and nothing can exist except through divine action, therefore from the fact that God absolutely and of himself exists in an immense manner locally in this last sense, it follows quite necessarily that, when any other thing exists, God is also necessarily in it locally in the prior sense. Whence it also happens that, although God does not operate somewhere nor has he ever decreed to operate there, nevertheless from the mode of existing of his substance he has his power sufficiently applied so that he operates if he wills, because of which special reason also that last sense of existing locally attributed to God is less improper, although the prior one seems more customary.

## SECTION VIII

## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD IS IMMUTABLE AND ETERNAL

1. We join these two because, since we have shown above that God is infinite in duration, from the lack of both beginning and end due to the intrinsic necessity of being, if we now prove that he is also immutable, the definition of eternity will be concluded and that it

belongs to God most perfectly in its entirety. Concerning what this eternity is, we shall speak more extensively below in disputation L, where, treating the common notion of duration and comparing it with others, it will be more easily understood, and therefore we shall not say more about eternity here.

*Resolution of the Question*

2. It must be said, therefore, that it can be sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason that God is immutable. This attribute, according to all that it includes, I do not think can be proved evidently from any effect immediately, but must be demonstrated from other attributes quasi a priori. First, from the simplicity of God; for every change, if it is properly taken, requires some composition, because it is necessary that some subject remain under both terms of the change, which through change acquires or loses something, which cannot happen without composition. But if change is taken more broadly and improperly, so as to comprehend creation or annihilation also, thus it requires at least composition of being and essence or of act and objective potency, which (whatever it may be) cannot fall upon God. Again, this very thing can be shown from the necessity of being and the perfection of such being; for from the prior consideration it follows that he cannot be substantially changed, and from the latter that he cannot be accidentally changed either. The first part is clear, for, since God necessarily exists of himself, he cannot acquire his existence simply through any action or change, and, since he depends on nothing, he cannot lose it; therefore he cannot be substantially changed. The latter part is proved because, since God has all perfection of being with the same necessity with which he exists, he cannot suffer diminution in it; but since he has in himself the fullness of all perfection, he cannot receive increase according to it; therefore he cannot suffer change either perfective, or corruptive, or diminutive of perfection; therefore none at all.

3. Finally, this can be demonstrated by running through various kinds of accidental changes; for concerning substantial ones, enough has been said. Among accidental changes, however, some are corporeal, which clearly have no place in God, since it has been demonstrated that God is not corporeal. Others are spiritual changes, which terminate either to place befitting a spiritual thing or to quality; for I omit relations, which, in the way they exist, follow upon other changes; I also omit immanent actions as actions, for there is no change to them, but rather they themselves are certain changes (I speak of true accidental actions), which always (as I think) terminate to some qualities. Therefore change to place cannot exist in God because of his immensity, which God has from intrinsic necessity just like his other perfections, whence he neither has anywhere to be carried anew, nor can he deprive himself of any place, any more than of his very substance or immensity.

4. But change to spiritual quality only has place according to intellect or will. For that change which can be made immediately in the essence of a spiritual substance is not natural, but supernatural, as is that which is made through grace, and thus it is not of present consideration. Especially because it cannot exist except through participation in some superior and supernatural being from some superior principle. Whence it is also evident that such change cannot have place in the substance of the first principle itself. Again, that change which seems to be made in the divine, or rather through the divine power, when he produces some things externally which he did not produce before, is not change in God, but in the creature; for it is transient action either formally or virtually, which, properly speaking, neither makes nor requires change in the agent, but in the patient or effect, although from it there results some new extrinsic denomination, which does not suffice for change. Only a difficulty occurred here about the mystery of the Incarnation, but that pertains not to the present doctrine, but to theology, and has been treated extensively in tome I of the Third Part. But insofar as this external

action proceeds from some immanent act of God, thus it proceeds from an eternal act of intellect and will. Concerning these we shall speak below. Now, so that all change may also be excluded from them, let the general reasons suffice, namely, that every change is imperfection and supposes imperfection, and that in God there is no quality, and that also according to intellect and will he is pure act. Finally, in all things that God understands or wills by necessity, this lacks all difficulty; concerning free things, however, we shall speak immediately.

### *Aristotle's Argument is Examined*

5. But two difficulties remain to be clarified concerning this assertion. One is about local immutability, not concerning the assertion itself, but concerning the physical proof, for that which we have adduced is metaphysical. But it can be doubted whether it can be demonstrated by physical means, and especially it is customarily asked whether it was sufficiently demonstrated by Aristotle in Physics VIII and Metaphysics XII. For the affirmative part is confirmed by his authority and his argument, which is of this kind: Everything that is moved is moved by another; the highest heaven is moved; therefore by another; either therefore that mover is also moved, and thus will need another mover, concerning which the same question will return; since therefore one cannot proceed to infinity, one must stop at a first mover entirely immobile, whom we call God. But immediately a response presents itself, that it is not always necessary for the mover to be a distinct supposit, but it suffices that the same supposit be distinguished into a part moving per se and a part moved per se, as Aristotle himself concedes and is clear in animals, and in these it is not necessary for the mover to be immobile simply, since that part, for example, the soul, is moved per accidens to the motion of the whole; thus therefore it could be said of the first mover, especially if heaven is animate, as Aristotle seems to teach in other places. But to this

objection the same Aristotle responds, because a mover moving for infinite time cannot be moved even per accidens; but the first mover moves the first mobile for infinite time; therefore it cannot be moved even per accidens. The major is proved, because one who, while moving, is moved per accidens, grows weak in moving; but what moves thus cannot move with perpetual and uniform motion, since its power is diminished; thus far Aristotle.

6. The first difficulty in the Aristotelian argument. Nevertheless, difficulties still remain in that argument. The first is that it is not sufficiently proved that a mover moved per accidens cannot move perpetually, for, although this is detected by experience in corruptible movers and moved things, nevertheless it is not permissible to argue from this to incorruptible ones, such as celestial things are; for the reason is far different. For a corruptible thing moving therefore becomes fatigued in moving and cannot persevere long in that motion, because such motion is violent in some respect, as is clear in animals, to which, although progressive motion is natural insofar as they are animals, nevertheless, insofar as they are heavy bodies, they suffer something violent in that motion, by ascending, or elevating members, or striving, or sustaining erectly. Another reason also intervenes, namely, because the instruments of this motion are altered and carried away while they move, and therefore they become fatigued in moving; animal spirits are also dissipated and consumed, in which great force is placed for perfecting this motion. But in the motion of incorruptible things these reasons cease; for that motion is simple and without any violence, and causes no alteration in the mobile or in the mover, even if we grant that it is moved per accidens; therefore it could move perpetually, even if it were moved in such a way.

7. The second difficulty is that the proximate movers at least of the lower celestial orbs are finite intelligences, and, according to Aristotle, each is in a determinate part of its mobile; therefore, although such intelligence were moved per accidens to the motion of

its orb, it could nevertheless move it perpetually, because it moves by its will and without any fatigue, which will it could have perpetually, even if it were carried along with its mobile. Nor would it be more wearied in that passive motion than in active motion. And it is confirmed, for, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 52, these intelligences are moved per accidens at least to the motion of some superior orb, and yet they move perpetually. You will say from the same Aristotle that to be moved per accidens by another does not conflict with perpetual motion, but to be moved per accidens by oneself impedes it. But certainly, if these are taken with the same proportion, the reason of each seems to be the same, for, if that which is moved by another per accidens is corruptible and is altered by that motion and is drawn from natural disposition, it will not be able to persevere long in moving; but if on the contrary what is moved by itself per accidens is incorruptible and is altered by nothing through that motion and needs no other instruments for perfecting that motion than will, it will be equally able to persevere in that motion as if it were moved by another.

8. Whence the argument that is customarily made here also has no force, namely: what is per accidens can contingently not be; therefore what is moved per accidens can contingently not be moved; therefore it will not move perpetually, if, while it moves, it is moved per accidens. For this argument, if it were valid, would also prove that what is moved per accidens by another cannot be moved thus perpetually, for, if something that is per accidens is perpetually, that universal proposition is false which says everything that is per accidens can contingently not be. In which there seems to be committed an equivocation in that expression per accidens; for insofar as it signifies the same as contingently and by chance, it is true that things that happen per accidens sometimes do not happen; but truly, insofar as that expression signifies not per se primarily, but to be done or to follow through another to the motion of another, thus it is not universally true that whatever is done per accidens sometimes fails; for

it can follow necessarily from the motion of another. Which, if it is perpetual, that other thing will also follow perpetually, even if it is said to be done per accidens.

9. Physical reasoning alone is insufficient for demonstrating God's immutability. I think therefore (which Scotus also noted, In I, dist. 8, q. 1) that from physical motion alone it cannot be sufficiently proved that there exists some mover of heaven entirely immobile, because, unless it is otherwise supposed that the first mover is immense, nothing would conflict with its being in a determinate part of heaven and impressing its impetus on it, and being carried along with the mobile itself, as if sitting on that part of its mobile, like a charioteer in a chariot. For it would not therefore grow weak or be destitute of motive power. Just as angels, who according to theological doctrine assume bodies and move them and are moved per accidens to their motion, nevertheless, even if they move them without cessation for any length of time, even with quasi-progressive motion, they are diminished nothing in power and efficacy of moving, because they are not fatigued, nor are they altered by moving thus, nor do they need corruptible instruments which become duller by acting. I add furthermore that, by that argument taken precisely, it is not proved that the first mover of heaven cannot be moved per se, much less per accidens, in the way that an angel moves itself. Because, unless we suppose the first mover to be immense, but to exist in a finite place, it could move itself not only per accidens, but per se from one place to another, and then it would move itself by its will, but would be moved according to its substance, and in this way that principle would be sufficiently verified in it: Everything that is moved is moved by another. Nor would it therefore desist from the motion of heaven, because it could simultaneously move both itself and its mobile, especially since it is truer that the first mover does not immediately move the first mobile.

10. Therefore I do not think that argument is rendered more efficacious, even if it is added that the first mover is such that it

ultimately moves for its own sake, as Aristotle seems to have added, Metaphysics XII, chapter 7, where he transfers the discourse from physical motion to metaphysical, which is through intellect and will, and concludes that God moves as desirable and lovable, and therefore is a mover entirely immobile. And virtually he argues in this manner: Either the first mover moves for its own sake or for another's; if for another's, therefore it was not the first mover, for prior is that for whose sake it moves; concerning which the same question will be made, and, since one cannot proceed to infinity, one must stop at something moving for its own sake: therefore that will be entirely immobile, since it is no longer allured by another to move. But in this argument I do not see the force and efficacy of this last consequence, neither concerning physical motion nor concerning metaphysical; for, although it moves for its own sake, it could move itself for its own sake, if we imagine it to be contained in a finite place and for presence in another place to be either useful or pleasant to it. Similarly, although it itself allures itself, it could through true change of will want to move for its own sake, which certainly does not conflict with the precise fact that it moves for its own sake; therefore from this means neither physical nor metaphysical immobility is gathered. And the a priori reason is that from physical motion or from the fact that the first mover moves for its own sake, just as it is not efficaciously gathered that God is simply infinite, so neither that he is immense, and consequently neither that he is entirely immutable; therefore it is necessary to have recourse to metaphysical means. And (as I said in the beginning) from effects alone the complete immutability of God cannot be immediately concluded, but one must use demonstration quasi a priori from other attributes previously demonstrated.

## SECTION IX

## HOW IMMUTABILITY STANDS WITH DIVINE FREEDOM

1. This difficulty could have been deferred until section 16; for it concerns the freedom of the divine will. Nevertheless, because that later treatment only supposes that God is free in willing things outside himself, which is evident enough, and divine immutability could not be treated precisely without addressing this difficulty, it seemed best not to defer it any longer.

2. The reason for the present difficulty is that a free act is something in God, and by the very fact that it is free, it can not be in God; therefore according to that act God is necessarily mutable. It will be said that although God can absolutely not have a free act, nevertheless, if he is going to have it, he has it from eternity, and if he once has it, he cannot lack it, which is sufficient for immutability. Thus St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 7, explains divine immutability in his will. And this would be a sufficient response if a free act in God added nothing to his necessary being; but if it does add something, as the argument assumes, it does not seem to satisfy. First, because although change in the strict sense occurs when something is in a different state now according to duration than it was before, nevertheless there is also some mode of change and imperfection when something is added to a thing according to different signs of nature by reason of which it is in a different state now than it was before by nature. For thus the justification of an angel, or knowledge or volition that were made in him in the first instant of his creation, were certain changes, even if they were only posterior in the order of nature. Thus therefore it seems to happen in God in these free acts; for his will considered in itself has none of these acts, and in reality can lack any of them; therefore the divine will by nature first lacks these acts and then is affected by them; therefore it is changed and truly something is added in eternity that could not be added, and something could also be added that is not added because he himself does not will it.

3. It is further argued that, whatever may be said about the name of change, nevertheless by this example all the reasons that are

made for God's immutability are weakened, at least insofar as they exclude accidental change. For here there intervenes a true addition of some thing, and consequently of some perfection; there also intervenes some potentiality to an act that God's will could have and will never have. Scarcely also can a sufficient reason be given why, if the divine will is capable of acts of this kind, it cannot by its freedom suspend some free decree from eternity and have it in time. For if it is capable of that thing or perfection that the free act has, and by its own choice can either have it perpetually or perpetually lack it, why will it not be able first not to have it in eternity and afterwards to have it? Or conversely, if it had it from eternity, why will it not be able to omit it in time, at least after it has fulfilled the effect that it willed through that act? As, if it willed to create or conserve a thing for two years, after that is done, it will be able to cease not only from the extrinsic effect, but also from that act that it had in itself, because it is not necessary to it per se, nor is it necessary that it decreed from eternity to endure perpetually in it.

### *First Opinion: That These Are Extrinsic Denominations in God*

4. This difficulty is one of the more obscure ones that theologians treat concerning God; however, because it does not exceed natural principles, it could not be entirely passed over by us. The first response therefore is of certain persons saying that acts of this kind say nothing in God beyond extrinsic denominations, because for God to will something outside himself (they say) is nothing other than to make some change in that thing for some time, or to confer some being, which is in God's power to do or not to do and, when he does it, he is said to will it; when however he does not do it, he is said not to will it, not because he himself is in a different state, but only because the thing itself is in a different state. Gregory reports this

opinion, In I, dist. 45, and Capr., q. 1, a. 2, and Altisid. indicates it, I parte Sum., c. 13.

5. It is refuted. However, it can in no way be defended, first according to the principles of faith, by which it is certain that God not metaphorically but properly loves and wills other things outside himself, as the sacred Scriptures passim attribute to him, which are understood not metaphorically but properly by the Fathers, whom it is not our purpose now to cite. Let that suffice from Ps. 113: "Whatever he willed, he did," where willing is sufficiently distinguished from effecting, and both are attributed to God. That passage to the Ephesians, 1, harmonizes with this: "Who works all things according to the counsel of his will": and that from Wisdom, 11: "How could anything remain unless you had willed it?" From these testimonies a reason can also be formed; for God is truly said to act something because he wills to confer goods, because he loves, according to that passage of John, 3: "For God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son," and that to the Galatians, 4: "On account of his exceeding love with which God loved us, he sent his Son"; therefore for God to will something and to do it are not formally and according to reason the same, but the doing itself, which is extrinsic to God, is an effect of his willing or love. It is further argued that according to true principles of theology, not every will of God that is exercised concerning created or creatable objects makes some real change in them formally and immediately, as is the efficacious will by which he elects the predestined to glory, concerning which matter I have said more in volume I of part III, disp. V, sect. 1.

6. The preceding opinion is refuted by natural reason. Second, that opinion is also disapproved by natural reason, because willing, loving and similar denominations, since they are vital, cannot be entirely extrinsic; therefore either God does not love, or he loves through love that is in him. Second, because acting in that way, namely with indifference of acting and not acting, and nevertheless determining oneself to act immediately and formally through the

external action itself, both is an unintelligible and impossible mode, and, even if it were possible, would be most imperfect and unworthy of God. The first is evident; for how can it be understood that the sun is not naturally determined to illuminate, even when the patient is applied and other things required for acting concur, and yet determines itself to illuminate only through the illumination that is received in the patient? For why is it determined now and not before? Surely no reason can be given because it now illuminates; for we seek the reason of this, which must be given from the part of the agent itself, because we suppose it is not determined by another; but through a merely extrinsic action it cannot determine itself, if it was otherwise indifferent, because through that action it cannot will nor have in itself determination to act. In which there is a great difference between the will and similar agents; for the will by its internal action wills not only the object, but the action itself, and therefore can determine itself through it. The second is evident, because that mode of determination of an indifferent potency would not really be through the mode of a vital act, but only through the mode of extrinsic action; but this mode is imperfect. Furthermore, in such a mode of action and determination it could not be understood that it would be properly and formally on account of an end, from the intention and relation of the agent; for that relation is not necessary, but free; for God can work one effect for various ends; but this relation is not formally in the extrinsic action itself, indeed it does not always appear in it; therefore such a mode of operating for an end cannot be attributed to God from extrinsic denomination alone, but rather conversely through denomination from God's internal act his external action is said to be for such an end; therefore the aforesaid opinion can in no way be defended.

*Second Opinion: That They Are Free Perfections in God*

7. Second, others, convinced by the reasons given, concede that God is denominated as willing those things that he freely wills from something that is intrinsically in him. Hence, since that denomination with respect to creatures is not necessarily in God, they consequently say that that thing or perfection that gives God such a denomination is not simply necessary to God, but could not be in him, although, after it exists, it cannot be separated from God. Thus Cajetan holds, I, q. 19, a. 2 and 3. The foundation has already been touched upon, and it is certainly most difficult, because it seems impossible that the same form according to the very same real aspect should give some intrinsic denomination, and that the same remaining entirely the same and informing or quasi-informing in the same way, or joined to the supposit, could not give that denomination. But God is denominated as willing a creature from some form or quasi-form really and intrinsically existing in him; therefore it is impossible that that denomination should proceed from the force of formal and essential perfection alone that necessarily belongs to God. The consequence is proved, because this denomination or quasi-formal effect does not belong necessarily to God; therefore it cannot formally proceed from a simply necessary perfection, for this, since it is the same and joined to God in the same way, can only always give the same necessary denomination. Otherwise the same form united in the same way could give a new or different quasi-formal effect, which cannot be understood. As, if my will has one and indivisible act unchanged and without any addition and affecting it in the same way, it cannot be understood that now it constitutes it formally as willing such an object, and yet that remaining in the same way it could not constitute it as willing that object.

8. And it is confirmed, for in eternity itself the divine will, before by reason it wills this or that object outside itself, is understood as able to will or not will it, otherwise it would not be free, and in that sign it is understood with all the perfection that is necessarily in it and then it is understood as actually willing such an object; therefore it is

necessary that something real be understood to be added to God, from which such denomination and quasi-information has arisen. The consequence is evident, because that denomination is not of reason, but real, because God truly and in reality wills and loves such an object; nor is it extrinsic, as has been shown, and it is new, if not in duration, at least in the order of nature and separability, because absolutely speaking it could not be in God; therefore it is necessary that it proceed from a real intrinsic form and separable of itself from every thing and perfection that necessarily belongs to God.

9. The response that is usually given to the reasons made for Cajetan is weakened. To these and similar arguments it is usually responded that for God to will a creature is partly a denomination of reality, partly of reason; for as it is willing, it is something real; but as it is said to be willing of this or that object, only a relation of reason is added. Therefore by the former aspect that denomination is taken from a real act that is necessarily in God; but by the latter aspect that denomination is not simply necessary, but free, because that respect of reason does not necessarily belong to that act. But this response does not resolve the difficulty touched upon. First, because a respect of reason, properly and strictly taken, as it is something feigned by the intellect and existing only objectively in it, is not necessary for God to be truly said to will something freely, for although no intellect feigns or thinks such a thing, God truly and in reality wills what he freely loves. For who can posit that love as dependent on such a fiction or respect? But if respect of reason is taken more broadly for that foundation which is given to our intellect from the part of the thing for thinking of things with this respect, thus it is not really something feigned by reason, but something real, which cannot be unless it is either an extrinsic denomination, or something real intrinsic having a transcendental respect to another which our intellect conceives through the mode of a true relation. But in the present case this foundation is not an extrinsic denomination, as we have shown; therefore it must be something real intrinsic including a

transcendental relation to such an object; therefore something of this kind is added to God when he is said to will this object freely. And indeed denominations of this kind of willing, loving, knowing, as they are determined to such objects from their genus, do not express relations of reason, but transcendental relations, which exist in the things themselves.

10. And it is confirmed, for if our intellect now understands two things without a relation of reason and without foundation of it, and then understands between those two things some respect of reason not merely gratuitously contrived but founded in them, it is necessary that some change or addition has been made in the things themselves, by reason of which the intellect conceives that respect for explaining the things themselves. But our intellect conceives God according to all things that necessarily belong to him in his eternity as loving himself, and as such it does not conceive in him any relation of reality or reason, unless perhaps to possible creatures; then however it conceives God as loving, for example, Peter, whom he elects to eternal glory, and then it conceives a relation of reason to him, and furthermore it conceives that the occasion or foundation of that relation is not taken from Peter, who from himself always remains in the same way; therefore it understands it to be founded in God himself, who is in a different state toward Peter than he would be in the prior sign; therefore it is necessary to understand that something real has been added to God, in which that relation of reason is founded. Finally it is explained in this way, for this addition, which is understood to be made in God through a free act in eternity according to different signs of reason, is such that, if it were made in time, God would really be changed; therefore it is not only an addition of reason, but true and real. The consequence is evident, because through the addition of relations of reason alone God is not changed, whence many respects of this kind belong to him from time. But the antecedent is evident, because otherwise it would not be inconvenient for that addition to be made to God from time, and consequently God

could begin to will something freely in time, because, if there were some inconvenience, it would be especially because he would be changed.

### *The Said Opinion Is Disapproved*

11. These arguments, if we look at pure natural reason, are so difficult that they seem to render this part probable and likely; nevertheless, if we think truly and worthily about God, and especially as we are taught by faith, we can in no way assent to this opinion, even if we had to confess our ignorance in resolving all these difficulties. And thus Ferrara, I cont. Gent., c. 75, and more recent commentators on St. Thomas, in I parte, gravely reject and reprove this opinion of Cajetan. The foundation is that from that opinion of Cajetan many imperfections are attributed to God. First, that he is capable of addition of real perfection, and that this addition is partly made in eternity, but partly is not made, but that capacity remains in God not reduced to act. Cajetan responds that this perfection is not great or simply simple, but only in a certain respect, and therefore those things are not inconvenient, because without such addition God remains supremely perfect, and with it he does not remain more perfect intensively, but quasi-extensively, because in his essence he contains eminently all that perfection. This response is disapproved by some on the grounds that they judge it absurd to posit in God some diminished perfection and one that is only in a certain respect. But this, unless something else is added, does not seem to be a great inconvenience, because we admit in the Trinity relative perfections, which formally are not perfections simply simple, but only in their proper genera or aspects, and in that sense can be called perfections in a certain respect.

12. Although, since Cajetan does not admit this in relations, the argument has greater efficacy against him. And furthermore I judge there to be a far different reason concerning absolute and relative perfections; for relative perfection from its intrinsic nature has

it that it cannot be a perfection simply without any imperfection, because that opposition is not an imperfection, nor does it exclude from individual relations every other perfection simply, and infinity in the genus of being, together with infinite perfection in its proper genus. But truly absolute perfection from this general aspect does not have that it is not a perfection simply; otherwise no perfection could be simply. Therefore that some absolute perfection is not simply a perfection always proceeds from admixed imperfection. For since from the common aspect of absolute perfection it has no repugnance with any other greater or equal perfection, that it should have such repugnance according to its proper aspect is not without imperfection. Especially because every opposition between absolutes always includes imperfection, at least on the part of one extreme which is imperfect.

13. But this general reason is more clearly declared and strengthened, descending in particular to the perfection of which we speak. First indeed, because, if a free act of the divine will expresses some perfection, I ask what that might be. Cajetan responds that it is the perfection of liberality, mercy, or justice, or of another similar virtue, which can be exercised through acts of most upright will. But liberality, mercy and justice are perfections simply, otherwise they would not be formally in God. But if Cajetan says that liberality, for example, in first act is a perfection simply, but in second act is a perfection, not however simply, first, speaking as he speaks of second immanent act, he involves a contradiction in the very terms, because second act by its genus is more perfect than first. Then he attributes great imperfection to God, positing in him a first act proper and separable from the second and actualizable through it. Nor is it sufficient if someone says that such a first act is always and necessarily in some second act, as, for example, liberality in actual and simple affection toward the honesty of liberality. Because this does not exclude that with respect to some second act it is truly a first act; for to that it is in potency of itself, and through it it is constituted in ultimate

act under that aspect. Finally, why is such a first act rather a perfection simply than such a second act? Certainly no reason for this can be given, unless on account of some adjoined imperfection, and that which is imbibed in the very terms of first and second act is sufficient; nevertheless it sufficiently declares that such an act, both second and first, cannot be a perfection simply, because neither is a pure act, since they are compared to each other as potency and act.

14. Second, that free act, which in its order is conceived as second and ultimate, such that according to its proper real perfection and entity it can not be in God and consequently simply not be, by this very fact includes great imperfection; for what can be more manifest than to be able not to be? You will say: after it once exists, it cannot not be. But what does this matter for excluding imperfection simply? For first it does not have this from itself, but at most from the immobility and constancy (so to speak) of the divine will; nevertheless, if the condition and nature of that free perfection is considered, it will not of itself be repugnant to again not be, since it is absolutely not a necessary being. Second, this very thing, namely, not to be a being absolutely and intrinsically necessary without that hypothesis, is a sufficiently great imperfection, namely, to be able absolutely and simply not to be. Which third can be evidently seen in the free acts that God could have had and did not have nor will ever have; for they are absolutely nothing now, and, since they could have been, they have their non-repugnance to being, and thus are simply possible objectively; but this is a quasi-transcendental imperfection of creatures. Indeed all the Saints place the root of all imperfections of created beings in this, that they are nothing of themselves. Fourth, from this it necessarily follows that these acts, when they are, cannot be their being quidditatively and essentially; for a being that is of this kind can never be conceived or be under nothing; but a being that is not essentially its being is participated, finite and imperfect being.

15. Fifth, principally and chiefly it is necessary that such an act be actually distinct in reality itself from the divine will, if not as a

thing entirely distinct (for this neither follows of necessity, nor can it be called into controversy by any Catholic), at least as a mode truly distinct in reality itself from the modified thing; but this is most absurd. The consequence is evident, because this act is said to be really added to the will itself; but real addition cannot be understood without distinction in reality, especially then when the addition is such that it can not be made. But the minor can be proved in many ways from what was said above concerning God's simplicity; for that modal distinction openly excludes all manner of simplicity from God. Which seems evident from the very terms, because a thing taken nakedly is simpler than one affected by a mode distinct in reality itself, or than that constituted whole that results from it and the mode. Likewise, because a composite is nothing other than consisting of extremes distinct in reality itself, as we said above.

16. From which it is further necessary that the divine will be compared to such a mode as true potency to its distinct act, and this for a double reason. First in the aspect of eliciting and truly efficient potency; for what is lacking to such an act that it might truly and properly be made? Is it perhaps that it is not really but modally distinguished? But this makes no difference, for even modes distinct by nature of the thing are produced through true efficiency, especially when they are not joined with the nature itself through natural resultance. Or does it rather hinder that such acts, when they are, are from eternity? But this also makes no difference, for creation or illumination could also be eternal with true efficiency. That could certainly be said more apparently, that those acts are not made, because they are from the divine substance itself, just as the divine Word is not made, because it is produced from the substance of God. But, although this suffices so that such an act cannot be said to be created, because it is not really made from nothing, nevertheless this cannot prevent it from being made through true efficiency, because it will not be from the substance of God as from an essence, but as from a subject.

17. Whence from this it is further inferred that the divine will is compared to such an act not only under the aspect of active potency, but also through the mode of receptive and almost passive potency, from which such an act is educed and whatever proper entity is in it. Which indeed has no place in the example adduced concerning the production of the Son; for the Son is so produced from the substance of the Father that he is not something distinct from that substance, but a most simple supposit subsisting in it and identical with it. But truly this act of which we speak is produced from the substance as something distinct from it. Whence it cannot be understood that its production is not true effection, and, since it is not creation, it will be eduction from a presupposed subject; therefore there intervenes there a true aspect of active and passive potency. And it is confirmed, for it has been shown that that act is not necessary being and through essence; but every action through which some being is made or communicated that is not of the essence of the thing produced is true effection; therefore it follows that there is something in God truly made and that is not God; for nothing made is God. Likewise, because it has been shown that that act is not necessary being, nor is it its being through essence; therefore it is not God.

18. Finally, it follows that such an act is a true accident of the divine substance, and its production is not only effection, but also imperfect, namely accidental. I prove the consequence first from the definition, because that act can be present and absent, and otherwise is outside the whole substance of the thing, which without it would be integral and substantially consummated. Perhaps they will say it cannot be present and absent, because, if it is present, it cannot be absent, nor conversely. But this is frivolous, both because from this at most it becomes an inseparable accident; and also because for the nature of an accident it is not necessary that it can be present and absent in the sense of composition, but it suffices in the sense of division, that is, that as much as is from itself, it is so outside the substance of the thing that it can be present or absent from it, whether

one can succeed after another or not. Otherwise it could be said that this act is not an accident, because it is not a distinct thing, but a mode. But this also is of no moment, because a mode is not outside the latitude of accident, as can easily be shown by induction, and will be treated below. Whence also concerning the acts of our will it has not yet been explored whether they are distinct things or modes, although it is established that they are accidents. Finally that free act, insofar as it is a mode of the divine will, is either substance or accident, for there is no middle; but it is not substance, because it cannot be uncreated, since it is distinguished from that, nor even created, because it could not be within God or actuate the divine will. Nor can it be substance as a substantial mode of uncreated substance, since it in no way pertains to the constitution or complement of substance; therefore it remains that it is an accident.

### *The Preceding Opinion Is Explained & Defended*

19. Some of the defenders of Cajetan's opinion saw these inconveniences and rightly feared to admit them, and therefore to avoid them they attempted so to declare or temper it that they say these acts or free perfections indeed add something to the necessary perfection of God, but that addition existing actually in God is in no way distinguished by nature of the thing from the necessary perfection of God himself. Because these two do not seem repugnant, namely, that something is added and that it is not distinct; for by the very fact that it is joined to the substance of God, it becomes the substance of God itself. For divine Filiation, for example, adds some perfection to the essence of God considered according to itself, which addition is produced or co-produced through the generation of the Son, to speak in our manner, and yet it is not distinguished in any way in reality from the substance of God; therefore, etc. But if these two are not incompossible, by asserting both all difficulties are optimally resolved. For if free acts of this kind add something real, it is easily understood

how they formally constitute God as freely willing; but if that which they add is not distinguished in reality from the divine will, the inconveniences that seemed to be inferred from Cajetan's opinion cease. And thus it is also understood optimally how in these acts there is immutability; for what they add is added to the divine will from eternity, because, since God has infinite knowledge, he has nothing that he should await for every free determination; and, since his will is infinitely perfect, it ought not remain suspended and as if uncertain through infinite eternity, and therefore from eternity it has every free decree of its own. And because what such a decree adds is entirely identified with God himself, therefore both it is added without any shadow of change, and it remains inseparable and immutable.

### *Refutation of the Explanation and Defense*

20. Nevertheless, this way of speaking both joins together other impossibilities and contradictions, and, once these are posited, it still cannot avoid the most serious difficulties that have been raised. Therefore, it does not solve the difficulty but rather increases it. I shall explain each point: for in the first place, it is impossible in general that any two absolute things should be related in such a way that one can exist while the other does not exist, and yet that they are not distinguished in reality. This principle has been extensively proven above in treating the distinctions of things, and in the present case it will immediately be proven specifically. But the divine will and this free perfection which is said to be added are so related that the divine will can exist, absolutely speaking, without such free perfection existing in the nature of things; therefore it cannot be conceived by the mind that in reality they are entirely the same without any distinction in reality. This is made clear in the free acts which could be in the divine will but in fact are not. For it is necessary that the divine will be distinguished from them as being from non-being, or as being in act from possible being, which distinction is certainly not fabricated

by the intellect, but is observed in the things themselves. Hence if those two are considered according to the being of essence, they are distinguished in the highest degree from the nature of the thing; for the will has actual necessary essence, but the free perfection has possible or contingent essence (taking the term "contingent" broadly insofar as it is opposed to everything necessary); but this is not only a distinction, but indeed the primary diversity which can be found between real essences, as is clear from what was said in disputation XXVIII. Moreover, this entire diversity also exists between the divine will and the free perfection which has in fact been added to it; for even this free perfection was by its own nature first under possible being rather than actual being, and it has a possible essence which, as far as it is from itself, could not actually be; but a thing of this kind has the same essence whether it actually exists or not; therefore it retains the same distinction from any other essence from which it is distinguished of itself in the being of essence. Especially since it is necessary that the being of existence also be distinguished on the part of the thing in such things; for the being of existence of the divine will is being through essence intrinsically necessary; but the being of existence of that free perfection is not thus necessary, but, absolutely speaking, could not have been; therefore it is impossible that such being should be one and entirely the same in the thing itself. Therefore those two things are incompossible and contradictory which that opinion joins together at the same time, namely, that there should be a free, real perfection which absolutely could not be, and nevertheless when it is, it should not be distinguished in reality from the necessary perfection of God and of His will.

21. Now it is easy from these things to draw out the second part which we proposed and to deduce the same or similar difficulties which follow from this position. One and the greatest is that something which is nothing of itself and in reality could remain under nothingness, should be truly formally and essentially God; and conversely that something which now is truly and essentially God

should be such that, absolutely speaking, it could not be; but this is most inconsistent with God. The consequence seems evident from those things which that opinion teaches; for if the free perfection is not distinguished in reality from the essence of God, therefore it includes in itself the entire perfection of the divine essence; therefore it is essentially God. Likewise, because either that perfection is God or it is not. If it is not God, many inconveniences follow which were raised above, namely that something should be in God which is not God, or (which is more wonderful) that something should be entirely the same with God which nevertheless is not God. Likewise, if it is not God, neither will it be uncreated substance; therefore it will either be created substance or accident, and nevertheless it will be something indistinct from God, which things and similar ones are all absurd and contradictory. But if that free perfection is truly God, therefore it is essentially God, because it is not God by participation, but true God; but no thing can be true God participatively or accidentally; therefore it is necessary that it be essentially God. Now the falsity of the consequent is proven; for since God is being necessary through Himself, and this is most proper to Him and that in which He is primarily distinguished from any other being, it is impossible that any free being should be essentially God.

22. And this is made clear from a certain received doctrine of the saints and all theologians, who teach that the divine processions ad intra, even though they are voluntary, nevertheless cannot be free with the proper freedom of indifference, because any person proceeding is true God, to whom indifference to being and not being is repugnant, because intrinsic necessity of being belongs to His nature. Hence the Arian heretics, in order to teach that the Son is a creature, asserted that He was produced by the free will of the Father. The councils and holy Fathers considered this connection necessary and therefore condemned that heretical antecedent, as can be seen in Hilary, book On Synods, anathema 24, and in the Council of Toledo XI, in the confession of faith, and Augustine, XV On the Trinity, chapter 10, and

St. Thomas, I, question 41, article 2, and other theologians. They therefore considered it impossible that anything which has from free will that it be or not be should be God. And similarly they considered it impossible that anything real should be within God which, simply speaking, can be and not be. And in this is seen the evident difference between this free addition which is fabricated by this opinion and that which according to reason we understand the divine relations to add to the divine essence; for this is as absolutely and simply necessary being as the divine essence itself; and therefore it can be in God and the same with God and essentially God, which is entirely otherwise in that free addition.

23. Furthermore, it follows from that opinion that the real divine perfection, as it now is in the nature of things, should be such that it is partly necessarily, partly could not have been, which to admit is no less absurd in a simple entity than by way of composition. For however it may be understood, it includes imperfection and a certain diminution in the very being as to that part, or quasi-part, which could not be. Hence the more this imperfection is attributed to the very simple entity of God, the more absurdly and inconveniently is such imperfection attributed to Him. Besides the fact that it involves greater contradiction that one simple entity in one most simple being should include those two conditions, of necessity of being and of potency to non-being. For if that entity has one most simple being, therefore that whole is intrinsically necessary, and as such is of the essence of that entity; therefore it is impossible that the same entity according to the same entirely real being should be contingent being as to something which absolutely could not be and remain under nothingness. And in this way nearly all the arguments made above can easily be applied; for although this evasion avoids one inconvenience, namely composition, nevertheless it cannot avoid others, and it attributes to the divine entity not only contradictory things, but also many things which include imperfection, as has been sufficiently made clear and will be more explained in the third member.

24. Hence therefore it can easily be shown what we said in the last place about the aforesaid opinion, namely that it rather increases the difficulty than resolves it. First indeed, because one of two things must be said here, namely, either that God wills the creature which He could not will, adding nothing real to His will, or that He adds something real to His will which in reality could not be added to it, and that which is added is so transfused (so to speak) into the divine substance that it remains in no way distinct from it in reality; but if these two are compared with each other, this latter is at least equally difficult to understand as the former. Indeed this latter seems to be directly demonstrated impossible and involving contradiction, as the arguments made declare. But that former, although we confess it to be most obscure, is nevertheless not positively demonstrated impossible, and we shall attempt to respond to the arguments by which it seems to be shown. On the other hand, that former attributes no imperfection to God, but rather a certain eminence, which by the very fact that it surpasses human comprehension is consonant with divine excellence. But the latter mode undoubtedly includes many imperfections, as we declared a little before.

25. To which I add that the inconvenience raised above is not avoided, namely, that for this real addition it is necessary to understand in the divine will some real production or effection, or by whatever other name it may be called. Because real addition or real augmentation cannot be understood without real production; but here there is made real addition and real extensive augmentation, for in the divine will according to itself that free perfection was not formally there; therefore its perfection is augmented extensively by the addition of that; therefore some true action or production is necessary by which this is done. Nor can it be an objection that that augmentation or addition is made with identification; for rather greater efficacy seems to be required for this; for it is more to make two things which according to themselves were distinct coalesce into

one simple thing, than that they be united; but in the present case the free and necessary perfection according to themselves, or prescinding from the action or determination of the divine will, are so distinct that one is non-being or merely possible being, the other is necessary being; therefore, that that possible being should be not only actual being, but also should be the very necessary being without any distinction from it, great force indeed and more than efficacy is required. For indeed if that free perfection became actual being from possible being, only united to necessary being and not one with it, efficiency or action would be necessary; much more therefore is it necessary that it not only become actual being united, but also one. And it is confirmed by the example of divine filiation; for because the person of the Son by reason of filiation adds something of reality to the divine essence according to our way of understanding, it is necessary that He have this through real origin and production, even if that addition is not distinct in reality from the essence, and the same is true of the person of the Holy Spirit; therefore the same must be said in the present case, if the free act as such adds something of reality or of real perfection. You will say: paternity is also understood to add something to the essence, without any real emanation. It is answered that this is most true, because the person of the Father not only according to absolute things, but also according to relative things, is entirely being from Himself, which theologians declare through the notion of the unbegotten; but this condition cannot belong to the free act, because as such it is not necessary being, much less entirely from itself, and therefore it seems entirely necessary that it become being through some action.

26. You will say there is another difference, that the Son is a thing distinct from the producer; but the free act is not a thing distinct from the divine will. But on the contrary; for this very thing is what is deduced from the argument, namely that that act ought to be distinct, because it is an effect and produced. For the Son is not produced because He is distinct, but rather conversely, because He is produced,

therefore He is distinguished; so therefore in the present case, if the free act is such that it cannot have its actual entity and perfection in the nature of things without some action, it is rightly concluded to be distinct. Hence, when something is attributed to it which it cannot have without efficiency, and at the same time it is said not to be distinguished in reality in any way from its principle, contradictory things are said. And besides, in whatever way it may be asserted that there is something in God made or quasi-made by free will, it is entirely absurd and alien to sound doctrine. It is added that it will be necessary to confess that there is in God a perfection in some way dependent on the actual existence of the creature, either made or future in its proper duration; for that free perfection which God has from the fact that He freely willed to create the world, so implies a transcendental relation to the creature as existing at some time, that it can in no way be in God without such existence of the creature; but this is certainly most absurd, that namely God should need in any way His creature for having any perfection, whether great or small, whether intensive or extensive.

27. Finally we can add an example from the received opinion among serious theologians. For they consider it absurd to admit in God real relations to creatures as actually existing and dependent on them as such, because they consider it impossible that anything real should be in God which depends on the actual existence of the creature, whether as on a term, or as on a necessary condition, or for any other reason, because whatever is in God is necessarily God, and therefore can in no way not be; but what in some way depends on the creature can not be just as it can. But if there are any theologians, like the nominalists, who attribute these relations to God, they do this for this reason, because they consider that relation adds nothing real intrinsically to the subject or foundation, but only position or concomitance of the term; nevertheless all hold as certain that no true thing, even respective, which is in God, can in any way depend on the

existence of the creature; much more therefore must this be said of a thing and absolute perfection, such as is an act of the will.

28. Furthermore, it is necessary according to the contrary opinion to admit some reality or real perfection indifferent of itself to being nothing or to being God, which is incredible in itself and seriously offensive. The consequence is made clear, for if we conceive God in eternity prior by reason to His willing or not willing to create the world, for example, we necessarily understand God to foreknow this act of willing to create the world as possible to Him and not necessary; therefore He knows that act and its real free perfection as indifferent to being and not being; therefore as indifferent to being God or to being nothing, because if it should not be, it will be nothing; but if it should be, it will be God, since it cannot be except in God. But the falsity of the consequent both seems evident of itself, and is further made clear, both because that very indifference is great imperfection, and consequently is repugnant to a thing which formally can be in God; and also because that indifference is repugnant with the being of God, of whose intrinsic concept is the necessity of being. Hence contradiction is involved in the very terms. Indeed even speaking more generally, it is impossible to understand two things including in their proper concepts opposite and contradictory reasons to be indifferent to being distinguished or identified; but God and this free perfection have entirely opposite reasons, for God is said to be necessary being, but that perfection is said to be non-necessary being; therefore it is impossible that they coalesce into the same entirely simple and indivisible entity.

### *Fourth & Common Opinion*

29. What Capreolus adds to the common opinion. There is therefore a fourth opinion, which affirms that the free act of God, beyond the necessary act which is the divine willing taken absolutely in itself, adds only a relation of reason to some created object, and

with respect to this relation it could have been and not been, although the act itself is necessary. Capreolus teaches this opinion in Book I, distinction 45, question 1, article 2, in response to the contrary arguments for conclusions 1 and 2. Although he adds something which we have omitted, because it seems neither strictly true nor necessary for explaining this matter; for he says that divine willing adds first the direction of the divine intellect showing such an object to the will and proposing it as something to be willed, and in this respect he says it adds something real, though not really distinct, but only according to reason. But we can ask Capreolus whether this direction of the divine intellect is free or necessary; for if it is necessary, then it is not correctly said that God's free willing adds this direction, since free determination does not add things that are necessary, but rather presupposes them, and is understood to add only what is indifferent. But if that direction is free, the difficulty is first increased; for concerning it we will need to ask what it adds insofar as it is free; and then we will further ask whether that direction is formally free precisely as it is from the intellect; and Capreolus will not admit this, for it is false and alien to the doctrine of St. Thomas, as I now suppose; or it is free by denomination from the will, and thus it is false that free willing adds this direction, since rather that direction itself is denominated free by that which free willing adds.

30. Whether Scotus agrees with us. Omitting therefore this part, about which other authors also say nothing, we must treat the other part concerning the relation of reason, which nearly all others follow, especially the Thomists: Ferrara on Book I Against the Gentiles, chapters 75 and 76, and other more recent authors on Book I, question 19, articles 2, 3, and 7, and Sylvester in the Conflate, Part I, question 19, article 2, where, reporting and explaining Cajetan's opinion, he says nothing else about it than these words: "Let these men see what this implies," and then he explains the matter differently. This opinion is usually attributed to Scotus in Book II, distinction 45, but there he only says that through God's free volition there arises a

relation in the thing willed, which he says is neither real nor strictly of reason (that is, one which arises through an act of the intellect), for he says this arises through an act or comparison of the will. Hence, insofar as the will is a rational power, that relation can be called one of reason, which Scotus says terminates in God to something absolute, yet he does not declare what that absolute thing is, nor what relation the free termination to creatures adds in God's will. But this opinion is favored in Book I, distinction 39, where he says that God's freedom is most perfect, and therefore does not consist in indifference to diverse acts, as it is in us, but in indifference of the very same act to diverse objects. Hence he thinks that termination to a created object adds nothing real to the divine will, otherwise God's freedom would consist in indifference not only to objects, but to free perfections that are mutually repugnant and contrary. And thus all Scotists incline to this opinion, and Lychetus expressly holds it in distinction 46, where Gabriel, Ockham, and other nominalists teach that God's free willing as such adds nothing real over necessary willing, but is entirely the same; however, they say nothing about the relation of reason. And the aforesaid opinion seems necessarily to follow from the refutations of the others; for since God truly and properly wills creatures freely, and speaking absolutely could have not willed them, it is necessary that actually willing a creature adds something beyond being able to will or beyond the necessary act of willing by which God loves himself; but it has been shown that it does not add anything real; therefore it is necessary that it add something of reason.

### *Difficulties of the Said Opinion Are Proposed, Especially Regarding the Addition of Reason*

31. But this opinion also has the greatest difficulty: first, because a relation of reason is taken either strictly and formally, or broadly and fundamentally. In the first way it is something fictitious, and exists only in the intellect considering and comparing one thing to

another, in the manner of something related which in itself does not have a relation; but in this way God's free willing cannot include a relation of reason, because even if such a relation arises in no intellect, God in reality itself truly and really wills such an object. Nor does it matter that Capreolus indicates and Scotus considers probable that this relation necessarily arises in the divine intellect; both because it is quite uncertain whether relations of reason are fabricated in their own way by divine knowledge, which intuits things as they are in themselves without any impropriety, analogy, or fiction; and especially because, even if we grant this freely, that relation, as arising through God's intellect, cannot matter anything for completing or constituting God's free willing as actually terminated to creatures. Because God wills a creature freely prior in the order of reason to understanding himself willing a creature freely and by understanding fabricating a relation of reason; therefore what free willing as such adds is not that relation of reason, but something prior to it. And this is confirmed first, for God wills freely through the will as such, therefore what free willing adds is added through the will, not through the intellect, speaking formally; therefore that relation of reason which arises through an act of the intellect as such cannot be what formally adds free willing over necessary willing. Finally it is confirmed, because that relation of reason, even as it is said to be objectively in the act of the divine intellect, is something contrived and nothing; therefore it cannot formally constitute God as willing creatures freely, neither as the total form nor as something completing or ultimately constituting that form. Hence Capreolus above expressly declares that this relation does not formally constitute God's free determination as such, but follows upon it. This indeed will be true of a relation of reason taken in the aforesaid strict sense; but according to this exposition, what we seek is not yet explained, namely, what the free determination formally adds to the natural act of the divine will, because if a relation of reason follows from free determination, then there is free determination

before that relation; what therefore does it add to the necessary act as such?

32. If therefore it is said to add the foundation of that relation, or (which is the same thing) to add a relation of reason fundamentally, which was the other member posited above, then it remains to be inquired what this foundation is. For the foundation of a relation of reason, which is taken from the side of the thing, must be something real; for if it were something of reason, we would proceed to infinity and the whole thing would be mere fiction; therefore something is presupposed in reality which gives occasion to the intellect for fabricating a relation of reason, and we call this the foundation from the side of the thing. This foundation therefore in the present case cannot be anything other than either some thing outside God extrinsically denominating him, or some thing within God himself. The first cannot be said in the present case, because, as we showed against the first opinion, God is not said to be willing through extrinsic denomination. Nor can it be conceived from what that extrinsic denomination would come; for either it comes from a possible creature as such, and this is not the case, both because otherwise that would not be a free denomination but a necessary one, and also because it would be indifferent and common to every possible thing. Or it comes from a creature as existing or future at some time, and this also cannot be said; because every creature exists, or will exist, because God through his will freely wills it to be; therefore the relation which God, as actually willing, has to such a creature cannot be founded on a denomination taken from that creature as existing or future. Hence Henry acutely distinguishes in God two kinds of relations of reason in Quodlibet IX, question 1: some are those which according to reality are presupposed in some way in the creature and are formed in the other extreme (namely, God) through a certain correspondence (as he says), and of this kind are the relation of creator, lord, and similar ones, which follow upon transient action. But others are those which are formed primarily in God himself, like the

relation of one who predestines, chooses, etc. In this genus therefore must be placed this relation which we understand follows upon free determination; therefore its foundation is to be sought not in some extrinsic thing, but in God himself.

33. And without doubt it seems to be so, for God from himself alone freely determines himself to will this rather than that, and therefore that relation does not seem able to be founded first in another rather than in God himself. In this there is a great difference between free volition and knowledge, even insofar as it is called the knowledge of vision and is said to be contingent or free in some way, insofar as it could not be under such an aspect if things were not going to be future. There is therefore a difference between this knowledge and will, that knowledge, in order to become vision from simple understanding and to extend beyond possible things to representing existing things, presupposes in the object some variety for some time to which eternity coexists, or at least presupposes some free decree of the divine will, and thus there can be understood outside that knowledge itself some foundation or principle of that relation; but in the will nothing can be presupposed, but all variety which can be understood in objects draws its origin from the will itself. And the reason a priori is that knowledge, even as terminated to such contingent objects, is not formally free in itself, but necessary from the presupposition of such an object existing or future; but the will as terminated to such objects is formally free, and therefore that relation in knowledge could be understood through the mode of a certain relation resulting necessarily in it, given the other extreme (namely, the knowable object in the being of truth or knowability); but in the will it cannot be so understood, but draws its origin first and per se from the will itself, all other things remaining the same, and therefore the foundation of such a relation must be intimately in it.

34. Then therefore it remains to be further inquired what such a foundation is in the divine will. For it is either God's necessary willing itself as such, or something added to it; the first cannot be said,

both because that foundation always and necessarily exists; but given the same foundation and term, the same relation is naturally apt to arise, whether of reason or real; therefore that relation would exist not freely but necessarily; and also because from our mode of conceiving it is evident that from God's necessary willing alone, as such, no occasion is given to us for apprehending any relation or disposition to created objects, because through that willing, as necessary, we conceive only God as loving himself; therefore in that willing as such no relation of reason to creatures, as existing in themselves, can be founded. But if the second is said, we fall into Cajetan's opinion; for that addition is something real, not of reason, because it is the foundation on God's part and of his volition, so that it can be conceived with that relation; but we have already shown that such a foundation is not something of reason, but of reality. Again that cannot be something necessary, both because it is said to be something added to the necessary willing itself, and also because it could not be a foundation any more than the necessary willing itself as such; therefore it will be something free by which God is proximately and formally constituted as actually willing creatures; but this is the very thing that Cajetan was asserting. And this is confirmed first, because it is impossible to pass from one contradictory to another unless some change or addition is made in one of the extremes; but God, insofar as he is precisely willing by the necessary act as such, is not willing creatures (I always speak of the will of creatures in themselves, so as to omit their complacency according to the being they have in God, which if it is in God, is necessary and not free), and then he is understood as willing creatures; therefore it is necessary that something be added, either to him or to creatures, by reason of which that disposition is understood to be between them which was not there before; but the addition cannot be understood as made to creatures, as has been shown; therefore it must be in the divine will. Finally, because otherwise, if God by his eternal willing without any addition whatsoever of reality, but only of reason, could freely will

creatures, then also in time he could begin to will them without any change in himself, because change does not occur without some real addition or subtraction; but even if God were to begin to be willing creatures from not willing, nothing real would be added, just as nothing is added in eternity, even if he wills creatures from eternity; therefore he would not be changed, even if he were to begin to love creatures in time, nor even if he were to cease loving those he previously loved.

### *Resolution of the Question*

35. From what has been said concerning these opinions, it is sufficiently declared (in my opinion) how great the difficulty of this question is, and that it is easier to refute any part of it than to properly defend or explain any part. Therefore I do not hesitate to confess that I find nothing that satisfies me, except this alone: in such matters we must believe about God what is more consonant with his ineffable perfection and what is alien to all imperfection, even if we do not attain the mode in which this befits God; therefore in this point I think these things must be asserted. First, that God truly, properly, and without metaphor wills and loves those things which he freely wills or loves, and which he could have not loved. This is sufficiently proven from what was said against the first opinion. And it can be confirmed from divine knowledge; for no one will deny that God properly knows created things to exist, for this is not only manifest in Scripture: "God saw (it is said) all things that he had made," and similar passages, but it is also most evident in itself, as we shall touch upon below, and yet about that knowledge there is nearly the same difficulty: what does it add to God, since it could not have been in him if created things had not existed; therefore.

36. Second, it must be said that God wills creatures by a real act of his will, or rather, who is his will and his essence. This is proven by what was objected or proposed concerning the last opinion,

because God cannot be willing, whether himself or any other thing, through something fictitious or imaginary, but through something that subsists in reality itself and is truly in him, because he truly and really wills and loves. Likewise, because if God were constituted as willing through composition, he would be constituted through a real form really affecting him in reality itself, and not through a being of reason, neither totally nor partially or completively, but entirely through a real and intrinsic form, because the whole formal effect would be intrinsic and real, as it is in us and in angels; therefore much more, since God is constituted as willing creatures in the most simple way, as pure act, he is constituted only by his real and intrinsic willing. Finally, this is most evident in knowledge, for God does not intuit creatures as existing in any difference of time except through his knowledge as through a real and intrinsic form (we speak in our mode), and not through something extrinsic or through beings of reason; for God truly and really judges about created things as existing, and apprehends and intellectually represents them; but all this is real, absolute, and intrinsic to God; therefore it is in him through something real and intrinsic to him; therefore through his intrinsic knowledge.

37. Third, it must be said that God by the very same most simple, indivisible act and without any real increase or diminution of it, wills all things that he wills and does not will what he does not will, whether he wills them necessarily or freely. This is the mind of the authors of the last opinion and St. Thomas intends this in Book I, question 19, article 2, reply to objection 4, and article 5, and especially article 3, where he expressly says that no perfection accrues to God from his willing things other than himself. The same thing he proves ex professo in Book I Against the Gentiles, chapter 76, and Scotus especially intends this same thing in Book I, distinction 39; likewise Hervaeus, Quodlibet I, question 1. And the reasons made against the second and third opinions prove this assertion. And although the mode in which this befits God cannot be comprehended by us, it is

nevertheless explained in some way; for God's willing is infinite, both in the genus of being and in the nature of appetite, and it is infinite not through the mode of potency, nor through the mode of inchoate or first act, but through the mode of most perfect and ultimate act; therefore that act from the force of its most simple entity, which it necessarily has in its entirety, is sufficient for attaining all wilable objects, each according to its own nature and capacity; therefore in that act is all the actuality necessary for God to love himself for his own sake, and other things for his sake, and himself as end, other things as means, and himself necessarily, because his goodness requires this, and other things freely, because the goodness of the end or object does not require more. Therefore when God loves things other than himself, he does not will by another act, nor through something added to the act, but by that very act by which he loves himself and by which he could not love other things, if he so willed.

38. Therefore the eminence of this mystery consists only in this: that this act is apprehended as a certain form which according to its whole reality is necessarily in God, or is God himself, and yet does not necessarily confer the adequate formal effect which it can confer in order to extrinsic objects, but it is in the hand and power of the one having such an act to tend or not tend through it to such objects; and when it tends, it truly loves and wills them, and therefore has nothing more than if it did not love. But this, which we explain through the mode of form and formal effect, is in God in a far more eminent and higher way, and therefore, although in imperfect forms it can never happen that the very same form necessarily existing in a subject does not confer to it its whole formal effect, and consequently in created will it cannot be understood that it necessarily has some act of willing, and nonetheless it is in its power to will or not will through that act some object to which it can be terminated, because an act existing in a potency necessarily has in it its whole formal effect and makes it actually tend to its whole object, nonetheless divine willing, because it is not an informing form, nor an actuating act, but purest act, must be

understood in a higher way to constitute one who wills, and to attain objects with a certain eminent power for attaining or not attaining secondary objects, with no change or real addition made in the act itself.

39. There is another notable difference between created and uncreated willing; for created willing is entirely ordered by its nature to an object from which it takes its species; and therefore such an act cannot exist in a potency without actually inclining to such an object, and not through the mode of potency, but through the mode of act, and therefore it necessarily constitutes one willing or not willing such an object; but uncreated willing takes no species from created objects, nor has a real relation to them, but attains them in a most eminent and absolute way, when God wills them; and therefore, although that willing necessarily exists according to its whole entity, it does not however necessarily attain such extrinsic or secondary objects; and when it freely attains them, it is not necessary to add anything real to it, but it is of itself the volition of them, by freely willing and determining itself. And for this reason authors say that this fact that God attains such objects through his willing adds only a relation of reason to the divine act, not because God is constituted as actually willing such objects through a relation of reason, but because it adds no real relation in God himself, neither predicamental nor transcendental, but attains them in a more eminent way, which mode we cannot explain except through a relation of reason.

40. Finally, this can be confirmed and explained from the comparison between created and uncreated freedom. For created freedom is potential, but uncreated is supremely actual; and therefore the former is through the mode of active and simultaneously receptive potency, but the latter is through the mode of purest act, from which arises between them a certain proportional agreement with absolute and supreme dissimilitude and difference. The proportion consists in this: that just as the created free faculty which is active, in order to determine itself to this act rather than to doing another, does not need

another actively determining thing, but itself actively accommodates its force to this act rather than to another, so the free faculty, or rather uncreated actuality, does not need another formally determining and quasi-actuating thing, in order to bend itself (so to speak) to this object rather than to another, but accomplishes this of itself. There is however a manifest difference, that the created faculty in which there is formal freedom, because it is only in potency or first act, needs something added through the mode of second act by which it is formally determined; but God's free entity, because it is not potency but pure act, does not need anything added in such a way in order to be terminated to an object, but accomplishes this formally of itself. But the reason for this difference is none other than the supreme actuality of divine willing and its infinite perfection, by reason of which it contains beforehand in itself whatever can be necessary for every actuality of willing. Hence all that perfection which is imagined to be added through that free and real addition is most actually contained in that very infinite perfection, though with a certain imperfection excluded; for that addition which is imagined is such that it joins the divine will to a created object with a certain necessity, after it is understood that addition to have been joined to that will. But that infinite perfection of the divine act is necessarily joined to no created object, but can terminate itself to it with a certain indifference and dominion, not over itself, but over the object.

### *Corollaries from the Preceding Resolution*

41. From this it is understood that free love of God is spoken of differently than love of a creature is spoken of. For the latter is called free with respect to its being, but not truly with respect to being terminated in such a manner toward such an object (I speak of love not as it is abstracted by thought in general, for here it is indifferent as to whether it is terminated toward this or that object, which is rather the indifference of a genus than of freedom; but I speak of the act of

love as it really exists in particular). This act, therefore, is called free with respect to being, because it is so constituted by its cause that by virtue of that cause it could not exist; but it is not free with respect to being terminated, because if it exists, it is necessarily terminated toward such an object, one adequate to such an entity of the act. But truly divine love is free not with respect to being, but with respect to being terminated in relation to creatures. For that love according to its whole entity and perfection is necessary, nor can it have indifference in this respect, because this would be a great imperfection; nevertheless in being terminated it has indifference, not indeed with respect to the primary object, which is God himself or the divine essence, because it is necessary that it be necessarily terminated toward some object, namely toward that with which it has intimate and necessary conjunction, or rather unity; but it has indifference with respect to secondary objects, with which it does not have necessary connection, nor does it depend upon them in any way.

42. Secondly, it is understood from what has been said how eminent and excellent is the mode of divine freedom, and how removed from all imperfection, so that, even for this reason alone, this way of understanding the divine will should be preferred to every other, even if it exceeds human comprehension. For thus is best understood that on account of which this whole disputation has been inserted in this place: in what way, by reason of freedom, there is no change in God, not only strictly according to real duration, but also not even broadly according to diverse signs of reason in the very now of eternity. Because, although in the first sign of reason the divine willing is understood as indifferent to this or that created object, but in another sign as terminated toward this object, nevertheless there is no shadow of change in this, because there is no trace of real addition, but only of formal termination through itself, with only a new relation of reason resulting from this. Then it is best understood in what way divine freedom exists without any potentiality. Hence, when it is said that God can will and not will, that "can" does not express active or

passive potency, but expresses only the indifference of the same act as to whether it is terminated toward this object or not terminated. This can scarcely be explained according to the second opinion without passive and active potentiality in itself, as has been explained above. For it is necessary that they confess the divine will to be indifferent to free perfection in the manner of a first act; therefore either it is determined to having that perfection by effecting it, and this is most absurd, or formally through itself, and if they say this, they fall into nearly the same difficulty; wherefore we say this better with respect to the very object to which immediately such an act is joined in its own way through itself formally without that imperfect addition.

43. Thus finally is best understood in divine freedom the distinction and opposition of acts according to reason, without any real contrariety or distinction, because indeed it is entirely the same act according to reality which without any addition is terminated toward various things; and thus it is distinguished by reason; and, insofar as it is terminated toward this so that some thing should exist, it is called love or volition; but insofar as it is terminated toward the non-being of such a thing, it is called nolition of the same thing, and metaphorically hatred, not of enmity, but of abomination. But truly according to the other opinion, true and real contrariety and opposition between the real free perfections of God cannot be avoided; for if the will to create the world adds to God a real perfection which would not be in him if he had been unwilling to create the world, but in place of that he would have had another through the free will of not creating the world, therefore it is necessary that those two free perfections be as truly opposed and contrary among themselves as are in us the will to act and not to act; for also those perfections would mutually exclude each other from the same divine will and would be like actual movements tending toward contrary terms, which is certainly unworthy to attribute to God.

44. Thirdly, it is established from what has been said that the same must be said proportionally concerning the act of divine

knowledge with respect to those things or truths which it does not necessarily represent on their part; on their part (I say), insofar as those things can exist and not exist, because they come about contingently or freely; for on God's part he necessarily knows them thus as they are, because as soon as they are future in some difference of time, they are represented in the divine essence. But if they are never future, this very thing is represented in the divine essence. But this representation is both eternal, because all things are objectively present to the eternal knowledge of God, and it adds no reality to the divine knowledge itself, but the very knowledge, which is necessary in God and by which he necessarily comprehends himself, has this power on account of its infinity, that it infallibly represents through itself and without any real addition all things which in any way are true or intelligible. This must be explained in knowledge in the same way that we have explained it in the will, and in a certain way it is more easily understood in knowledge, because it presupposes an object determined to one part of truth, as has also been explained in the preceding sections.

*To the First Difficulty Concerning Free Denomination*

45. Finally we shall attempt from what has been said to respond to the difficulties which have been raised on the contrary. There are three principal ones. The first concerns that denomination by which God is said to be willing creatures, since it is not of reason but real, from what form or quasi-form is it taken; and since it is a denomination not necessarily belonging to God, how can it be taken from a necessary form and not rather from a free form or real perfection. The brief response, if we look to the reality alone, is that that denomination, insofar as it is real, is taken from the very infinite entity of God, which on account of its eminence can through itself quasi-formally confer all of that. Again, responding formally, as far as knowledge is concerned, it can easily be said that, although knowledge

according to its whole entity is necessary, it does not confer all of that denomination with the same absolute necessity, because in the object there is not always absolutely necessary truth; but it is in the nature of knowledge that it represent an object to be such as it is in itself, and therefore it suffices that, given the truth of the object, God is constituted as knowing that through his eternal and necessary knowledge by necessity; but in the will not even this necessity is found, for even given a creatable object good in its order and lovable, there does not result (so to speak) in God by necessity that denomination of willing; and therefore it is in some way more wonderful in that case how it should be freely from a form or act simply necessary with respect to its whole being.

46. Nevertheless it must be said that this is the excellence or eminence rather of that act that according to the requirement of objects it tends toward them, and therefore, although it is necessary in itself, it can, according to its tendency toward some object, give a free denomination. This can be further explained by us a posteriori, for the divine will concerning created objects involves causality; for it is the first root that they should exist or not exist; although, however, God's willing is necessary in being, it is nevertheless free in causing, and therefore it is also free in willing creatures, or (which is the same thing) in giving to God the denomination of willing or not willing creatures. But if you press the point because that denomination is real, therefore it is something real; again it is a denomination not necessary but free, therefore it is something real not necessary but free. The response is by distinguishing the final consequent, namely: it is something real not necessary with respect to being, the consequence is denied; but not necessary with respect to termination or causality, thus the consequence is granted. Hence, although that real denomination is on God's part, it nevertheless involves causality or termination toward a creature, and therefore it is not simply necessary; nor does the act itself, although necessary in itself, necessarily provide that, both on account of its eminence, as has been said, and also

because, although that denomination is intrinsic, it is nevertheless with order to something extrinsic which it somehow involves with itself, and therefore it can be free. And nearly the same thing coincides with what Marsilius responds in a similar case, In I, q. 44, ad 3, where he says that not willing to produce the world was not necessarily in God, although it could have been, because God's not willing does not only express a thing, but an action, which could not have been in God in the being of action, that is, insofar as from that something results in the creature. And nearly the same thing returns to what Gregory responds, In I, dist. 45, after concl. 7, and what the authors cited above in the final opinion said about a relation of reason. Nevertheless, all suppose as certain that there is no reality in God which could not have been, or conversely none can exist which is not.

### *To the Second Difficulty Concerning Relation of Reason*

47. The second difficulty concerned the relation of reason which is involved in this denomination or termination and concerning its foundation. In which it must be briefly said that this relation of reason does not constitute God intrinsically and formally as willing a creature; for this is correctly proved by what we said concerning the final opinion. It follows therefore, according to our way of conceiving, from the fact that God loves a creature in an intimate and ineffable way; but because we cannot explain or conceive that free determination of God without some addition or without some relation, therefore theologians have explained this matter through such a relation. But as concerns the foundation of this relation, it is true that what was concluded in the discourse made above concerning the final opinion, namely that such a foundation must in some way be taken on God's part, as St. Thomas signified before Henry cited there, I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 1; but this foundation, as was signified in the same discourse, is very easily explained in knowledge; for the very necessary

knowledge of God is of itself a sufficient foundation of that relation which free knowledge or vision imports, if on the part of the other extreme there is posited the condition necessary for terminating such a relation, namely some truth or actual entity; and therefore there is no inconvenience that a thing simply necessary can found a relation not necessary, because that such a relation is not necessary comes only from the part of the term. Hence, by the very fact that in the term there is aptitude for terminating such a relation, such a relation is understood to arise quasi-necessarily, because the divine essence naturally and necessarily represents every true and every intelligible object.

48. But concerning the will it must be said that in the reality itself there is no other foundation on God's part for such a relation, besides the very necessary act of God's will, not however as it is only necessary in being, but as it is also free with respect to termination and some causality. Hence this relation is not understood as resulting when a necessary act is posited on God's part absolutely and according to itself, and a creature is pre-understood as lovable; for, these two things standing, it remains that that relation does not follow or is not understood; therefore a free determination of God intervenes, which, although in itself and formally it is not a new reality in God, is nevertheless conceived by us in the manner of a new reality for founding the relation. Or certainly that determination in the will is always conceived in the manner of some causality, through which the object is conceived as changed in some way in order to the actual existence proportioned to it, and therefore that act of the will, necessary in itself, as having the power of freely causing, is understood on God's part as a sufficient foundation of such a relation. But the relation itself is not understood to result until that act of God exercises its free power or causality concerning such an object, in which not the act itself is otherwise disposed, but it makes the object to be otherwise disposed, and such a relation is understood to result quasi, and in this

differs this relation from the relation of the knowledge of vision as such.

49. But when we say that through God's will some change is made in the object, so that such a relation is understood to follow, this is not to be understood of real and physical change, but of objective change according to relation to actual existence, and therefore this relation is understood to be eternal in God, although the creature is not really and in itself changed except in time. Because, by the very fact that God loves a creature from eternity, the creature is understood to have some relation to existing which it did not have of itself; and this I call change in objective being. This is also understood in its own way in things never future, for by the very fact that God has decreed that they should never exist, they are understood to have some relation to existence which they did not have of themselves, for of themselves they were quasi-indifferent, but through God's decree it is determined that they should never exist; and this change alone suffices that they should also fall under knowledge differently, for now they are known through the knowledge of vision as never future; therefore the same change in the object suffices for both relations; but it differs in that the will makes that change, but the knowledge of vision presupposes it made or permitted through the will. Nor is it surprising that such objective change should suffice, since the whole being of these relations is objective.

### *To the Third Difficulty Concerning Immutability*

50. The third difficulty concerned divine immutability, as if from the opposite extreme. For from the opinion explained it follows that God would not be mutable, even if he could begin to will what he never willed, or cease to will what he willed. To this Ferrara responds, I cont. Gent., c. 83, and Bassolis and Lychetus, In I, dist. 45, that God cannot cease to will what he willed without being changed, because the relation of reason which God's willing includes cannot be changed

unless one of the extremes is changed; but this relation cannot be removed through change of the creature, and therefore it would be necessary for a change to be made in God. But this reason, if we speak consistently, is not efficacious, and the difficulty mentioned proceeds against it; for the same argument can be made concerning this relation even if it is understood to exist from eternity, because from eternity it could not result without some addition, either in God or in the creature, beyond those things which are necessary in God or possible in the creature. But if in eternity itself there would not be a necessary addition on God's part, nor other change in the creature except that objective one which has been explained by us, also in time there will not be a necessary real addition on God's part, and consequently nor change, but by the same most simple act he will be able to will what he did not will before and cause the aforesaid change in the object, which suffices for that new relation.

51. Others respond that it is indeed true that God would not be changed from the fact that he would begin or cease to will something anew, but that there would nevertheless follow in him a shadow of turning, which is no less repugnant to God than proper change, as is said in James 1. But this response supposes that a shadow of turning is something distinct from change, and something less than it, which nevertheless is contrary to the mind of James and the exposition of all. For a shadow of turning is nothing other than change which brings the shadow of turning, the metaphor being taken from the motion of the sun. For because he had called God the Father of lights, he adds that God is not to be conceived after the manner of the sun, in which there is perpetual change and shadow of turning. This Augustine signified in one word, in the book de Speculo, saying: "With God there is no change, and therefore with him the course of time is not varied by alternation of day and night." And certainly, setting aside metaphor and manner of speaking, there does not seem to be able to be found a middle between true and real change and immutability, because that which is called a shadow of turning either is

in some true reality, and thus it will be true change, or it is only in a relation of reason, and thus it does not conflict with God, and consequently it is not a shadow of turning of which James speaks. This last proposition is clear in the relation of creator or lord.

52. You will say with St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 1, that this turning of relations has place in those relations which are founded in actions ad extra, but not in those which arise from immanent acts. But granted this is true, we investigate the cause of this thing; for if in the immanent acts themselves no real addition is necessary in order that such a relation should result, neither will real change be necessary in order that it should newly result. Nor conversely, in order that it should be removed, will the removal or suspension of some real act be necessary. St. Thomas applies another response there (which he himself does not seem to approve, since after it he adds another), namely that these relations are not terminated to creatures as they are in themselves, like the relations of lord or creator, but as they are in God himself, and therefore they cannot be changed unless God is changed. But this in the first place has no application in free will, for through it God wills the creature in itself; therefore that relation is not terminated to the creature in God, but in itself. And the same is true of the knowledge of vision, concerning which there is discussion there; for although God is said to see things in himself as in a cause or reason of knowing, nevertheless God's intuition is ultimately directed to things as they are in themselves, and thus the relation of such knowledge is terminated to them in themselves.

53. Therefore this difficulty seems to need to be resolved differently in knowledge and differently in will. For in knowledge the matter is far easier; for since it is not free in itself but necessary, there cannot be understood in it that something should newly fall under it or cease to be known, unless some change is made in the knowledge itself; for if a knowable object is supposed, the divine knowledge is so perfect that it naturally and necessarily represents every truth or everything knowable. Wherefore, if in time God should know

something which he had not known from eternity, it would be necessary that some real knowledge be added to him, because he can know nothing except through real knowledge; therefore either he did not have that from eternity, and thus it was necessary to be added in time, or, if he had it from eternity, from eternity also it represented to him such an object, because, as we said, it represents naturally; and for the same reason, what it represented from eternity, it represents perpetually. For variation in such a relation cannot happen from the part of the object alone; for every future thing in some difference of time, as far as concerns itself, is always knowable, because from eternity it is true to say that it will be at such a time. And for the same reason every truth, both affirmative and negative, concerning future or non-future things, whether it is signified by us in the mode of future, or of present or past, is of itself knowable objectively or terminatively; and therefore that it is not always, but newly known, cannot come except from imperfection of knowledge, which is either limited or must be derived from the things themselves. Wherefore such addition of knowledge cannot be made quasi through extrinsic addition of an object, but through real augmentation of the knowledge itself, and consequently through true and real change.

54. Wherefore, by the very fact that divine knowledge is infinite, such change or newness is repugnant to it, because that knowledge is neither derived from an object nor depends upon its real existence, but is of itself naturally apt to represent that, even if it is distant in duration, and always and naturally represents whatever in an object is representable. And for the same reason diminution cannot happen to such knowledge, because it represents each thing for that time and mode in which it is future or not future.

55. Some add that the immutability of the knowledge of vision comes from the immutability of the divine will; for because its decree is eternal and immutable and future things depend upon it, therefore the knowledge of them is also immutable. But although it is true that, given the immutability of the decree, the knowledge

founded in it would also be invariable from that title, nevertheless, speaking per se, the invariability of knowledge is not founded in the immutability of the free decree. For even if per impossibile God should begin to will something anew or cease, or should be able to change his will, nevertheless knowledge would be invariable, because from eternity it would represent such a decree, or the change future in it for its times, in the way in which it invariably represents these things concerning created will. Therefore that knowledge is from itself and intrinsically immutable, on account of its infinite and natural or necessary representation.

56. Concerning the will therefore the matter is more difficult, because even when a sufficient object is proposed, its free determination is such; and therefore, although its act is infinite and per se sufficient without any real addition for tending toward a created object, it does not appear whence it is necessary that its free determination should be eternal and posited in reality from eternity, if it is ever future, or endure eternally, if it once exists. You will say: rather by the very fact that God's volition and free determination is nothing other than his entity, it is necessary that what he once wills, he should will always from eternity and eternally, because it cannot happen that an object which God once wills for some difference of time, for example for that time, should not be future, and consequently that from eternity and eternally it should be thus future or should have the same relation to existing for that difference of time; therefore neither can it happen that, if God once wills such an object, he should not will it from eternity and eternally. But this reason does not seem efficacious; for it is founded either in this, that God's free volition is his simple necessary entity without addition of free reality; or in this, that given the truth of an object future for some difference of time, it cannot happen that it should not be future in the way it falls under the divine will. The first does not suffice, for this is what we are investigating the reason of: since God through the same necessary entity can freely will external things without any addition, why cannot

he accomplish this as much in time as in eternity, since no greater addition is required in one than in the other, and consequently no greater change? Hence so far is this difficulty from being resolved from that principle, that rather it arises from it. But if the second concerning the object is added, it seems to be begging the question; for an object or effect willed by the divine will for some difference of time will therefore infallibly exist, because the divine will is efficacious and immutable; but if God's decree were mutable, even if it were posited from eternity, its effect would not be absolutely infallibly future, but only under condition, namely if God should persist in that decree. Nor will this be against the efficacy of the divine will, but rather from that will it will result that when the decree is changed the effect ceases. Therefore the principle is begged, while the immutability of the decree is proved from the immutability of the object once willed. It can be responded that the reason is founded in the immutability of the object; but this is not founded in the immutability of the divine will, for thus the principle would be begged, but is founded in the eternal truth of the proposition concerning the future, which cannot be changed on account of the composite necessity which it includes. Because, just as that which exists, when it exists, it is necessary that it exist, so that which is future, supposing that it is future, cannot not be future. But in all things which in reality are or are not future at some difference of time, one of the contradictories is true from eternity, as I now suppose from what has been said elsewhere. Therefore, if from eternity it is true that something is future, therefore God could not from eternity not will it, because either afterwards it would be against God's will, or entirely without it, which is impossible; or afterwards God would begin to will it with no change made in the object, and a new relation of reason would arise with no change made in either extreme, which also cannot be. And for the same reason, if from eternity it is true that a thing is not future, God from eternity wills it not to exist, because God can will this, and in willing that it not exist he does not effect another change in the object, nor does another

relation arise; therefore such a relation is necessarily eternal. And in this way this reason is probable. Nevertheless it always proceeds from our way of conceiving to the reality, for these relations of reason are not in reality, but are feigned by us; hence it could be said that, although we do not understand a new relation, nevertheless God newly wills. Then it supposes these relations to be founded only in the object, when nevertheless they have their first root in God's will, not indeed in its change or in something added to it, but in its eminence and causality, as has been explained. Hence finally it could be said that, although a thing which de facto is future at some time, is future from eternity, it does not have this from the fact that God willed from eternity that it should exist, but because it was also true from eternity that God was going to will at some time that that thing should exist. And then, although a new relation of reason in God willing from time is understood, that could be founded on God's part in his eminence; but on the part of the object only in this, that previously it was future from the future determination of the cause, but now from the actual determination; hence from the force of the prior state it could have not been future, as far as concerned the actual state of causes, but not in the posterior state.

57. Another reason can be given from the part of the intellect, and it is founded in St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 7, where he proves that the will cannot be changed, the same reason of good persevering in the object, except because cognition is changed and good is known which was previously ignored. Since therefore it has been shown that this variation cannot happen in divine cognition without real change, it results that neither can a new free determination happen in the will without change. This reasoning still does not prove that change then occurs formally in the will as will, but at most that it is presupposed in knowledge. Then, this also does not seem to be sufficiently proved, for the will, the same cognition standing entirely, can for its freedom love what it did not love before, or not desire what it desired, because given any cognition whatever, the will remains free. And this is explained in

the present case, for in eternity, given the whole merely natural knowledge of God (which alone is presupposed for the free determination of the will), the will remained free to love or not love a creature; therefore the same cognition standing, it could first love and afterwards not love, because cognition of itself does not more necessitate to persevering in love than to exhibiting love. And for the same reason, the infinite knowledge of God standing, the will could for its freedom suspend every free determination; therefore from the same freedom it could afterwards choose whichever part it willed; therefore if change does not otherwise intervene in a new free determination, it would not be necessary from the part of knowledge.

58. Wherefore that response to this difficulty has always most pleased me: this argument concludes that from such variation of decree or free determination there is not immediately inferred physical change in the divine will, but there is nevertheless inferred a certain (so to speak) inconstancy of mind and imprudent manner of conducting oneself in one's decrees; which imperfections are no less repugnant to God than physical change. Indeed when God is said to be absolutely immutable, it is understood no less of moral than of physical immutability, and in man it is esteemed an imperfection that he should be changeable in his purpose, not only on account of variation of the entity of the act, but much more on account of inconstancy of mind. Hence, if per impossibile through the same entity of act a man could vary his purpose, and now will, afterwards not will, there would be great imperfection. But from this imperfection it can immediately be inferred that a will thus mutable is finite and not right by essence, and from this finally it can mediately be concluded that such quasi-moral change never happens without physical change. This whole reasoning seems evident enough per se, for that there are certain moral imperfections from which by intrinsic locus (as they say) there does not follow physical imperfection or change, is evident. For willing to lie or willing sin does not immediately infer in God some physical change, nor composition or

anything similar. For God could be understood willing this from eternity through simple free determination, as has been explained above; nevertheless from that imperfection it is inferred that such a will is not right per se, and consequently is finite, and thence quasi through extrinsic locus it will be concluded that such a will is physically mutable. Thus therefore I think we should proceed in the present case, for that inconstancy (which we thus call) of mind is an imperfection, and a mode of operating proceeding either from inconsideration or from imprudence, is per se known from the very terms; for if in men this is deservedly censured as an imperfection, how much more in God! Likewise, because not fulfilling a promise is a great imperfection, not indeed formally and precisely on account of physical change, but on account of the indecency and moral defect which is in that act, and yet that whole defect, even setting aside falsehood, consists in this mobility of mind, and would arise from it, even if it happened without physical change.

59. But how this imperfection would follow in God from that mode of willing, is to be briefly explained thus. For considering God as having, in his eternity, present through simple intelligence all created objects lovable according to all degrees, modes, and reasons of fitness which can be thought out in them, it was necessary that the divine will should not remain as if suspended in its free decrees concerning such objects, but should incline to one part or the other, either by willing them, or by definitely not willing, or by willing them not to exist, or by not loving or not choosing them. First indeed, because it is probable that in every will this is necessary, after full counsel or judgment has been had concerning a thing to be loved or not loved, to be done or not done. Then, whatever may be the case with others, concerning the divine will this seems certain, both because as much willing as not willing or not willing, and as much the being as the not being of creatures is from God's choice; therefore it ought to be perfectly voluntary; therefore directly through a positive act, and not only indirectly through suspension of act. But I speak of

good objects, which can fall under the divine will; this is to be applied with proportion to evils, which, although they are not willed but permitted, nevertheless ought to be permitted through a positive act, by which God wills either not to impede them, or even to concur to their entity. Moreover because that total suspension of decree is truly an imperfection, and is called by St. Thomas, I cont. Gent., c. 82, a certain potentiality. For that suspension can be conceived in two ways: first, as including a definite will to deliberate or define nothing further in that matter as thus proposed, and this is not the suspension of which we are treating, but is a free decree, which in God will be as immutable as others, and truly is a will of not doing that which is thus left. In another way therefore that total suspension is understood, because the will then neither chooses one part or the other, nor decrees what is to be chosen by it afterwards, and such suspension of mind is without doubt a great imperfection. And it seems moreover to arise from imperfection of intellect, which namely has not yet fully considered or judged whatever can be required for decreeing something; for if it had considered all things and were certain that nothing more could be desired, the will could not remain in that suspension. You will say: it could do this from its freedom. I respond that the use of freedom has no place except where something is represented under the aspect of good; but in that suspension, given the aforesaid state of the intellect, no reason of good can appear, and especially in God, who conducts himself in all things in the most perfect manner and with the highest judgment and reason. Hence I will ask again whether, when God is feigned to suspend his deliberation quasi into the future, he foreknows what he is going to choose afterwards or not; for if he does not foreknow, that is an imperfection in the intellect, and could not but induce anxiety and solicitude about future deliberation into the will. But if he already foreknows his future deliberation from eternity, such suspension is irrational and impertinent. Therefore it is necessarily left that God has an eternal decree in one part or the other of willing or not willing in

some way any object proposed to him, which necessity does not depend upon whether the free decree adds or does not add something real, but follows absolutely from the fullness of knowledge, and from the perfectly voluntary and perfect mode by which God conducts himself in all things, even if he should most simply and without any real addition freely determine his will.

60. From this principle, it further follows that such an eternal decree cannot be changeable without great inconstancy and imperfection in the willing God, because the decree established by God can be understood to vary in two ways. In one way, through a proper change of the decree itself, namely, because such change is understood to concern the same object and according to the same thing for the same time, etc., that is, that God first decreed to create Peter at such a time, for example, and afterward does not will to create him for that same time, and this is proper inconstancy of mind, repugnant to prudence and perfect virtue, and therefore it is impossible to be found in God; concerning which it is therefore written: "He will not be turned by repentance, for he is not man that he should repent," 1 Samuel 15. And this can be confirmed by the arguments made a little before, and can be very well declared in this manner. For either God would foreknow that he was going to change his purpose and that the earlier one would have no effect, and thus it would be most frivolous to have such a purpose, indeed it could scarcely be efficacious; or God would not have foreknown this, and thus great imperfection in knowledge is supposed, and God would remain as if doubtful and uncertain about his constancy and the firmness of his purpose, which is the highest imperfection. In another way, variety can happen concerning the thing decreed or loved by God, not according to the same thing or for the same time, but for different times, as, for example, if God loves Peter today, tomorrow he does not love him, etc. And this variety does not bring about change in God, because without change or inconstancy of mind, a thing can be loved at one time and not at another. Especially when this happens

without any novelty on the part of the lover, who simultaneously decreed both things, namely, both to love for such a time, and not to love for such a time, and both from sufficient cause and reason. Thus indeed God conducts himself, willing the variety of things without any variety in himself, because he neither has new decrees nor changes old ones, but loves, disposes, or permits individual things for their own times from eternity, and in what he once purposed he endures perpetually. Therefore, for the variety and change of things, such inconstancy in the divine will is not necessary, nor could it exist without great imperfection. And according to this discourse, that reason remains efficacious which proves that there cannot be such change in the will unless some imperfection and change in knowledge and cognition is presupposed; because it has been shown that such imperfection always precedes every new deliberation. And furthermore, although perhaps a change of purpose imprudently made might happen without increase of cognition, nevertheless not a prudent one; whence, since in God neither imprudent change can exist, nor increase of cognition, so that such change might be made prudently, it remains that it can in no way exist in God.

61. Finally, another reason for this immutability could be given from divine eternity; for the whole of eternity is one indivisible instant, much more so, if it can be done, than an instant of our time; but in one and the same instant of our time it cannot be understood that God should have some free determination and change it, whether that determination adds something real, or only a relation of reason, for even in those relations there is such opposition which includes contradiction on the part of the object. Therefore neither in the instant of eternity can there be such a mode of change in God. And it is confirmed, for that variety in free decree cannot be understood without true succession through before and after; but in God there can be no succession at all. Nevertheless, this reason can be evaded by saying that there is no succession of things in God, but of relations of reason, which can be varied without the foundation being really

varied, and consequently it will be said that in eternity there can be that variation of relations, because, although it is really indivisible like an instant of our time, it is nevertheless more eminent and more permanent and can coexist with any time. Against this, however, the reason treated above could be made, that this variation of relations has no place; because in the object there cannot be change, since necessarily from eternity it either is future or is not future; but concerning the force of this reason enough has already been said. Wherefore we must persist in the reason made earlier, which correctly proves that this change of relations cannot come about except from limited perfection both in the mode of knowing and in the mode of deliberating, and therefore is always founded in some real succession, and from this it is correctly concluded that it is repugnant.

## SECTION X
## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE GOD

1. This question seems to have been settled in the preceding sections, where we showed that being from itself (ens a se) cannot be other than one; since it belongs to the nature of God that He be being from itself, it follows necessarily that there can be only one God. Nevertheless, it seemed appropriate to add this discussion here, both because this conclusion is formally distinct and is customarily proved by different arguments which ought to be briefly examined, and also so that we may incidentally advise theologians how the arguments that demonstrate God's unity in no way oppose the Trinity of persons.

### *Aristotle's Argument Is Examined*

2. Aristotle therefore attempted to conclude that God is one from physical motion, in Physics VIII, text 54 and following. Because

there is only one first mover; but the first mover is God; therefore there is only one God. The major premise is established because there is only one first mobile thing and one first motion; therefore there is only one first mover. This argument is further clarified by what he teaches in Metaphysics XII, text 44, where he shows that there are as many moving intelligences as there are moveable heavens, and consequently, according to the order and dignity of mobile things, there is an order of movers; just as among mobile bodies there is given one supreme body, so also among movers there is given only one first mover, and he is called God. This reasoning of Aristotle has indeed as much probability as can be obtained from a physical medium and sensible motion; nevertheless, as I have often said above, these physical media are less efficacious for demonstrating those things that are found in God. Hence, if, as we have said, from physical motion alone it cannot be evidently demonstrated that God exists, much less will it be possible to conclude that He is only one. First, therefore, although by that reasoning it is concluded that in this universe there is only one first mover, this is not the case absolutely, because from motion it cannot be demonstrated that there is not another universe and another equally first mobile thing.

3. Furthermore, since intelligences do not exist primarily for the sake of celestial motion, all reasoning that proceeds from the motions of the heavens to infer the number, order, and nobility of intelligences is a very weak conjecture, as Aristotle himself saw, and as we shall say again below when treating of other spiritual substances; therefore the unity of God cannot be sufficiently demonstrated from the unity of the first motion of the heavens; for above that mover there can be other superior substances. Indeed, according to the truer opinion, even philosophically speaking, the proximate mover of the first heaven is not God; but from the order of motions it can be concluded at most that the proximate mover of the first sphere is only one and is nobler than the movers of inferior spheres. But that beyond him there are no other nobler beings, or that there are not many but

only one, cannot be demonstrated from that motion. Although indeed nothing more can be gathered from physical motion than one first mover. Hence from that reasoning there can at least be taken that the order of things and motions of the universe indicates unity rather than plurality in God. There is also taken a proportional argument that, just as all physical motions are reduced to one first mover, so all beings are reduced to one first principle and cause, which we call God.

### *A Second Probable Argument*

4. To this is added another argument, which Aristotle touched upon at the end of Metaphysics XII. Where, having argued against the Pythagoreans who posited many first principles, he adds: "But beings do not wish to be badly governed; plurality of rulers is not good. Therefore one ruler." St. Thomas proposes this argument thus in Summa contra Gentiles I, chapter 43, argument 3: What is sufficiently accomplished by one thing placed is better done by one than by many; but the order of things is as good as it can be; for the power of the first agent does not fail the perfection of things; but the best order is through reduction to one; therefore, etc. This argument is indeed a good conjecture, but it cannot be a convincing demonstration, because God's existence is not for the sake of the universe, nor for the sake of its best order or governance, but exists through itself on account of the intrinsic necessity of being which it has from itself. Therefore, although the order and government of the universe does not require several first principles, nevertheless, if it did not otherwise contradict the existence of several gods, it could not be concluded from this that they do not exist, because it could be said that they exist from themselves and for themselves, even if one would suffice for the government of the universe. Just as we say regarding the multitude of persons in one divinity that it was not indeed necessary per se for the creation of the universe, nevertheless, from intrinsic necessity and

infinity, there is given in God a multitude of persons, not for any other reason, but for themselves.

5. For this reason, from God's effects alone it does not seem possible to conclude demonstratively and immediately that there is only one God, but only quasi-negatively from them that only one God is shown, because one suffices for all things; nevertheless this is not sufficient to demonstrate positively the unity of God, but it is necessary to show that it is contradictory for the divine nature to be multiplied. Hence, because this does not seem to be gathered from effects, certain theologians have taken occasion from this to deny that this can be demonstrated by natural reason, because natural reason can only be taken from effects. Just as in the cited example of the Trinity of persons, from natural effects it can be shown that a multitude of persons in the first principle is not necessary for those effects; nevertheless it would not be correctly concluded from this that such multitude does not exist in reality. But this opinion is deservedly rejected by other theologians[12]; for the same reasoning applies to God's existence and to God's unity; hence, just as the former can be demonstrated, so can the latter. And besides, although we grant that from effects it is not immediately concluded that God is only one, nevertheless it can be concluded mediately, because from effects some property of God is demonstrated, from which it can be concluded that it is contradictory for a being having such a property to be multiplied. This property is principally and especially being a being necessary through itself.

### *The Resolution of the Question & Proper Demonstration*

6. Therefore the third and principal argument can be formed thus: God is a being necessary through itself, as is evident from the common notion of God and from what has been said above; but it is

[12] Ocham, Gabr. et alii, In I.

contradictory for a necessary being to be multiplied; therefore also for God.

7. Perhaps it will be said that a being so necessary through itself as to be completely unproduced cannot be multiplied, and this at most is proved from what has been said above; but a being simply necessary through the production of one from another does not contradict being multiplied, because, even if one is from another, if the former produces from necessity and the latter is produced from necessity, both will be necessary beings; but this is sufficient for there to be a plurality of gods. For if such a being necessarily produced by another is infinitely perfect like that one, it will be God just as much as that one; but it has not been demonstrated that it is impossible for such a being to be produced in the said manner. For although we grant that God does not produce inferior beings by natural necessity, which we shall prove below, nevertheless, that He cannot produce something equal to Himself by natural necessity, as if from the fecundity of nature, neither from God's freedom, which is sufficiently exercised regarding inferior beings, nor from any other consideration seems demonstrable. And this is confirmed, because according to our faith one divine person produces another by natural necessity; why therefore could not one God produce another by natural necessity? For the arguments by which this is customarily proved seem to fail and be weakened in that mystery. For instance, this is customarily proved from the attribute of supreme and infinite perfection, because there would have to be another perfection in the product which was not in the producer, or conversely, and therefore neither would be infinitely perfect, and consequently neither would be God. This same argument can be applied to the divine persons, and the response that is given in their case can be given in the present case. For if those two gods were conceived as essentially and quasi-specifically distinct, it would be said that some perfection exists formally in one which was not formally in the other; nevertheless these would exist eminently in each one and this would be sufficient for infinite perfection. But if

these gods were conceived as having the same perfection, then it would be denied that any perfection exists in one which was not in the other, because they would be similar in all things, and thus each would be infinitely perfect, although individually they would not have all the individual entities of such perfections; for this is not necessary for intensive infinity. Another argument is customarily taken from the attribute of simplicity, namely, because such gods would agree in genus or species, and consequently would also differ in species or individually, and thus would have in themselves composition from the grade in which they agreed and in which they differed. This argument can simply be pressed against the divine relations or persons; for they agree in the common notion of relation, and are distinguished in their proper characteristics, without composition in reality, because that agreement is only of reason; therefore the same could be said in the aforesaid multiplication of gods.

8. Nevertheless it must be said that from the unity of a being necessary through itself the unity of God is evidently inferred; for it implies a contradiction that the being which is necessary from itself should produce another essentially distinct from itself which could be God. The contradiction involved in this can easily be taken from what was said above about the unity of uncreated being, for it is almost the same as that which is found in multiplying uncreated beings. The first is that such a being would necessarily have to be produced through true creation, although necessary and eternal, because it would be produced from nothing; for the entire entity of such a being, both as regards nature and as regards person, would be from itself non-being, unless it were produced by another God, and this is to be produced from nothing, because nothing of that being's entity is presupposed for its production; therefore such a being would be truly created; it could not therefore be God, for these two things, God and created being, involve in their concepts a primary diversity, as is easily evident from what was said above about the first division of being. And this is briefly explained, because the true concept of God is the concept of a

supremely perfect being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, as was explained above; but than any created being another greater can be conceived, because this very thing, namely being something created, includes an imperfect origin or imperfect mode of having or receiving existence, whereby another more noble one can easily be understood truly and without any contradiction.

9. The second contradiction is that an uncreated being should produce another essentially different and equal to itself; for by the very fact that it has an essence which could not exist unless it were made or produced by another, such an essence is of inferior nature and order, because it would be a dependent and made essence; but a dependent essence is intrinsically less perfect than an essence independent from itself. Hence it further follows that such a being cannot be infinite in essence, since it is not equal to that from which it is produced.

10. The third contradiction, which explains the preceding ones more fully, is that either such a being would be dissimilar in essence and quasi-different in species, or completely similar and distinct only in individual. Neither can be said without contradiction; therefore. The first part about specific diversity is customarily proved because there cannot be two beings specifically different yet equally perfect; which seems especially true in beings having supremely perfect essences and including in themselves every perfection of being, concerning which it cannot be conceived in what they would be essentially dissimilar, if each has such an essence that includes the total perfection of being. But this very point is declared more urgently, for that by which a being is essentially constituted as completely uncreated and unproduced must be the greatest perfection, absolutely simple, since it constitutes the supremely perfect being that can be conceived. Therefore either such perfection is found formally in the other produced being, or not. If the first, then it is not essentially different, because it is contradictory for an essentially distinct being to have in itself formally the proper difference constituting another. If the

second, then such a being is not infinitely perfect, since it does not have in itself formally that supreme and absolutely simple perfection by which the other is constituted. And from this it can also be concluded that the proper nature and quasi-ultimate essential difference constituting that produced being is not an absolutely simple perfection, because it would contradict formally with the proper difference of the other unproduced being. And thus it could not constitute an essentially supremely perfect being; for to be constituted essentially is to be constituted simply in the being of a being, and therefore it cannot be understood that through a difference which is not an absolute perfection there would be constituted a being absolutely infinitely perfect. Finally this is explained in this way, for if those two beings were essentially different, the producer would be compared to the produced as principle or univocal cause to effect; therefore it would be necessary that the total perfection of the produced being be contained in a higher and more eminent way in the producer, because it would not be contained formally, since it is posited as specifically different; therefore eminently; therefore that produced being could not be infinitely and supremely perfect, because the total perfection of such a being cannot be contained more eminently in another, because in supreme and infinite perfection itself is included the most eminent mode of having it.

11. Now the other member is proved, namely, that specific identity with numerical distinction of essences is impossible in infinite nature. First, because it was shown above that the essence of uncreated being is essentially singular, because the necessity of being from within can essentially belong only to a singular thing; therefore it is impossible that such a nature be multiplied in individuals through any production, because it involves an open contradiction that an essentially singular nature be multiplied in individuals, whether through production or in any other way. Second, because it is impossible that an uncreated essence and a created or produced essence be of the same species, because this diversity alone is essential,

namely that one essence is such from itself that through itself and without any production it has its actual entity, and consequently it is contradictory for it to have it otherwise; but the other is such that it does not have its actual entity except from another; for this great diversity in the essences themselves cannot be understood with specific identity. To this are added other arguments by which we proved above that there cannot be two unproduced beings different only in number, because they would mutually deprive each other of supreme dominion and supreme power; for these equally prove even if such supreme beings having numerically distinct essences are imagined with the emanation of one from the other. And in this way also from the attribute of omnipotence this unity of God can be confirmed. And the second argument adduced above from Aristotle can also be strengthened, taken from the monarchy of the universe, which Cyprian also uses in his book On the Vanity of Idols, because, if the monarchy ought to be perfect, as it ought to be in the supreme prince, it is not only superfluous but also impossible that such a prince should have a partner, concerning which enough was said above.

12. How the arguments that defend God's unity do not attack the Trinity. Finally, it is easy to explain from what has been said how these arguments are so efficacious for proving God's unity that nevertheless they pose no obstacle against the truth of the Trinity of persons. For first of all, the persons who are produced in the Trinity are not produced from nothing, but are produced from the divine substance, because they do not proceed and subsist in an essence different in species or number, but in the same numerical nature, and therefore they are neither created, nor made, nor dependent, but proceed by a higher origin than natural reason can recognize. Again, from this it follows that the proceeding person is not essentially different from the producer, because although one is producing and the other produced, nor can they subsist otherwise, nevertheless these properties do not belong to them by reason of essential nature, but by reason of personal properties; hence the nature itself neither produces

nor proceeds, but is unproduced in all persons, although in some person it exists without communication from another, while in others it exists as communicated through some production. This does not indicate diversity in nature (as we were arguing in the case of different gods), because in the divine persons it is the same numerical nature that exists in both persons, in one communicated through the production of the supposit, in the other from itself without communication through any origin of such person, and the same nature requires both modes of existing. But truly, if one God proceeded from another in distinct nature, necessarily one nature would be independent and the other dependent, which properties would not only be personal but also essential, because they would belong not only to persons but also to natures. But it is impossible that natures having such properties be equal in perfection; indeed it is necessary that the one which is dependent be imperfect. This has no place in persons of the same nature, because, if the nature is the same numerically, it cannot be more or less perfect, and provided such nature is had, it is equally good to have it communicated through some production as to have it without origin.

13. From this it is also incidentally understood that the argument made above about the lack of perfection is excellent against the distinction of gods, but not against the distinction of persons. For if one God proceeded from another in distinct nature, necessarily some perfection pertaining to the essence of the producer would be lacking to the product, and on the other hand it would have an imperfection contrary to the perfection of such nature, namely being created and dependent; but truly where the origin is in the same numerical nature, no perfection that pertains to the formal constitution of the essence can be lacking, and therefore the produced person can be as infinite as the producer. Finally, the ultimate dilemma about specific or individual distinction ceases in the production of a distinct person of the same nature, because such a produced person is not a God distinct in species or number, but the same numerical God

with the producing person. But if that question were made about persons as persons, it must be said that a person, speaking simply, is essentially constituted through nature, and therefore those persons, even speaking simply, are not essentially diverse. Indeed, insofar as they are persons they cannot be said to have distinct essence, and consequently, speaking absolutely, they cannot be said to be essentially distinguished, because essential distinction must be taken from distinct essence; but essence absolutely is not predicated of personal nature, even if it is taken with reduplication. But speaking more broadly of formal nature as quasi-specific, those three persons as such, or three relations, can be said to be formally different according to their proper natures; nevertheless in them as such the argument made about different gods does not proceed, because in these there would be absolutely and simply essential diversity in the whole entity of each, because nature in them would be different; but truly in persons of the same nature there is only distinction in personal natures, in which the total perfection of nature is intimately included, and from that they have infinite perfection simply. Thus therefore, according to the character of this place, it has been sufficiently declared that the arguments made both demonstrate excellently that there cannot be distinct gods, and pose no obstacle to the distinction of persons in the same deity.

14. Why God's unity was unknown to so many nations. But someone will ask: if it is naturally evident that there is only one God, how could it happen that nearly all men were involved in this error, that they thought there were several gods, indeed (which is more wonderful) that they adored brute animals, birds and serpents, and even stones as gods? It is answered first that nearly all men learned in philosophy acknowledged only one God, as is evident concerning Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and others, and concerning Pythagoras, Sophocles, Euripides, and Orpheus, and the ancient poets, as Justin relates extensively in his book On Monarchy and in his Hortatory Oration; and Lactantius in Divine Institutes I, from chapter

5; and Arnobius in book III Against the Gentiles; Eusebius in Preparation for the Gospel XI, chapter 9; Tertullian in his Apology, chapters 10, 11 and 12; and Augustine extensively in City of God IV, from the beginning, where in chapter 11 he says that nearly all philosophers held correct opinions about God's unity, although they worshipped several gods as virtues or parts of one God. This is what Paul signified to the Romans, chapter 1, saying about the gentiles: "When they knew God, they did not glorify Him as God," because either they worshipped Him as the soul of the world having different virtues in its different parts, which they venerated individually with the same degree of honor; or because, although they recognized one God, especially the philosophers (about whom Paul seems chiefly to speak) and knew that the common people's belief in several gods was error, which by popular or ancient custom called certain dead men or demons gods and venerated them as such, they did not dare to profess the truth, as Augustine indicates about Varro in the said City of God IV, chapter 21. Therefore, from the gentiles' error regarding plurality of gods no argument can be taken that the contrary truth should not be considered demonstrable by natural light, both because that was an error of the ignorant common people, who were led by human opinion and custom, and also because it is not sufficiently clear what they understood by the name of God, nor whether they recognized any God as creator and principle of things, but called any superior cause or power, or distinguished man, God; but in what sense they worshipped idols does not pertain to this place. We have spoken about this matter when treating the adoration of images, in tome I of the third part, disputation 54, section 8.

## SECTION XI

## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED T HAT GOD IS INVISIBLE

## Section XI

1. How great the difficulty in knowing God is, is proven by the acts and sayings of the philosophers. The human mind can never adequately explain what God is, which Simonides acutely signified, according to Cicero in Book I On the Nature of the Gods, who, when asked by a tyrant what God was, procrastinated from day to day, always requesting a new day to respond, because the matter always seemed more obscure. In agreement with this view, Plato said in the Timaeus that it is difficult to perceive God by the intellect, but impossible to express Him in speech. Gregory Nazianzen, correcting this saying in Oration 34, which is the second on theology, not far from the beginning, says: "But I think it should rather be said thus: that the nature of God cannot indeed be explained in any words, but can much less be comprehended by the mind and intellect." Hence it has come about that, in order to explain in some way the excellence of the divine nature, we use various negations or attributes drawn from negations, because we can neither properly nor directly nor positively say what or what kind He is, nor do we sufficiently express this even by one or another negation. Thus far, therefore, we have explained the attributes which are drawn from negations of the imperfections of creatures, by which it is indicated that the divine nature surpasses every created nature. But beyond these, other attributes are added by which the divine excellence is explained through comparison to the created intellect and its capacity. For that which can fall under the intellect seems to be greater than what the intellect itself is, and therefore the excellence of the divine nature seems to be explained even more through comparison and excess above the capacity of the intellect, than through any positive concept which we can form of God. For this reason, therefore, God is said to be invisible, incomprehensible, ineffable; concerning which attributes we must see what is conveyed through them and in what way they can be shown by natural reason.

*In How Many Ways God Is Said to Be Invisible*

2. That God is said to be invisible can first be referred to corporeal sight, and thus it presents no difficulty and can easily be demonstrated from what has been said above; for it has been shown that God is incorporeal, from which it evidently follows that He cannot be seen by the eyes of the body, at least naturally, in the way we now speak; for, since sight is an act of the body, it cannot extend beyond bodies. Indeed, the more learned theologians hold that even by absolute power, corporeal sight cannot be elevated to see incorporeal things, because it cannot be carried beyond its proper object; which Ambrose seems to have indicated in Sermon 8 on Psalm 118. And this is more probable, although Augustine sometimes seems to doubt in Book XXII of the City of God, chapter 29. Hence, when it is said in Scripture that God was seen by corporeal eyes, it must be understood not in Himself, but in some sensible representation, as Epiphanius explains at length in Heresy 70, and Gregory in Book XVIII of the Morals, chapter 36, and Augustine in Letters 111 and 112. But this attribute declared in this sense does not greatly explain the perfection of God, for this is common to all spiritual things, as is evident from reason.

3. God can be known by creatures, even evidently. In another sense, therefore, that negation can be referred to the intellect; for by transference those things are also said to be seen which are properly beheld by the intellect as they are in themselves. Hence through this negation, not all knowledge of God is denied or said to be impossible, otherwise it would be falsely attributed to God, since it has been shown above that God can be known by natural light, indeed even demonstrated. Hence neither is all evident knowledge excluded by this attribute; for not every knowledge, even evident knowledge, can properly be called vision; for vision properly signifies intuitive knowledge, but there can be evident abstractive knowledge. Likewise,

vision indicates clear knowledge of a thing in itself and as it is in itself; but evident knowledge can be confused and through improper or connotative and negative concepts. Therefore, through this attribute God is not said to be unknowable (so to speak) or undemonstrable, but only invisible. But this attribute explained in this sense cannot be understood or truly said with respect to all intellects, for it is certain that God is not invisible to Himself; which can also be demonstrated by natural reason, for God is an intelligent and intelligible substance, since He is immaterial; therefore He is maximally proportioned to Himself, so as to understand and see Himself perfectly; therefore God is not said to be invisible to Himself; He is therefore said to be invisible with respect to others.

4. God cannot be intuitively beheld by man existing in this state. The heretics who denied this. But God can be said to be invisible first with respect to the human intellect, as it exists in this life and knows with dependence on phantasms, and in this way it is not only certain according to our faith, but also evident, that God is invisible to mortal man inquiring into God by the natural power of his genius, even if it should happen that he finds and understands Him with the highest perfection which human genius can acquire through discourse, discovery, learning, and any natural intelligence. This is evident first from experience itself, for no mortal has thus far seen God in this way, nor has any of the unbelieving philosophers testified about himself or another wiser that he had arrived at this kind of vision of God; nor could any believing philosopher testify to this, since it would be contrary to faith. There were indeed certain heretics, called Beghards and Beguines, who asserted that God could be seen naturally by man. But they spoke lightly and without foundation, and they can offer no witness to their falsehood, but are rather convicted by the most open testimonies of Scripture, and therefore they have been condemned by the Church[13]; but it is not our task to pursue

[13] Isai., 64; Exod., 32; Ioan., 1; Clemens V cum Conc. Vien. In Clement. Ad nostrum, de Haereticis.

these matters now. The same thing is demonstrated by reason, because all our knowledge in this life begins from sense and depends on phantasms; but God is above all sensible things and above all phantasms; by what way or reason, therefore, will man be able to ascend to seeing God in Himself? Likewise, for this reason man cannot intuitively see his own soul, which seems to him most closely joined and proportioned, because it and its power of understanding are immaterial in themselves; nevertheless, as it is joined to the body, it receives through that body the proximate principles of knowing, which are species, and thus depends in its mode of knowing on the body such that it conceives nothing except in the manner of bodies and phantasms; therefore much less will man be able in this life to arrive at knowledge of God through natural discourse. And this truth will be more evidently established from what will be said; for in this way alone or with respect to this alone, the proper invisibility of God is not declared, since being invisible in this way is common to all separated substances.

5. Whether the rational soul joined to the body can be supernaturally elevated to the vision of God. Theologians doubt, however, whether the soul joined to this body can be supernaturally elevated to the vision of God, whether by absolute power or ordinary power, and also whether this has been granted to anyone; but these questions do not pertain to metaphysics, for I think nothing can be sufficiently defined in them by natural reason alone, as I shall immediately say in a similar case. According to the doctrine of faith, however, it cannot be doubted concerning absolute power, nor concerning some act of it, namely in the soul of Christ as long as He lives even in a mortal body; but it is certain that according to ordinary law this gift is not granted to other men; whether it has been given to some even for a brief time by special privilege is an uncertain matter. I would note this, however: when it is said that it can happen that man in a mortal body sees God, this must not be understood as preserving the mode of knowledge connatural and proportioned to the state of

the human soul in such a body, or that God is seen by means of the body or knowledge and principles received from it; for this involves a contradiction, because it is impossible that a material thing should represent God as He is in Himself; therefore, this is possible only insofar as God can elevate the intellect to another mode of knowledge, to which mode it is entirely foreign and accidental that the soul is joined to the body; concerning which mode nothing, as I said, can be explained by natural reason. Other things that might be desired concerning this, we shall touch upon a little below.

### *The Proper Sense of the Question*

6. Second, this attribute can be taken with respect to the human intellect separated from the body, or more broadly with respect to any created intellect operating or understanding by its own and natural power, so that God is said to be invisible because He cannot be seen by any created intellect understanding by natural power. And in this sense this is truly attributed to God; for this is certain according to faith, as is evident from the definition adduced above. But whether this attribute in this sense can be discovered or demonstrated by natural reason is difficult. And since the same difficulty exists concerning the separated soul and any other created intelligence, both will be treated together.

### *The Difficulty of the Question*

7. Many therefore hold that this cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, because it can neither be gathered from any effect of God, nor even from the perfection of divine being. For what does it pertain to that perfection, whether it can be seen or not seen by another? That some thing is seen by another imperfect thing is no argument that the thing which is seen is imperfect; for an inferior thing can clearly see a superior one, as a lower angel sees a higher one,

and the separated soul sees all angels; therefore, although God is supremely perfect, it cannot be inferred from this that He is invisible to all intellects which are or can be created.

8. Second, the difficulty is declared in this way, for it can be understood in two ways that a created intellect arrives by natural power at the vision of God: in one way from the effects of God alone, and from knowledge of them, thence eliciting some species by which God might finally be seen directly in Himself clearly and distinctly. The other way could be if an Angel, for example, had an innate and connatural species of God Himself, just as he has of other things, by which he would see God naturally, just as he sees a superior Angel. That the former way can be shown to be impossible will easily be persuaded (I think), because no effect of God, however perfect, especially one naturally knowable, contains in itself or adequately participates in the perfection of God. Likewise, in no creature is being itself in that mode in which it is in God, namely by way of purest act without admixture of potency; therefore from no created being as known can one arrive at knowledge of God in Himself, or elicit a species which represents God as He is in Himself. For how will a species be elicited from only a trace of a thing, or from an imperfect image, or from an inadequate effect, which directly represents the whole power and perfection of the thing as it is in itself? This is plainly impossible.

9. I said "especially naturally knowable" to tacitly respond to the opinion of certain theologians, who think that the created beatific vision is such an effect that, with it perfectly known, through it God can be seen as He is in Himself; although we might admit all this, nevertheless it would not follow from this that one could arrive at the vision of God through naturally known effects, because that vision cannot be naturally known, just as neither can its being, as we shall say below. Besides the fact that that opinion is not true, for although that act is the proximate reason for seeing God, as the medium which they call unknown, and although also that vision perhaps cannot be exactly

seen or comprehended unless God is seen and through the vision of God Himself, nevertheless it as a known medium cannot be the reason for seeing God, because it too is an inadequate effect of God, and of far inferior nature. Hence, if it is referred to God as to a cause, it does not exactly represent Him; but if it is referred to God as to an object, thus it does not refer to Him as a known medium, but as the formal reason of knowing, which it does not exercise as it is known, but as it formally constitutes the one knowing, as I have touched upon elsewhere[14]. Therefore, as regards this mode of knowledge through an effect, it is rightly shown that God cannot be seen through His effects by any created intellect by natural power.

10. From this, however, it cannot be inferred that the other mode of vision tending directly and immediately toward God by virtue of some proper species is beyond the natural power and grade of a created intellect. For one angel cannot arrive through effects at clear vision of another angel as it is in itself, indeed not even at clear vision of a rational soul, because there is no effect so adequate to it that represents it as it is in itself, and yet through innate species it is natural for an angel to see another however superior; why therefore cannot the same be said with respect to God? Or what reason can be offered why this would be beyond the natural due of a created intellect? That God is a more perfect being is not a sufficient reason, indeed not even that He is infinitely perfect, because, notwithstanding that infinity, He is included under the adequate object of a created intellect; therefore the natural capacity of the intellect in this regard has a certain infinity and proportion so as to attain even an infinite object; therefore by the same reason it will be able to be naturally capable of a proper species and vision of Him. And this is confirmed, for some theologians teach that to angels and men seeing God there is given now in fact such a species of God, and that beyond it they do not need another light or another intrinsic power in order to see God connaturally; therefore there is in the created intellects themselves the

[14] I tom. III p., disp. XXVII, sect. 3

faculty and intrinsic power on their part necessary for seeing God, and all that power is connatural to them; therefore to such power the species is connatural by which the created intellect is joined with an object proportioned and connatural to its power; therefore the act also must be called connatural and connaturally possible.

11. Third, not only does it seem that this cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, but even the opposite seems more probable, if we look precisely at reason. First indeed, because, as Aristotle testifies in Book X of the Ethics, chapter 7, our natural beatitude consists in contemplation of God; but it does not consist in imperfect and confused contemplation; for that does not fulfill the appetite of the contemplator, both because everyone, having seen an effect, naturally desires to see the cause, and, although through the effect he knows that it exists, nevertheless he does not rest until he distinctly sees what and what kind it is; and also because, if love is joined to contemplation, as is necessary for true happiness, love itself excites the desire for seeing; therefore natural happiness consists in the vision of God; therefore that vision can be had naturally, because natural happiness can be had naturally; for nature maximally inclines toward natural happiness; but it does not incline toward something naturally impossible. Hence also philosophers lacking the light of faith believed that inferior intelligences could see the first one, and that we also after this life would be blessed by such contemplation of that first intelligence. This Averroes signified in Book XII of the Metaphysics, comment 17, and others whom we shall commemorate below.

12. Fourth, we can argue because, if it were demonstrable that God is invisible in the aforesaid sense, it would also be demonstrable not only that He is thus invisible to creatures already made, but also that a creature is not possible which sees God by power connatural to itself; but this is not demonstrable; rather, many theologians think it either true or at least probable that a creature is possible which has connatural light by using which it clearly sees God; but this would not be probable if the opposite were demonstrated. Indeed Durandus, in

Book VI, distinction 43, question 2, judges that, setting aside impediments, any created intellect is by its nature apt for God to be made present to it through clear vision without the infusion of another supernatural gift.

*Resolution of the Question*

13. Nevertheless, it must be said that this truth can be persuaded by sufficient reason, which, although it may not be so evident a demonstration as to compel a reluctant intellect entirely, is nevertheless sufficient to persuade a well-disposed intellect. And first St. Thomas, Summa I, question 12, article 4, from the fact that God is His own being and purest act, concludes that He is invisible to every created intellect through its natural powers. He proves this inference by an elegant discourse, which Cajetan there, Capreolus in Book IV, distinction 49, question 4, to the arguments against the first conclusion, and there Soto, question 2, article 2, and Ferrara, Book III Against the Gentiles, chapter 52, declare at length and defend against the attacks of others. Nevertheless, I think briefly that its efficacy consists in this: that the mode of understanding and conceiving follows the mode of being and is so proportioned to it that each one understanding conceives other things according to his own mode. From which principle the argument is thus concluded. The mode of being of God is of a superior order with respect to every created intellectual nature; therefore no created intellectual nature can by its connatural powers form a proper concept of God as He is in Himself; therefore neither can it see Him clearly and in Himself. This latter consequence is evident from the former, because clear vision of a thing does not occur except through a proper concept of the thing; but the former consequence is evident from the principle posited and the proposition assumed. Which is also easily declared in this way. For God, from the fact that He is His own being, has by essence that He is purest and most simple act without any admixture of potency; but

every created nature has its being with some composition and potentiality; therefore God has a certain superior mode of being incommunicable to a creature, as it is in God Himself. If therefore a creature naturally understanding conceives and forms in itself all things according to its own mode, it will also conceive all things either as somehow composite, or by analogy and proportion to its own being and its own composition; therefore it will never be able to form a natural concept representing the purest actuality of God and His most simple entity as it is in itself.

14. And certainly, whoever attentively weighs on one hand the purest actuality of the divine nature joined with its infinity and immensity, and on the other hand the limited natural powers of any created intellect and its imperfect mode, will immediately (I believe) understand that it is intrinsically very probable that so imperfect a faculty cannot by its own powers form a proper concept of so excellent an object. This is also most aptly declared by the sensible example which Aristotle used when he said that as the eye of an owl is related to the light of the sun, so our intellect is compared to the most manifest things of nature. And we can add that any created intellect is distant from the uncreated divine light by infinitely greater inequality or disproportion than the eye of an owl from the light of the sun; if therefore not only the eye of an owl, but also many others more perfect cannot directly intuit the sun in itself, what wonder is it that God is invisible to every created intellect operating by its own and natural power?

15. The mode of conceiving corresponds to the mode of being. It remains for us to declare and prove that principle which is the basis and foundation of the whole discourse, namely that the mode of conceiving is proportioned to the mode of being. This can be declared first from what we experience in ourselves; for our senses, because they are material, perceive only material individuals, and (what pertains more to the matter) our soul, although immaterial in itself, because nevertheless while it is in the body it truly exercises the office

of form of the body and has a mode of being in matter, hence it happens that it can conceive nothing by a proper concept except a material thing, and that it conceives all other things through some analogy and proportion from that. But we cannot give a reason for this most evident experience from anywhere else except that the connatural mode of conceiving follows the mode of being. Indeed, if we experience this in the actual mode of being of the soul, which does not pertain to its essence and substance, but to a state connatural and conformable to its essence, much more will it be true in the mode of being that is entirely essential, such as is that potentiality and essential composition which is found in every created substance.

16. But if it should perhaps be said that this happens in our soul joined to the body because it takes species through the body by means of phantasms, we shall respond first that this taken precisely and alone is not sufficient, for we experience besides that, even after having received such species, the intellect cannot freely use them without some dependence and partnership with phantasms, whereas the soul separated from the body can freely use those species which it received through the body; therefore it is a sign that the mode of understanding is accommodated to the mode of being, not only as regards the reception of species, but also as regards their use and the mode of forming concepts. Indeed, for this reason other species are not naturally due to the joined soul, because it cannot naturally use them on account of the mode of being which it has. Thus therefore, from this experience is taken an indication that in every intellectual thing the mode of understanding is accommodated to the mode of being. This can also be confirmed by proper reason and a priori, because the faculty of understanding is a property following upon the very being of an immaterial substance; therefore it is consonant with reason that the mode of this faculty and its use should be proportioned to the mode of its very being. Likewise, species, which are the proximate principles of things to be understood, when they are connatural, are received according to the mode of the one

understanding in whom they are received, according to the common axiom; therefore from this aspect also the mode of understanding will be accommodated to the mode of being of the one understanding.

17. Every intellect obtains some object maximally proportioned to it. Finally, from the same experience it can be understood that every intellect has some object maximally proportioned to its powers and its mode of understanding, and therefore perceives all other things through that or in proportion to it. Hence, if they are of an inferior order, it not only perfectly perceives them, but also in some way elevates them to a higher order so that it may perfectly know them; but if they are of a superior order, it accommodates them to itself and conceives them in a more imperfect way; and, if they are excessively disproportioned, it can only conceive them through analogy and proportion to its proper and proportioned objects, if it understands in a natural way. But in this last way every created intellect is compared to the divine being, and therefore it cannot naturally see that being as it is in itself. The assumption is declared in the highest and lowest intellect, from which the same argument can be taken to hold, in a proportionate way, in the intermediate ones. The divine intellect therefore has its own substance and nature as the object maximally proportioned to it; indeed, as we shall say below, adequate in some way, insofar as in it and through it it understands all other things; hence, because all other things are inferior to it, they are in some way elevated to divine being so that they may perfectly know it; but with respect to the divine intellect, there is no intelligible object which is of a superior order, and therefore the imperfect mode of knowing has no place in it. But the human intellect joined to the body is so inferior and potential that it does not have itself or the substance of its own soul as a proportioned object, but only material being which can be perceived in some way through sense, which is the lowest intelligible object and only in potency, and therefore no object less perfect can be imagined which could be perceived in some way by this inferior intellect; but superior objects

cannot be naturally known by this intellect as they are in themselves, but only through analogy and proportion to its proportioned object.

18. What proportioned object spiritual substances claim for themselves. From this therefore we conclude that intelligences separated from bodies, under which the separated rational soul is comprehended, have some proportioned object, which cannot be other than their own substance respectively or by comparison to their own intellect. For since such substance is actually intelligible and intellective by reason of its perfection, it seems in the nature of an intelligible object maximally proportioned and commensurate to its faculty of understanding; therefore every separated substance is a quasi-proper and maximally proportioned object of its own intellect; therefore it understands all superior things according to the mode of this proportioned object and accommodating them to its capacity; therefore, if the object is so excellent as to be entirely of a superior order, as God is, and having an entirely different mode of being, it will not be able to know that object naturally as it is in itself. And this is confirmed, for God exceeds much more in the nature of an intelligible object every created intellect, than created immaterial substances exceed the intellect joined to the body, and similarly the disproportion between the actuality of divine being and the potentiality of a created spirit is greater than that of the latter to material things; but on account of these disproportions the intellect joined to the body cannot see or naturally conceive created spiritual substances as they are in themselves; therefore much less will a created intellect be able by its natural power to know or see God as He is in Himself.

19. This discourse therefore with all that we have said in its declaration seems sufficiently efficacious for confirming the aforesaid truth. But what Scotus objects against it in Book II, distinction 3, question 9, and in Book IV, distinction 49, question 11, and Quodlibet 14, article 2, all reduces to two inconveniences, namely, that by the same discourse it would be proven both that an inferior angel cannot naturally see a superior one as it is in itself, and that a created intellect,

even suffused with the light of glory, cannot see God. But these inconveniences do not follow, as will easily be evident from the solutions of other difficulties which have been proposed. And among the same to be solved we shall touch upon other reasons which are commonly adduced by others to confirm the said truth, but which seem to us less efficacious.

### *Response to the First Difficulty*

20. To the first difficulty, therefore, it is answered that it pertains greatly to the excellence of God that He should be invisible to creatures in this manner, because this is an argument that He possesses a certain more noble mode of being, which no creature can imitate with equality, indeed not even with univocation. Wherefore, although the ability to see another by natural power does not imply equality of perfection or imperfection between the one seeing and the one seen, it nevertheless implies at least equality or agreement in grade and mode of being. And therefore it does not follow that a lower angel cannot see a higher one, because they agree in the mode of composition or potentiality which they have, and differ only according to greater or lesser essential perfection. And therefore, although a lower angel conceives a higher one according to the mode of its own proper nature, nevertheless it still forms a proper concept of it and as it exists in itself; for that mode is in some way the same or of the same nature (ratio) in both, just as the composition of matter and form is of the same nature in material things, although the forms differ specifically. From that inequality of perfection, however, it results that, although a lower angel sees a higher one, it nevertheless does not comprehend it, because by the very fact that it conceives it in a mode proportioned to itself, it understands it less exactly than it is intelligible according to itself, and therefore does not comprehend it. And all this can be applied to the separated soul with respect to the intelligences, although concerning it, it is less certain whether it can

distinctly see angels by natural power; for many, among whom St. Thomas seems to be, deny this. From which opinion, if it were true, what we are now treating would be excellently confirmed, for much greater is the disproportion of any created intellect to God than that of a separated soul to any created intelligence; but concerning this, elsewhere.

### *In the Second Difficulty it is Inquired Whether a Proper Species of God is Connatural to the Created Intellect*

21. Concerning the second difficulty (omitting the prior mode of knowing God explained there, because it is clear that it is naturally impossible, as is sufficiently proved there), regarding the second [mode], Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 9, admits not only that it is possible, but also that there actually exists in the created angelic intellect a connatural species by which it naturally knows God with distinct cognition of the divine essence. Because it is not repugnant that there be given a species which so distinctly represents the divine essence, nor is it inconvenient to affirm that this species is connatural to the angel, because it can be naturally due to it and in order to a natural act, although it cannot be made by any other cause except God. But he adds (lest he speak against faith) that that species does not represent intuitively, but only abstractively the divine essence, because it does not represent God as present, but as absent, and thus he does not admit that cognition elicited through such a species is vision. Whence, according to this declaration, this opinion is not contrary to what we have said, for Scotus still simply confesses that God is invisible to the angel through natural principles.

22. It is answered in the negative. But nevertheless that opinion has always greatly displeased me, for two reasons especially. First, because it seems impossible to distinguish in God between cognition or distinct representation of the divine essence and intuitive vision. For when it is said that through that species or act God is not

represented as present but as absent, either this is speech about absence according to place, or according to duration or existence; neither of these can be said, and no other member can be devised, whence neither has it been devised thus far; therefore there cannot be such abstractive cognition, but [only] intuitive. The major is established by sufficient enumeration. The minor is proved regarding individual parts, for if that species represents God's essence distinctly, therefore it represents it as immense; therefore it cannot happen that it does not represent it as present through essence or as undistant and intimately existing even in the very one understanding. Again, it also necessarily represents God as eternal, because eternity is also of God's essence; therefore it cannot represent Him except as present in duration, because eternity is totally simultaneous and always present. And hence finally (which especially pertains to Scotus's mind) it is concluded that the divine essence cannot be represented distinctly through such a species, abstracting from actual existence, because the most principal essential predicate of the divine nature is itself being actually existent as necessary from intrinsic necessity; therefore, unless such actual being is distinctly represented, God's essence is not distinctly represented; but if this being is represented, abstraction is not made from actual existence; for this reason, therefore, although in creatures distinct representation of essence can be abstractive, because abstraction can be made from actual existence, and consequently from place and time, in God nevertheless there is a singular reason which Scotus does not sufficiently consider; for since He is being itself through essence, distinct representation of the divine essence cannot be abstracted from actual existence, and consequently neither from the presence of duration and place, through His eternity and immensity.

23. The second reason against this opinion of Scotus is that if such a species is possible, which represents the divine essence distinctly but abstractively, as he says, why not also intuitively? Is it because it is repugnant for intuitive vision to occur through a species?

But this, if said generally, is neither true nor probable; for corporeal sight sees intuitively through an impressed species, and one angel intuits another through its species, which Scotus does not deny. But if it is understood specifically about intuition of God, a special cause must be given, which can be referred to nothing but the impossibility of such a species, which would be begging the question; for this is what we are discussing, namely, if Scotus admits a species representing the divine essence distinctly, he undeservedly denies that there can also be given a species which represents it intuitively. And perhaps Scotus would not deny this, for In IV, dist. 49, q. 11, he more probably believes that there is given in the blessed a species of God than the light of glory. He will be forced to say, however, that such a species is not natural, but gratuitous, even with respect to the angelic intellect.

24. But this can be understood in two ways: first, in that sense in which the same Scotus in the prior place calls supernatural that species which abstractively represents the divine essence distinctly, which he says comes from God as a supernatural cause acting supernaturally, only from the fact that it can be infused by God alone through free will. And this is not sufficient, first because that mode of speaking in rigor and consequently is improper and false, because he himself concedes that the use of such a species is natural and occurs by the powers of nature, and the act itself is merely natural, whence it is also necessary that he confess that species to be infused in the angel according to natural capacity and thus to be naturally due; otherwise, on what foundation could he assert such a species to be concreated with the angel? when he simultaneously affirms there that such a species and its act do not pertain to the gifts of grace or glory, but to a lower order, to which pertain other natural perfections concreated with the angel. But that God alone infuses such a species is not sufficient for it to be called supernatural, or for God to effect it as a supernatural cause; for the rational soul also can be created by God alone, and then God does not operate as a supernatural agent; and the angel also has species of other things impressed from the beginning by

God alone, not as by a supernatural agent, but as by the proper cause perfecting its effect according to natural capacity and what is due. Scotus responds that other species are natural because similar ones could be made by their proper objects. But this is uncertain in many cases, as in spiritual things, and in others clearly false, as in material things; and besides, it has nothing to do with the matter; for rather hence it would result that other species are in some way supernatural, at least as to mode, because, since they have proper causes by which they can be caused, God prevents them; just as human knowledge, infused per accidens, is called supernatural as to mode. But truly that species representing God, since it has no other more proper cause by which it could be made than God, when it is infused by Him, occurs in a mode connatural to itself; whence, if otherwise it is according to the natural capacity of the subject and natural due, it will be simply natural and from God as operating within the order of nature.

25. Then, whatever may be said about that mode of speaking, nevertheless since Scotus confesses that species representing abstractively does not pertain to the order of grace and glory, and its act comes from the powers of nature, supposing such a species, he cannot say the same about the species representing intuitively; therefore it is not sufficient in the aforesaid sense to call this supernatural or gratuitous. It is necessary therefore to confess that it is a gift pertaining to the order of grace and supernatural glory, and is not due to nature, and its act is simply supernatural, even for an angel. And then the argument made above returns. For what reason can Scotus give why one species rather than another is connatural to the angel in the said mode or naturally due? Perhaps he will say that the one which represents intuitively is more perfect. But this is not sufficient for it to be also of a higher order and supernatural, especially because Scotus himself, In II, where above, in order to conclude that there is in angels that species distinctly and abstractively representing God's essence, assumes this principle: It is reasonable to attribute to angels every perfection which befits a created intellect. But this perfection also

befits a created intellect; why therefore is it not also attributed to it as connatural? Whence when Scotus there adds: No repugnance occurs that a created intellect should have such cognition through a species distinctly representing the divine essence, provided it is not intuitive, it does not appear on what foundation that final limitation was added by him, because no special repugnance appears or has been declared by him in intuitive representation more than in abstractive. It is added that the conjectures which he there adduces to prove that the prior species is given to angels, if they are worth anything, proceed equally and better concerning the intuitive species, especially that concerning matutinal knowledge, which more probably occurs through intuitive vision of the divine essence. I confess however that those conjectures are very weak for proving either, and therefore I omit them.

26. Finally I add that the reasons by which the same Scotus, in IV, tries to prove that the human intellect, even when separated, cannot see God by its connatural powers, are very weak, especially if they are applied to created intellect in general. The first is because no intellect can effect vision, unless it either has the object in itself, or something in which the object is contained more eminently; but no intellect has God present in itself in the nature of object, nor anything which contains such an object more eminently, because God cannot be contained more eminently in anything else; therefore no intellect can see God from its own powers. The second reason is because vision is intuitive cognition of a thing in itself; but human nature or created intellect cannot from itself have God present in the nature of object, although He is present to it through indwelling (illapsus); therefore it cannot from itself have vision of the divine nature. But in the first reason the major proposition is strictly false; for to elicit vision of some object it is not necessary to have the object in oneself through itself, or through something in which it is eminently contained, but it suffices to have it in an intentional species, in which it exists representatively or virtually as in a seed or instrumental power; but in this way it is not repugnant for God in the nature of object to be in a

created intellect, through some species. But the second reason assumes a certain minor proposition which in reality is the very conclusion to be proved, for when it says that created intellect cannot from itself have God present in the nature of object, either it speaks of presence in second act, and thus to have present is the same as to see, or it speaks of presence in first act, and thus to have God present is nothing other than to have Him, either through Himself or through a species, sufficiently conjoined or united for eliciting vision, and this is also what is being inquired, why namely it cannot be had naturally in this way, especially if a species distinctly representing God is possible and connatural to created intellect, as he himself admits concerning the species which he calls abstractive.

### *Whether an Intelligible Species of God is Absolutely Impossible*

27. Having omitted therefore this opinion of Scotus, others respond that that second mode of seeing God through a species naturally endowed is impossible, because such a species distinctly representing God whether abstractively or intuitively (for these two modes are not distinguished in God, as we said) is impossible. Henry teaches this opinion ex professo, Quodl. III, q. 3, and Quodl. IV, q. 7, and it is taken from the common opinion of Thomists, who think it implies contradiction that there be given a created species by which God can be seen as He is, which St. Thomas also seems to teach, I, q. 12, a. 2, and q. 56, a. 3. The foundations of this opinion are set forth more broadly by Henry than by others, and Scotus reports and solves them. The sum of all is that the infinite cannot be represented by the finite. But if this opinion is true, an excellent reason is made from it why God is naturally invisible to every created intellect, namely because He is not representable through a created species. For that God Himself through Himself and through His essence should be united to created intellect in the nature of species, cannot be naturally

due to created intellect, both because a form of an altogether higher order cannot be due to a potency of a lower order, and especially because, since God is purest act and for His own sake only, He cannot be owed to any created thing under the nature of form, even an intelligible one. And the first four reasons by which St. Thomas, III cont. Gent., c. 52, proves that God is naturally invisible to every created intellect tend to confirm this.

28. The proposed doubt is resolved. Nevertheless, this response, as asserted by these authors, does not satisfy me. For such a species can be understood to be impossible in two ways. First, simply as implying contradiction. Second, from the nature of the thing, or according to the natural capacity of the creature. The aforesaid authors speak in the first way, whose opinion I have never been able to prove, because they bring forward no sufficiently probable reason by which such implication of contradiction is proved; but what is not proved to be impossible should not be denied to divine power. The antecedent could easily be shown by running through individual reasons and satisfying them; but this is done more fully by theologians, and this matter, regarding this point, pertains more to them, and therefore I declare the foundation briefly thus, which being posited, it will be very easy for anyone to dissolve all reasons. For where in some order a created act representing some object is possible, and a created intellectual power elicitive of such an act in its order is also possible, a created intelligible species of the same order commensurate to such an act and such power is also possible; but a created act of divine order is possible by which God is seen and represented as He is in Himself; an intellectual power of the same order elicitive of such an act is also possible, which theologians call the light of glory; therefore a created species of the same order is also possible. The consequence is evident. The minor is certain from the doctrine either of faith, or received by theologians as more sound and more consonant with faith, insofar as faith teaches both that God is seen by the blessed, and that for this some light of glory is infused in them. Likewise, from the general

doctrine of faith, that there are in us certain supernatural acts, for eliciting which supernatural powers of the same order are infused in us; for this doctrine has place by the strongest reason in the vision of God. But the major, in which lies the force of the argument, can first be persuaded by induction, because apart from the example about which we are treating, in all others it is found true; therefore a sufficient argument is taken thence for the present matter, unless a manifest reason of difference is assigned. Second, because no reason of impossibility can be devised in the species, which does not proceed and is found ineffective in the act or power. For if force is made regarding God's infinity, that God, who is infinite, cannot be represented through a finite species, we will ask how He is represented through a finite act and is attained in Himself through a finite light. But the response is that this can happen, because such power and act are divine and of a higher order, and represent God not infinitely and comprehensively, but finitely; and therefore for that office there can be sufficient proportion between a finite thing and an infinite one in the nature of object and act or power. Therefore let the same response be applied to the intelligible species; for speaking generally about such a species, it is evident according to the principles of theology that there can be given intelligible species of that supernatural and divine order, both from parity of reason and because that order ought to be integral and complete in its principles, and also by induction, for grace, or charity, etc., can be seen through proper supernatural species of the same order, and in fact are thus seen by Christ through infused knowledge, as I have said more broadly elsewhere; therefore from this source it is not repugnant that there also be given a species of the same order, and of the same object of light, and vision, namely, of the divine essence in itself.

29. The objection is satisfied. They will perhaps say that it is repugnant from another source, because a species cannot finitely represent as an act and light can; for if a species represents, it must necessarily represent adequately, and thus comprehensively, which is

repugnant in a finite thing with respect to an infinite one. But why is this necessity specially attributed to a species? For it should not be asserted gratuitously, otherwise, with what facility it is said, it will be scorned. They will respond that a species naturally emanates from an object as object; which therefore communicates either no species of itself or an adequate one. But this reason can be refuted in multiple and very easy ways. First, because it is not necessary that every intentional species be caused by an object as object, but it can be effected by another cause, as is manifestly established in our agent intellect and in species impressed in angels at their creation. In which it is also seen that it is not necessary that a species always be adequate to the object or comprehensive of it. For a lower angel, just as it does not comprehend a higher one, so neither does it have a species adequate to it or comprehensive of it. For what some say, that that species is also in itself adequate and comprehensive, but due to defect of the potency in which it is, it cannot have an adequate act, this (I say) is said voluntarily, for everything that is received is according to the mode of the receiver, and an instrument is accommodated and commensurate to the principal power; for to what purpose would the author of nature give to an angel species disproportionate and exceeding its power, which it could never adequately use according to their total perfection? For God does not act merely naturally, so that He cannot temper His action according to the capacity of the receiver. Nor does it repugn the species according to itself to be less perfect, or inadequate to the object; for even in sensible species we experience them to be made less perfect and effective in distant places than in near ones, and in a medium or organ badly affected than in one well disposed. And besides, because there is no reason why this variety or inequality should repugn the species according to itself more than the act. Thus therefore, although we gratuitously concede that God as object does not communicate a finite species of Himself, nevertheless the same God, as first efficient cause of other forms, will be able also

to effect this one commensurate to the light or act, and not adequate to Himself as object.

30. Then, although God, as object, should effect this species, it would not be necessary that that effection be merely natural, because in whatever way God produces anything outside Himself, the whole effection is always dependent on His free will. Which many also probably opine concerning angels, namely, when they are objects actually intelligible, they can from themselves emit a species of themselves, and nevertheless have that efficacy subject to their will, according to which doctrine they probably explain angelic speech. Much more therefore God, even if as supreme object actually intelligible He could manifest Himself by emitting a species of Himself, nevertheless such action would be free to Him, and therefore it would not be necessary that such a species be adequate to God Himself, because it would not be necessary for God, as object, to act as much as He could in such a species. Especially since, although an object naturally effects a species of itself, it is not necessary that it always effect an adequate one, but according to such capacity of the subject; for this is general, that the action of a natural agent is limited and determined from the capacity or disposition of the patient; for the sun does not always illuminate or act as much as it can absolutely, but as much as it can regarding such a patient. And in sensible objects, as much as experience establishes that they effect these species, so much certainly it establishes that they do not always effect adequate ones, or as perfect as they can, but according to the disposition of receivers. Therefore by no probable reason can it be said that it would be necessary that, if a species of God were made, it be adequate and infinitely representing. Therefore there is also in this the same reason concerning species as concerning act and light, so that in general it is true that of that intelligible object of which created vision and visive power is possible, a species commensurate to the vision and faculty of seeing is also possible.

31. An evasion is precluded. But perhaps force will be made regarding the nature of representation and image; for vision and light are not images representing God, but vision is a certain action which is concerned with God, whose principle is light, like love and charity; but truly a species is an image and proper similitude of the object; and from this source it peculiarly repugns that a species of God be given, because a creature cannot bear the proper image and similitude of God as He is in Himself. This response however would require many things from philosophy, if it were to be exactly examined. For it seems to suppose that a species is an image and formal similitude, which is false; but if it does not suppose this, the reason is of no moment, and makes force in metaphorical words badly interpreted. Concerning formal image and similitude therefore we concede that a created entity cannot bear proper and natural similitude of God, as He is in Himself, because such similitude cannot be understood except through univocal agreement in that form in which the nature of similitude or image is constituted. But we speak of proper image, not of a thing, which on account of analogous agreement can be said to be made to the image, as man is with respect to God. For this image is neither an unknown medium (as they call it) of knowing, but at most it can be a known medium, and will not induce cognition of God, as He is in Himself, but imperfect [cognition] through an effect. Speaking therefore of proper image, we deny that it is of the nature of species that it be such similitude or formal image. First, for the same reason, because it is not of the nature of species that it have univocal agreement with the object in some form or figure, as is evident in the species representing the substance of an angel.

32. Second, because there is no necessity on account of which such formal similitude is required in species. For either this is necessary because the species supplies the place of the object, and for this such similitude is not necessary, for it supplies by way of instrument or as a seed of the object itself; but it is not necessary that an instrument or seed be a formal image of the primary agent. Or that

necessity arises from the fact that species is ordered to cognition, and cognition occurs through assimilation, and this also is not rightly said, because, if cognition itself is not formal similitude, since the whole being of species is in some way for the sake of cognition, why will it be necessary that species be itself formal similitude? Likewise hence is made a dilemma by which it is more openly shown that the principle posited by us is true, namely that there is the same proportion of species, act and light. For either the act itself of knowing, and much more of seeing, is an actual image of the object seen through true and formal similitude, or not. If it is affirmed to be (although this is false), it cannot be denied that the act itself of seeing God is a true image and formal similitude of God; whence either it must be denied that such similitude in act is possible, or it must be admitted in species. For frivolous is what some say, that this repugns more in species than in act or word, because a word or act is made by intellect elevated through light and having essence united by way of object, but a species would not be made thus, but by God alone. For this is of no moment, both because, if there is any repugnance in this that a created thing be formal similitude of God, it is not from the cause or mode of producing such entity, but from this that it repugns a finite entity to have with God that formal agreement which is necessary for formal image and similitude; or, if formal similitude and image is not taken in this rigor, but in some other way to which it does not repugn a creature, as creature, neither will it repugn species. And also because for that cause the nature of image can more easily be communicated to species than to word or act, because species is made by God alone, but act through the medium of intellect; but it seems easier that God can impress similitude of Himself than that intellect effect it, or at least it is equally easy, which is the same to us.

33. But if it is denied that act is formal similitude, by greater reason this should be denied of species, because the whole reason of conceiving species by way of image or similitude is because cognition occurs through assimilation, which assimilation is most perfectly

accomplished through the act itself of knowing; if therefore actual cognition itself is not formal similitude in the aforesaid sense, there is no reason why species should be feigned to be such. But if it is not such, the response or reason adduced to the contrary falls, and the foundation posited remains firm, that proportion must be preserved in this among species, act and light. And truly it is so, for true representation which is said to occur through cognition, is only intentional, and consists in this alone that a thing is apprehended or conceived as it is. And it can be explained by us thus, because through cognition we form concepts of things among ourselves in such a way that from the force of such concept we can as it were paint or declare what sort they are. But this representation is said to be made formally through the act itself of understanding or word, not because there is formal agreement in it, as has been well refuted, but because the act itself is the form, which by informing the intellect, intentionally or intelligibly relates the object to it, and this is to formally represent it; but the intelligible species in this genus will be said to represent effectively rather than formally, because it is the proper efficient principle of the act and determining it to the said formal representation. And thus it is concluded that intelligible representation, whatever it may be, is found either more or at least equally in act as in species, and therefore from this part it cannot repugn that of that intelligible object a created species be given whose proper concept can be given through created vision and created light proportioned to that vision.

34. Another escape is excluded. Finally, hence is easily excluded what some say, that on account of God's supreme immateriality a created species of Him cannot be given, because, if a material quality cannot be an intelligible species for representing an angel, much less will a created quality be able to be an intelligible species for representing God, because any created spirit is more distant from God's purest immateriality than body is from created spirit. But this reason, if it had efficacy, would prove the same about

act and light; for through material light and corporeal vision a created spirit cannot be seen; therefore through created immaterial light and vision an uncreated spirit cannot be seen. But if this argument is ineffective, because proportion is not preserved in the nature of object and act or potency, for a spiritual object, whether created or uncreated, is altogether outside the latitude of the object of corporeal act or faculty, but uncreated spirit is not altogether outside the latitude of the object of spiritual potency, even if it be created; this same response is to be applied to intelligible species, which is always accommodated to the principle and act of understanding. Therefore just as God, from the fact that He is purest act, has indeed that He cannot be attained in Himself through the natural faculty of a creature, but does not exclude that He can be attained in Himself through light and act of a higher order, so also He does not exclude a species of the same order. For it is not necessary that a species always be altogether equal to the object in immateriality and purity, but it suffices that it be in some way of the same order. Just as among angels a lower one has a proper species of a higher one, although not with equal immateriality, because in this it is accommodated to the subject in which it is, it suffices nevertheless that it pertain to the same order and that it preserve proportion with the intellect which it connaturally informs and the act which it elicits; therefore the same will suffice for a species of God. And thus there always remains firm the foundation posited, namely, that proportion is always preserved among light, act and species; and therefore a species cannot be judged simply impossible, where act and light are possible.

35. A created species representing God in Himself is naturally impossible. In another sense therefore this species is truly said to be impossible, namely, according to the connatural order and what is due from the nature of the thing to created intellect, and this sense suffices for expediting the second difficulty, in which we are engaged. But the reason which is required in it why this species cannot be connaturally due to created intellect, must be taken from the demonstrated

foundation, namely that species, act and light preserve proportion among themselves and pertain to the same order of things; because therefore vision and light are of a higher order and beyond what is due to nature, therefore species cannot be connatural to created intellect. But lest we seem to commit a circle, the root from which it comes that those three things in the present case are supernatural, is posited in the reason by which we proved that God is naturally invisible, namely, because God's mode of being is altogether of another order from the mode of being connatural to nature. Nor does it matter that God is contained under the object of created intellect; for He is contained insofar as He can be manifested through naturally knowable effects, or insofar as He can be conceived in some imperfect mode proportioned to the understanding nature; but hence it does not result that He can be naturally known with greater perfection, or through a proper species.

36. A species representative of God in Himself is not given in fact. But the other opinion which was touched upon in confirmation of that difficulty, that in fact a created species is given for seeing God, is false, as I now suppose from the opinion of theologians now almost common. But much more false is it to say that created intellect informed by such a species alone, without other supernatural power, could elicit that vision in a connatural mode. For hence it plainly follows that intellect from itself has all the powers or activity from the part of intellect necessary for seeing God, and only the species and proportioned concurrence is lacking; but this is false and absurd. For why would such a species not be said to be connatural, indeed due according to the order of nature, even if it could be made by God alone, as in a similar case we were saying above when disputing with Scotus? For to created intellect from itself alone that activity belongs intrinsically which is to be applied from the part of potency; for that which ought to come from the object, is to be communicated by it, either through itself, or through species. Whence with respect to potency the act of seeing or knowing cannot be more connatural than

if the potency naturally has the whole active force necessary from the part of the intellective faculty for such an act. Nor can it be judged from another principle that species is connaturally due, than from the fact that potency from itself has the connatural whole activity necessary from its part. Therefore in no way can this be affirmed of any created intellect with respect to the vision of God. And therefore St. Thomas and many theologians, besides the concurrence of the divine essence in the nature of species, require light which is an intellectual power supplying the defect of natural powers of created intellect, and therefore in the above we did not say that species is proportioned to intellect, but to light. And for the same reason this species is not due to intellect according to itself; but to intellect already elevated through light it would indeed be due, unless the object itself were present through itself and excluded the necessity of species. And therefore such a created species, although it may be possible logically, that is, does not imply contradiction, nevertheless is never possible physically or connaturally, because it is disproportionate to intellect according to itself; but to intellect elevated through light it is not necessary, because the object, from the fact that it is most actual and supremely intelligible and immense, is intimately present to the potency through itself. I have said more about this matter in tome I of III pars, disp. XXIX, sec. 2.

### *The Third Difficulty is Resolved, & Something is Touched Upon Concerning Natural Happiness*

37. The third difficulty demanded a most extensive question: whether that happiness which consists in the vision of God can be called natural, and consequently, whether there is in the intellectual creature a natural appetite for it, or, if natural happiness is not found there, where it is, or in what the natural appetite for happiness comes to rest, which we know with absolute certainty exists in us, since we naturally desire nothing more than to be blessed. But these questions

are for the most part theological, and could not be treated in this place without great inconvenience, and therefore it must be briefly said that the natural happiness of a creature does not consist in the clear vision of God, both because of the reason given in that third difficulty, and especially because otherwise there would be owed to the intellectual creature an ordering toward such an end through proportionate and sufficient means, nor could it be dealt with otherwise except by denying to it the providence of nature owed to it; but I consider this to be a great absurdity in theology and a pernicious foundation for explaining the matter concerning grace. The consequence is manifest, because nothing pertains more to the providence owed to each nature than its ordering toward a connatural end through suitable means. But if that happiness is in no way natural, neither can there be a natural and innate appetite for it, because, as was also correctly touched upon in the third difficulty, this appetite is only toward those things which are natural. Likewise, because that appetite is always founded upon, or rather is the same as, a natural power, either active or at least passive, to which some active natural power always corresponds, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, chapter 1, and On the Soul III, chapter 5. Since therefore in the creature there is no natural power for that act, neither can there be a natural appetite.

38. But we speak of innate appetite, which they call the weight of nature, for that appetite is properly called natural; but elicited appetite is more voluntary. How it can be exercised concerning this object, we shall touch upon immediately. It must also be understood concerning the appetite for that vision or happiness, as such it is, or according to its specific nature; for insofar as that vision is a certain great perfection of the intellect and a certain knowledge and most perfect happiness, man naturally desiring knowledge can be said to naturally desire that vision, not as such vision is, but under the common notion of knowledge, which is not really to desire that vision, but knowledge as such. Indeed, if the proper nature of that appetite is considered, it is enclosed in connatural knowledge. From that natural

appetite, however, it arises that in whatever way man apprehends, or persuades himself that that vision is a perfection possible for him, he can desire it by some elicited act, which desire, if it be imperfect and disproportionate, will be able to be elicited even by the powers of nature, and for that reason can be called natural appetite, and because it is also conformable to that natural inclination by which man generally desires his perfection. But this mode of elicited appetite is concerned not only with natural goods, but also with preternatural ones. Indeed, if it be entirely inefficacious or conditional, or through simple complacency, it can sometimes be concerned with impossible things.

39. In what act the natural happiness of the rational creature consists. Therefore it must be said that the contemplation of God in which consists the natural happiness of each intellectual creature is the most perfect act of knowledge of God, which each can achieve by its own natural light and through means proportionate to its nature. For it must be a natural act, as the arguments made prove, and on the other hand it must be most perfect, as the nature of happiness demands; therefore no other act can be conceived. Hence in separated intelligences this happiness will be that knowledge of God which each can have through its own proper substance, as St. Thomas indicated, I, q. 56, a. 3, and the same is proportionally true of the separated soul. But for man in this life such happiness will be the best contemplation by which he can know God from creatures, as St. Thomas said, I, q. 62, a. 1, and this is the mind of Aristotle, whom he expounds there. Whether indeed love ought to be joined with this knowledge, so that it can obtain the name of happiness, is a matter for other consideration. But this contemplation, although imperfect in itself, compared however to such a nature, is most perfect, as much as it can be according to its natural capacity, and this is sufficient for it to be its natural beatitude; for it is sufficient for man, as Aristotle said, book X of the Ethics, that he be happy as man, and the same can be said of angels. Therefore by such contemplation both the natural capacity

would be satisfied, and the prudent desire of the soul or elicited appetite would come to rest, because a more perfect knowledge would not be considered possible and owed to it; for we speak within the limits of nature, and with no revelation made concerning superior happiness; for then, although man or angel naturally contemplating God from His effects would know his knowledge to be imperfect, and therefore could be excited to some velleity or conditional desire of seeing God, if it were possible, nevertheless he would not therefore be restless and as it were anxious, but would be content with his lot, and this would be sufficient for imperfect beatitude, as I said, proportionate however to imperfect nature.

40. Concerning the opinion of the philosophers about the clear vision of the first cause, I find nothing certain, nor did Aristotle ever assert or suggest anything in this matter, especially when treating of human beatitude. But Averroes, in the cited place, speaks not so much of men as of that agent intellect which he imagined to be a separated substance united to us, concerning which intellect he says the ultimate prosperity is to understand through this intellect, stripped of potency, and through intellection which is its substance; but he does not declare that such intellection is vision of the first cause, but rather thinks it to be intellection of the proper substance of such intelligence or form. Finally, if some philosophers, especially the Arabs, whom we shall mention below, thought that inferior intelligences reach to the vision of the first, this is so because they spoke of all as things of the same order and as if they were pure acts; nor nevertheless, as I have already said, do they sufficiently declare what kind that vision or contemplation is.

41. Whether some philosophers judged the clear vision of God to be possible. In the fourth difficulty let us first omit the opinion of Durandus which is touched upon in it, because in theology it is absurd and in metaphysics so perplexed that it seems to say nothing that pertains to the matter. For what is it for God to become present to someone through created vision? Either it is that God by His efficacy

alone effects vision of Himself in the created intellect, and thus it contains two errors, one in philosophy, namely, that someone sees while doing nothing but only receiving; the other in theology, namely, that the created intellect from its nature alone is sufficiently apt and disposed for that vision, especially since he openly speaks of natural aptitude or capacity. Or for God to become present is to concur by Himself with the created intellect for vision of Himself, and in this way it is entirely false to say that no other power than the natural is required on the part of the intellect so that God might become present to it. And indeed Durandus by this presentation of the object understands not vision, but something prior to vision; for he says that, the power of the potency remaining and the object being presented per se and immediately and with impediment excluded, vision follows, and thus he says the vision of God comes to be. But what that presentation of the object is which precedes vision, he neither explains nor can explain (especially in God, who of Himself is always intimately in the potency), except through this alone that God is as it were applied in the nature of object to influencing vision, and thus he supposes all the power necessary per se on the part of the intellect to be innate and connatural to it, which is most false.

42. Therefore, with this opinion omitted, to the fourth difficulty I concede that the reason which proves God to be naturally invisible, whether to men or to angels already created, proceeds equally concerning any intellectual substance which can be created by God. This is sufficiently established from the discourse made by us, nor could I devise or find any reason which proceeds more concerning intelligences already created than concerning creatable ones. Hence consequently I concede that by the same discourse it is sufficiently shown that the light of glory cannot be connatural to any created substance. Indeed, for the same reason I think the same is sufficiently proved from the fact that according to faith we believe that in fact there is no created substance which is such. We shall declare this inference more fully below when treating of created intelligences. And

indeed, that that very light of glory according to species, which is now extrinsically communicated to men and angels, is not connatural to any created substance, is not difficult to believe. First, because it can scarcely be understood that an intellect according to species, which is connatural to man and intrinsically flows from his essence, should be communicated to another substance as an extrinsic accident, so that through it it might understand; therefore conversely, since the light of glory is communicated to men or angels as an adventitious accident, it is a sign that this very light is not a connatural property of that creatable substance, and, even if we should grant that this does not imply contradiction, it would nevertheless be very monstrous and entirely alien to the perfection of God's works that that property should always be in the nature of things in a foreign suppositum and never in its own.

43. Second, because this light is not, so to speak, a full intellective power, that is, per se sufficient in the nature of a power for understanding; otherwise it would not be posited in the intellect, but immediately in the substance; nor is it a pure habit, because it gives not only facility, but also faculty of seeing; but no quality of this kind is connatural to any intelligent substance; but, if a quality is thus natural and flowing from essence, it is a full power; if however it is connatural only as consonant and congruent to nature, but acquired or superadded, it is a pure habit, nor is that middle found in connatural qualities. Which I thus declare in the present case: let there be imagined indeed a substance to which this light of glory is connatural; either in that substance this light is the true intellect and integral proximate faculty of understanding, and this is repugnant to this light, as has been shown, otherwise our intellect could not be informed by such light any more than by some angelic intellect. Or that light in such substance would not be its intellect, and thus it would necessarily suppose another intellect in such substance; and since otherwise it is supposed that this light is connatural to the substance, it would be necessary for such intellect to be of that superior order of which this

light is now considered to be, for therefore now it is not connatural to intellects de facto created, because they pertain to an inferior order; therefore, so that there might be proportion and connaturality, it would be necessary for that intellect to be in a superior order. But, this being posited, such intellect would not need a superadded light distinct from itself which completes its power; for every intellect in its order and grade is a sufficient principle, in the nature of an intellective faculty, of all acts connatural to it, nor does it need superadded light, except when it is elevated to supernatural acts. By these reasons therefore (as I think) it is sufficiently proved that this light of glory which is infused into men or angels, according to this same nature and species is not a quality naturally implanted or flowing from any created substance.

44. But that neither can there be a created substance having an intellect of superior order and nature, which would have sufficient connatural powers for eliciting the vision of God, because it would be said by eminent reason that the light of glory is connatural to such creature, this (I say) is what the discourse of St. Thomas declared extensively above proves directly and a priori. Because such intellect would be connatural to the substance from which it would flow, and potential like it, which it would regard as its proper and proportionate object, to whose norm (so to speak) it would conceive whatever it conceived; in this order are all intellects de facto created, and from this they have that they cannot naturally see God. Therefore a contradiction is involved when it is said that such intellect is of superior order. But a posteriori and from inconveniences it can be declared first, because such substance would be naturally perfectly blessed. Second, because it would see God by natural necessity, just as now the intellect informed by the light of glory sees by natural necessity. Third, it would naturally be entirely impeccable, because the vision of God renders impeccable. Fourth, the light of glory, which is now given to men or angels, would not be so much proximately and immediately a participation of the uncreated light of God as of the

created light of such intellect. Fifth, either the vision which such intellect would elicit would be of another and nobler species than the beatific vision now is, which is repugnant; or now the beatific vision in its entire latitude would be outside its connatural subject, although it could have it, which would also be a great imperfection. Therefore the opinion of those theologians (if there are any) who believed that the light of glory could be connatural to a creature, not only does not weaken the force of the reason made, but rather the efficacy of that reason is seen in this, that such opinion is disproved a priori through it, although a posteriori and from inconveniences it is also sufficiently established that it is false.

### *The Distinction Between the Light of Glory & the Connatural Light of the Creature*

45. And from here also one can easily respond to the instances or objections which are usually made from this light against the discourse made above, namely, that if it is efficacious, it equally proves it to be impossible to see God through this created light, however much divinely infused. First, because the intellect affected by this light is said to see God connaturally, and yet the light itself and the intellect, as affected by it, is a potential being and has a mode of being much inferior to what the mode of being of the divinity is; therefore either from this mode of being nothing can be concluded concerning other intellects and created lights, or it equally proves concerning the created light of glory; for that it is called supernatural, and others natural, matters nothing, if, insofar as it is created, it has the same disproportion and the same impediment.

46. But it must be said that the reason is far different, because the natural light of any created intellect, just as it intrinsically flows from a created essence, so it is commensurated to it in power and mode of acting and regards it as its first and accommodated object; and it is as it were a conjoined instrument of it for eliciting all

intellections, of which the very essence itself, which is the root of that light, is the proper and principal cause through its proper influx. But the light of glory which theologians say is infused into the blessed, just as it can be connatural to no creature, so in a peculiar mode and way it flows from the divine essence as a singular participation of His uncreated light; and therefore it primarily regards the divine essence itself as its proper and accommodated object, and participates in His mode of operating, and is His proper instrument for effecting vision of the same, of which vision therefore no created essence is the principal and as it were radical cause, but the divine essence itself. Because, just as the intellect is an instrument of the soul, so the light is an instrument of God. But it is called an instrument in this way, not because, in the way it acts, it does not act by its own and proportionate power; for indeed it so acts, and under that aspect it can be called a proximate principal cause in its genus; but because it is a power subordinated to another, to whom under another aspect the operation is more principally attributed; just as heat is called an instrument of fire even for heating, and intellect an instrument of the soul for understanding; in this manner therefore the light of glory is not an instrument of any creature, but of God; for this reason therefore God is said to be the principal cause of that vision.

47. The created intellect attains the blessed vision only instrumentally. Then, because that light is not the entire active power of that vision in the nature of a proximate faculty, but it is necessary that the created intellect also, in which such light is, apply its proximate activity, partial (as they say) with the partiality of cause, not of effect: for that is absolutely necessary[15], so that the act might be vital. But the intellect does not apply that activity as a natural power, even if it applies it through its entity, but as it is an obediential power, because the whole action and the whole effect is supernatural; therefore it acts as a power subordinated to God, and thus as His

[15] non effectus... necessaria est, 1597, 1960; ed. Vivès om. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 578.

instrument, whence also by this title God is said to be the principal cause. Finally, because in the action of understanding (just as in every animal action) besides the activity of the proximate faculty there intercedes the actual flow of the very soul or essence, in which such faculty is rooted, and therefore that is considered the principal principle of such action, not by denomination only, but by causality, as was treated above, disputation XVIII. For this concurrence to be provided concerning the blessed vision, every created essence is insufficient, and therefore in this also it operates as an instrument of God, who therefore concurs with these principles with far higher aid than if in all those principles there were connatural and proportionate power for such action, and therefore also for this cause God is the principal cause of that work.

48. The created intellect, not God, is denominated as seeing by the beatific vision. Nor indeed does it follow from this (as some object) that God is denominated as seeing by that vision, because action is usually wont to denominate principally the principal cause; this (I say) does not follow, for to see is not denomination precisely of an agent as such, but of such agent who receives in himself and is informed by vision; on account of which Aristotle said that to understand is a certain suffering, just as to sense. But God so effects that vision that He does not receive it nor is informed by it; but man or angel is correctly said to see by that vision, because he is informed by it; and as to activity, it suffices that he concur to it in a vital way, even as an instrument, as has been declared more extensively, tome I of part III, disputation XXXI, section 6, to 4.

49. There is therefore a far different reason concerning light superadded to things above their natures and concerning the mode by which they operate through it, than concerning light and connatural actions. From which difference it arises that the connatural mode of action or vision is to be regulated and commensurated according to the connatural mode of being, either of the natural light, or more principally of the created essence, which is as it were the first

foundation and principal principle of that action and order; but the supernatural mode of action or vision is not to be regulated in all respects from the mode of being of the created light or of the thing understanding through that vision, but principally from the divine essence, to which as to the principal root in such action all these things are subordinated.

50. Hence in form I concede the assumption, namely, that the intellect even informed by the light of glory has an inferior mode of being than God has in Himself; I deny nevertheless the consequence simply, because that whole conjunction does not concur as an organ of some created essence to which it is commensurated. And this very thing is for that light to be of a certain superior order, in which it has such relation to God that it cannot regard any created substance as the radical principle and foundation of its being, and therefore cannot be connatural to it. But I add also that that vision which is proportionate to this light has in itself an inferior mode of being than the uncreated vision of God Himself has. It is nevertheless a singular participation of that vision and surpasses every vision connatural to a creature, because it immediately regards the very essence of God as it is in itself, as its proper concept. In which it also has proportion with the supernatural light, because that, just as it has its immediate origin from the uncreated light alone of which it is a participation, so it regards the divine essence itself in itself as its proper object, as has been explained.

51. In what other way God can be said to be invisible. From these things it is understood that God can be said to be invisible by the created intellect in another way, that He can be beheld by no path or reason whether natural or supernatural. In which sense certain heretics interpreted that attribute, who denied that we or angels would see God in Himself, but in some created splendor. Whose opinion was deservedly condemned as heresy, as openly repugnant to John saying: "We shall see Him as He is," and to other places, which it belongs to

theologians to recount and interpret, with the holy Fathers adduced[16]. But although that opinion is so false, nevertheless I do not think it to be among those things which can be convinced of falsity by natural reason alone. For, if what we said in the superior point are true and efficacious, from them it is probably collected that, natural reason alone being considered, it is rather to be thought that God is simply and in every way invisible in Himself, than visible by any means or reason. First indeed, because natural reason taken per se would not easily persuade itself that an effect is possible, which according to the natural course and power cannot come to be. Second and especially it could seem that this is repugnant in a vital act, which it is necessary be made by the power which it informs and be concerned with its object; from which it seems to follow that either it ought to be natural, or it can in no way be. Since therefore it is sufficiently proved by natural reason that that act cannot be natural, staying within the limits of the same natural reason, such act would rather be thought simply impossible, than possible in some way. Or at most, one who would act with great judgment and moderation would judge that God indeed is naturally invisible; but whether He Himself could manifest Himself by some superior reason, cannot be known. Therefore this truth as to this part, by which God is said to be supernaturally visible, is from those things which are held by faith alone. But reason serves to solve contrary arguments, either from general principles per se credible, that many things can be done by divine power which cannot be done by the powers of created nature, or particularly by showing that here there is no repugnance or contradiction, because God in some way pertains to the object of the intellect, which is sufficient so that the same intellect can be elevated to operating more perfectly concerning such object than it naturally can.

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[16] Lege Bern., epist. 110; Concil. Flor., in lit. Unionis; c. Damnamus, de Haer., quatenus damnat errores Amalrici. Vide Direct. Inquisit., p. II, q. 7; Turrecrem., in Summ. de Eccles., lib. IV, c. 35.

## SECTION XII
## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD CANNOT BE COMPREHENDED OR KNOWN QUIDDITATIVELY

1. Another attribute of God is to be incomprehensible, which is partly contained in the preceding and necessarily follows from it, and partly adds something which we shall only indicate, because it pertains more to theologians than to metaphysicians. It is established therefore first that this attribute is to be understood by comparison with created intellect, for God is comprehensible by himself, if nevertheless the metaphor of comprehension is rightly accommodated to the same thing with respect to itself. For the name of comprehension according to its proper meaning is taken from quantified bodies, in which one body is not said to comprehend itself, but another, which so surrounds or encompasses it within itself that nothing remains outside, and from this the name has been transferred to comprehension or vision, so that vision is called comprehension by which an object is seen insofar as it is visible, such that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing, as Augustine said. If therefore the proportion of the metaphor were to be observed in all things, it would not be attributed to the same thing with respect to itself; because however intellection is reflected upon itself or upon the very one understanding, therefore, just as God is said to see himself, so also most properly is he said to see himself adequately insofar as he is visible, because he is no less intellective than intelligible; in this sense therefore he is truly said to be comprehensible by himself; when therefore he is called incomprehensible, it is to be understood by comparison with created intellect.

*How God is Incomprehensible*

2. This can be understood with respect to created intellect, either as operating through the powers of its nature, or absolutely and simply and in every respect. In the former way we say this attribute is contained in the superior one and is more evident than it; for comprehension includes whatever belongs to the perfection of vision and further adds adequation to the object, for it denotes exact and altogether perfect cognition of the object; if therefore vision is not possible naturally, much less will comprehension be. This is also more evident, because, since God is infinite, it cannot be understood that he would be comprehended by finite power and especially by natural strength.

3. Concerning the latter sense however there is not such evidence, especially supposing the truth of faith, that God can be seen supernaturally, even if he is naturally invisible; for it can be doubted, and not undeservedly, whether he can be comprehended by supernatural power by created intellect, even if he is naturally incomprehensible. Especially because it is not easy to understand intellectually how God is seen clearly as he is in himself, and is not seen insofar as he is visible, since he is a most simple thing. Indeed there have not been lacking theologians who have thought this to be one of the most hidden mysteries of faith; and therefore I said that the disputation concerning this attribute under this aspect does not pertain to the metaphysician. I think nonetheless that it must be held with certain faith that God is simply and altogether incomprehensible by created intellect, however much it may be elevated for understanding, as I have proven more broadly elsewhere from Scripture, Councils and Fathers. And incomprehensibility declared in this sense follows upon the infinity of God; for because he is infinite, therefore he cannot be comprehended by finite power, and because created intellect, however much elevated, is always of finite power,

therefore with respect to it God is simply and altogether incomprehensible, and although he is seen as a whole, because he is most simple, nevertheless he is not seen adequately or totally, on account of his eminence. See what we have written in tome I of part III, disputation XXVI, almost throughout.

### *Whether God Can be Known Quidditatively by Nature*

4. Opinion of some. But someone will ask, granted that God cannot be comprehended, whether he can at least be known quidditatively. This can be asked in that twofold sense often distinguished, namely either by natural or by supernatural power. And concerning this latter mode there is no question, for by whatever cognition God is seen clearly and as he is in himself, by the same he is known quidditatively; for he is seen according to his whole essence, which will be established a fortiori from what is to be said. Whence it is understood that comprehension adds something beyond quidditative cognition, namely adequation, just as we said about vision. Concerning the former sense however there is a question on account of certain philosophers who said that we can know quidditatively separated substances, also comprehending God among them. Thus held the Commentator, III De Anima, c. 7, and reports Avempace, Themistius and Alexander to this opinion, who by greater reason would concede that God can be known quidditatively naturally by lower intelligences. And Scotus, as we saw above, affirms that angels by natural cognition know God quidditatively through a natural species implanted in them. Indeed in I, dist. 3, q. 1, he affirms that we can in this life naturally and from creatures arrive at forming such a concept of God, which would represent him to us quidditatively. Several reasons are given, but they are of little efficacy and scarcely need response, which we shall better touch upon below when treating of created intelligences. Now one suffices, because we naturally know concerning God that which is most essential and proper to him,

namely to be existence itself through essence, and from himself and from intrinsic necessity to be actual being; therefore we know him naturally quidditatively.

5. In this doubt however, unless some equivocation in terms is mixed in, no question that pertains to the matter can remain for us, supposing the doctrine given concerning vision. The name of quidditative cognition can be taken equivocally; for in one way quidditative cognition can be called that by which it is known concerning a thing what it is, by conceiving some quidditative predicate of it, not only as common, but also as proper, whether it is conceived through positive reason or representation, or through negation. In another way quidditative cognition is called that through which all quidditative predicates concerning a thing are known up to the ultimate difference or quasi-difference, conceiving it by a proper and positive concept. In the former way Scotus above seems to have used the name of quidditative cognition; in the latter way however Averroes and others cited seem to have used it, and St. Thomas, I, q. 88, a. 2, and III Contra Gentiles, c. 45, as Ferrariensis and Cajetan noted in those places; and again Cajetan, in the tract De Ente et Essentia, c. 6, q. 14, where he notes that Scotus in this part differs from St. Thomas only in the use of the name. Whence he himself, to remove the equivocation of the word, distinguishes that it is one thing to know the quiddity of a thing, another to know a thing quidditatively, so that the first of these signifies only knowing any essential predicate; the second however is to know the whole essence of the thing, up to the ultimate degree or difference.

6. The quiddity of God can be known by us in this life naturally in some way. Having explained therefore the signification of terms, it is a certain thing that not only intelligences abstracted from body, but also we in this life can in some way know naturally what God is or the quiddity of God. This is proven by the argument made in favor of the prior opinion; indeed all the things by which we have hitherto proven that divine attributes are known by natural reason

support this very thing, because through all those things the essence of God is explained, and insofar as they are said concerning him, they are said essentially, as we have shown. Also because we attribute to God many predicates common to him and creatures, which according to the most abstract or analogous notion are properly said of God, such as to be being, substance, spirit, etc.; but these are said essentially of creatures; much more therefore of God. Again, so that we may appropriate these to God, and in some way form a proper concept of God, that is, not common to other things, we add certain quasi-differences or modes, by which we declare the singular excellence which such predicates have in God, as when we say God is being through essence, infinite, pure act, etc.; therefore we truly know in some way the quiddity of God.

7. It must be said further however that not only man in this life, but no creature whatever can know God quidditatively from his effects and by natural power. St. Thomas intends this conclusion, I, q. 12, a. 12, and q. 88, a. 2; and Cajetan and Ferrariensis, in the cited places; and Capreolus broadly in I, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 1, from conclusion 4 up to 8; and in the matter Scotus says the same above, insofar as it pertains to our cognition and that of angels through effects alone; for as regards the other cognition which he attributes to angels through their proper abstractive species, he plainly disagrees with St. Thomas; but concerning this enough has already been said. The reason of the conclusion however is touched upon above, because no effect of God is so adequated to him that it bears his proper likeness, and therefore it cannot manifest the proper quasi-difference or ultimate constitutive of God as he is in himself. Also, because the mode of being of God is of another order from every creature; and he is more distant from creatures even spiritual than spiritual creatures are from material; therefore from the perfection of creatures the perfection of the creator can never be conceived quidditatively. Finally, as regards us, experience itself and induction sufficiently persuade this, which we

can make concerning those things which we know or predicate concerning God.

8. For some things (as Dionysius distinguished, c. 2 De Caelesti Hierarchia) are negative, others affirmative, under which are comprehended those composed or mixed from both. Affirmative ones again are either absolute or respective. It is not necessary however to distinguish proper and metaphorical predicates, for we treat only of proper ones, since metaphorical ones are attributed to God only insofar as they signify through transference something of those things which are properly attributed to God, and thus they differ only in word or concept of the name. Therefore the predicates which are absolute, as they are attributed to God by us, do not perfect his quidditative cognition, because either they are analogous and common to God and others, or if they are made proper to God, they are most confused, and scarcely become proper except with negation joined. The assumption is clear, because all these things, being, good, perfect, substance, wise, just and similar things, which are properly said of God, are common to creatures; but if we wish to conceive them as they are proper to God, we cannot do this except under some confusion, as when we say God is supremely wise, or being embracing every perfection, or something similar. Most often however we do this with negation joined of that imperfection which such a predicate is accustomed to have in creatures, so that we may in some way explain that which we confusedly apprehend concerning such perfection as it is in God. On account of which Dionysius, in the beginning of De Mystica Theologia, and De Caelesti Hierarchia, c. 2, prefers cognition of God through negative concepts to that which is through positive ones, which Augustine also teaches, tract. XXIII in John, and V De Trinitate, c. 1, and often elsewhere. Because we conceive more easily and distinctly what God is not than what he is, if we desire to conceive something proper and absolute, and not only common and analogous and respective, concerning God. Through positive and absolute concepts therefore we do not know God quidditatively; it is

established however that, although negative concepts are joined, they cannot consummate quidditative cognition, because through them directly and formally it is rather known what God is not than what he is; insofar however as through that negation some excellence of divine perfection is declared, the cognition remains in the same confusion and darkness. And the same is also true if respective ones are added to all these absolute concepts, such as of creator and similar ones, both because those predicates formally either denote extrinsic denominations or relations of reason (for real relations ad intra are not naturally knowable, nor are they even properly of the quiddity of God); and also because the real properties which we desire to declare through those relations, either are emanations ad extra, which are not in God but in creatures, or there is only the principle or power which is in God for such actions, and this also is not conceived by us except by a confused or negative concept, just as has been declared concerning other attributes. Thus therefore it is established that through no concept, nor simultaneously through all those which we can naturally form concerning God, do we arrive at his quidditative cognition.

9. And this discourse can be applied, with proportion preserved, to any created intellect. For although an angel, for example, can more distinctly and properly conceive certain perfections which are properly attributed to God, such as being spirit, intelligent, etc., nevertheless he always infinitely falls short of the mode in which those perfections are in God, and either stops at conceiving that property as common and analogous, or, in order to conceive it as proper to God, employs some negation or respect, or something similar. And for this reason Dionysius said, in Mystica Theologia, c. 2, that God is above all cognition, and c. 17 De Divinis Nominibus: "Truly (he says) we shall say that we do not know God from his nature; for it is unknown, and surpasses all reason and sense"; and Gregory Nazianzen, oration 3 De Theologia, in this sense said that God cannot be naturally comprehended by any intellect: for there he takes comprehension

broadly, insofar as it includes proper and quidditative cognition. The a priori reason of this truth however is the same by which we proved that God cannot be naturally seen, adding that God cannot be known quidditatively unless he is seen, as we also proved above against Scotus.

10. Nor does the reason made in the prior opinion urge anything against this sense, for, although we know that God is existence itself through essence, nevertheless we neither properly conceive what kind that existence is, nor can we even conceive what it is to be existence itself through essence, except through negations, namely, because from himself he is actual being, that is, not from another, and we also declare the proper perfection of that existence through negation, because it is infinite. You will say: therefore we do not really conceive God, because what is constituted through that negation, as such, is not God; but what we conceive as substrate to that negation is not proper to God; for, with that negation set aside, what remains is common. And in our manner of conceiving this seems to be more difficult, because we conceive nothing except in the manner of a sensible or material thing, which concept does not seem to be able to represent God. But if we do not form some proper concept of God, we certainly do not know him.

*The Manner in Which we Conceive God is Explained*

11. It is answered by denying the first consequence, because, although we do not conceive God distinctly and according to his proper representation, nevertheless we truly conceive him by a concept directly and immediately representing him, or some perfection as proper to him. This concept however, if it is positive and absolute, is very confused, not as confused is said of the universal or common, which they call a potential whole, but as it is opposed to a concept properly and clearly representing a thing as it is in itself. But if negation is included in that concept, although that does not pertain to

the quiddity of God, under it nevertheless we understand the foundation or root of it, which is the proper quiddity of God and not some common or analogous notion; as, when we conceive God as infinite being, we do not understand the substrate of that negation to be being as such, but some singular being, having so much perfection that it is not enclosed by limits. This is universal in us whenever we use negative differences to contract positive genera, as when we say irrational animal, we do not conceive animal as such, as the foundation of that negation, but we conceive some contractive difference of animal, which, because we cannot conceive it merely positively except most confusedly, we explain through that negation.

12. Nor is it true that every concept of ours is directly and immediately of some sensible thing, for the concept of being or substance is not the concept of a sensible thing. At most therefore this is true in concepts which we wish to form distinctly of things as they are in themselves; then indeed it is true that such representation is always of a material thing as such, indeed it is always of a thing according to some mode in which it has been perceived through external sense, or composing it from those things which have been perceived through sense; but we do not conceive God so distinctly, but confusedly with negation or respect joined, as has been explained. But if sometimes he seems to conceive God in the manner of a sensible thing, as in the manner of some light, or cloud, or very old and grave man, etc., it should not be thought that these concepts representing sensible things are concepts of God, but it should be understood that two concepts intervene there, one of that sensible object, which we imagine, another confused quasi-respective concept by which we conceive God as something similar or proportional to that sensible thing which we make present. This can be explained from metaphorical expressions; for when we say God is a lion, we immediately conceive the fortitude of God; we apprehend it however, not indeed by the concept of a lion or material thing, but of God

himself, though confusedly conceived, and with a certain respect of likeness or proportionality to the fortitude of a lion.

## SECTION XIII
## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD IS INEFFABLE

1. The meaning of the title of this question is explained. The sense of this attribute is not that God is such a being that He cannot in any way be named or expressed in speech; for by common usage it is established that we speak many things about God and attribute proper things to Him, and similarly it is established that God has many names, even in Sacred Scripture. The meaning, therefore, is that God cannot be declared in speech according to His total perfection, nor can He be named by us or by any creature with such a name that would express His nature as it is in itself. And in this sense this attribute does not declare in God any perfection other than the two preceding ones; nor is it founded on any other reason except that names are signs of concepts, and therefore, just as we cannot sufficiently conceive God, nor as He is in Himself, so neither can we name Him or declare His perfection in speech. Hence not only the holy Fathers (which is most frequent in them), but also philosophers, have attributed this excellence to God, namely that He is ineffable, as Nazianzen reports from Plato, Oration 2 on Theology, and Cyril from Hermes Trismegistus, Book I against Julian.

### *Some Matters are Investigated Concerning the Attribute of Ineffability*

2. But you will ask whether God is ineffable to us, or also to the angels. Likewise, whether He is ineffable to creatures only naturally, or also supernaturally, that is, to those who see Him clearly.

Likewise, whether He is also ineffable to Himself. Finally, whether He is ineffable in human tongues or sensible and human speech, or also in spiritual tongues or words. To all these questions response is made easily, beginning from this last point, that the discussion here concerns vocal names, which signify by imposition; for spiritual or intellectual ones represent naturally and are nothing other than the concepts themselves, which are not distinguished from cognition. Hence in this last sense God is not ineffable otherwise than He is unknowable [or invisible][17].

3. God is naturally ineffable to angels and men. From which it is easily responded to the first question, that God is ineffable not only to men, but also to angels naturally, whether they are understood to speak to men in sensible speech in assumed bodies, or among themselves in angelic tongues and words, because they cannot speak more than they conceive; but they do not naturally conceive God as He is in Himself; therefore neither can they speak of Him. But this reasoning (to speak of the second question) seems to cease in those who see God, for, since they conceive God as He is in Himself, they will also be able either to impose a name on Him which expresses His proper nature, or to explain His essence in speech. But first, just as they do not comprehend the perfection of God, so neither can they sufficiently explain it by speaking; and in this way God is ineffable to them, just as He is incomprehensible. Then, they themselves cannot explain to others what God is just as they themselves conceive Him, because they cannot produce such words as would generate in others such a concept as they themselves have, because a similar concept cannot be had except through the beatific vision; but they themselves cannot in any way bring it about that others form a similar vision. Indeed, even if they wished to speak spiritually or mentally, they could not manifest their own vision clearly and as it is in itself to others, because that vision cannot be known except either through a similar

[17] [or invisible], 1960; ed. Vivès om. "The words in brackets do not appear in the Vivès edition." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 590.

vision, or at least through species and light of a higher order, which God alone can confer; and, although we might grant that through supernatural faculty one blessed soul could manifest his vision to another, nevertheless he would not thereby manifest God as He is in Himself, because the vision of a created vision alone is not the vision of God. Thus therefore even to the blessed God is ineffable as He is in Himself; He is ineffable (I say) with respect to others, for with respect to himself and in mental speech each one speaks to himself and says what God is, forming his own proper word. But this is nothing other than to form the concept by which he knows and sees God as He is in Himself.

4. God cannot fully express Himself by any created speech. Hence to the third question it must be said that even God cannot sufficiently express Himself, not only in sensible and human speech, but not even in intellectual and angelic speech. I omit that interior speech by which He once spoke within Himself; for that is nothing other than the comprehension by which He comprehends Himself, concerning which, how it has the nature of speech, insofar as the Father produces the Word, theologians treat when explaining the mystery of the Trinity, which pertains in no way to metaphysics. Having omitted therefore that internal speech, God cannot outside Himself sufficiently express His perfection; for He would do this either in one word and moment, or in long speech and span of time. The first cannot be said, because no word can be made which exhausts and comprehends the total perfection of God. Nor even the second, because, even if God were to speak of Himself through all eternity, He would never sufficiently explain His total perfection. Likewise, God cannot express Himself as He is in Himself by any other vocal or mental speech except the beatific vision, which He supernaturally infuses into men or angels; but through that vision He never sufficiently manifests Himself, for, even if we were to imagine God more and more perfecting some vision of Himself, and enduring in

that increase to infinity, He would never complete an exact manifestation of Himself.

5. And hence it follows that much less can God, if He speaks to men in human manner, sufficiently express Himself, because He cannot form any speech or impose any name on Himself, which would represent His nature and perfection as it is in Himself, much less exhaust it. In which way Dionysius absolutely said, chapter 1 On the Divine Names, that God is unnameable, adducing that from Genesis 34: Why do you ask my name, which is wonderful?

### *Some Objections*

6. You will say: since God comprehends Himself, why can He not impose some voice for signifying in such a way that it signifies a thing of such nature as it is in itself? And similarly, since Christ as man saw God as He is in Himself and could impose names for signifying, why could He not similarly impose a name on God by which He would express His nature as it is in itself? For this neither is comprehension necessary, nor on the part of the name can there be any repugnance; for, since this signification is at will and through extrinsic denomination alone, it does not require in the thing which is imposed for signifying a determinate perfection.

7. Indeed, hence Scotus, Ockham, Gabriel, and others further conclude, In I, dist. 22, that it is not repugnant that we, even if we do not know God as He is in Himself, impose a name to signify Him as He is in Himself, and they say that of this kind is this name God among the Latins, or Jehovah among the Hebrews; for, although perhaps as to etymology they are taken from some action of God or from being itself as such, as is indicated in Exodus 3: He who is, sent me to you, nevertheless they are imposed to signify the very substance of God as it is in itself, in whatever way finally it may be conceived by us. Just as this name, angel or Gabriel, signifies the substance of an angel or of such an angel as properly as this name Peter signifies this

man, even if we do not equally conceive both. And it can be declared by an accommodated example, for the will cannot be carried except to a known thing, and nevertheless it is said in this life to tend toward God as He is in Himself, even if the intellect does not conceive Him as He is in Himself, because, although affection does not tend except to a conceived thing, yet otherwise than the conception itself, namely not by representing, but by inclining; but it inclines toward the thing itself in itself, although it is not represented as it is in itself. Thus therefore, although a name is not imposed to signify except a conceived thing, nevertheless, because it does not represent naturally like a concept, but at will, it can be imposed to signify an apprehended thing, not however as it is apprehended, but as it is in itself.

*Response to the Objections*

8. To the former part it is responded that these names are not imposed to signify except with respect to those who through those names can arrive at knowledge of the signified things; and therefore their signification ought not to be measured from the cognition alone which is supposed in the one imposing, but especially from that which they can generate in the hearers. For as dialecticians say, a sign is what, beyond the species which it brings to the senses, makes something else come into knowledge; hence it cannot signify more or more perfectly than it can cause to be known. What therefore pertains to God or Christ or any other one seeing God, on the part of the imposer himself it would not be repugnant to impose a name to signify God as He is in Himself; because nevertheless it cannot happen that a name so signifies as to make the hearer arrive at proper knowledge of God as He is in Himself, therefore on the part of those for whom such a name is imposed, such imposition and signification of God is repugnant to the name. From which it is evident that it is much more repugnant that such a name should have that signification from human imposition, because in them there is the same difficulty and

repugnance on the part of those for whom the name is imposed, and besides there is a defect on the part of the imposers themselves, who cannot express things except as they are conceived by them; indeed sometimes and often they cannot express as much as they conceive, which happens especially in speech about God. On account of which Plato, often already cited, said that it is difficult to perceive God by intellect, but impossible to speak of Him; but Augustine or Prosper, sentence 61: More truly (he says) is God thought than spoken; and He is more truly than He is thought. And in Psalm 85, the same Augustine says: You ask what God is? What eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has entered into the heart of man. Why do you seek that what has not entered the heart should ascend to the tongue? And similarly in book 59 On the Trinity, chapter 10, he signifies that nothing can be properly said of God by the mouth of man. And in the same way Dionysius, chapter 1 On the Divine Names, and the last chapter On Mystical Theology, denies that there is any proper name of God, which namely signifies Him as He is in Himself to us. What therefore is brought from Aristotle, in the book On Interpretation, that words signify things through intermediate concepts, is true as much with respect to the imposer or speaker, as of him to whom the name signifies; and therefore it cannot happen that the signification of a name exceeds the concept both of the imposer, and of those for whom it is imposed; and thus think St. Thomas, I, q. 13, a. 1, and more frequently theologians, In I, dist. 22.

9. To Scotus therefore and others it is responded that, although names signify things at will, nevertheless they signify them through our intermediate concepts or in order to concepts, which, having heard such names, we ought to form about things; and therefore they cannot even voluntarily be imposed to signify a thing otherwise than it can be conceived by us. Nor truly should it be denied on this account that this name God, or another similar one, signifies the divine substance and nature, because truly that is what we intend to signify through that voice, and the reasons and examples

adduced in favor of Scotus sufficiently prove this; and this St. Thomas also admits, I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2 and 3, and a. 8 and 9. Nevertheless this signification does not exceed our concept, because we also conceive in some way the nature and substance of God, although we do not form a distinct and proper concept of it as it is in itself; and thus it can also be signified through a name, because it is not signified except through such a concept and with relation to it. Nor in the signification of one simple name, since it signifies only from imposition, which is extrinsic denomination alone, can it be understood to be confused or distinct, or more or less pure, except in order to the concept which it causes to be formed by virtue of its imposition.

10. To the voice "God" one simple concept corresponds in the mind. But what some with Scotus affirm, that this name God, and similar ones, are not subordinated in us to one incomplex concept, but to some complex operation, such as is expressed by these or those words infinite being, first cause, universal provider, etc., this (I say) is incredible to me, which Fonseca accurately noted, II Metaphysics, chapter 1, question 2, section 4. For since voices are signs of concepts, what we signify with a simple voice, we can also conceive with a simple concept. Likewise, because, if, having heard the name God, we always internally form a concept composed of two parts, we will more easily be able to express that concept either by a complex term or by some sentence; I ask therefore what that might be. It will surely be some one of these: infinite being, first cause, or another similar one. But it is evident that this is false, because by almost evident experience it is established that we conceive otherwise and more distinctly having heard some one of those sentences, than having heard that name of God alone; then also because on account of that cause we rightly do not think that we commit a tautology by saying: God is infinite being, as by saying: God is God; and the same is true of any similar sentence; then finally because all who think rightly about God, having heard this name of God, form the same concept, if they perceive its signification; and yet not all declare that concept by the same sentence. Although

therefore to define in some way or describe what this name signifies or what we conceive, having heard it, we always use some sentence, which happens also in all other voices, nevertheless it does not follow that the proximate and immediate concept to which that voice is subordinated, is complex; indeed because that is simple and confused, therefore, in order that we may explain it in some way, we use complex speech; and on this account in that explanation and sentence there can be variety, although the concept is the same. We conceive God therefore as we name Him, and we name Him as we conceive Him, namely with a simple name and concept, confused however and imperfect on our part, but involving in that confusion in the conceived thing all perfection. Whence finally it comes about that, just as God is incomprehensible and invisible, so also He is ineffable; but as He is known in some way, so also He can be named.

## SECTION XIV

## WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD IS A LIVING, INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE THROUGH HIS ESSENCE AND SELF-SUFFICIENT

1. In order to explain more fully the essence of God according to our method through a certain imitation of genus and difference, or of common and proper predicate, just as we are accustomed to declare created essences, it has seemed fitting in this section to show how it can be known by natural reason that God is a living substance with the most perfect and most blessed intellectual life. For the attributes that we have explained thus far belong to God according to that first diversity which is considered between Him and all other beings in the very notion of being or entity. But in this quasi-description which we now propose, we explain those attributes or predicates in which God

agrees with creatures as if in a direct line up to the ultimate degree and quasi-difference in which He differs from others.

### *That God is a Substance*

2. First, therefore, we take as proven in the preceding sections that God is a substance; for, since He is the first being, it is established that He cannot be an accident, which is imperfect and necessarily presupposes a substance in which it exists. Indeed, from that principle it has been demonstrated that God is such a being that no accident can exist in Him; therefore it remains that He is entirely substance. And this is the first predicate contained under being, in which God essentially agrees with some created beings, and in which He is distinguished from others. But that agreement is analogical, not generic; and therefore neither by reason of that, nor by reason of the other attributes which are considered under this notion of substance, is God placed in the category of substance, as is sufficiently clear from what we said above concerning the simplicity of God.

### *That God is Living*

3. Again, that God is a living substance not only seems evident, but even self-evident, if we once admit that God exists in the nature of things; for it is more incredible that something inanimate, like wood or stone, should be God, than that there should be no God at all. Hence also concerning the most ignorant peoples, who worshipped wood and stones as gods, St. Augustine says in his second sermon on Psalm 113 that they did not think these existed without some living inhabitant. And it is easily proved a posteriori, because whatever exists besides God is from God; but among creatures many things have life; therefore they have it from God; much more therefore does God have it; therefore He is a living substance. One might correctly respond that it is rightly concluded that He has it eminently,

but not however formally. But on the contrary, because the degree of living as such is more perfect than the degree of not living; therefore the degree of life cannot be eminently contained in something not living; if therefore God has life, He cannot contain it only eminently, but it is necessary that He also have it formally, since otherwise He would formally be something inanimate, and consequently could not eminently contain the degree of living.

4. Whether the heavens are living substances. Concerning this reasoning, an occasion presented itself for examining that proposition: the living is more perfect than the non-living; and another: a non-living thing cannot eminently contain a living thing. For this is often called into doubt on account of celestial bodies, which, although they are inanimate, nevertheless seem more perfect than living things and to contain them eminently, since they produce them. Concerning this matter, much is said by philosophers. For some assert that the heavens are truly animated, and thus they overturn the foundation of the doubt. Others confess that they are inanimate, as they truly are, and consequently say that in degree and essence of form they are less perfect than any living thing, nor can they eminently contain those things or produce them by their own sufficient and principal power, but only either through the mode of instruments of the intelligences by which they are moved; or (which is more probable) as partial causes concurring to the disposition of matter, with another more perfect cause concurring to the introduction of form, which cause is regularly proximate and univocal; but if this or its power is lacking, it is supplied by some superior one, according to what was said above concerning causes. Others indeed do not think it inconvenient to admit that some non-living body can be more perfect than many living things and eminently contain them.

5. But whatever may be the case concerning these opinions, it must be said that the demonstration made is not founded on these uncertain principles and doubtful opinions, but on what is most evident and most certain in itself, namely, that the degree of living is

by its genus more perfect than the degree of substance which does not participate in life. This is so evident that it has never been brought into controversy by anyone; for thus are distinguished by all the four degrees of things, namely, of existing, living, sensing, and understanding things, and in these the living are preferred to the non-living, as Augustine said in Book XI of the City of God, chapter 16. Because living things as such are more actual and operative in a more noble manner and less material. And indeed, because if each degree ascends to the highest state of perfection in determinate species or beings, without any controversy that which lives exceeds. From this principle, however, it evidently follows that it cannot happen that the entire degree of living things with its whole latitude should be eminently contained in some thing which lacks life, because it cannot equal all the perfection of a higher degree up to the species or thing most perfect in that order in perfection; therefore much less will it be able to contain all of that eminently. Thus therefore it is evidently concluded that God according to His formal and essential nature cannot be contained within the limit of perfection of non-living substances. And consequently not only does He contain eminently all created living things, but He is also formally living.

### *How God Lives*

6. But a difficulty still remains, because the nature of life does not seem to be a perfection absolutely simple; therefore it cannot be found formally in God. The antecedent is clear, because life consists in this: that it is either an operation elicited by an intrinsic active principle of that in which it exists, or that it is the intrinsic active principle itself of such operation or motion by which he who so operates moves himself through himself. For life is either taken in second act, and thus it denotes operation, or in first act, principal and radical, and thus it is the very nature or substance of the living thing. Nor can we understand a living thing otherwise than in relation to

efficiency, insofar namely as it can act upon or move itself in some way; and then we judge that some thing previously living has lost life when it has lost all intrinsic motion; therefore life intrinsically includes this imperfection which is to move oneself and to exercise one's own active power within oneself; therefore it does not denote a perfection absolutely nor can it be found formally in God.

7. This difficulty is proposed only to declare how life is found in God. For from this objection it is correctly understood that there is a vastly different mode of living of divine and created substance, and that what we said above concerning the positive attributes of divine things is most manifest in this, namely, that according to the mode in which they are in creatures they are not in God formally, but eminently; but they are in God formally according to a higher mode, which excludes all imperfection of creatures. In the mode therefore of life which creatures have, two things can be considered: one, that existing in their natural state they actuate themselves, either in some way perfecting themselves, or representing other things in themselves through knowledge, or tending toward them through perfect appetite. The other is that they accomplish these things through true causality and motion by which they move themselves, either by proper motion, or at least by perfective change. The former of these is of perfection, and includes or presupposes no imperfection, except insofar as it includes the latter, that is, insofar as that actuating of oneself is through true causality. This imperfection therefore must be taken away from the life of God, and only that which is of perfection must be attributed to Him; and thus God must be conceived as most actually having all that perfection which a living thing has when it actuates itself by understanding or knowing, excluding that imperfection of distinction between act and potency and of causality. And by similar reasoning, that in created life there is distinguished in the thing itself life in first act from life in second act, and that the former is the principle of the latter, but the latter is the form of the former, this is not of perfection absolutely, but includes imperfection. That however

is of perfection absolutely in the former life, which namely is substantial life; in the latter however what is actual life; both of these therefore are most unitedly and simply joined in the life of God without any imperfection; for through His very substance He most actually lives, and in His life there is not first act or second, but purest act; and therefore there is not accidental life there, but life through essence; wherefore He is not only a living substance, but substantial life itself.

8. St. Thomas, I, q. 18, a. 3. When therefore some theologians in the Platonic manner say that God lives, because He perpetually moves Himself through immanent perfective operation, which He has from Himself and from internal nature and not from elsewhere, they speak broadly concerning operation more according to our mode of signifying and conceiving than according to the thing, so that in the operation neither efficiency nor real emanation is included, but only that actual perfection which we can explain only through the mode of operation or motion. The theologian could add that there are also in God ad intra true and real processions, which most manifestly are acts of life. Nevertheless those surpass natural reason and are not per se necessary for understanding the essential life of God. For God as such is essentially living, even if as such He produces nothing ad intra. And similarly, if in such an essence only one person subsisting were understood, it would be living by virtue of such essence; just as also now the Holy Spirit most perfectly lives, although He produces nothing ad intra; and the Son lives by understanding, although by understanding He does not produce. Those processions therefore were not per se and formally necessary for life, but they could not have existed except in a living and most fecund nature. And therefore to us, who believe them, they correctly declare the most perfect life of the divine nature.

*That the Life of God is Intellectual*

9. From these things it is easy to prove the other part proposed, namely, that God is a living substance with intellectual life, which also can easily be demonstrated by reason; and thus Aristotle joined both parts in Metaphysics XII, at the end; indeed from this latter part he gathers the preceding, whom St. Thomas seems to imitate in I, q. 18, a. 3. Where he proves that God lives from the fact that He understands; for to understand is an act of life or vital act, insofar as it is an immanent act, befitting from within, either through efficiency, as in accidental life, or through essence. That God is intelligent, however, is proved by the same St. Thomas, in the same I, q. 14, a. 1, from the fact that He is spiritual, or immaterial; which has already been proved above in treating the simplicity of God; and therefore we have not numbered this property and quasi-subaltern difference here, although in it many created substances agree with God in some way, because it had already been proved and because it is convertible with intellectuality. For no substance can live with intellectual life unless it is spiritual, as is proved more fully in the science concerning the soul. Nor can a spiritual substance exist unless it is intellectual.

10. But because this last proposition does not seem to be so evident, and the inference made by St. Thomas seems to be founded on it, therefore to some theologians that reasoning has not seemed a sufficient demonstration, as Gabriel, In I, dist. 35, q. 1, and there Aureolus apud Capreolus, 1, q. 1. But it must be said first that this proposition: every spiritual substance is intellectual, can sufficiently be proved by natural light, as we shall show in a more convenient place below in treating created intelligences. Then we add that proposition taken absolutely is not necessary for the efficacy of that reasoning and inference. For, even if we were to imagine that God could create a spiritual substance that is not intelligent, nevertheless it is most evident that in that degree an intellectual substance is more perfect than one which would lack aptitude for understanding. But it is established that God is not only a spiritual substance, but also

supremely immaterial and spiritual, and therefore obtains the highest perfection in that degree.

11. And in this way this part can be proved from the preceding through the argument from division; for, since a living being can be intellectual and non-intellectual, that which lives with intellectual life is more perfect than that which lives with irrational life, as is self-evident from the terms; nor could one deny this unless he lacked intellect and reason. But the reasons which prove that God is living equally prove that He lives most perfectly; therefore it is necessary that His life be intellectual. Furthermore, this can be shown from the effects of God, and that in two ways. First, from the things produced by God, for among them some are intellectual; therefore much more is God. The antecedent is evident to us concerning men. Concerning angels indeed, although it is true, it is not so known to us, and therefore for the present demonstration an argument cannot be taken from there unless on the supposition that such are the angels; but that such they are, is rather to be proved by us from the fact that God is intellectual. But the consequence is proved from the fact that this is a great perfection, which must necessarily pre-exist in the cause, and cannot be only eminently, both because it is a perfection absolutely including no imperfection, and because it cannot be eminently contained in a non-intellectual thing, as is clear from what has been said.

12. Second, the same is gathered from effects, insofar as their order and beauty sufficiently manifests that they could not have been produced except by an agent through intellect and will. This was a dogma received by all philosophers after Anaxagoras, who is said to have been the first of all to teach this, as Plato relates in the Theaetetus, and Aristotle in Metaphysics I, chapter 3. And it can easily be explained by the discourse made in the preceding disputation, where from the connection of all things and their order among themselves we showed that there is one author of all, who from a preconceived exemplar produced so beautiful a work, and who directs and orders all

things to a predetermined end; but this mode of operating is proper to intellectual nature. Furthermore, from the fact that natural things operate for an end, as is demonstrated in Physics II, and was touched upon above in disputation XXIII, it evidently follows that God much more operates for an end, both because it is more perfect to operate thus than fortuitously or by chance; and especially because nature in irrational things does not operate for an end as proposing an end to itself, but as directed toward an end by some superior cause, which cannot be other than the author of nature itself, who is God. But He cannot direct His action toward an end as moved by another; therefore He most formally intends and knows the end, which is proper to an intellectual agent; therefore God lives with intellectual life.

13. What connection intellectual life has with sensitive and vegetative life. You will say: intellectual life presupposes sensitive life, just as this presupposes vegetative life; but neither of these can belong to God; therefore neither can the former. It is responded that intellectual life as such is not so compared and per se subordinated to sensitive life as the latter is to vegetative life; for sensitive and vegetative life agree in this, that both are contained within the material degree; and therefore they are so subordinated among themselves that vegetative life is as if the foundation of sensitive life and a necessary disposition for it, as far as can be understood by us from things made. But truly the intellectual degree as such does not have a necessary order with the sensitive, because it is not contained with it in the order of material things; but rather per se requires abstraction according to being from matter, and therefore only the rational degree on account of its imperfection is joined with sensitive life, because it needs it in some way for its operation, at least as cooperating and administering species; but the intellectual degree taken in itself and in its purity has no connection with the sensitive.

14. From which it is understood that when it is said that God lives and in that degree agrees at least analogically with all living

creatures, that predicate "living" is taken far differently than when it is commonly taken as a subaltern species of the category of substance constituted under body and above animal, for in this way it is taken from the peculiar degree of vegetative life, insofar as it is common to all corporeal living things. According to which notion it in no way belongs to God, because in Him there is not formally such a degree of life even according to analogical agreement. Therefore "living" is taken, as it is said of God (and in this respect the same is true of angels), as it is common and quasi-transcendent to all degrees of life, insofar as they all agree in this, that they operate from within in their connatural and perfect state. And taken in this way "living" is not immediately divided into sensitive and vegetative only, as in the other acceptation, but into intellectual or spiritual and corporeal living. Or it could also be divided into cognitive and vegetative only, and again cognitive into intellectual and sensitive only, and then intellectual taken broadly into rational and intellective strictly taken for that which understands without discourse, but by simple intuition, and in this last degree God is constituted, and in this sense He is said to be an intellectual living substance; for under this quasi-difference, other intermediate ones, which can easily be thought out and multiplied by us, are comprehended.

15. But I added that God is intellectual through essence, in order to complete the proper and quasi-specific nature which He has in that degree. For, since He agrees in some way with created intelligences, it is necessary to conceive in God a proper and peculiar mode of having this degree, in which He surpasses all other intellectual things; but this mode is none other than that which is explained through that particle "through essence." This must be declared in the same way as we explained the living of God in general, namely, that God is so intellectual that nevertheless for the exercise (so to speak) of intellectual life He does not need any accident or operation properly so called or any effection, but through His essence He has the entire actuality of this life. Wherefore God is said to be

understanding through essence no less than intellectual; because, although "intellectual" seems to signify only aptitude, while "understanding" signifies act, nevertheless God is pure act also in the notion of understanding; therefore He is understanding, or rather intellection itself through essence. All of which will be explained more broadly in the following section.

*On the Happiness of God*

16. Finally I added that God exercises intellectual life sufficient to Himself, in order to explain more fully the perfection and happiness of that life. For with this attribute Aristotle declared it in De Caelo I, chapter 9, where generally and in the plural he says that those things which are above heaven have the best and most sufficient life in all eternity. Where he so speaks, whether because he so thinks concerning all intelligences, or because in that degree this life is most happy, not however equally in all who participate in that degree, but absolutely and simply in the supreme substance of that order, which is supreme absolutely, but in others according to greater or lesser participation in its perfection. Hence the same Aristotle in Magna Moralia II, chapter 15: "There is cast about concerning God the saying that He is sufficient to Himself and needs nothing: because God possesses all goods." And in Politics XVII, chapter 1, he says: "God is happy and blessed, not through anything external, but through Himself, because He is such according to nature." Wherefore, this singular perfection of divine life is excellently declared through this, that it is so sufficient to itself that it needs nothing else, either for living, or for living happily and blessedly, which is communicable to no creature. For inferior and material living things need many extrinsic aids in order to live; for those things which are nourished need food, alteration and other similar motions. But those which sense, for substantial and radical life (so to speak) need all those aids which are necessary for vegetative life, and besides their proper motions,

without which they cannot be conserved. And furthermore for the actual life of the senses they need extrinsic objects, without which they cannot actually live. And the same is proportionally true of the life of man, as regards his inferior operations, for as regards the supreme or rational, he rather imitates the intelligences. Created intelligences therefore do not suffice for themselves in order to live, much less in order to live happily; not only because they need the influence of God in order to exist and operate, but also because they cannot rest in themselves, nor be content with their own created goods, but they need the uncreated good as object in which they live and rest, namely by intuiting and knowing it, and loving it. Because, since created intelligence is not from itself, nor the supreme and perfect good, it is not the ultimate end of itself, and therefore it needs some other extrinsic ultimate end, which it attains by its vital operations, in order that it may live happily in it.

17. But God, since He is the supreme perfect good, under no aspect needs anything extrinsic to Himself in order to live most happily, because namely He has neither an efficient principle from which He depends in existing or living or in any other way, nor does He have an end outside Himself, but rather He is the end of all other things; but of Himself properly and positively He is not an end, but negatively He is said to be an end, because He does not have another end, but rests in Himself as in His supreme good. And therefore He does not need any extrinsic good as object in order to live most happily, because He Himself suffices for Himself, since in Him are all goods. Nor finally does He need anything else besides His essence, in order that He may have the operation by which He lives happily, because, as we said, by His very essence formally taken He actually lives and has the ultimate perfection of life. Thus therefore it happens that, for exercising the most happy life, God essentially suffices for Himself, and therefore to live happily is as essential as to live, just as also to live is as essential as to be. Wherefore, just as God is said to be

being through essence or living through essence, so He is also happy and blessed and self-sufficient through essence.

18. Nor does it contradict this truth that it is commonly said that God is happy by seeing Himself and knowing His sufficiency in the good which He enjoys, for through that vision He as it were vitally possesses that good, without which He could not be understood as blessed. For all this is most true, but it does not conflict with the superior doctrine, for that very vision is not outside the essence of God, but is as it were the ultimate essential constitutive of God Himself in such degree and perfection of being, as has been intimated above and will be explained more in the following section.

## SECTION XV

## WHAT CAN BE KNOWN OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE BY NATURAL REASON

1. Although it has been said in the preceding sections that these positive attributes which express formal absolute perfection necessary to God are part of God's very essence, nonetheless these three—namely, knowledge, will, and power—are conceived by us in a particular way as faculties or operations of God himself by analogy to created things. Therefore, in addition to what we shall consider concerning the essence of God, it is necessary to speak of these three in particular, because in each of them certain matters occur worthy of consideration which do not exceed the limits of natural reason and metaphysics in which we are engaged.

2. First, therefore, lest we labor in equivocation, it must be established what is signified by the name "knowledge." For we do not understand some quality or habit, or an act properly made or elicited by a power, nor even cognition acquired through discourse, as including some similar imperfection. In this signification those seem to have taken knowledge who said it is not properly in God, but is

attributed by metaphor or causality, that is, because he causes knowledge in us, as St. Thomas reports, q. 2 de Veritate, a. 1. For it is not likely that these understood God to be so lacking in knowledge as to be completely ignorant; indeed, since they confessed God to be the fountain of all created knowledge, it is not likely they believed God to be entirely unknowing. Therefore, because they thought knowledge included imperfection, they denied it to be formally and properly in God. But those imperfections are as it were material, found in human or angelic knowledge, but they do not pertain to the formal nature of knowledge as such, which is here taken most abstractly, prescinding from created and uncreated, and signifies only clear and evident and perfect cognition or perception of truth or of a knowable object, whether that perception occurs through quality, or through substance, or with effection and reception, or without these imperfections. Indeed, knowledge is not even taken here with that restriction by which we are accustomed to use that term, for cognition of demonstrable truths, which we distinguish in ourselves from the habit of first principles. Nor even as we are accustomed to distinguish knowledge from wisdom, or from art and prudence; but it is taken generally for open and clear understanding of any truth whatsoever.

*Resolution of the Question*

3. I now say first that it is evident by natural light that there is knowledge in God. This conclusion in the sense explained is so well known that no philosopher who has acknowledged God has denied it, and Aristotle proves it in Metaphysics XII, ch. 7, and Ethics X, ch. 8, and it is sufficiently proven from what was said at the end of the preceding section. For it has been shown that God lives with actual and perfect intellectual life; but knowledge is nothing other than such life.

*Whether Knowledge is in God in First Act, or Only in Ultimate Act*

4. From these things it follows and is said second, that in God there is not knowledge in proper first act, but in second act. This also Aristotle plainly teaches in the cited place, and the Commentator and other interpreters agree, even the pagans. And it is proven, for knowledge in first act can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it is really separated from second act, which Aristotle compares to sleep, and in this way it is most evident that God's knowledge cannot be in first act, because such a state includes potentiality and lack of ultimate perfection, and consequently mutability and other similar imperfections.

5. Small doubt. Only this can be doubted in this matter, because the reasoning made not only proves that God cannot be in first act alone with respect to all knowable objects, which is most evident, because at least he necessarily knows himself, as can be established from the end of the preceding section, because by knowing himself he is happy and blessed; but he cannot not be blessed; but it also proves that concerning no knowable object can God be in first act alone, because the same inconveniences follow with respect to any object whatsoever. But this seems to be able to be said for two reasons. One is because it follows that God knows other things with the same necessity as himself, which seems to contradict the final assertion placed in the preceding section; for if this pertained to God's perfection, God would need creatures at least as objects for his consummate perfection; but the opposite has been demonstrated in the superior section. The other is because concerning contingent objects there are many things which God could know and does not know, for example, that it will rain tomorrow, which could indeed be, but will not be; therefore with respect to these and similar objects God's knowledge is only in first act.

6. It is examined. The response is given by conceding the assumption, namely that with respect to no object is divine knowledge only in first act, properly speaking, because that state is imperfect and potential, as the argument correctly proves. To the first inconvenience it is responded that, given truth or knowability in created and creatable objects, they are necessarily known by God, not because God needs them, but because this follows from divine perfection by a certain natural necessity. And indeed, if the discussion concerns possible creatures as such, they are seen by God necessarily insofar as God necessarily comprehends his own essence, which being comprehended, it is necessary to comprehend whatever is contained in it formally or eminently and whatever can emanate from it. And for this reason, although, formally and precisely speaking, God is not blessed by cognition or knowledge of creatures, it nevertheless pertains to God's perfection and beatitude to have such knowledge by which he necessarily and as if by a certain consequence knows possible creatures, given their possibility. Hence here also fits that saying of Augustine, Confessions V, ch. 4, where speaking of men he says: "Unhappy is he who knows all those things (namely, created things) but does not know you; but happy is he who knows you even if he does not know other things. But he who knows both you and those things is not more blessed on account of those things, but blessed on account of you alone." But if the discussion concerns creatures already made, or future ones, God could indeed know none of them under that condition or state, if he had determined to create none; and without them he would remain as perfect and blessed and would have as infinite knowledge as he now has. From this it is plainly established that he does not need creatures for his perfection. Nevertheless, given that creatures exist at some time, it pertains to God's perfection to know them[18] actually, not because he needs them, but from the abundance of his own and intrinsic perfection.

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[18] ea, 1597, 1751, 1960, ed. Vivès; "verbum scire videtur accusativum fem. eas postulare (Castellote).

7. Hence to the second argument it is responded that with respect to those things which are not future and could be, God's knowledge is not in first act only, but is in a certain second act, sufficient in itself for seeing all those things if they were to be future. But that it does not now in fact represent them as existing is not because that act lacks something of entity or ultimate actuality, but only because the object does not have nor will have such a condition as can be represented in it. Hence, when it is said that God can know these things if they were to be, that "can" must be taken not physically but logically, because it does not signify active or passive potency, nor first act, but such a second act which is sufficient in itself for representing those things, if they are ever to be future, so that when it does not represent them, it is not diminished in itself; when however it represents them, it is not really increased in itself, but only a new relation of reason can be understood in it, according to what was said above concerning God's immutability. And thus it is established that God's knowledge can never be so in first act alone that it is separated from second act in reality itself.

8. But in another way knowledge in first act can be taken, so that in reality it is indeed always joined with second act, nevertheless it has and provides a different actuality to the one understanding; as the blessed one seeing God is necessarily always in second act, yet at the same time has the first act of that blessed knowledge, which is the light of glory; and in the natural knowledge of angels, and that infused in Christ's soul, similar examples are easy. And also in this sense we deny that there is knowledge in first act in God, but only in the ultimate and most simple actuality of knowledge. This assertion is also taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, in the cited place, where he holds that God is his own act of understanding. The same is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1, and I cont. Gent., c. 40, and other theologians In I, dist. 35, where especially Capreolus, q. 1, a. 2. It is declared by reason, because first act with respect to knowledge can be twofold: one by way of passive potency, another by way of active principle; whether these

two are always distinguished in reality among themselves, or sometimes only by reason. The former first act therefore is repugnant to God, because passive potency expresses imperfection, whence it is formally repugnant to be in pure act. But the latter first act in the present matter supposes the former or includes it, for since intellection is an immanent act, there cannot be given a first act which is by way of a principle of intellection, unless there is also given a first act receptive of intellection as of an ultimate act. Then such a first act, if it truly is elicitive of second act, is distinct from it; but this cannot be in God. Finally, this principle in us can be threefold, namely intellectual potency, or a habit facilitating it, or an intelligible species joining the object to the potency; but running through each of these individually, it will be established that they are not found in God.

9. There is no intellectual potency in God. From what has been said it is therefore inferred first that there is not in God, if we speak properly, intellectual potency. This St. Thomas noted, I cont. Gent., c. 10, because intellectual potency formally expresses power or faculty of eliciting and receiving intellection; but in God there is not intellection elicited or received, but there is intellection necessary of itself and subsisting through itself; therefore there is not given in God intellectual potency with respect to such intellection, nor does such potency express perfection simply, but includes imperfection, wherefore it is not in God formally, but only eminently. The theologian will say: in the eternal Father there is proximate potency for generating; but this potency is nothing other than the intellect itself. It is responded that generative potency as such, even according to the conceived notion, differs from intellectual potency in two ways. First, because it does not express potency for receiving, but only for producing; second, because intellectual potency expresses relation to intellection as to something produced and distinct from itself; but generative potency does not express relation to generation or the person generated, as to something distinct from itself, but as to a term distinct from the generating person itself. Hence also potency for

understanding expresses only something absolute, but generative potency connotes the relation of a principle distinct from the generated term. For these reasons therefore the consequence must be denied; in this however there is some similarity, that just as there is not given in God real potency with respect to intellection which he elicits or receives, so there is not given generative potency with respect to generation which he really elicits, but only with respect to the generated thing, which is really distinguished from the producing principle, but not from the generative potency itself, except as regards the relation which it connotes; but of this more fully elsewhere.

10. Knowledge in God is not a habit facilitating potency. Second, it follows that there is not in God knowledge insofar as it expresses a habit facilitating potency to act. It is proven first, because where there is no such potency, neither can there be its disposition. Second, because even where this potency exists, such a disposition is not necessary except on account of the imperfection of the potency, because this disposition intermediate between potency and act is added to strengthen and aid the intellectual light itself, which is therefore supposed to be imperfect, and therefore such habits do not pertain formally to perfection simply. Hence it is probable that they are not found even in angels as regards natural knowledge.

11. Third, it is inferred that there is not properly in God an intelligible species, which by way of first act supplies the place of an object. It is proven from the same principle, because in God there is no potency to which an object is united by way of first act; but species is posited only so that an object may be united to potency in the aforesaid way; therefore it has no place in God. Likewise, intelligible species as such is posited in the nature of a principle determining potency to elicit an act; but in God there is no act of knowledge as elicited. Therefore it remains that in no way is there knowledge in God as regards first act, but by way of purest and ultimate act.

12. Small doubt. But you will ask whether these things are to be understood according to reality, or also according to reason and our

way of understanding. In the former way they have no difficulty and are sufficiently proven; but in the latter way they have some controversy, which Capreolus disputes with Aureolus, In I, dist. 35, q. 1, a. 2. For he contended that they are true even according to reason and our way of conceiving; but Capreolus defended the opposite, whom the way of speaking of St. Thomas and other theologians favors, indeed even of Augustine, especially in the matter concerning the Trinity. For they say the Word proceeds from the fruitful memory of the Father, and that the divine essence insofar as it eminently contains all things is the reason for knowing all things by way of species. But Aureolus urges with apparent reasons, because first act as such cannot truly be attributed to God, as formally found in him with respect to his own immanent act; therefore neither according to our way of conceiving can first act be understood in God as distinct by reason from second act. The consequence is proven, because this distinction of reason supposes those things which are thus distinguished to be found formally and properly in God, as is evident in other attributes. But the antecedent is proven from what has been said, because first act in its formal concept includes imperfection and potentiality; indeed even second act, if taken formally, also includes imperfection, namely relation to the first, either as to a principle from which it flows, or as to a potency which it actuates, and therefore I have almost never said that there is knowledge in God by way of second act, but by way of pure and ultimate act. And it is confirmed, for our actual intellection cannot be understood by way of first act, because it is essentially ultimate; much less therefore can divine knowledge be conceived in that way, because it is also ultimate act much purer and more essential. These arguments Capreolus does not dissolve, but confesses they convince that the formal reason of first act, and as regards all that it includes, cannot truly be conceived in God nor attributed to him. But nevertheless he says there is something of perfection in first act, which is formally found in God, by reason of which something in him is conceived by way of first act.

13. I think this opinion is true and does not differ in reality from the superior one. And I declare it thus, for divine intellection not only has that perfection which we understand in intellection as such, but it has the total perfection which is in the one understanding; for it is intellection in such a way that it is the very substance understanding, in which we understand both being and the power of penetrating or intuiting an intelligible object, and some reason for containing in an intentional or intelligible way the things known. Again, something can be conceived by us by way of first act in two ways. In one way on the part of the object and positively attributing to it the formal nature of first act, and in this way it is not attributed to God, as the arguments made correctly prove. In another way only on the part of the one understanding, prescinding only one notion from another, and in this way we are said to conceive something in God by way of first act; for we conceive there to be in God the power of understanding, prescinding from actual intellection and from this that that power be active or the very formal act itself. And similarly it is conceived that there is in God sufficient reason for representing intentionally all intelligible objects, prescinding from this that it formally and actually represents. And this is sufficient that without falsehood or attribution of imperfection something may be said to be conceived in God by way of first act. Nor is there equal reason concerning created intellection in this regard, because this does not include all perfection and power which is required for understanding, which nevertheless uncreated intellection includes, as we have said.

*How Knowledge is of God's Essence*

14. Resolution of the small question. I say third: divine knowledge is not only God's very substance, but it is formally of God's essence and as it were ultimately constituting it in the nature of such a nature or essence. This assertion is known (as I think) by natural light, especially as regards the former part, which Aristotle also knew, as is

evident from Metaphysics XII. And it can be proven from what was said above concerning the simplicity of the divine nature and the identity of his attributes among themselves and with it. But concerning the latter part there can be doubt, for some theologians do not understand God's knowledge to be God's substance, except through a certain identity, either real, as Scotus holds, In I, dist. 2, q. 2, or also formal as it were arising from God's simplicity, not from his formal constitution, as Cajetan holds, I, q. 14, a. 1, speaking of God as God is, for concerning God as cause he thinks otherwise, as we shall touch upon below, sect. 17. The reason is, because formally a thing is understood to be essentially constituted prior to operating, and being prior to understanding. Nevertheless the assertion placed is more consonant with St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1, and a. 4 and following, where he often repeats that to understand is God's very being; but he speaks formally, otherwise he would not proceed correctly. This Ferrara also indicated, I cont. Gent., c. 50, reason 3, and others. And it can be sufficiently proven from what was said at the end of the preceding section and from the superior assertion.

15. For these predicates "living" and "intellectual," taken substantially, are without doubt and are conceived as essential or formally constituting God's very essence. For they are said essentially of creatures according to a common and analogous notion; therefore much more will they be said of God; therefore it is necessary that something be conceived essentially by us in God, by reason of which he has those predicates in a way essentially different and superior to every creature. But this way consists only in this, that he has that intellectual life through essence and not through participation; but to have through essence is nothing other than to have intellectuality itself by way of pure and ultimate act without any effection or causality. But this is nothing other than that the divine essence is intellectual, not by way of principle or root of intellectuality, but as intellection itself subsisting; but God's intellection and knowledge are most formally the same; therefore actual knowledge through essence is as it were the

ultimate essential constitutive of the divine nature. And so, since it is conceived by us in two ways that some nature is intellectual, namely, because it has intrinsic relation to understanding, or because it is understanding itself, in the former way we conceive created nature to be intellectual; and, because this is common to all, in each we conceive the proper constitutive or specificative through relation to proper understanding. But the divine nature is intellectual in the latter way, because it is proper to it, namely, because it is understanding itself most pure and most abstract. Thus therefore God's knowing most formally constitutes and as it were specifies his essence. Therefore, when we conceive God precisely as existing and not as understanding, that is a true conception, because we do not exclude nor deny, but only prescind from explicit and distinct consideration. But in truth in the very thing conceived it is intrinsically included as its proper constitutive. Just as also when we conceive God as immense substance, we do not exclude that that substance is essentially constituted in the grade of living, not with aptitudinal life (so to speak) but most actual; but this life is none other than intellective and intellection itself; for this is the most worthy and most honorable life. By this argument Aristotle above proved that God's understanding is of God's very essence. But whether we should philosophize in the same way concerning will and power we shall say below. Again whether the divine essence is of the essence of divine knowledge itself has been sufficiently determined above in treating of divine simplicity.

### *How Great is the Perfection of Divine Knowledge*

16. I say fourth: by natural reason it is established that this knowledge of God is most perfect, both essentially, and intensively and extensively. The first part is manifest first from the general reason of divine perfection, for all things that are in God are essentially supremely perfect: for this pertains to God's consummate perfection. Likewise, because it has been shown that God is supremely perfect in

the intellectual grade; therefore his knowledge too is essentially supremely perfect in the grade of knowledge. Likewise, the primary object of that knowledge is infinitely perfect and the supreme intelligible object, for it is the divine essence itself, and that knowledge is adequate to such an object, for it is comprehensive of it; it is therefore essentially supremely perfect. Finally that alone is the fountain of all knowledge, according to that: "The fountain of wisdom, the word of God on high"; for that alone is knowledge through essence, but every other is a certain participation of it; therefore that knowledge is supremely perfect in its species (so to speak).

17. And hence the second part is also easy, which is not to be understood concerning gradual intension, such as is wont to be in qualities, for it is established that this has no place in a most simple and substantial entity, but by this metaphor we intend to signify the outstanding perfection which that knowledge has in all conditions or properties of perfect knowledge. For it is above all most clear and most evident, for this perfection maximally pertains to the essence of knowledge; if therefore that knowledge is supremely perfect in the essential nature of knowledge, it is also necessary that it be most perfect in clarity. Hence it also comes to be supremely certain; for certitude accompanies evidence with proportionate perfection. For although sometimes certitude is without evidence, nevertheless evidence is never without certitude; and although obscure certitude exceeds some evident certitude, absolutely however and from its genus evident certitude is better; hence, if it accompanies supreme evidence, it is also supreme certitude. Again hence it comes that that knowledge is also supremely infallible and maximally true, because it attains truth with most perfect light and most simple intuition, intuiting each true thing as it is in itself, and judging concerning each truth according to its measure, and in this consists infallibility, which is almost the same as certitude. Hence it does not matter that truths known through this knowledge are not equal in themselves, because some are uncreated, others created, some immediate, others mediate,

some necessary, others contingent; for this whole variety uniformly falls under this knowledge, which under the same infinite light and without dependence on an object sees each truth according to the state in which it has determination and certitude, and judges concerning each according to its grade, and therefore it is supremely adequate to all, and thus supremely true and infallible. And hence finally it comes that it is also completely invariable, for, as I said above concerning the attribute of immutability, it receives in itself no real increase or diminution; indeed not even, as it is knowledge, does it receive variety in relations of reason; for from the citadel of eternity it sees all things with immutable intuition, even those things which vary in themselves, and it regards all things for their times, and in that regard it always and perpetually remains.

18. Some theological questions are expedited in passing. But here would occur to be disputed and declared some expressions about which theologians dispute, namely whether God in contingent things could have known more than he knows, or whether he could have not known something which he knew, and similar things; but I omit these because they do not pertain to metaphysics and consist more in manner of speaking than in reality. For it is established that in contingent things some propositions could have been true which now are not true; and conversely, some are now true which could have been false, like "Peter is to be saved"; and now God knows those which are true, but not those which are false; yet God knows those to be false, and their opposites to be true, and he could know the opposite, if the opposite had been future in things. But through these things that knowledge is neither increased nor diminished, neither according to reality, because this representation of contingent things adds nothing of reality, as has been treated above; nor according to reason, because it is always necessary that one or the other part be true, namely, either that the thing is to be future or is not to be future, and God from eternity sees that part in which objective truth is. And for the same reason it is never varied according to itself, because that intuition or

regard or conformity which from eternity it has with such a thing it always retains, and therefore simply and on the part of God himself it knows nothing now which it did not know before, nor, conversely, does it now not know something which it knew before, although on the part of things and in order to the succession of time and its various instants, some proposition is now true which was not true before. Let Augustine be read, De Trinitate XV, ch. 7; and St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 15, and I cont. Gent., ch. 67, and q. 2 de Verit., a. 13, especially ad 7; and other theologians, In I, dist. 39; and Hales, I p., q. 24, memb. 7.

19. The third part of the conclusion concerning the perfect extension of divine knowledge is not to be understood (as is clear per se) concerning entitative extension on the part of knowledge itself; for it is established that God's indivisible and most simple entity is not capable of this extension. Therefore divine knowledge is said to be supremely perfect in extension on the part of the object, because, existing most simple in itself, it intuits all knowable objects. And in this sense it is proven first by the general reason of God's infinite perfection. For every perfection of his is infinite under every aspect which pertains to perfection simply; but to have knowledge infinite and comprehensive of every knowable object in this way pertains to perfection simply; for it expresses perfection without imperfection, and, other things being equal, it is greater perfection. Then it can be proven individually by dividing knowable objects into three classes. In the first let there be only God himself and what are within him, in the second, possible creatures or things makeable by God himself, in the third, all existing things, or future in some difference of time or in all eternity. Concerning things of the first order it is most evident, and therefore it has not been called into doubt even by infidel philosophers. First, because God, just as he is a supremely immaterial thing, so is he an object maximally intelligible in act; therefore he is knowable through some knowledge; therefore maximally through his own, because none can be more proportioned to him, nor can any object be more proper to that knowledge. By this argument it is

proven not only that God knows himself, but also that he comprehends, as we also touched upon above in treating of the attribute of incomprehensibility; nor is it necessary to multiply more reasons in a clear matter.

20. That he is the most accommodated object of divine knowledge. Only someone can object, for hence it follows that God himself is the primary and most accommodated object of his own knowledge; for above we generally showed that each intellectual substance is the maximally proper and proportioned object of its connatural intellect, which in divine substance is maximally necessary, because it is content with itself for all its perfection, therefore it will be the maximally proper object of its own knowledge, indeed also in some way adequate, as we shall say later. But this is difficult to understand, because, as we said, God's knowledge is most formally divine knowledge itself; but it cannot be understood that knowledge as knowledge has itself as primary object. For thus St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, says it is impossible that the first visible be the first seeing, because every seeing is of some visible object, and in the same way he proves that it cannot happen that the first lovable is love itself, and in every created intellection the same is found universally, that it cannot rest in itself as in a first object. And the reason is because knowledge, since it is an immanent act, directly tends toward some object, before it is understood to tend reflexively toward itself.

21. It is responded that in created acts or intellections or volitions this always happens thus, because they are acts in some way effected or caused by the objects themselves, and they express transcendental relation to them, whence it is necessary that they be distinguished from them by the nature of the thing. Likewise another reason can be given, because a created act is not so immaterial and pure that it can according to its whole self (so to speak) be reflexive upon itself; therefore it is necessary that it be as a motion directly tending toward some term distinct from itself. But truly both reasons cease in divine knowledge, because it is not caused, but is such of itself

primarily and from itself; then, it is most immaterial and purest, and therefore it is content with itself and sufficient to itself under every aspect, both formal and objective. From this it is understood in passing that divine knowledge is in a most eminent way simultaneously direct and reflexive, which is also necessary in it, by this very fact that it is first and most perfect. For from the fact that it is most perfect, it cannot be unknown to the knower himself, because he knows perfectly who knows that he knows; but from the fact that it is first, it cannot be known through another knowledge, because otherwise that would be known through another knowledge, and thus one would proceed to infinity, which since it cannot happen, one must stop at divine knowledge as at the first, which intuits itself as its proper and primary object. Nor is this so difficult to understand, since that knowledge is subsistent and a most perfect understanding substance.

### *On God's Knowledge of Possible Creatures*

22. It must now be said concerning things of the second order, that is, concerning those things which God can make, insofar as they are merely possible, and it is evident that all of these fall under divine knowledge. The a priori reason is that God is infinitely intellectual; therefore he has the power to know everything intelligible; but things of this kind are intelligible, because they are beings at least in possibility, and each thing is intelligible insofar as it is a being; therefore divine knowledge, on account of its infinity, encompasses all these things. Second, because God comprehends his essence and power; but in comprehending his power, he necessarily comprehends whatever is eminently contained in it and can be made by it. I spoke more extensively about this reason in tome I of part III, disputation XXVI, section 3. Third, there is an excellent a posteriori reason, because it is impossible for God to be ignorant of a thing which he can create, since he operates nothing nor can operate except as an intellectual agent, both because this mode of operation alone is

perfect and worthy of God, and also because divine power, since it is infinite, cannot be determined by itself to produce all its effects, and therefore cannot be determined to produce these effects rather than those, except through intellect and will. Therefore it is contradictory that something should fall under divine power which does not fall under divine knowledge.

23. From these reasons it is understood that God not only knows or is aware of these creatable things according to the being which they have in God himself, but also according to the proper and formal being which they can have in themselves. Thus divine knowledge is not only terminated to God's own essence and to that eminence of all creatable things which God formally has in himself, but also to the creatable things themselves, which are not in him formally, but only eminently. This is proved, because otherwise he would not know creatures, but only his essence, since creatures, as they are in God, are not creatures, but the creative essence itself, according to that saying: "What was made, in him was life." Also, because it is impossible to comprehend the whole eminence of creatures, which is formally in God, most distinctly and clearly without simultaneously knowing and comprehending the formal creatures themselves, which are eminently contained there. Finally, since creatures are not to be created according to the eminent being which they have in God, but according to the formal being which they receive in themselves, knowledge of them according to the prior being, if it were to remain in that and not pass to the posterior being, could be of no help for their production; therefore God knows possible creatures formally and in themselves.

24. Objection. But we seem to contradict the theologians in this; for they commonly say that God knows creatures in himself, not in themselves, as Dionysius affirms, chapter 7 of the Divine Names, and the last chapter of Mystical Theology; Augustine, book LXXXIII Questions, question 46, and XV on the Trinity, chapter 14; St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 5, and I against the Gentiles, chapter 30, and q. 2

on Truth; and the remaining theologians, In I, dist. 35; Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 23, a. 1 and 3; Scotus, in Quodlibet, q. 16 and q. 2 and 3 of the Prologue. It also seems to be an imperfection that divine knowledge should be terminated to creatures in themselves, because under that aspect it will have a transcendental relation to them. And consequently his knowledge will take its species from them as from objects and will depend on them under that aspect, and God will need creatures for some perfection of his own; all of which are contradictory.

25. Solution. It is answered that the theologians in the former part indeed affirm that God knows creatures in himself, but they do not deny that he also knows them in themselves in the sense we have explained. But if sometimes some deny this, like Aureolus according to Capreolus, In I, dist. 35, q. 2, in the arguments against the 2nd conclusion, they understand this only in a sense contrary to the prior affirmation. They intend to teach two things, therefore, which are true and sufficiently known even in natural reason. One is that God does not receive the knowledge which he has of creatures from the creatures themselves, which is evident, since that knowledge is uncreated and prior to every creature. And for this reason God can in some way be said to know creatures in himself, because, namely, he has knowledge from himself, and as it were an intelligible species representing every creature to himself; although in this sense alone the expression is less proper, for by that reasoning God would rather be said to know creatures from himself and through himself, than in himself. The second is that God's knowledge does not regard creatures except as a secondary object; for it is primarily occupied only with God himself, whom in comprehending he knows as if by a certain resultance all possible creatures, and in this sense he is most properly said to know them in himself as in their cause. For the more reliable theologians speak and explain in this way, although some disagree. Nevertheless they do not deny that divine knowledge extends (so to speak) to creatures according to their proper being; rather they

elsewhere teach that God has proper ideas of all creatures, which are nothing other than the very intellection or concept of God representing the proper natures of individual creatures. Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 6, ad 1, openly declares that God is not said to know creatures in himself because he only knows them according to the being which they have in him, but because through that being he knows them in their proper aspects, and q. 20, a. 2, ad 2, says that God knows creatures in their proper natures just as we do. The same, q. 2 on Truth, a. 4, ad 6, and I against the Gentiles, chapters 48 and 49. In this sense, therefore, God is truly said to know creatures in themselves, and that expression can only be denied if by it is signified that God takes knowledge from creatures, or regards them as a primary object.

26. There is no imperfection in divine knowledge attaining creatures in themselves. And hence there is an easy response to the other part of the difficulty; for it is denied that any imperfection is supposed or follows from the fact that God knows creatures in themselves in the manner now explained, or from the fact that God's knowledge in the same sense is terminated to creatures. Because this being terminated does not posit any dependence in that knowledge on the creature, but only an eminent and intellectual representation, in which we ground the denomination or relation of reason, according to which we say that knowledge is terminated to such an object. Nor does it follow that that knowledge has proper specification, or a transcendental relation to such objects, because it is not per se ordered to them, nor is it instituted (so to speak) for their sake, but exists from itself and for itself alone; but all those things which are outside itself, it attains only as if consequently and from the eminence of its perfection. And universally, knowledge does not receive its species from a secondary object, nor does it depend per se on that, but on the primary. A theological example is in the created vision of God by which the blessed enjoy; for although through it they see God and creatures, in this it does not receive its species and nature from creatures, but from God, because God is the primary object of that

vision, creatures however are secondary. The same thing therefore must be understood with much greater reason in the uncreated vision of God himself, which is simply more absolute and independent. Nor finally does it follow that God needs creatures for any perfection of his own, but rather it follows that creatures need this divine knowledge in order to be, either actually, or even in order to be possible, because creatures, just as they have from divine efficacy that they are, so from divine eminence and power, from which knowledge is not separated, they have that they are possible.

27. But here there occurred a theological question, whether this knowledge of God posits or supposes some being in creatures so that they can be known, even as possible, which is disputed by Henry, in Summa, q. 23 and 25, and Quodlibet VIII, q. 1 and 9, and Quodlibet IX, q. 1 and 2, and Quodlibet XI, q. 3; Scotus, In I, dist. 35 and 36, and In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2, and in Quodlibet, q. 1 and 14; Capreolus, In III, dist. 35; Cajetan and others, I, q. 14, a. 5 and 6, and q. 34, a. 3. But there is no reason to linger on it in this place, because we will speak below about the essence of creatures before they exist, which Henry disputes, when treating of finite being and the distinction of essence and existence in it; but concerning the known being of creatures, which Scotus treats, there can only be and really is disagreement in the mode of speaking; for creatures are said to be known from some real being, not which they have in themselves, but in God; for God in knowing creatures has them in a peculiar mode in representative or ideal being, as is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 1, and q. 15, throughout, and q. 16, a. 7; and Augustine, VI on the Trinity, last chapter, V Genesis to the Letter, chapter 14, book LXXXIII Questions, q. 46; and Waldensis reports others, book I of the Doctrinal of the Ancient Faith, chapter 8. But from that being which creatures have in God, they are denominated as known, but this is only an extrinsic denomination in them and can only be the foundation of some relation of reason. Nor can anything else be imagined without great error, both in faith and in all natural reason. Nor does Scotus

intend anything else, as is openly evident from the cited places and will be said again in the following disputation.

*On the Knowledge of Existing Things*

28. I come to the third proposed part, namely that God's knowledge extends also to creatures that have been made, or which are done or will be done in any time. This part is not only a matter of faith, according to that passage: "God saw all things that he had made," and other innumerable passages which could be adduced, but is also evident by natural reason, although certain nominalists deny this, because they think that divine providence cannot be proved by natural reason[19]. But they err greatly, for, as Augustine rightly said, V on the City of God, where throughout he disputes this extensively, nothing is more contrary to natural reason than to admit that God exists and yet to feel that he is unwise. Thus to know also existing creatures, supposing that they are or will be future, is per se a great perfection and is found in us, and of itself is not incompatible with any other perfection; therefore it pertains to perfection simply; therefore it is formally in God. Also the reason made in the preceding point about the infinite power of divine understanding has place here too, because created things, even as existing, are in a peculiar way visible or intelligible; and proper knowable truths are founded in them; therefore it pertains to the infinity of divine knowledge that it embraces all these things.

29. Moreover, from the effect, for God first of all cannot be ignorant of those things which he makes immediately and alone through himself; for he wills to make them and knows his will to be powerful and efficacious; therefore he cannot be ignorant of that effect as made by himself. Then all other things which are made by creatures, are also made immediately by God himself, although not by him alone, as has been shown above; therefore nothing of those things

[19] Ocham et Gabriel, In I, dist. 35.

which are made can be ignored by God. You will say: what about sins, which are not made by God? I respond: whatever is real and positive in them, or around them, is made by God, and therefore even the defect cannot be ignored by him, both because, when all the positive things which are in such an act are known, the defect is necessarily known, and also because, although that defect is not made by God, it nevertheless is not made except with God permitting. And hence there is also an efficacious argument which is taken from divine providence, which it is false is not known by natural reason, both as regards sufficiency on God's part, and also as regards use or exercise. For what can be thought more unworthy of God than that he himself should be insufficient for governing the universe? But he would not be sufficient, unless he were powerful to know all things which are done, so that he might provide for them according to the requirement of things. But if he is powerful to know all these things, he actually knows all things, because his knowledge naturally represents all things which are representable, otherwise that knowledge would be changeable. Again the very order of the universe sufficiently manifests that it is not without a universal governor, as has been shown partly above and we shall touch on partly in what follows.

30. And hence it follows that God has this knowledge of all creatures which are made in time from his eternity, because it is necessary that he should have all of it simultaneously without succession, since he cannot admit variation in himself, otherwise he would be really changed, which is impossible; but both of these have been demonstrated above. Also, because God could not have perfect providence and prudence in administering or governing things, unless he had foreknowledge of all things.

31. Whether God knows future contingents. But immediately there presented itself in this place a disputation about the knowledge of future contingents; for God could not have known from eternity all things which are done in time, unless he also foreknew whatever was in any way to be future in time; if therefore some things were

contingently future, he also foreknew those. But this involves a contradiction, both because what is contingent, as long as it has not been made, does not have a determinate knowable truth; and also because the very knowledge of God, since it is necessary and the cause of things, would remove their contingency; and finally because no way or mode can be devised by which these future things might be known. Because of these difficulties Cicero, in his books On Fate and Divination, denied that God has this foreknowledge, and, as Augustine says, V on the City of God, chapter 9: "In order to make men free, he made them sacrilegious." But, since this difficulty is most extensively disputed by theologians, and cannot be treated ex professo, unless by adducing many things about divine providence, predestination and grace, which are proper to theologians, therefore besides what has been said above about the contingency of effects in the disputations on causes, we shall add nothing here. But we respond briefly that the inferred consequence is most true and certain, which need not be proved by other reasons than those by which we proved the positive assertion, for from that this consequence evidently follows, as has been deduced.

32. Nor is it true that a contradiction is implied in the foreknowledge of these future things, because, although in their causes they do not have determination, that is, in the power and mode of operating of the proximate cause, nevertheless, in the thing itself one part of the contradiction will be future, which, although we are ignorant of it, God nevertheless sees from his eternity. Nor does it follow from this that through this foreknowledge God imposes any necessity on things thus known, because this knowledge as such is not the cause of them, indeed it supposes, both on God's part and on the part of any other cause necessary for such an effect, the whole efficacy or concourse to be future in its time, and God through this knowledge sees future things as present to his eternity. Nor finally does God need any extrinsic medium for this, but with his infinite light and eternal vision he attains all times, and in each one he sees whatever is in them,

which with respect to diverse parts of time itself is denominated future or past, but with respect to divine vision is always so objectively present as if it always existed. Whence, just as we do not need any medium by which that truth might be demonstrated for seeing the truth of an existing thing, but immediately we see this truth in itself, for example, that Peter is white, because we see whiteness joined to him, not because whiteness is necessarily joined, but only because it is so in fact, so also, with greater reason, God does not need any medium outside his light for seeing these truths in themselves, because he is more efficacious for seeing all times, and all things which are done in them, with his eternal vision, than is our intellect or sight for seeing things coexisting and present to itself. It is indeed true that natural reason cannot sufficiently investigate how this may be, but it perceives well enough that there is no repugnance in this, and the whole thing is consonant, indeed also necessary for the consummated perfection and providence of God.

33. Whether God knows future contingents under condition. But another question, which insinuated itself here about the knowledge of future contingents, which they call conditional, although it is really metaphysical, nevertheless cannot be treated worthily without Scriptures and Fathers and other theological principles, and therefore I omit it entirely. And I only assert, if these conditional expressions, "if Peter had been here, he would have sinned," or other similar ones, have determinate truth according to which they are knowable, they cannot be ignored by God. But it is much more probable that these propositions have some determinate truth, not indeed founded on the force of inference or consequence (for such propositions are not to be taken in this sense), but in the fact that in such an event one part alone of the contradiction would determinately be made, which, although it escapes us, does not escape God, who penetrates all things with his infinite light, the most certain sign of which is that he predicts these future things no less than absolute ones; but about this elsewhere. Therefore the assertion

posited is sufficiently proved from these things as regards all the members which we distinguished in it.

*How Manifold is God's Knowledge*

34. I say fifth: In God there is only one knowledge, and that most simple, formally and eminently containing every perfection of intellectual power simply, according to which it is distinguished by us into several knowledges by reason and inadequate concepts. This assertion, as regards the principal matter which is intended in it, is evident by natural reason, namely that God's knowledge is supremely one and simple. For, if among the divine attributes there can be no distinction in reality, neither can there be any in knowledge itself, especially since it has been shown that this knowledge is as if the formal constitutive of God's very essence[20] in the being of such a nature and essence. Also, because this knowledge of God, as it concerns God himself, who is the most simple object, is one and simple; but it is entirely the same which comprehends all creatures as possible, because it attains these secondarily from the power of comprehension of his essence, as we have said. Again it has been shown above that the free knowledge of God, which concerns creatures as existing, adds nothing of reality to necessary knowledge as such; therefore that knowledge is entirely one and simple.

35. The mode of knowing which God has is most universal. From which it is understood in passing that the mode of knowing through that knowledge is most perfect, and can also rightly be called most universal. The first is evident, because in it there is no composition, division, or discourse, but simple intuition, by which

[20] scientiam hanc… essentiae Dei, 1597, 1960; essentiam hanc … scientiae Dei, ed. Vivès. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 632: "La ed. Vivès y otras construyen indebidamente, a nuestro juicio, la frase última de la siguiente manera: praesertim cum ostensum sit essentiam hanc esse quasi formale constitutivum ipsius scientiae Dei... (N. de los EE.)"

things that are composite are simply seen, and things that are variable invariably, and things that are successive simultaneously. Read St. Dionysius, chapter 7 on the Divine Names; and Augustine, IX Genesis to the Letter, chapter 18; and Clement of Alexandria, book VI Stromata, toward the end, where in this sense he says that God sees all things with one application; and St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 7, 14 and 15.

36. The second is declared, because that knowledge is usually called universal which attains many and various things by one principle or act; for universal knowledge cannot be imagined by predication or abstraction; every knowledge is of a singular thing. Nor also is knowledge formally as knowledge called universal on account of causality; therefore it is so denominated because of the attainment of several things, as angelic knowledge is said to be more universal than human; and among angels, the superior are said to have more universal knowledge and species than the inferior; so therefore ascending to God, his knowledge is called most universal, as St. Thomas rightly noted, In II, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 2, because by one likeness (he says) which is his essence, he knows all things. It is true that elsewhere St. Thomas says that that knowledge of God is neither universal nor particular, namely, I, q. 14, a. 1, ad 3, but there he speaks in another sense, namely, as universal knowledge is said of that which attains precisely the universal aspects of things and does not descend to particulars. In which sense (among others) our metaphysics is called the most universal science; on the contrary, however, singular is said of that which is occupied only with particulars, in the way that sense is said to be of singulars. Thus therefore God's knowledge is said to be neither universal nor particular, because it excludes neither aspect, but in all things attains all most perfectly, and for this same cause it is said in another sense to be most universal.

37. Some attributes of divine knowledge are declared. The remaining things which are posited in the fifth assertion, are posited only for explaining the eminent multiplicity of that most simple knowledge and the diverse concepts and words by which it is signified

by us. It is therefore first to be considered that in our intellect there are certain cognitions which are called virtues simply, because in their formal concept they include no imperfection, as are those five which Aristotle distinguishes in Ethics VI, namely, understanding, wisdom, knowledge, prudence and art. But others there are which either are in no way virtues, like opinion and human faith, because they do not infallibly attain truth, or are not virtues without some defect and imperfection, like divine faith, and theology founded on it; for insofar as they are infallible, they have the nature of virtues, but they fail in obscurity. In this genus also can be placed knowledge of "that," for it is in some way a virtue, but it includes imperfection. Therefore divine knowledge formally includes all the prior virtues most simply united in its one perfection. For that knowledge is the clearest cognition of all first principles and the most delightful contemplation of the first and supreme cause and of all things, both natural and supernatural. It is also the art of all things that can be made, and prudence, which most rightly judges about all things which it is expedient to do. Under these aspects, therefore, it can be named both understanding, and wisdom, and knowledge, and art and prudence. All of which are distinguished only by reason through our inadequate concepts is clear.

38. But the posterior properties are not in God formally and in his knowledge. For God does not have opinion, which signifies fallible and therefore fearful assent. God indeed knows all the reasons by which men can be supported for eliciting probable assents; but this knowledge in God is scientific and evident, by which he knows what weight each reason has for generating probability. And therefore God also knows mutable and contingent things only insofar as they are capable of evidence and certitude; as for example, if he contemplates a contingent effect in its causes and circumstances, he only knows the cause to be sufficient, but indifferent to such an effect, or equally, or with greater propensity to one part than to another, as it really will have been; but he does not judge the effect to be future, except by seeing the cause as to be determined in its time. Again, neither does

faith have place in God's cognition, as is self-evident, both because all obscurity is repugnant to the infinite clarity of God, and also because there is no authority to which he himself can believe; for he does not believe himself, since the speech by which he can speak with himself is the most perfect comprehension of himself and of all things; but inferior authority, which is fallible of itself, cannot move God to assent, but he evidently sees what weight each testimony has to be able to move a human or angelic intellect to assenting.

39. Finally, neither can knowledge of "that," or a posteriori, be formally attributed to God, because such knowledge is when cognition of an effect induces cognition of the cause; whence it is necessary that cognition of the effect be the cause of cognition of the cause; but this causality cannot intervene on the part of the object, as is evident from the terms themselves; therefore it is necessary that it be on the part of the knower; but this is repugnant to God, because it includes manifest imperfection. Therefore God knows the necessary connection between effect and cause, as it is in itself; he also knows that one who imperfectly knows can ascend from cognition of the effect to cognition of the cause; but he himself does not so ascend, but rather knows the effect in the cause, and therefore he does not have knowledge of "that," or a posteriori. But knowledge of "why," formally and properly in God is rightly conceived, because that expression "why" does not indicate causality on the part of the knower himself, so that cognition of the cause would be the cause of cognition of the effect, but says only causality on the part of the object, which can be seen through most simple cognition, and in this way God sees from what cause or from which causes each effect is, and therefore most properly is said to have knowledge of "why," especially with respect to creatures, in which Durandus feared without cause, In I, dist. 35, q. 4. He notes, however, not without reason, that God does not have knowledge of "why" with respect to himself, because he has no cause; whence he can be said to have most perfect knowledge of "that" and eminently of "why"; because in his most simple nature he knows all

the reasons to be contained, which in some way can be rendered a priori concerning his attributes.

40. What should be considered in intellectual virtues so that they can be attributed to God. And in this manner we can discourse through all words or concepts of cognitions or intellectual perfections, for they are innumerable. And in them it must be attentively considered whether they signify perfection simply, or include some imperfection, so that the former are formally and properly attributed to divine knowledge, but the latter by no means; as, for example, apprehensive and judicative cognition, as they absolutely and formally signify perfection without imperfection, namely, to represent intelligible things and to assent to truth, are deservedly attributed to God. But if apprehension is taken not only with precision of judgment on our part, but also with exclusion on the part of the thing itself, that is, that such a concept is truly apprehensive and not judicative, thus such apprehension cannot be attributed to God formally, because it includes imperfection, namely, that through such apprehension the thing is not known as much as it is knowable; for, when it is conceived in this way, through such conception everything that can be judged about it is judged. And for this reason all those words which seem to signify apprehension of a thing without perfect judgment, are attributed to God only metaphorically, and of this kind seem to be thought, counsel and similar. Again there is found in us intuitive and abstractive knowledge, which, insofar as they signify cognition of an existing or non-existing thing, include no imperfection in the cognition itself, and in this way can be attributed to God; however, if abstractive cognition is said because of absence and local or temporal distance from the object, thus it includes imperfection and limitation in such cognition, namely, that it cannot be extended to all times or to all places, and in this way it is not found in God formally; and if there are words which involve this signification, they are not attributed to God properly, but metaphorically; but of this kind seems to be remembrance, which therefore can only be attributed to God by

metaphor. And according to this signification and consideration is given that celebrated division of theologians of divine knowledge, into knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of vision; for the former is of itself only of possible things as such and abstractive; but the latter is said of the whole cognition of things which have existence or are going to have it in some difference of time. About which division many things are handed down by theologians, which do not belong to the metaphysician; and it is enough to know the signification of those terms.

### *What Aristotle Thought About Divine Knowledge*

41. Only the philosopher can desire to know what Aristotle thought about divine knowledge, concerning which there is practically one point of controversy, for regarding the other matters it is established that he thought correctly. For openly in Metaphysics XII he posits God as understanding himself as pure act, and by a unique and most simple, perpetual and immutable intellection, which is his substance, in which principle the other things we said above are contained, which, although not all of them were declared by him, nevertheless he says nothing that conflicts with them; with only that one exception, about which, as I said, there is controversy, namely, concerning the knowledge that God has of creatures; for many think that Aristotle taught that God either knows nothing outside himself, or does not know it distinctly, clearly and in particular. Thus Gregory thinks, In I, dist. 35, q. 1, where he also adduces the Commentator, XII Metaph., text. 51, thus expounding Aristotle. From this text the principal foundation is taken, for there Aristotle says that God does not know certain things, lest his intellect be debased; for certain things are so base that it is nobler to be ignorant of them than to know them; but the other testimonies that are customarily adduced from Aristotle are of no importance. Gabriel attributes the same opinion to Averroes, but not to Aristotle, In I, dist. 35, q. 2. Avicenna also, as the same

Averroes reports, disp. XII Destructorii, thought that God does not know singulars according to their existences, because he did not understand how such knowledge could be invariable and independent of changeable things. Averroes adds other reasons, which Gregory and Gabriel relate extensively above, which have been solved by us in virtue in the preceding sections, except for that one, that if God knew singulars, he would know infinite things, which is impossible. Finally, many of the ancient Fathers taught that Aristotle thought thus, such as Clement of Alexandria, lib. V Stromaton; Ambrose, lib. I de Officiis, c. 13; Gregory of Nyssa lib. VIII Philosophiae, c. 4 (or Nemesius); and Theodoret, lib. VI de Curandis graecanicis affectionibus.

42. Aristotle thought correctly about God's knowledge concerning creatures. But those who vindicate Aristotle from this error think more correctly, because in other places he thinks correctly, and that text of the Metaphysics has a fitting exposition, so that it is not necessary to say with Durandus that he taught contrary things. The first point is proved from various principles and testimonies of Aristotle, because in Physics II he demonstrates that nature acts for an end, directed by its author, and therefore he says that the work of nature is the work of intelligence; therefore Aristotle supposed that the author of nature knows the actions and ends of natural agents, which are concerned with singulars. Hence in De Caelo I, text. 13, he said that God and nature do nothing in vain; therefore all things that happen are known by God. Then in Metaphysics XII, c. 2, he makes God the cause and author of all things; but it is established among Aristotle that God does not act ignorantly, but through intellect and will, as we shall see below. Which he teaches more extensively and elegantly in the book De Caelo et Mundo ad Alexand., saying: You will be able to call all things of air, earth and water the works of God; and below he says that by his will he contains and moves all things. Again, in Ethics X, c. 8, he says that one who joins contemplative to active happiness is most dear to God, and in Magna Moralia II, c. 8, he says that the good fortune of wicked men is not to be referred to God.

In which indeed he errs, but in the reason that he adds below, he declares what we intend. For he says: We set up God as the master of such things, so that he may distribute goods and evils according to merits. And below: But if we ascribe this to God as distributor, we shall make him a bad judge, and the other things that he adds in the same vein. Likewise in Oeconomicus I, c. 3, he says that divine providence has thus ordered the nature of both (that is, of man and woman) for society. Moreover, in Metaphysics II, text. 15, and De Anima I, text. 80, he reduces Empedocles to this as to the greatest inconvenience, that God would be unwise or ignorant of certain things. It is established therefore that this was Aristotle's opinion. And thus St. Thomas judged, I, q. 14, a. 11, and I cont. Gent., c. 50, and his Commentators, in the same places; and Capreolus and other scholastics, In I, dist. 35; Marsilius, q. 38, a. 3.

43. Secondly, it is clear, for that text of Metaphysics XII can be expounded in two ways, by which we expound similar words in the holy Fathers. For first, St. Jerome, on Habakkuk 1, speaks in a similar manner: It is absurd to reduce God's majesty to this, that he should know moment by moment what gnats are born, etc., although it is most certain that Jerome was not ignorant that God knows all things; therefore he speaks there not of any knowledge whatsoever, but of that which has joined to it particular care and providence; not that all things do not fall under divine providence, but that they do not fall under it in the same way as human affairs, which God principally intends, as Jerome immediately declares; just as Paul also said: Does God care for oxen? Thus therefore we can expound Aristotle, that God does not know certain things that are base, principally intending or caring for them. Secondly (more according to his mind), Augustine also, lib. LXXXIII Quaest., q. 46, said that God knows nothing outside himself; not because he is altogether ignorant of other things, but because he knows nothing through itself and from knowledge of itself. Therefore Aristotle spoke in this same sense, as St. Thomas interprets him. And this alone proves his reasoning, namely, that God does not

know these things in such a way that he would be perfected and dependent on them, for this would be base and unworthy of God. But to know these things, however base, by a superior and independent knowledge, and only as secondary objects, this is not only not unworthy, but is from the abundance of perfection. And in this manner the reasoning of Avicenna is also easily solved; for variability does not follow in divine knowledge, since it is independent, as has been most extensively declared in the preceding sections.

44. What Averroes thought in this matter. What Plato and other philosophers thought. And some have also wanted to interpret Averroes in this manner, especially Palacios, In I, dist. 35, and certainly he adduces probable testimonies from him, from disp. VI and XIII contra Algazel., and from lib. I de Generat. animal. But I think what Averroes thought should be little cared for, and concerning him I would easily admit what Durandus says there, q. 2, that he was not consistent in this, but wrote contrary things; especially because ex professo and in his own disputation he seems to have taught that error. But the argument taken from the infinity of singulars is of no importance, because God's infinite intellect can grasp all these things most distinctly, otherwise God could not even comprehend all species of possible things. Finally, it is established that other philosophers attained this truth from Plato, lib. X de Legib., and from Algazel, contra Avicennam, as Averroes reports, dicta disp. XII Destruct., and from others, which Eugubinus treats, lib. VI de Peren. philosophia.

## SECTION XVI

## WHAT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED BY NATURAL REASON CONCERNING THE DIVINE WILL

1. Concerning the divine will, the judgment is almost the same as concerning divine knowledge, and therefore what was said in

the preceding section must be applied to it almost entirely, and a few things must be added which are proper to the will.

*The Existence of Will in God*

2. First, therefore, it must be said that it is demonstrated by natural reason that there exists in God a proper and formal will. I omit the testimonies by which it is established that this is also a matter of faith, because they are common knowledge and do not pertain to the present undertaking. It is therefore proved first a priori, because it has been demonstrated that God is a most perfect intellectual living being; but it belongs to the nature of such a living being to have not only the power of understanding, but also of vitally appetizing; therefore there exists in God such a spiritual and vital appetitive power; this, however, is called will properly and formally. The minor proposition is demonstrated in philosophy, because every form is followed by an appetite proportioned to it: namely, to a natural form, natural appetite; and to an apprehended form, vital appetite; to a sensitive form, sensitive appetite, and to an intellectual form, rational or intellectual appetite. Second, it can be proved principally a posteriori from effects; first, because this appetite is found in the most perfect creatures, which are made in the image of God, and it pertains to their great perfection and formally includes no imperfection; for the fact that the motion of this appetite in these creatures is accidental, or that it exists through intrinsic efficiency or information, and that it has similar imperfections, does not belong to the nature of will as such, abstracting from participated will and essential will, but follows from the fact that such will is participated and imperfect.

*Concerning Innate Appetite*

3. There exists in God a natural and necessary appetite. The reason for doubt. But someone will ask whether there exists in God a

natural appetite, not taking "natural" as equivalent to "necessary," as it is distinguished from free; for in this way it is most certain that there exists in God a natural appetite, at least regarding the love of himself; but taking "natural" as it is distinguished from elicited and is called the weight of nature or innate appetite, concerning which we touched on some things above, in disputation I, final section. However, it seems that such an appetite cannot be attributed to God, both because such a mode of appetizing seems imperfect, since, as such, it does not include life, whence it is common to inanimate things, and in created living beings it does not seem to be found, except insofar as the appetitive power in them precedes vital appetition; but in God there is nothing imperfect or non-vital, nor is there an appetitive faculty which precedes the vital motion of appetizing, as I shall say below. Second, because natural appetite seems proper to those things which do not have through themselves all their perfection consummated; for, if they had it, there would be nothing which they would appetite. Whence it is commonly said that this appetite is nothing other than natural capacity; but God through himself has all his perfection consummated, and does not truly have capacity, but the actuality of all perfection. But if someone should say that God has natural appetite, not for his own goods, but for those of others, against this is the third point, that it follows either that God necessarily communicates himself to others, or that God's natural appetite is not fulfilled; but both alternatives are inconvenient.

4. Affirmative resolution. Nevertheless, it must not be denied that there exists in God a natural appetite; this appetite is indeed so called metaphorically; nevertheless, what is signified by that metaphor, we say truly belongs to God because it is nothing other than the natural inclination or determination of each thing to its own perfection or action. But it is not of the nature of this appetite that it be in the mode of desire for a good not possessed, but it can also exist in the mode of love and rest in perfection possessed. For thus matter not only appetites as if desiring the form which it does not have, but

also quietly and as if delightfully possessing the form which it has; and created beatific vision, or the light of glory, is borne toward God by natural weight, although it is never separated from him. Nor is it of the nature of this appetite that it tend toward a thing distinct from the one appetizing, or (which is the same thing) that its terminus or quasi-object and subject be distinguished in reality; for there can be an appetite quasi-reflexive of the same thing toward itself. For if this is found most properly in vital love, why should not the same be transferred by metaphor to natural appetite? Likewise, this is established by induction, for each thing is said naturally to appetite its own being or its own actual entity, which is nothing other than itself; each thing is also said to appetite its own perfection, not only that which can be superadded to it, but also that which it intimately includes in its own entity; indeed, it appetites that all the more, the more it is identical with itself; for if the proper good is lovable to each, other things being equal, that will be more lovable which is more proper.

5. From these things, therefore, it is clearly concluded that there exists in God a natural appetite, even for the intrinsic goods which he possesses in himself, although he necessarily has those goods and they are not distinguished from him, nor is there in reality anything but one most excellent good. Because, if other things naturally appetite themselves and their own perfection, without distinction or lack, why not also God? Likewise, by this metaphor of natural appetite nothing else is signified than that each thing is so at rest and as if content with its own being and perfection, just as the appetite of life is accustomed to rest in a good attained; and that it has as if an intrinsic bond with its own perfection, by reason of which it protects and defends it, if it is necessary; but all this most properly belongs to God, even if he is considered precisely without vital love. Add that proper vital love is founded in this natural appetite, presupposing cognition, that is, in that natural bond which a thing has toward itself. And among other causes, therefore vital love of self is

most necessary in God, because a thing is naturally determined toward itself, and in general elicited connatural love is founded in some natural appetite.

6. The reason for doubt is resolved. Therefore this appetite includes no imperfection on account of which it should be denied to God. For what does it matter that this appetite is common to inanimate things? For many predicates are common to God and to them, such as being a substance, being, etc. Therefore not every nature which abstracts or prescripts from vitality is imperfect, but only that which is co-distinguished and opposed to life; but that which is as if transcendent and intimately included even in life itself can express perfection simply; thus natural appetite is related to vital appetite, and in this way will itself is accustomed to be distinguished into nature and will as such. Whence not only in created will insofar as it is a power, but even in the elicited act itself natural appetite is absorbed; for an act of love, for example of God, as it is such an entity, has a natural propensity toward God and toward its own proper being, and thus it always appetites to be, and so concerning others. Therefore, although in God there is nothing which is not life, indeed although there is nothing which is not vital love, nevertheless there is understood to be included in him the nature of natural appetite, not in the mode of desire, as the second reason for doubt made at the beginning correctly proves, but in the mode of union and rest in proper perfection, even if it be most necessary, indeed in it he rests better and more securely. Therefore, when it is said that this appetite is founded in natural capacity, if capacity is taken properly for passive power, it has truth only in imperfect and created appetite, in relation to proper perfection; but if it is taken more broadly for any natural aptitude or property, even this appetite in God is founded in the natural aptitude or rather necessity which he has toward his own being and his own perfection. And thus, prescinding according to concepts, God is commonly said to be capable of knowledge, and thus also he naturally appetites to know; and in this way we can speak concerning other

essential attributes. And in personal matters this is also easily understood; for why should not the eternal Father be said naturally to appetite the Son, and conversely? and the divine essence naturally appetites to be in three persons, and so concerning others.

7. And these things indeed proceed concerning innate appetite for the internal properties or perfections of God himself, concerning which the first two reasons for doubt proceeded; but what pertains to the natural appetite for external or created things, which was touched upon in the third reason, it must be said that God also has an innate appetite for other things outside himself. First indeed and principally, because he is the supreme good; but good is diffusive of itself; therefore God has a natural propensity to communicate his goodness, and therefore to communicate himself is said by the Fathers and theologians to be fitting to God insofar as he is good, not because it brings him any perfection or advantage, but because it is consonant with the propensity or inclination of his goodness, as I treated with St. Thomas, III p., q. 1, a. 1. But this cannot be understood of elicited or vital inclination; for this does not belong to God necessarily, but freely; but the propensity of good to communicate itself is natural and necessary, although the free will of intellectual nature governs its execution and use. Moreover, every active power naturally inclines toward its own action, because it is consonant with its nature; but in God there is a most perfect active power; therefore. Moreover, in creatures such natural propensity to benefit others is good and participated from God; therefore it exists in God much more perfectly and through essence. Add that, although creatures bring no perfection to God, nevertheless there exist in them certain goods which are considered in some way to pertain to God and to be as if his extrinsic goods, such as glory, worship, honor, knowledge, love of God and similar things; but these also are naturally appetible, and such appetite is not bad, but good, when it tends toward true and due honor or worship; therefore there exists in God a natural appetite even for these goods. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that God necessarily

wills these things absolutely and simply with a quasi-elicited act, because those goods are not necessary to him, and he can have other reasons on account of which he does not will them with absolute and efficacious will. And therefore it is not inconvenient that this appetite of God for things outside himself is not always or entirely fulfilled, or does not come into effect, just as it is not inconvenient that his active power does not always act, or does not act whatever it can; for, since this natural propensity is not toward proper perfection, but toward perfecting others, it is a greater perfection of God that its execution be free, as we shall say shortly after.

### *What Kind of Will Exists in God*

8. In God will exists in the mode of ultimate act. Second, it must be said principally that it is established by natural reason that the will which exists in God is not according to the mode of power according to reality, but according to the mode of ultimate and pure act. This assertion must be proved and declared in the same way as in intellect and knowledge. For will which in reality is a power has that character in respect to the act which it elicits and receives[21], but there is not in God a power effecting or receiving act, because neither is there that receptive power in God, since this is repugnant to pure act, nor is there a power really active or productive in respect to the attributes or essential acts, such as willing itself. Moreover, the willing of God is nothing other than his substance or being; therefore just as no receptive or active power is given in God in relation to being itself, so neither in relation to willing; therefore there is not in him a power of willing, but volition through essence.

9. It is proved in necessary essential acts. And indeed in the necessary and essential act by which God loves himself, this assertion has no difficulty at all, but a manifest reason; for all things which are necessary in God are as actual as the essence itself, and as pure from all

[21] receives, 1597, 1960; respects, ed. Vivès.

potentiality; therefore just as in essence there is no power toward being prior to being, or distinguished from it in any way, so neither is there a power of loving himself prior to love of himself, distinguished from it in any way. And this indeed is evidently concluded concerning power and act according to reality; but it could be doubted according to reason and our mode of conceiving. Nevertheless, in this matter we must speak in the same way as we spoke concerning intellect and knowledge, namely, that on the part of the thing conceived, a power of willing cannot be conceived in God, because a power of acting or receiving ad intra cannot be conceived. Nor can it be feigned that there is a power for acting and receiving not according to reality, but according to reason, because, speaking from the part of the thing conceived, repugnance is involved in these terms, for to act according to reason is not to act, but to feign action. But from the part of our mode of conceiving, we conceive in God something in that manner by which we conceive in creatures the power of willing, namely, the virtue of loving himself as such, which we prescind from actual love, just as we said concerning first and second act in knowledge.

10. It is proved in free acts. But concerning free acts someone could doubt, because in these we seem more clearly to distinguish the power of willing from actual determination. But, since it has been shown that these acts add nothing real to the necessary act of God, which is really elicited and received in God, it necessarily follows that even for these acts there is no true power in God, but the very use of freedom exists in God in the mode of most pure act, as we shall touch upon again shortly after.

11. Also in notional acts. Finally, someone could doubt concerning the willing which theologians call notional, by which the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit, for in relation to that there seems to be posited a real power in God, which theologians call the power of spirating. But this exceeds the limits of metaphysics, and therefore it should only be said that we must speak in this matter just as we touched upon above concerning the power of generating, for the

power of spirating is spoken of in the same way, not in respect to the act of willing, but in respect to the terminus or person produced. For, because that person is in reality distinct from the producer, therefore something is understood in the producer which is the principle of spirating, and this is called productive power by way of principle, not in respect to action, but in respect to terminus, to which it is not compared as receptive power, but as a principle by which it is productive. But truly in respect to the act of willing as such no power can be given, because it must be active and receptive of it. Which St. Thomas expressly noted, I, q. 41, a. 4, ad 3, and II cont. Gent., c. 10.

12. What unity the divine willing has with essence. But on the occasion of this assertion it can be asked here whether the actual will of God or willing itself is the substance of God, not only identically with real identity, for this is beyond controversy; nor only entirely from the nature of the thing or without any actual distinction in reality, for concerning this also there is the same reasoning about will as about the other attributes; whence it is also far more probable that in this way the willing of God is the substance of God. But more formally, whether it is so of the essence of God that it is also constitutive of it, just as we said concerning knowledge. For there seems to be a different reasoning, because in every thing appetite as such does not pertain formally to the being of the thing, but follows upon it. Whence in created intellectual nature the principle of understanding, as such, primarily constitutes its essence; but willing is as something consequent upon the apprehended form; therefore it must be understood in the same way in God: that knowledge formally and primarily constitutes that nature in such a degree of intellectual living being, but will is as something concomitant, although on account of simplicity it exists in him without any distinction. And some theologians willingly embrace this position, because it seems apt for giving a reason for that most difficult theological question, why production ad intra through intellect is generation, but not production through will, namely, because the principle of the former is nature as

nature, according to that formality by which it is constituted in such a degree of nature; but the principle of the latter is nature, not as nature, but as will. Which reason does not formally pertain to the proper and quasi-specific constitution of nature.

13. But on the contrary, first, there is the common mode of speaking of the saints and theologians, especially Augustine and St. Thomas, who speak in the same way about will as about knowledge, saying that just as knowing, so also willing, is being itself or the essence of God, as is clear in Augustine, XV de Trinitate, c. 7; and St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4, and II cont. Gent., c. 10. Second, because the reasons by which we proved above that the attributes of God are of the essence of God, not only materially (so to speak) or identically, but as formally constituting the very essence of God, those reasons (I say) equally prove concerning the act of willing itself, because this act also expresses perfection simply, which formally taken is of the essence of an infinitely perfect being. Nor does it suffice to include it eminently or radically, because it should include it in the best way, so as to be the best being; but the best way is that it include it formally and essentially; therefore the act of willing is in this way of the essence of God. And it is confirmed and declared from what was said concerning knowledge; for we said that an intellectual substance can exist in two ways. In one way, as the root of intellection; in another way, as formal intellection itself; and we said that the former way belongs to created substances, the latter to the uncreated. From this therefore I make the argument, for that nature which is intellectual as the root of intellection, just as it essentially has this, so also it has that it be the root of volition, because it has both through the same indivisible difference; but it is denominated from intellection, because that is the prior operation; therefore that nature which most actually is intellectual as substantial intellection itself, equally essentially is willing as substantial volition itself. The consequence is clear, because whatever perfection belongs essentially to created nature as intellectual radically, belongs in a higher way and most actually to

intellectual nature through essence; whence, just as the former is essentially the root of willing, so the latter is essentially volition itself. Finally, it pertains to the perfection of the divine nature that it should possess beforehand or formally include in its quidditative conception the perfections simply, which other natures participate through a certain consequence, efficiency or emanation from the essential conception; therefore will or willing which belongs to lower intellectual natures, as something consequent from knowledge or intellection, does not so belong to God, but as something formally existing from the quidditative concept of God. Whence, just as we said above, divine understanding is as if the ultimate essential constitutive of the divine nature in such a degree and excellence of that degree, so now it seems it should be said that that understanding through essence is such that from the force of its essential conception it is not only understanding, but also willing, although we divide it through precise and inadequate concepts.

14. And certainly these latter reasons efficaciously conclude that the act of willing is of the essence and quiddity of the divine nature equally as the act of knowing, nor can any true difference be devised in reality. But according to our mode of conceiving there is some discrimination, for knowing itself is such that without it that nature is not understood distinctly as constituted in its proper degree and essential perfection, and with it it is sufficiently understood as formally constituted in that degree and in its excellence. But willing is not understood as thus constituting nature, for it is already pre-understood as constituted, but willing itself is understood as something consequent, or certainly it is understood to be such as understanding itself was. On account of which St. Thomas said, I, q. 70, a. 3, that appetite does not constitute a special degree or order of beings. From which it also happens that knowledge from itself and from supreme excellence in its formal conception has formally to constitute the very essence of God in proper and quasi-specific conception; but willing only has that it be of essence, either from the

general conception of perfection simply, or certainly because understanding itself is so perfect that not only consecutively, but formally it brings with itself willing itself.

*What is the Object of Divine Will*

15. I say third: the divine will, although it is primarily concerned with God and those things which are intrinsically in God, nevertheless does not rest in him alone, but secondarily can be concerned with other things outside God. In this conclusion we declare the object of the divine will, which is also known by natural light. First indeed, because will is a universal power just like intellect; therefore just as the intellect of God is concerned not only with himself, but also with other things, insofar as others also can participate in or take on the nature of intelligible object, so also will can will not only God himself, but also others insofar as they can participate in the nature of lovable object.

16. Second, the individual members are proved specifically, for that God loves himself, and consequently that he is the object of his own will, is most evident; because, if in other things it is true what Aristotle said: "The good is lovable, but to each his own," much more so in God, whose proper goodness is also supreme and most lovable; it is also universal goodness, not only because it includes all goodness in itself in a certain most excellent way, but also because all other goodness depends upon it and cannot exist without it. From which reasons it is concluded not only that God is the object of his own will, but also that he is the primary object, both because he is most proper and proportioned, and also because he is supremely good and depending on nothing, and on whom all other things depend. Whether indeed he is also adequate for some reason, we shall say a little below. Again, those reasons conclude not only that the divine will can love this object, but also that it necessarily loves it, which is most certain, according to true theology, which first teaches that God

by loving himself produces the Holy Spirit, who is true God, and consequently a being simply necessary; therefore he is necessarily produced; therefore through necessary love. Likewise it teaches that the supreme good clearly seen so attracts the will that it cannot not love it; which if this is true in external (so to speak) viewers, and non-comprehending ones, what will it be in the supreme good itself not only seeing itself, but also comprehending?

17. Metaphysics also has sufficient principles by which it demonstrates this. First, because the act of divine will is a being simply necessary, for it has been shown to be the very being of God; therefore it is necessarily concerned with some object; therefore most of all with himself, both because he is closer to himself, and also because God is the primary object of such an act, and finally because we shall show that it can not be concerned with other objects which are outside himself. Second, because it is impossible that God should not be in the most happy and most perfect state; but without love either there is no happiness, or it cannot be perfect, as is manifest through itself. Third, because to cease from that love cannot be voluntary for God; for no reason of good can be found in such cessation; nor truly will he cease involuntarily; for who will bring force to bear on him so as to compel him to cease from love of himself? Therefore that love is essentially and intrinsically necessary. You will say: this very necessity of loving himself seems to be a certain imperfection, both because it is a mode of operating similar to the mode of operating of natural agents, which is imperfect; and also because freedom and dominion of operation is a greater perfection, as we shall see immediately. It is answered by denying the assumption, for rather necessity in such love is supreme perfection, because it is not violent or irrational or inanimate (so to speak) necessity, but intrinsic, vital and supremely voluntary with most perfect reason. Whence, although it agrees in some way with natural action in this, that it cannot not be, indeed not only does it agree, but by more excellent and greater necessity it cannot not be, because this firmness and stability in being does not per se pertain to

imperfection, but rather to perfection, nevertheless they do not agree in other imperfect conditions, because the necessity of natural agents is purely natural and not vital or not intrinsically voluntary, just as the necessity of this love is. But freedom does not always pertain to perfection, but according to the capacity of the object, as we shall see immediately. Therefore concerning an object supremely good and supremely necessary, supreme perfection will be to love it with supreme necessity; and conversely, freedom in such love would be great imperfection, because it would include the power of lacking it, for we speak properly of freedom of indifference, which is opposed to necessity. Add that the necessity of this love is not causal (so to speak) or from a cause, but formal, because, just as God necessarily is, not from a cause, but formally and from himself, so this love is necessary in the same way, because God both essentially is, and it is of the essence of God, according to that: God is love.

18. Creatures are some object of divine will. It remains to speak concerning the other part of the conclusion, namely, that the divine will is also concerned with other things outside God. Which was almost proved in the preceding sections. For there, when we were dealing with the immutability of God, we showed that God wills other things than himself not metaphorically, but properly; nor can Catholics doubt in this, since Sacred Scripture speaks so manifestly, attributing to God proper love of his creatures and attributing to the divine will that it be the principle and cause of all the works of God. From which principle a natural reason is also taken; for the effects of God are objects of his will, for God is an agent through intellect and will; therefore he both operates what he wills and wills what he operates; but he operates nothing except things outside himself; therefore he truly and properly wills them.

19. God properly wills creatures in themselves. From which it is understood that we should think and speak in this part concerning will just as concerning knowledge, namely, that just as God knows creatures not only in himself, but also in themselves, so also he wills

creatures in themselves, as St. Thomas expressly taught, I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 6, and a. 6, ad 2. Which indeed is most certain in respect to things existing in some difference of time; for those have in themselves being distinct from that being which they have in the essence of God, and they have that from the will of God; therefore God wills them as having such being, and this is to be terminated toward them in themselves, that is, according to their proper being. But whether also the will of God is terminated toward possible things insofar as they are possible in themselves, we shall touch upon later. Again, whether it can also be said that God wills all creatures in himself, even those which he wills to exist at some time, it must be said that in some kind of cause or formal reason that mode of speaking can be admitted in will just as in knowledge, as St. Thomas signified, I, q. 19, a. 2 and 5. For thus God wills things outside himself, yet in such a way that he wills all things to be on account of himself and on account of his goodness; so that, although he wills the created goodness which he communicates to things themselves, nevertheless he does not will it except insofar as it is a participation of his goodness and insofar as it befits his goodness to communicate itself. Therefore in this way it can be said that God wills all things in himself or in his goodness as in the ultimate end on account of which he wills all things; and for this reason also, as I was suggesting above, the goodness of God can in some way be said to be the adequate object of his will, not as an object willed, but as the reason for willing. And all these things are clear and sufficiently consonant with natural reason and the doctrine of philosophers, especially Aristotle.

### *On the Freedom of the Divine Will*

20. The first argument persuading that God wills creatures necessarily. That truly difficult and arduous doubt concerning this part is how God wills other things outside himself, namely, whether necessarily or freely, and what the philosophers have thought about

this matter. And it seems indeed that according to natural reason it ought to be said that God wills these things from necessity. First, because freedom in willing cannot exist in act, but in the potency of the will; but it has been shown that in God there is no potency, but only the act of will; therefore there cannot be freedom in him. The major premise is evident, both from the definition of theologians declared above, that free will is a faculty of will and reason; and also because an act is determined to willing, since it is actual volition; but what is free is what is indifferent to willing and not willing; therefore formally the free cannot be an act, but a potency; but an act will only be denominated free insofar as it is from a free potency, which can will and not will.

21. The second argument. Second, because otherwise it follows that God can will nothing outside himself and create or effect nothing. The consequent is false; therefore. The inference is proved, because there is no greater reason concerning one thing than another, nor concerning the whole collection of them than concerning individuals. But the minor premise is proved, both because it pertains to God's perfection to communicate himself; hence St. Thomas proves that he wills things other than himself; and also because otherwise God could will entirely against his natural inclination, for this, as we said above, is toward communicating his goodness; but he could will not to communicate himself at all; therefore he would will entirely against his inclination. Whence it is confirmed, because God cannot not will himself most perfectly; but God wills himself more perfectly if he wills not only intrinsic goods for himself, but extrinsic ones, and not only wills himself, but also something else for his own sake; therefore he necessarily wills thus; therefore he does not will all other things outside himself in an entirely free manner.

22. The third. Third, because otherwise it follows that God wills and operates contingently; the consequent is false; therefore. The inference is evident, because the contingent is opposed to the necessary, just as to the impossible, because it includes being able to

be and being able not to be; but the free includes these and is opposed to the necessary; if therefore God wills freely, he also wills and operates contingently. But that the consequent is absurd is established, because contingency includes imperfection, both because it includes potency, and also because it seems to include chance and occurrence beyond intention. And here could be added all those things which have been said about divine immutability, because the divine will cannot be understood to be determined unless some real addition is made to it.

23. The fourth. Fourth, because an indifferent cause, as indifferent, can operate nothing unless it is determined by another; but the divine will cannot be determined by another; therefore it is necessary that it be determined from itself, otherwise it could will or operate nothing. The major premise is established, because it includes a contradiction in terms that an indifferent cause should operate something determinate from itself.

24. The fifth from Aristotelian principles. Finally, that Aristotle thought thus about the divine will is established from two of his principles. The first is that God acts by understanding and willing, from book I of the Metaphysics, chapter 2, and book XII, chapter 9, and book II of the Physics, chapters 8 and 9, and book VII of the Ethics, chapter 4. The second is that God acts externally from the necessity of nature, for on this he founds his position concerning the eternity of the world. For either he believed the world was made, or not. If the first, he could not have judged it to be eternal for any other reason than because it flows from God by natural necessity; for, if it was made freely, whence can it be proved that it was made from eternity? But if he did not believe the world was made, the same argument will be made concerning the motion of heaven, which he himself does not deny nor can deny was made, indeed is continuously being made. Whence in Physics VIII, chapter 1, he argues thus. If the first mover previously did not move, therefore something existed which retarded it from motion, supposing indeed that it moves from

the necessity of nature; for, if it were free, without impediment it could have not moved previously by its will alone. Whence in chapter 6, text 52, from the necessity of the first mover he proves the eternity of the world and motion.

### *Multiple Necessity Having Been Declared, Divine Freedom Is Proved*

25. Nevertheless it must be said that it can be demonstrated by evident reason that God wills things outside himself freely, speaking absolutely and simply, and that the opposite opinion, namely that God acts outside himself from the necessity of nature, is an error, not only in faith, but also against natural reason. But, because there can be degrees in this necessity, it is necessary to distinguish them and to speak briefly about each. The first is, if someone should imagine that God acts outside himself by the necessity of nature in such a way that he operates in no manner through intellect and will, but by mere transient action naturally flowing from him, just as illumination flows from the sun. And in this sense neither Aristotle, nor any philosopher who has known God, attributes to him that he acts from the necessity of nature, because all confess that God is of intellectual nature and operates through intellect and will. Someone will say that even if God has intellect and will, nevertheless he can act from mere necessity of nature, with will and intellect in no way concurring to the action, but at most having themselves concomitantly, knowing and willing that which necessarily flows from God's nature; just as theologians say that the eternal Father generates the Son voluntarily concomitantly, but not antecedently. But this also clearly contradicts divine perfection and its effects; for, as is established from what has been said in the disputation on causes, an efficient cause acting in a perfect manner acts both according to a preconceived exemplar and according to a preknown and intended end; therefore for a perfect mode of acting it is necessary that intellect and will concur, not only concomitantly, but

also causally. But this mode of acting must necessarily be attributed to God. First, because in all things he has supreme perfection. Second, because he is the first cause, which cannot receive the end of its action from another, whence it is necessary that he himself conceive it and propose it to himself. Third, because on account of infinite power there are also infinite things which he can do; whence his power is most universal and indifferent to many things, which cannot be determined by an extrinsic agent or matter, because he neither has a superior agent, nor needs matter for his first action; therefore he can only be determined by a preconceived exemplar, with will or intention of the end joined; therefore it is evident that this mode of necessity has no place in God.

26. God does not now act as much as he can. The second mode, which more particularly concerns the present matter, is, supposing that God operates through intellect and will, if his will is judged to be determined by its nature to willing things externally or their production. Which necessity can still be conceived in two ways: one is, if that determination should be absolute to willing to act as much as he simply can without any limitation. And this mode can easily also be refuted from what has been said above; for it openly contradicts God's intensive infinity, both in his being and in his power of acting and moving, because it is impossible that infinite power should act according to its whole power and according to the ultimate of its potency. Which can be proved first by Aristotle's argument, taken from local motion, because, if the first mover having infinite power naturally acted as much as it simply can, it would move in no time. For which reason many judge that Aristotle could not have believed that God acts from the necessity of nature, since otherwise he posited that he has infinite motive power, because otherwise he would involve a contradiction in his statements.

27. Second, a similar argument can be made from almost all effects of divine power, especially from those which he makes immediately and through himself, because, if God created angels, for

example, why did he create them in such a multitude and not greater nor less? Or why in species of such perfection and not greater nor less? Certainly no reason can be given, except that either he could not do otherwise, or because he did not will it. If the first is said, this is against his infinite power and excellence and against omnipotence, as will be more apparent from the following section. But if the second is said, therefore he does not necessarily will to act as much as he simply can. A similar argument can be made by asking why he created this world and not another, or in this quantity and not greater, or now and not before, supposing that he did not produce from eternity, as faith teaches and we believe can be sufficiently proved by reason, at least regarding the motion of heaven and the successions of generations, as we have touched upon above. For of all these and similar things no reason can be given, if God operates from necessity according to his whole power, except by positing that power to be limited and finite regarding the effects possible to him, both in multitude and in magnitude and other circumstances.

28. Third, we can argue from the contingency of effects, because, if God acted from the necessity of nature in that manner, there would be no contingent effects in the universe; which is not only against faith, but also against true philosophy and Aristotle himself, as has been seen above. But the inference is proved, because if the first cause acted from necessity as much as it could, no second cause could resist it; therefore it would be moved with as great necessity as the first cause moved; and thus by absolute necessity one thing would follow from another, concerning which matter has been spoken above, disputation XXII.

29. Therefore in a third way it can be understood that God acts or wills from the necessity of nature, not absolutely and simply with respect to his power, that is, necessarily willing to act as much as he can, or infinitely applying his infinite power to acting; but only acting from necessity according to the apprehended end, or according to the natural capacity of the subject or matter about which he

operates. As, for example, if we say that God from necessity moves heaven with such velocity and not greater, not because absolutely he cannot move more swiftly or impress a greater impulse, but because he apprehends this velocity to be suitable to heaven and the world, and by the necessity of nature he operates what the necessity of the end requires, and so concerning other things. And in this way some interpret Aristotle's opinion, as Soncinas, XII Metaphysics, questions 39 and 41. Nevertheless it is no less erroneous in faith than the preceding, although some Catholics inadvertently fall into it, as I shall immediately declare. It is also against natural reason, first, because, if divine power is not limited to a definite effect, for example, to this velocity of motion, neither can the divine will by its nature be terminated to willing that from necessity, and not greater nor less. For why, or whence does it have such determination? You will say it has it from the end, for example, because such motion is expedient for the good of the universe, which God intends. But against this, for concerning this very end I will inquire why the divine will is determined to willing this universe and its good from necessity, when God's power is not limited to this, but can effect another universe, either similar or more perfect. Then, in this same universe divine wisdom could find other ways of composing the motions of the heavens with greater or less velocity, from which would arise a proportion equally useful for the conservation of the universe, as is that which is now found in the heavens; therefore that mode of divine determination is entirely irrational. But whether it is sufficient for Aristotle's intention, I shall show below.

30. Second, it also contradicts divine perfection, for from that position it follows that God does not so much will and operate from rational will, as from natural instinct, which is a great imperfection, much approaching the imperfection of brutes and declining from the perfection of intellectual nature. The inference is declared: for God is able to produce these angels and innumerable others, and although he is not necessarily determined to will to create all whom he can,

nevertheless he is determined by natural necessity, both to judge that these are to be created by him and not others and to will to create these and not others; but this determination does not arise from any reason known by God, which could move him from necessity; for, just as he knows the creation of these to be possible to him, so also of others; and, just as in these he manifests his goodness, so he would do in others, and perhaps more perfectly, if those were more perfect; therefore that determination cannot be reduced except to some natural instinct of the divine nature. Nor is it similar in this concerning the determination to loving himself, because that is indeed founded in the dignity of the object and the necessity known by God himself, and therefore it is so natural, that it is also rational and most perfect. Which cannot be said of a created object, because no greater necessity is found in these angels, than in other possible ones.

31. And hence is taken a third argument, and especially a priori, because no good outside God is known by him as necessary, either for his being, or for his happiness, or for his consummate perfection; therefore his will is in no way necessarily determined to willing any of these goods. The antecedent is established from what has been said above; for therefore we proved that God is a good sufficient to himself and that no true perfection accrues to him from the fact that he wills creatures. But the consequence is proved, because the movement of the will follows reason, and therefore it necessarily loves only necessary good; wherefore it is customarily said that from the indifference of judgment arises the freedom of the will, from indifference (I say) objective; for thus in one word it is correctly explained, that is, from the fact that the object to be willed is judged indifferent or not necessary. Whence it is also understood (which especially confirms this truth) that freedom concerning such objects pertains to great perfection, because to be able to love each thing according to the measure or proportion of its goodness, is a great perfection; just as therefore to necessarily love necessary good is a great perfection, so to not necessarily love good that is not necessary,

but according to the judgment of reason and the dominion of freedom, is the greatest perfection; therefore it cannot be denied to God. Especially because intellectual creatures enjoy this freedom and perfection, which, although in them it has some imperfections joined, these are nevertheless not of the nature of freedom as such; therefore such perfection cannot be denied to God. For from whom would creatures participate it if God lacked it, as we argued above? And conversely, no rational creature has that natural determination to willing any object from those which are not necessary in themselves, but either equally lovable, if they are considered as ends, or equally eligible, if they are considered as means; why therefore will such determination be attributed to God, when it does not pertain to perfection?

32. The necessity arising from immutability befits the divine will. A fourth necessity can be added, which is called that of immutability, which is indeed not absolute necessity, but in a certain respect, namely, from supposition, and this must necessarily be admitted in the divine will, as has been shown above. But this necessity does not contradict freedom, indeed it intrinsically includes or supposes the use of it, for in that which God once freely decreed, he remains immutable. You will say that immutability conflicts with freedom, because, since immutability is perpetual, it never leaves room for the use of freedom. I respond briefly that the use of freedom in God is unique or only once, namely in eternity itself, in which he simultaneously deliberates about all things outside himself, and in that which he once freely decreed, he perpetually remains. Therefore the inference is denied, because with this use immutability does not conflict, for this use is as perpetual as immutability itself, and, although they are simultaneous in duration, nevertheless the free determination precedes in the order of reason both immutability itself and the free determination is preceded by the indifference of the will, or rather of the divine volition, in the same order of reason. And this necessity can be declared according to that saying of Aristotle: What

is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. Which is also true in the free act of our will; for we are not only free before we will, but also when we will, and the act by which we will is simultaneously free simply and necessary from supposition; but it is made or exists by nature or reason prior to being understood to have that necessity, and prior in reason or nature before such an act is made, the will is understood to be indifferent to making it for the same instant; but what in us is an instant, is in God eternity itself, and what in our act is necessity from supposition for that instant for which it is supposed to exist, is in God the necessity of immutability for his eternity.

33. The objection is sufficiently met. You will say: therefore now God wills nothing freely, or at least he is not free to not will what he willed. It is responded to the first part by absolutely denying the inference, if we speak of him according to himself; for in him according to himself there is not properly having willed, but willing, and in his eternity he simply wills freely, and by the same freedom perpetually remains in the same decree; if however we speak by comparison to our time, it is true that he necessarily now wills what he previously willed; nevertheless that necessity is only from supposition, which, as we said, does not contradict freedom. Whence to the other part the inference is granted in the composite sense which it presents; for indeed in God there is no potency to not will what he willed, from the supposition that he willed, and speaking of the same object for the same time and according to the same respect, because such potency would be toward change; simply however he can in his eternity not will what he wills, in the divided sense (as they say), which we better explain through the past tense, namely, that he could have not willed what he wills, and this is sufficient for perfect freedom. From these things therefore (as I judge) it has been sufficiently demonstrated that God has freedom in willing those things which are outside himself, freedom (I say) both as to exercise, because, namely, he can will them or not will them, and as to specification, because he can will and not

will, or will this or its opposite, which we shall declare more fully in the following assertion.

### *The Difficulties Against Divine Freedom Posited Above Are Resolved*

34. To the first argument made at the beginning of the doubt, the response must be taken from what has been said above about divine immutability. For created freedom formally cannot exist except in the potency of the will as in the proximate efficient principle from which the act is denominated free. And concerning this created free will, indeed particularly concerning the human, that definition is customarily given, that it is a faculty of will and reason. But truly in uncreated free will freedom is not in potency, but in act, because its indifference is not in order to acts, but immediately to secondary objects, with respect to which that act is not determined to willing, but only with respect to its primary object, which is divine goodness, concerning which to be loved in itself and for its own sake that act necessarily has its whole entity, and through the same it can love or not love the remaining objects without increase or diminution of its entity, and in this consists its freedom, admirable indeed, but true.

### *Whether at Least in General God Necessarily Wills Something Outside Himself*

35. In the second argument it is asked whether God's will is not only free to willing any created good in particular, but also in general, so that not only determinately and distributively does he necessarily will none, but also confusedly and collectively. For the arguments insinuated in that argument seem to prove that, although God can not will this or that creature, and so concerning individuals determinately, nevertheless he could not not will creatures at all, and perpetually abstain from their production, because this seems very

repugnant to his goodness. And on the other hand it is not necessary for his freedom, for this is sufficiently preserved if God necessarily wills no creature taken determinately. Nevertheless, if we speak of the efficacious will by which God wills to produce something outside himself, it must be said that it is free for God not only to will any creature, but simply to will a creature, or to communicate himself externally, and therefore he could have willed to produce nothing created at all. The reason is because created good, whether taken absolutely and simply or in particular, is a good distinct from God and minimally necessary, either for his being, or for his beatitude or perfection; therefore, in whatever way created good is taken, it is not an object necessarily determining the divine will to its love. And it is confirmed first, because otherwise God would not be a good sufficient to himself, but would need the partnership of created good, or the communication of his goodness with a creature at least confusedly and indistinctly taken; but this contradicts God no less than that he should need any particular creature. It is confirmed second, because, when the choice of any means in particular is free, it is not necessary to will some of them confusedly and indistinctly, unless the intention of the end is necessarily presupposed; if therefore the choice of any creature is free for God, but it is not absolutely free to will something created, there will have to be presupposed in God the intention of some necessary end, which brings the necessity of willing some creature, at least confusedly; but no such intention can be imagined in God, because he can most perfectly love his goodness intending nothing outside himself. Whence God for an end (if it is permitted to speak thus) necessary to himself needs no means, neither determinately nor confusedly taken, because God has no final cause, and consequently no end necessary to himself which ought to be attained through means, because naturally and through himself he has his ultimate perfection; therefore the intention of any other end to be attained through means is free for him; therefore the volition of means, both taken determinately and confusedly, is free for him and not necessary.

36. Whether communicating himself to creatures signifies some perfection in God. To the second argument therefore the inference is granted, which is sufficiently proved there. But to the first disproof of the consequent it has already been responded above that actually communicating himself to creatures signifies or adds no formal perfection in God, but supposes and proceeds from the greatest perfection, and in this way it must be explained when it is said that it pertains to God's perfection to communicate himself, as I said more broadly in article 1 on the Incarnation. To the second disproof it is responded that, even if God willed nothing outside himself, he would not therefore properly act against his inclination, but only would not act according to some inclination of his, which is no inconvenience, because that inclination is not to his own good, but of others, and because it inclines only with subordination (so to speak) to reason and will. Nor would that natural inclination of God to communicate himself therefore be frustrated, because then properly some inclination is said to be frustrated when it lacks the act or perfection due to it; but the divine good, even if it is not communicated to others outside itself, does not lack the state, perfection or action due to it, but only action possible to it and consonant with its goodness. To the third disproof or confirmation it is denied that God wills himself more perfectly when he wills himself to exist and to communicate to creatures than when he only wills himself to exist, because it is entirely the same act by which in both ways he wills himself, and he has entirely the same good in himself willing himself in both ways; and he only posits some good in creatures, when he wills to communicate himself to them or to be their end, which he would not posit if he willed himself only absolutely. And this itself is what in other words is customarily said, that God necessarily loves himself most perfectly intensively, but not extensively; although these words seem less proper to me, and are to be interpreted in a sound way concerning purely objective and causal extension, but not concerning entitative and formal extension in the

very act of God, as Cajetan and others seem to have intended, with whom enough has been disputed above. For objective or causal extension adds no reality to God himself, but to the creature into which he flows and to which the necessary act of God is freely terminated; but on account of this extension the act of God cannot be called more perfect, even extensively, since its perfection in no way grows or is multiplied.

### *Whether God Necessarily Loves Possible Creatures*

37. You will say: God, comprehending himself, necessarily knows creatures, even if the knowledge of creatures adds no perfection to him; therefore similarly God, loving himself, necessarily loves creatures, because God does not love himself less comprehensively than he knows himself. Saint Thomas touches upon this difficulty in I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 6, and establishes a difference between knowledge and will, that the will is directed toward things in themselves, but the intellect is directed toward things as they are in God. Created or creatable things have necessary being insofar as they are in God, but not insofar as they are in themselves. This response is very difficult, as will become clear from what will be said, from which it will perhaps be explained in some way. Therefore, divine knowledge and will can be compared first to creatures as existing in some temporal difference, and thus it is true of both that they terminate in creatures in themselves; for just as God wills creatures to be in themselves, so also he contemplates them as existing in themselves, and of both it is also true in another sense that God knows and wills creatures in himself, as was explained above. From this it follows that, just as it is not simply necessary for the divine will to be terminated toward creatures in this way, so neither is there simply this necessity in knowledge, but only on the supposition that they are willed by God or that they will be future in some temporal difference. And in this there is a difference between will and knowledge; for the will regarding existing creatures is in itself

formally free with respect to such determination, and does not result necessarily from any prior supposition; but divine knowledge, even as it terminates in existing creatures, is not in itself formally free, but necessarily belongs to God, supposing the future existence of such an object; from which it follows that every knowable object, even created, is necessarily known by God; but not every lovable thing is necessarily loved. The proper reason for this discrimination is that the will is formally free, but knowledge is not formally free; for from this it follows that knowledge naturally and necessarily represents whatever is representable or knowable, but the will does not necessarily love whatever is lovable. This freedom pertains to perfection in the will concerning goods that are not necessary for the one loving, as was declared above; but in the intellect, freedom of assent or cognition never arises from perfection; for if such freedom is understood with respect to the specification of the act, it arises from some obscurity, for in evident cognition such freedom has no place, because where evidence intervenes, the intellect cannot dissent. But freedom with respect to exercise in the created intellect arises from potentiality, because it cannot always be in final act, and therefore needs some other mover by which it may be reduced from first act to second, or transferred from consideration of one object to consideration of another; but these imperfections have no place in God, and therefore his knowledge necessarily represents whatever is representable. The more a priori reason for this discrimination is that the will of God, insofar as it is concerned with existing creatures, is the primary and radical cause of them, and therefore is said to terminate in them in themselves, that is, so as to benefit them and make them exist in themselves; but this cannot be necessary for God, because it does not contribute to his advantage and perfection. But the knowledge of vision, which we are now discussing, although it contemplates things as they are in themselves, nevertheless is not the cause of them, nor does it contribute to their being in themselves, but only contemplates them by virtue of that eminence and perfection by which it contains

them in itself, which pertains to the perfection of God in himself and not to the perfection of the creature.

38. Some assert that love of simple complacency is necessary in God toward possible creatures. Second, the knowledge and will of God can be compared to creatures only as possible. And in this way some theologians admit the inference and parity of reasoning with respect to some love, which can be concerned with possible creatures as they are possible. For the divine will can be concerned with possible creatures in two ways. In one way effectively, by willing to create them, and this love no longer terminates in them simply as possible, but as existing, and concerning this applies what we said in the previous member. But in another way the divine will can be concerned with possible creatures through a certain simple complacency in their essences, insofar as we recognize them as having such and such possible perfection; and with respect to this effect they concede that, just as God knowing himself, necessarily knows creatures as possible, so loving himself, he necessarily takes complacency in creatures as possible. For this love is not an effective cause of creatures nor does it tend toward them in themselves, that is, so as to give them being, and therefore the differences assigned in the previous member cease, and the similarity of reasoning between knowledge and love compels.

39. Others deny this. Others are not pleased to admit in God any love that is simply necessary, even by way of simple affection, concerning creatures, even as possible. Because to love creatures in any way is neither necessary for the perfection of God, otherwise God would need creatures in some way; nor is it necessarily consequent upon any divine perfection, because, just as divine goodness is entirely independent of creatures, even as possible, so God can love it and take complacency in it precisely, even if he has no affection concerning such creatures. And this is confirmed, because the created free will necessarily loves nothing except God, and perhaps also itself, but other creatures it loves in no way necessarily, neither with effective

love nor with complacency, which is also true in the blessed who see and love God. For although perhaps, having seen God, they necessarily see in him some creatures, nevertheless, loving God, they do not necessarily love creatures even with the love of complacency. And the reason is that creatures are not the supreme good, however much they may be seen in the supreme good; but the will is directed necessarily only toward the supreme good, and toward its own being as it were consequently and on account of the supreme good, insofar as it is the foundation without which it could not enjoy the supreme good; but with other creatures it has no necessary connection, and therefore it does not necessarily love them nor take complacency in them. Much less, therefore, can God have any necessary affection that is truly terminated toward creatures.

40. Some also add that this complacency which does not include affection toward the actual existence of the good itself that is known, is either fictitious, or does not pertain to the will, but to the intellect. For it seems to be nothing else than a judgment by which someone approves such a nature or essence of a thing that he knows; but if from this judgment there does not follow some affection by which the will wills that thing to be and to have such perfection, no true love can be understood which may be called complacency of the will in such a thing. This can be confirmed from what we experience in ourselves. For we never love or will anything except in relation to its existence, whether we desire the thing to be in us and perfect us, or to be in itself and have its own perfection. This is most evident in effective love; but the same may be understood in simple affection, which is understood in us in two ways. First, through an ineffective act, which we explain through conditional will, namely, I would will this good if it could be done, or if there were not such an impediment, which affection is a clear desire of the thing in relation to its existence, although it is not effective and absolute. The other mode of this simple affection is through complacency in a beautiful or good thing without any desire of having it, as when someone takes complacency in a

beautiful image seen, or in a rose, or in the goodness of God contemplated. And such complacency cannot be except either a certain delight concerning one's own act regarding such an object. For the beautiful sight delights us because the act itself regarding such an object is consonant with our nature; and we call that delight simple complacency, which is undoubtedly concerning that object or its appearance as existing in us. Or that complacency can be by way of benevolence toward the object itself or the thing seen and contemplated, and thus it is nothing else than to will or rejoice that that thing has that beauty or goodness which we perceive or consider in it, and thus this affection also is directed toward goodness in relation to its being. Thus therefore in God no act of will is understood which is true love toward a creature, except in relation to its actual existence. And because no thing can have actually existing perfection except from the will of God, therefore God is said to love only those creatures to which he wills to give being; and if he wills this by absolute will (which they call consequent), he is said to love effectively; but if he wills this only by simple affection or conditionally (which they call antecedent will), the love is in itself ineffective; nevertheless both, in the way that it is, is concerning the actual existence of the thing, and therefore is free in God; therefore concerning possible creatures, which are in no way ordered toward existence by the divine will, no true love can be understood which may be called simple complacency. Finally, for this reason many philosophers and theologians, especially those who follow the doctrine of Saint Thomas, establish this difference between intellect and will, that the intellect is concerned with the quiddity of a thing prescinding it from actual existence, but the will always tends toward good in relation to actual being, as is evident from Saint Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 3; therefore according to this doctrine no true act of divine will can be understood concerning the essences of possible things which it orders in no way toward being.

41. The second opinion is judged probable. According to this opinion, therefore, which is sufficiently probable, a difference must be established between the knowledge of simple intelligence and the necessary love of God, that God through that knowledge necessarily comprehends possible creatures, because he comprehends his infinite perfection and power, with which creatures have a necessary connection in possible being, and consequently in knowable or intelligible being, because the connection of an effect as possible with power is entirely necessary; and therefore, the power being comprehended, which by its virtue alone eminently contains the whole effect, the effect is comprehended as possible, even if it is never going to be future, for, as I said, the intellect of itself prescinds from actual existence. But truly the love of God, however perfect, does not have a necessary connection with the love of creatures, because the actual being of a creature does not have a necessary connection with the goodness of God; but love is not without order to actual being. And Saint Thomas seems to intend this difference in the cited place, when he said that knowledge is concerned with creatures as they are in God, but love concerning them as they are in themselves. And his commentators teach the same more frequently, I, q. 34, a. 3, when against Scotus they say that the divine Word proceeds from knowledge of possible creatures, which is necessary, but the Holy Spirit does not proceed from love of creatures, because none is necessary.

42. A probable mode of explaining the prior opinion. But if someone should interpret the prior opinion in such a way that God, loving his omnipotence, necessarily loves and rejoices that creatures are possible, because he cannot himself be omnipotent unless creatures are possible, and calls this the simple love of possible creatures, he will say nothing improbable, but in fact most true. Nevertheless, that love is not without some respect to the being of existence, not indeed of the creatures themselves, but of the very omnipotence of God; for the possibility of creatures is loved only insofar as it is connected with the actual existence of the omnipotence

of God; and therefore they are necessarily loved as possible, because the omnipotence of God is necessarily loved. Nevertheless, if we speak truly and properly, this love is not so much of creatures, as of the omnipotence of God, because it loves no actual good for creatures, but only for God. And in this sense Cajetan seems to have said, I, q. 34, a. 3, that God necessarily loves creatures as they are in himself, but not as they are in themselves, because as they are in God they have no other good nor other being except God's; but as they are in themselves, they have distinct being. And for this reason he equates love with knowledge of creatures as possible. In this we are not entirely pleased, for through knowledge the creatable natures are truly known as they are beings essentially distinct from him, and thus they are known terminatively in themselves and according to their absolute essential being; but truly through the said love they are not really loved in themselves, but only in that being which they have in the omnipotence of God, from which they are denominated possible, because nothing is loved in itself unless it is ordered so as to have some good in itself and in its proper being; but something is known in itself even what is prescinded from all its actual being; therefore a difference always intervenes between knowledge and love, on account of which God can most perfectly love himself while not properly loving creatures in themselves.

### *Whether God Wills Contingently*

43. The third argument touches the controversy between Scotus and the Thomists, whether effects proceeding from the free will of God should be called contingent or not. For Scotus speaks thus, In I, dist. 38 and 39, whom Gabriel, Palacios and others imitate; nor does Capreolus disagree there, dist. 38, q. 2, to the argument of Aureolus against the 2nd and 3rd conclusions. But other Thomists are not pleased with this way of speaking, as is clear from Cajetan, I, q. 19, a. 8; Ferrariensis, I cont. Gent., c. 67 and 70, and Capreolus also

insinuates, above, a. 1; and they have foundation in Saint Thomas, In I, dist. 43, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4. But I think the question is about the name; for if contingency only signifies a certain indifference which an effect has in relation to its cause, insofar as by virtue of it it can be and not be, thus there is no doubt that such effects are contingent, because this is nothing else than not being simply necessary. For it is established that the divine will, even if in itself with respect to its being it is necessary, nevertheless not in the role of cause, because it does not have a necessary relationship to secondary objects, as Saint Thomas rightly noted, I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 4, 5 and 6. But if contingency besides indifference includes some imperfection from those things which are noted in the argument, thus it is clear that it is not of the nature of a free cause; and therefore it does not follow that God is a contingent cause, even if he is free. And in this way Saint Thomas, In I, dist. 43, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4, says: It should not be said that the will of God is contingent, or his operation, because contingency imports mutability, which is nothing in God. And this way of speaking is more cautious, although among learned men contingent effects are often accustomed to be called such on account of the indifference of the cause alone. The remaining things which are touched upon in that argument concerning immutability, and how there can be free determination without real addition, have been sufficiently treated above in the attribute of immutability.

### *By What the Free Will of God is Determined*

44. The opinion of some. In the fourth argument the very broad matter concerning the determination of a free cause is emphasized; but that thing, as it pertains to created causes, has been treated above, disp. XIX and XXII. But as it pertains to the divine will, there are not lacking those who seek in it also something determining, at least rationally distinct from it, on account of that axiom, that an indifferent cause as such can determine to will or operate nothing.

And because this determining thing cannot be outside God, because it would be an imperfection, they say the divine will is determined by the intellect judging practically what it is fitting to will. Thus thinks Capreolus, In I, dist. 45, q. 1, a. 2, to the argument of Aureolus against the 3rd conclusion, and Ferrariensis, I cont. Gent., c. 82, where Saint Thomas, solving the fourth objection, speaks thus, saying the divine will is determined by the intellect proposing the good which it itself wills. Nevertheless, lest we labor in equivocation, it must be supposed that a twofold determining is customarily distinguished in the will. One, with respect to the specification of the act; another, with respect to exercise; concerning the former there is no difficulty here, nor is anything inquired about it in the argument made, because divine volition does not take its species from created objects, but from itself and from its goodness it is such, as Ferrariensis rightly noted, above, where in this sense he denies that created objects, or the intellect proposing them, can be said to determine the divine will with respect to the species of the act, but only insofar as they terminate or are material secondary objects, concerning which the divine willing, as free, is concerned. And in this sense the divine intellect will be said to determine the divine will, only because it offers matter which can terminate its volition. And Saint Thomas indeed spoke only in this sense; and Capreolus and Ferrariensis sometimes insinuate the same, although they later indicate something else, as we shall see.

45. Therefore for the sake of greater clarity we can distinguish this determination into sufficient and effective, or let the former be called with respect to specification, the latter with respect to exercise, or let those two terms be applied to either of these members, as can easily be done. Therefore I call sufficient determination that metaphorical motion which of itself is sufficient so that by reason of it the will may be determined to such an act; but effective determination will be that motion, which having been posited, the will is so determined to the act, that it can in no way happen that, such motion having been posited, such determination does not follow in the will. In

the former way it is most true that the divine intellect determines the divine will, even concerning created objects, because it proposes them and sufficient reasons of fittingness and goodness on account of which the will may be determined or be able to be determined to willing such objects; and finally, as much as is from itself, it sufficiently allures the will itself so that it may determinately will such objects. This kind of sufficient determination is found in every intellect and will, and can be called motion or sufficient determination, not only with respect to specification, but also with respect to exercise, because in its kind it sufficiently draws the will to exercise such an act, or to such determination. And in this way also Saint Thomas can be understood very well, I cont. Gent., c. 82, and lib. II, c. 26. Nevertheless, this kind of sufficient determination does not suffice to solve the difficulty touched upon in the fourth argument, because if, even with that sufficient determination having been posited on the part of the intellect, the will remains indifferent so that it can not exercise the act to which it is allured, it will have to be asked by what it is determined. Therefore effective determination with respect to exercise will be, if in the order of reason there precedes in the divine intellect some judgment, which having been posited, determination of the will cannot not follow. For thus the divine will can be said to be determined to love of itself by the judgment of the intellect.

46. The divine will is not determined by the divine intellect to will created objects. Speaking therefore about this determination, we say it is impossible for the divine will to be determined by the intellect to willing such created objects. This is proved first by a reason most effective in my judgment, because this is repugnant to the free determination of the divine will, for the judgment of the intellect, which precedes the will, is natural and not free; therefore if, the judgment having been posited, the will cannot not follow it and be determined by following it, therefore nowhere is there exercise of freedom, but through natural determination all things follow from necessity. The inference is evident from the aforesaid position. Nor

should the common distinction of composite and divided sense be heard here, for if the composite sense is from an antecedent and natural supposition, and the consequence of certain volition and determination is inevitable in the composite sense, or that supposition having been made, it is simply and in every sense necessary and not free. For why is the love of God toward himself simply necessary, although it cannot be unless his knowledge of himself is supposed? Certainly for no other reason except that both that vision is such, and it having been posited such love cannot not follow. But the first antecedent is clear because the intellect is not formally free, but only as it is subject to the motion of the will. But if someone with Durandus should contend that the judgment itself of the intellect is per se and formally free, besides the improbability of that opinion, he will fall into the same question, by what, namely, the divine intellect is determined to judge, for example, that this world should be created, since it is not determined to this by its nature; but if he should respond that it determines itself by its very freedom, he will say the same about the will, that false opinion about the formal freedom of the intellect being set aside.

47. But Capreolus responds differently above: that first judgment of the intellect is not merely natural and necessary, but free, not from the formal freedom of the intellect, but from the motion of the will freely determining the intellect. Hence he establishes this order, that the divine intellect naturally and necessarily understands all things and proposes them to the will; but the will naturally and necessarily wills its principal object, which (he says) having been loved, it wills the intellect to conceive and dictate something to be produced, in which the divine goodness may shine forth in such a degree. This having been done, the divine intellect dictates that this or that should be done, and afterwards the will is determined to willing this. But immediately it occurs to ask Capreolus whether that volition by which the will wills the intellect to conceive and dictate something to be produced, in which the divine goodness may shine forth in such

a degree, is necessary or free. He will not say the first, otherwise whatever necessarily follows from it, would be necessary, and thus God would necessarily communicate himself externally in such a degree. But if that volition is free, I will ask again whether the will is determined to it by some judgment of the intellect; for if this is affirmed, either such a judgment is merely natural, and from it such volition inevitably follows, and thus the argument made returns, by which freedom is destroyed; or that judgment is free, and thus it will be necessary that another prior volition precede, by which such judgment is determined, which nevertheless he does not posit, and rightly, because otherwise one would proceed to infinity. But if it should be said that the will is not determined to that first free act by some judgment of the intellect, but determines itself by its freedom, as finally Capreolus himself seems to confess, saying: With respect to the exercise of the act the divine will is determined from its nature as to the principal object, and as to other things through its freedom. And if it should be said, that in this at least it being previously indeterminate determines itself, this is conceded; for it is not determined to willing or not willing, and yet it determinately has willing or not willing; if this (I say) is said about that first act, the same can by the same reason be said immediately about the will to create the world and to communicate itself in such a degree; and that circle or multiplication of acts of intellect and will is superfluously feigned.

48. Add that it can scarcely be understood what that act of the divine intellect is, to which it is said to be determined by the will, the will willing the intellect to conceive and dictate something to be produced, in which the divine goodness may shine forth in such a degree; for if by conception we understand apprehension of the intellect, the divine intellect can conceive nothing from the motion of the will concerning producible creatures, which has not been conceived naturally and necessarily through the knowledge of simple intelligence. But if that conception is not only of the thing as producible, but as to be produced, it already supposes the will to

produce that thing; therefore the divine will cannot will the intellect to conceive the thing thus, unless it first wills to produce the thing itself. Indeed, in no sign is that formal volition concerning the conception of the intellect necessary; for by this very fact that the will wills to produce a thing, it is naturally and necessarily conceived by the intellect as to be produced, as was shown above; therefore a special application of the will to that conception is not necessary. But if the speech is not only about apprehension, but about judgment, which is the same as dictate, I will ask again what the divine intellect judges or dictates as new, as moved by that will, which it did not dictate before. For either it judges the production of the thing in this degree to be possible, and this it dictated before naturally and necessarily; or it judges it to be fitting and consonant with divine goodness, or something similar; and all this it necessarily dictated without such will, as is per se known. And besides, with all that judgment and dictate standing, the will still remains indifferent and indeterminate. Or it judges such a work to be necessary, or necessarily to be done by itself, and thus the judgment will be false, unless another prior will of God himself is supposed, in which such necessity is founded; for of itself and from the object, such a work or production of such a thing is not necessary for God, or necessarily to be done or willed. Indeed, if it were such, it would be naturally judged as such by the intellect, without that special application of the will. Or finally it judges such a work to be entirely to be willed and done by itself, not indeed from necessity, but de facto thus to be done. And this judgment either regards conditional foreknowledge, which God can have, even concerning acts of his will, concerning which there is another consideration which does not pertain to the present; or it is impossible, unless it supposes a free and absolute decree of the divine will concerning such a thing to be done. For God does nothing except insofar as he wills to do it; therefore nothing can be judged as entirely and most certainly to be done by God, unless first according to reason God himself has decreed to do it; therefore the divine will cannot will

the intellect to dictate something, as to be produced by itself in the said way, unless it has already decreed to do it. Therefore it is falsely feigned that this decree of doing something is founded in the will of that dictate, or in the dictate itself. Rather, as I was saying above in a similar case, the decree by which God wills to produce something having been posited, that other will applying the intellect so that it may dictate that it should be done is superfluous, because this dictate follows by natural necessity in the intellect, the free decree concerning the thing to be done having been posited, as a knowable object, as has often been said above.

49. First corollary from what has been said. And from this discourse two things very necessary for confirming this truth are gathered. One has already been touched upon above, namely, that in the divine intellect there is no judgment that is in itself free, either formally, or from the proper motion or application of the will, because such freedom is never in judgment, except from imperfection and obscurity of it; therefore every judgment on the part of the divine intellect is necessary. But some judgment is denominated free, only because its object supposes a free determination of the will; but that determination having been supposed, the intellect necessarily judges whatever truth is found in that object. From this principle, however, which I think is most certain, it clearly follows that the divine will cannot be determined by a judgment of the intellect, because not by a judgment entirely necessary on its part, otherwise the determination of the will would also be necessary and not free; nor by a judgment free in some part, because it can only be free objectively; but such a judgment, so that it can be had, supposes a free determination; therefore the determination itself cannot arise from such a judgment.

50. The second thing that follows from what has been said is that the will is never determined effectively by a judgment of the intellect except under some notion of necessity. Thus, unless the intellect judges this good or lovable object to be necessary, it will never effectively determine the will to will it. This is evident from the

contrary, for the freedom of the will arises from the objective indifference of the intellect, as I was saying above, that is, from the fact that the intellect judges such a good, which is proposed for loving, not to be necessary, and although it has a reason on account of which it can be loved, nevertheless there is not lacking a reason on account of which it also can not be loved. Now truly the divine intellect cannot judge or propose to its will any creatable or to be created good as necessary for itself to operate or will, except from some free determination presupposed in the will itself. This is thus evident, for in two ways a good proposed to the will can be judged necessary: in one way, absolutely and of itself, as God himself is proposed to himself and to those seeing him. And in this way the divine intellect cannot conceive creatable goods as necessary, for it would be an erroneous judgment, as is evident from what was said above. In another way an object can be judged necessary from the presupposition of a prior will, just as the unique means is judged necessary, the intention of the end having been supposed. And such a judgment takes its whole efficacy from the will which it supposes. Hence, if that will is through free determination, such a judgment cannot be the first reason of that determination, since it supposes it. Thus therefore the divine intellect cannot judge something external as necessarily to be willed by itself, unless it supposes something else freely willed, with which the other has a necessary connection; therefore the first free determination of the will of God cannot be from the determination of judgment.

51. Solution of the fourth argument. It must be said therefore to the fourth argument that the divine will does not need another determinant with respect to exercise besides itself, which by virtue of its freedom as it were inclines and determines itself to this object rather than to another. And thus Saint Thomas teaches expressly, I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 5. Nor does the reason made to the contrary in the said fourth argument have difficulty, for, as is taken from the same Saint Thomas, I cont. Gent., c. 82, although an indifferent cause on account of imperfection, that is, which has not yet attained all that is necessary

for operating determinately, cannot operate anything unless it is first determined or rather completed in itself, nevertheless a cause which is indifferent through eminence, because it is complete in itself, but is not determined to one or another object or effect, because it exceeds all things and can do all things through itself, can rightly determine itself and produce one or another effect by its judgment and will.

## *What Aristotle Thought about the Freedom of God*

52. The opinion of Scotus. In the last objection it is asked that we explain what Aristotle thought about this matter. For the testimonies adduced there seem to convince that Aristotle in this part did not think rightly about God and attributed to him natural necessity in acting and willing. And this was his opinion is commonly thought by the Doctors, Scotus, In I, dist. 8, q. 5, and in Quodl., q. 7; Gregory, In I, dist. 42; Gabriel and Ockham, dist. 43; Marsilius, q. 42 and 44; Hervaeus, Quodl. II, q. 4, and in the treatise de Aeternitate mundi, q. 4, Ferrariensis, I lib. cont. Gent., c. 23; and Javellus, XII Metaph., q. 10; Soncinas, XII Metaph., q. 30 and 41; Soto, VIII Phys., 1. All these and many others teach that Aristotle indeed believed God to act through intellect and will, but to be naturally determined to judging and willing what should be done. Soncinas among others declares that Aristotle did not think God acts thus from necessity of nature, so that he necessarily wills to act as much as he can, but because he necessarily does something which he judges to be better or more fitting. He did this, so as to excuse Aristotle from manifest contradiction, namely, that having infinite motive power, he acts from necessity of nature as much as he can simply, and that he only moves with definite velocity.

53. What the preceding opinion has of doubt. But according to this interpretation the discourse of Aristotle which proves the eternity of the world is enervated; for he gathers this from the fact that

the first mover moves by necessity of nature. But if he had only believed him to act from necessity of nature in the aforesaid way, he could easily respond to his discourse that, although God necessarily willed to create the world, nevertheless he willed by that necessity to create it in time, not in eternity, because perhaps he naturally apprehends this as better and more fitting. But Aristotle should have proved that God necessarily judged it more fitting to create the world from eternity. To this it can be said that Aristotle was principally moved to think God acts from necessity of nature because he did not understand that it could happen without change in God that he first did nothing or moved nothing, and afterwards began to act or move. Because therefore he believed God to be immutable, therefore he believed him always to act and not to be able not to act, which is to act from necessity of nature. And therefore, although as to magnitude, multitude or perfection of effects or velocity of motion, perhaps he did not believe God necessarily acts as much as he simply can, nevertheless, as to the duration of the world and of those things which he immediately makes, he believed him necessarily to act as much as he can, or as soon as he can, on account of his immutability.

54. And it is established that this was Aristotle's principal motive from Physics VIII, text 9 and 13, and text 52 and 53, and Metaphysics IX, text 17, where he says that in eternal things there is nothing in potency, but all things are in act. From this he infers that there is nothing to fear that the heavens might come to rest, because neither the heavens themselves nor their mover is in potency to not moving, as Saint Thomas explains there. And from this, in Metaphysics XII, chapter 6, he concludes that it is not sufficient to posit an eternal substance capable of moving, because otherwise it could also not move, but it is necessary that it be actually moving from necessity, such that its motion is its substance, and consequently the motion is as necessary as the substance itself. And in On the Heavens II, chapter 6, text 35, he proves that the motion of the heavens is invariable, because their mover is immutable. From this he wishes to

infer that they are always moved in the same way and from necessity. Finally, from the same principle he gathers the necessity of generations, and for their variety requires various reasons[22] of the heavens, because the first mover from itself always moves in the same way and immutably, as is evident from Physics VIII, text 53, On the Heavens II, text 21, and On Generation I, text 16, and On Generation II, text 56. It is added that the same Aristotle, in Magna Moralia II, chapter 15, although he says that God is happy through himself and does not need external goods, nevertheless holds that he cannot lack operation, nor certain quasi-friends or companions, with whom he communicates his happiness. For what (he asks) will he do? Indeed, he will not sleep. He will contemplate something, they say. What therefore will he contemplate? For if anything else is better, this is absurd that anything better than God should exist. Therefore he will contemplate himself? But this is madness; for we cry out against a man who gazes at himself, as if he were stunned. And at the end he finally concludes that friendship is necessary, even for one who is sufficient to himself. Finally, Averroes seems to descend to this opinion in Physics IX, from text 6; and Simplicius, in Physics VI, text 15; and Avicenna, in book IX of his Metaphysics, chapter 4.

55. Nevertheless, there are other passages of Aristotle from which the opposite can be gathered, especially in that book On the World to Alexander, if it is by Aristotle, where there is an express testimony of this matter. For first its author compares God to an emperor who rules over all things and accomplishes whatever he wills, and thus concludes: In sum, what the helmsman is in a ship, the charioteer in a chariot, the conductor in a chorus, the law in a city, the general in an army, this same is God in the world; except that for those very ones their rule is laborious, troubled, and anxious, but for God it is free from all sorrow and labor, bringing no weakness to the body; for, since he is placed in an immovable position, he moves all things

[22] rationes, 1960; alit. lationes. "Lectura perfectamente aceptable". Cf. BHF, Roma 1960, t. IV, p. 683.

that he wills and turns them according to his judgment in diverse kinds and natures of things. Moreover, in Physics II, text 49, he distinguishes agents acting for an end into those that act from natural necessity and those that act from choice, that is, with mind and reason. But it is established that Aristotle placed the first cause in the latter order, since he attributed to it that it directs all natural causes to their ends, in the same Physics II, chapter 8. Again, in Ethics VIII, chapter 7, and more clearly in book X, chapter 8, he says that the wise and good man is a friend of God; and in Magna Moralia II, chapter 8, he attributes to God that he distributes good and evil things according to merit. But these things cannot be understood without the use of freedom. Moreover, in Topics IV, chapter 5, he says: God and the studious man can do wicked things, but they are not wicked: for all wicked men are said to be so according to choice. Where, although he errs in attributing to God the power of choosing wickedly, he nevertheless favors the truth in attributing to God the power of choosing. Moreover, Laertius reports, in the Life of Aristotle, that at the time of his death he sought mercy from the first cause. This is an argument that he believed God can be moved by prayers to bestow benefits, which is proper to a free agent. Hence Alexander, in his book On Fate, from Aristotle's opinion, advises that benefits should be sought from God, because he can both not give and grant them. Hence the same Alexander, in Physics VI, text 15, says that the mover of the heavens does not move when compelled by necessity, for the good (he says) do not operate in this way, even if they always do the same things, but they have the power to do contrary things. Finally, the Commentator, in the book of Destructions, disputation III, and XI, to the 1st and 2nd doubt, says that God according to Aristotle neither acts from natural necessity nor from choice, but in another more eminent way unknown to mortals, which he alone knows. In this he indicates that natural necessity is denied to God as regards determination to one thing, but choice is denied as regards mutability and other imperfections, while a more eminent mode of operating is

attributed to him, so simple and uniform that it does not exclude indifference and freedom, and so free that it does not admit mutability.

56. The author's judgment on this matter. It is established therefore from these things that Aristotle's opinion on this part is slippery and obscure. Hence some think that he believed God operates with a certain natural determination and necessity concerning the universal good of the universe and concerning the creation and general disposition and order of it, but in other particular works he can use freedom. But if he thought this way, he did not speak with sufficient consistency, because if immutability conflicts with freedom, it will conflict in all effects; but if it does not conflict, neither will immutability in the creation of the whole universe exclude freedom. Then, Aristotle could not deny that God does many things in time, even by himself alone, as is at least evident concerning the creation of souls. Nor does it matter if it is said that he does not create them except on the occasion of a body already disposed; for if a change were necessary for a new operation, even if the operation were to happen when a new occasion is offered, it would happen with change. But if it can happen without change, because God foreseeing the occasion from eternity so disposed, and remaining the same way executes thus in time, Aristotle should have understood the same thing about the motion of the heavens and the creation of the world; for without that external occasion, by his eternal wisdom and will God could dispose that things would happen in time without any change of the one acting. We cannot therefore excuse Aristotle from both having been ignorant of God's mode of operating and having used a weak argument for proving the eternity of the world and having been insufficiently consistent in his arguments and opinions. Nor should this seem surprising, because the mode of operating of the divine will is extremely difficult, as is sufficiently established from what has been said above.

*On the Various Perfections of the Divine Will*

57. Finally, it must be said that the divine will in itself is one and most simple, and formally contains every perfection of rational appetite simply speaking, although it is variously distinguished and named through our concepts. This assertion must be explained and proven in the same proportion as the final conclusion of the preceding section. For concerning all its parts, there is the same reasoning about the will as about knowledge. Therefore, since God's willing is his very being, it is established that just as being is one and most simple, so also is willing. Likewise, the act of God's will, insofar as through it he necessarily loves himself, is one, adequate to such an object; but it has been shown above that to that act, insofar as it is freely terminated toward creatures, no reality is added; therefore there is in God only one will, or rather one most simple willing; for we have already shown that in God there is no will by way of potency, but only by way of act.

58. That this willing formally includes every perfection simply speaking in the nature of will or willing is also evident. First, from the general reasoning, namely, that the divine being formally includes every perfection simply speaking; but God's willing essentially is God's very being; therefore it follows. Second, more specially and formally, according to our mode of conceiving, that willing is simply infinite in the nature of an act of intellectual appetite; therefore it formally includes whatever perfection can be understood simply speaking in such appetite, and it will eminently include all other perfections of the will that involve some imperfection. From this it can be understood which virtues of the will are properly and formally attributed to God, and in what manner. We use the name of virtue, not as it signifies a habit and quality in us, but as it expresses an internal perfection of the will in the act of loving or willing. This being presupposed, it must be attentively considered whether such a virtue formally includes some imperfection or not; and according to that formal concept in which no imperfection is found, it will be properly

and formally attributed to God, but according to other aspects only metaphorically.

59. What virtues are to be attributed to the divine will. Charity. Hence charity, which is the most powerful virtue of the will, is found most properly and perfectly in the divine will, especially if by the name of charity is signified only love or benevolence toward an intellectual person. For in this way it is evident by natural reason that nothing of imperfection is included in such love as such. Indeed, it is evident that there cannot be will in anyone without love being in him, because love is the first act of the will; but if there is love in God, it is especially of himself; therefore there is in him love of intellectual nature or person; therefore there is charity in him, or rather he is charity itself by essence.

### *Whether Friendship Exists in God*

60. But if by the name of charity friendship properly so called is signified, which is toward another, thus it is not so evident by natural light that there is charity in God with every property. For the theologian can first doubt whether God in himself without the company of creatures has true friendship, which doubt not only could not be defined from natural reason alone, but could not even be raised; but faith being presupposed, it can worthily be asked whether the distinction of persons suffices for true friendship, or whether on account of the unity of will, that is not proper friendship, but something greater than friendship. Which seems more correctly said; but of this elsewhere. Again it can be doubted whether God enters into true friendship with intellectual creatures. For Aristotle seems to deny this, in Ethics VIII, chapter 7; whom theologians contradict, not so much speaking of pure nature or founded on natural reason alone, as founded on the order of grace, which natural reason does not reach. Speaking however of pure nature, Aristotle does not deny that God loves rational persons; indeed sometimes he affirms this, as we have

seen above, especially concerning those devoted to study and dedicated to wisdom. Nor can he deny that he can be loved by them, since this is most evident. I do not speak of love above all things, for perhaps Aristotle or other philosophers have thought nothing about this under this express and formal concept, but I speak precisely of love of God, as he is the first principle and ultimate end of the intellectual creature. Finally, it also seems evident that God wills to be loved by his intellectual creature, whom he himself loves, for this is most honorable and most due. Whether however this mutual love suffices for true friendship or falls short of it on account of the great inequality between God and creature, which Aristotle intends, is a question of little moment and about the use of words and which bears little on the present matter; for that which pertains to the matter is evident by natural light, namely, that God both loves the natural creature to whom he does good and, insofar as it is in him and according to his dignity, confers every duty and benefit of true friendship upon it, or rather that no good can such a creature have which does not proceed from this love; because it cannot have that except from God, at least as first cause; but God does not cause that except by willing; but to will good is to love. By this reasoning it can be concluded proportionally that God loves whatever participates in being from him, according to that text: "You love all things that are" (Wisdom 11:24), because they have being only as derived from God's good pleasure and love; thus therefore it is established that charity, or more generally the perfection of loving, is most properly attributed to the divine will.

### *Whether Moral Virtues Exist in God*

61. But concerning other virtues of the will a philosopher might doubt; for Aristotle, in Ethics X, chapter 8, universally denies such moral virtues to God. But distinction must be made concerning virtues that are toward another or toward oneself, or (which is the

same) concerning virtues that deal with actions or with passions. Concerning some virtues therefore that are about actions toward another, there is no doubt that they are found formally and properly in God. First, this is established concerning liberality, for he wills to communicate his goods to others, not in view of some advantage, for he can neither desire nor expect any; but this is great liberality, as is clear from Aristotle, Ethics IV, chapter 6. Whence St. Thomas elegantly concludes, in Summa contra Gentiles I, chapter 93, with Avicenna that not only is God liberal, but also that he alone is properly liberal. Nor can any imperfection be conceived in the nature of liberality on account of which it would be formally denied to God. For what Aristotle objects is ridiculous; for he says thus: "What acts should we attribute to them (that is, to the gods)? Liberal ones? But to whom will they give? It is absurd moreover if they should even have money[23] or something of the sort"; this (I say) if taken as it sounds is ridiculous, because God not only has to whom to give, but also nothing besides him can exist unless he gives it. And a little below, Aristotle himself says that God confers the greatest benefits, especially on those who love and honor him. Whence St. Thomas there excuses him, saying that he speaks of imperfect and human liberality.

62. Again, in the same proportional manner it can be shown that there is magnificence in God, according to its formal nature, and setting aside the imperfection which it can connote in us. For magnificence deals with the same matter in which liberality deals, as St. Thomas says, Summa Theologica II-II, question 134, article 4, reply to objection 1, and differs only in that magnificence deals with great expenditures or goods to be bestowed; in us however it presupposes a certain imperfection, insofar as great expenditures by comparison to man's resources and the indigence which he can fear, take on the character of an object peculiarly arduous and difficult; but in respect to God no expenditures are arduous and difficult. For there is nothing for him to fear concerning indigence, even if he should make

[23] nummos, 1605 (ed. M. Sonnium), 1960; numeros, ed. Vivès. Cf.

expenditures however great; but setting aside this imperfection, which pertains materially rather than formally to the nature of magnificence as such, this virtue is found in God in the highest perfection.

63. And the same judgment applies to the virtue of mercy; for this virtue inclines to relieving another's misery, but in us it connotes a certain compassion concerning our neighbor's misery and need; hence, as regards this imperfection it cannot be found in God; nevertheless, that imperfection is compared materially to the nature of mercy as such; but formally it expresses the will to relieve another's misery, and thus it exists in God. Indeed, in a certain way it is his proper virtue according to all its perfection, because he alone can relieve all misery and he alone is outside all misery, and otherwise he is supremely good, from which arises the inclination to benefit and assist others.

64. Again, the virtue of truth is properly attributed to the divine will, which also deals with actions that are ordered toward another, namely concerning speech, and inclines to speaking truly or speaking according to mind. It must therefore be presupposed that God can speak to others, namely to intellectual or rational creatures, which is not difficult to believe, even standing in pure natural reason; for to be able to speak to another and manifest one's mind to him according to his capacity is a certain perfection, most fitting to intellectual nature; why therefore would it not befit the divine, and much more perfectly than others? This therefore being presupposed, it is evident that this virtue exists in God; for it is honorable in itself, and the vice contrary to it, which is lying, is so intrinsically evil that it can never be made honorable; therefore this virtue exists in God; indeed, in him alone can it have that supreme perfection, because he alone neither can be deceived, since he is supremely wise, nor deceive, since he is supremely good; and therefore he is not only truthful, but also the first truth itself.

65. And connected with this virtue is another, which is called fidelity, concerning which there is the same reasoning as concerning

the preceding. For it is a virtue inclining to fulfill promises; but God, just as he can speak, so also can promise something; but it especially befits his majesty and authority that he fulfill what he promises. And this follows necessarily from his truth and immutability; for if he is truthful, he cannot promise without the will and purpose of doing what he promises; because moreover he is immutable, he cannot not be constant in that will, and consequently faithful in that promise. These virtues therefore and all similar ones are properly attributed to God, because they include no imperfection. But the reason a priori seems to be that, since they do not deal with passions, but with actions, from this aspect they do not include imperfection, because action, as action, although it does not add perfection to the agent, nevertheless does not express imperfection, but rather is a sign of perfection. On the other hand, all those actions are such that they can be exercised by a superior concerning an inferior, such as speaking, promising, benefiting, giving, etc.; and therefore rectitude in these actions truly and properly befits God.

66. From this it follows first, that if there are virtues that deal with actions including in their formal concept a relation of inferior to superior, these cannot be attributed to God with propriety nor exist in him formally, but only eminently; of this kind are religion, observance and similar ones. And the reason is manifest, because God cannot recognize anyone as superior. And perhaps in this order legal justice should be constituted, as it is a special virtue; for it regards the republic as superior to itself, or its good as something more excellent. Indeed from the same principle it follows that if there is any virtue that regards another as equal, that cannot exist in God formally and properly, because God also has no equal. And hence arises the common doubt about justice, whether it is properly attributed to God. Which Aristotle above absolutely denies: "For they will seem ridiculous (he says) (namely the gods) if they exchange and return deposits, and do other such things." Which reasoning proves well concerning commutative justice most properly taken; for this seems to

include a certain equality of those among whom it is exercised, at least in the mode of ownership, but it does not prove concerning distributive justice; and thus St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles I, chapter 64, denies the former, but affirms that the latter befits God; and Aristotle himself elsewhere attributes just distribution to God, as we have seen above. And indeed this is the office of a superior; whence from this aspect it includes no imperfection, nor from any other. Which is the same concerning vindicative justice formally taken, and insofar as it is like a certain part of distributive justice. Which matter is treated more broadly by theologians, and I have touched upon it in the first volume on the Incarnation, disputation IV, section 5.

67. Second, it is understood from what has been said that all remaining virtues, which deal with passions, or for any other reason include imperfection, are attributed to God not properly, but only metaphorically, such as fortitude, which moderates fear, patience, which moderates sadness, and similar ones; for it is established that such passions or imperfections have no place in God, but through these virtues sometimes is indicated metaphorically either God's power and efficacy in operating, or goodness or good will by which he defers punishment, so that he may have occasion to remit sins, or something similar.

68. Third, it can be understood from what has been said that those virtues which are properly in God are not to be thought of by way of habit, as they are in us, but only by way of ultimate act; for habit is something intermediate between potency and act; where therefore there is not potency, but pure act, virtue ought not and cannot be truly conceived by way of habit, but only by way of pure act. But I speak on the part of the thing conceived; for on the part of the one conceiving, it can happen that these virtues are conceived in God according to some aspect of first act, as if they were habits, in the manner explained above concerning knowledge, for the reasoning is the same. From this the objection which could immediately occur is easily solved; for the formal perfections of these virtues are necessarily in God's will, for

they pertain to his infinite perfection; but the ultimate acts of such virtues are free, since they include or presuppose action toward creatures; therefore, as they are necessary perfections, they are not second acts, but first acts by way of habit. For it is answered that this is the foundation for us to conceive them by way of first act, but in reality they are nothing other than God's necessary being itself, which through itself is most right and most honorable, and a certain actual affection toward all rectitude of all actions which he can exercise, although the exercise of such actions toward external things is free for him, through which exercise no act is added to the divine will, as we have seen in the preceding sections.

69. Fourth, it is easily understood from what has been said in what manner all these perfections, which are conceived and declared by us as many, are in reality one most simple perfection of the divine will, without any actual distinction in reality, because they are nothing other than the essential rectitude of divine willing, just as in our will that radical rectitude or inclination which it has toward justice, or toward mercy, or other virtues, is in itself one without distinction in reality. But if it were so perfect that through the entity of the potency alone it would be as easy and inclined to acts of virtues as it now is through habits of all virtues, then the will through itself would be in first act sufficiently just, merciful, liberal, etc., all of which would not be distinct from the nature of the thing in the will itself, but would express only inadequate concepts of the adequate inclination and perfect disposition which such a will would have toward the honorable good. Ascending therefore to the divine will, it through itself has supreme rectitude in all honesty, not as first act only, but as ultimate, most perfect and most simple act.

70. Finally, it is easy from what has been said to declare in what manner in that one act of the divine will is contained formally and eminently whatever perfection exists in all acts of created will. For among these there are some which according to their abstract nature express perfection simply speaking, and these are found formally in

God, either necessarily, if they are abstracted from free relation to creatures, such as love, joy or pleasure. But if a relation to creatures as existing or future is involved, they can indeed be properly attributed to God, not however from absolute necessity, but freely, such as intention, choice, love of creatures in themselves, joy concerning the salvation of men. And to this pertain many things which theologians dispute concerning antecedent and consequent will, preventing or permitting, of good pleasure or of sign, concerning all of which what they signify and how they are attributed to God properly or metaphorically, it is not the place of the present work to expound, for it exceeds the limits of metaphysics. Only let this be certain, that whenever in the object or mode of such acts no imperfection is included, even if in our mode of conceiving a free relation is involved, nevertheless they are properly and formally attributed to God; for God truly rejoices in our salvation, for example, although (which is wonderful) from that joy no real joy accrues to him, beyond that which he has concerning himself, just as he truly wills and loves our salvation without increase of his act. But truly, when acts of will do not express perfection simply speaking, but mixed with imperfection, then they are not in God formally, but only eminently. And therefore if sometimes they are attributed to him, it must be understood not properly, but by metaphor. Which indeed is manifest in some cases, because their imperfection is known, as in sadness, grief, repentance and similar ones; but in others the imperfection is not so manifest, as in the act of desire and in the act of inefficacious will, which they call velleity, and in the act of hatred and similar ones, concerning which theologians dispute whether they are attributed to God properly or only metaphorically, which to examine particularly concerning individual cases is not part of our undertaking.

## SECTION XVII
## WHAT CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON CONCERNING DIVINE POWER AND ACTION

1. Concerning which power we speak. I assume that our discourse concerns the power of operating externally; for that power which belongs to generating or spirating internally does not fall under natural cognition, as the certain doctrine of theologians holds and as is self-evident. For the effects which God produces outside himself, especially those which belong to the natural order, do not manifest him as triune, but only as one, because they do not have from themselves a necessary connection with the divine relations, but with the divine essence and power. However, the power of generating or spirating includes in some way these relations, and therefore metaphysical consideration does not extend to it, but to that power which is attributed to God absolutely and essentially.

2. That there is true active power in God. Concerning this power, therefore, we can assume many things that have been treated and demonstrated above. The first is that there is true and proper active power in God. This is evident first a posteriori, because it has been shown that besides God no being can exist that is not effected by God; therefore it is necessary that the first being, necessary from itself, be effective of others, since otherwise nothing besides itself could exist. Since therefore it is established that besides God there are many other beings, these evidently show that there is true active power in God. Second, a priori, because this power pertains to perfection and includes no imperfection. In this regard, the difference should be noted between true power for effecting externally, or for understanding and willing: the former is so oriented toward acting that it is in no way oriented toward receiving, because whatever is

effected through it is outside it; but the power proper to understanding and willing cannot be truly active without also being passive. And therefore these powers are not properly in God, but the former is most properly and perfectly so. Conversely, however, the act of understanding and willing is necessarily in God, as expressing perfection simply; yet the action of that active power, as it is properly action toward the external, does not belong to God necessarily, because as such it does not express pure perfection simply. Indeed, perhaps it is not in God himself, but in his effect; or if it is in God, it connotes a free relationship to creatures, by reason of which it does not pertain to the necessary perfection of God.

### *That there is Infinite Power in God*

3. Second, it can also be assumed from what has been said above that this power is simply infinite. This can also be proved in two ways. First a posteriori, from God's action, not so much by reason of the term produced, since it is always finite, as by reason of the mode, namely because he produced this whole machinery of the universe from nothing, which is known to natural light as proven above in disputation XX, where I also judged it more probable that simply infinite power is required for this mode of production. For as regards this part, there does not seem to be such evident demonstration. Second, it is demonstrated a priori, both because the power of a thing is such as its essence is, but it has been proven above that God's essence is simply infinite in the genus of being, therefore also his power will be simply infinite; and also because finite power, insofar as it is limited, is imperfect and can easily and without contradiction be conceived as having another greater than it; but in God neither can there be any imperfection, nor any such perfection that a greater can be conceived in that genus without contradiction; therefore divine power cannot be limited and finite. Nor does anything worthy of explanation occur in these two assertions; for active power pertains to

actuality and not to potentiality, and therefore imports perfection from itself and no imperfection, especially if it be supreme and unlimited, which is sufficiently evident in itself. As regards infinity, this has been sufficiently declared in the attribute of infinity of essence, and we shall add a few points in the following assertion.

*That there is Omnipotence in God*

4. Third, therefore, from what has been said I conclude that it can be proven by natural reason that this power of God is omnipotence, or (which is the same thing) that God is omnipotent. It is proven, first, from the preceding assertion, for simply infinite power can produce every possible effect; but this is the definition of omnipotence; therefore. The minor is established from the terms. The major is proven. First, because simply infinite power is infinite in all the ways in which it can be infinite; it is therefore infinite, not only in its entitative perfection, not only in its mode of acting, but also in its object, insofar as infinity can be or be understood on the part of that object; therefore it includes under its object all possible things, even if they be multiplied or conceived to infinity. Second, because if something is possible and does not fall under the said power, then with respect to that thing such power is finite and limited, and it would be greater and more perfect if it also extended to that thing. Third, because if something is possible, it is possible through some power, for these two are correlatives; therefore, either that power is in God, and we have what we intend, or it is in some other being, and from this it is also necessarily concluded much more and more perfectly to be in the first being, because no other being can have it except as participated from the first; and moreover, because it is a certain perfection; but every perfection is in God in a more eminent way. For just as in God's essence as such is contained every perfection of being, so divine power embraces every perfection or force of acting, formally indeed, insofar as it is pure force of acting not involving any other

imperfection, eminently however according to every other inferior aspect.

5. From this principle theologians have most excellently inferred that whatever secondary causes can do, God can do by his power alone. Because, namely, every force of acting that is in other causes is more perfectly in God, from whom it flows. And because to act as such, if nothing else is mixed in, expresses perfection without imperfection, therefore every force of acting is contained in divine power in a higher mode indeed, but formally and properly; whatever therefore is possible falls under that power; therefore that power is omnipotence. This truth is taught not only by faith, but philosophers have also attained or suspected it: Seneca, in book IV On Benefits, chapters 7 and 8, suggests it; and Cicero, in books II and III On the Nature of the Gods: "There is nothing," he says, "that God cannot accomplish, and indeed without any labor." And the poets frequently call Jupiter omnipotent. Whence, as Vives reports from Porphyry, in book IV On the City, chapter 17, they painted Jupiter holding a scepter in his left hand, but in his right sometimes an eagle, sometimes victory, because all things are subject to him, and there is nothing by which he can be conquered. And thus Seneca, in the cited place, calls his force invincible. Whether Aristotle attained this, I am not certain; for although he attributed infinite power of moving to the first mover, he never nevertheless declared that it has simply infinite power of acting, but at most of moving according to place, and otherwise he seems often to define or restrict divine activity to the order of natural causes, although sometimes he seems to concede something greater to it. He did not therefore sufficiently declare what he thought in this matter.

### *Difficulties Concerning the Preceding Truth*

6. But there remain some things to be explained concerning this and the preceding assertion. The first is in what way it is true that

God is omnipotent, since we deny that many things are possible to him. For thus theologians and the Holy Fathers often speak, when they deny either that God can lie, or make it so that past things have not been. Whence comes that saying of Jerome, epistle 22 to Eustochium: "I will speak boldly: although God can do all things, he cannot raise up a virgin after her fall"; and Augustine has a similar opinion in Against Faustus XXVI, chapter 5. For they speak of a past thing, on the supposition that it is past. For just as God cannot make it so that a thing, while it exists, does not exist, so neither that a past thing has not been past. Nor do theologians alone speak thus, but Paul also: "God is faithful; he cannot deny himself," II Timothy 2.

7. Second, there is a difficulty in reconciling this and the preceding assertion; for if God can do everything possible, therefore he can exhaust his power by effecting whatever is possible to him; for if it were possible and could not actually be done by him, he would not be omnipotent. But if God's power were to do all things possible to him, by this very fact it would be finite.

8. Third, it follows from what has been said that, whatever creature being made, God can make a better one, indeed he can even make an infinitely perfect creature; for if he cannot do this latter, he is not omnipotent; much less will he be omnipotent if he cannot do the former; indeed he will not even have infinite power, because it would be terminated at some finite effect which he could produce, and no greater. But the consequent seems false in both parts; for if God could make an infinitely perfect creature, he could make another God; but if he could always make a better creature, he could never make anything optimal, which otherwise contradicts his omnipotence. Whence such contradiction seems to be involved in these conclusions that, when we wish to defend the infinity of power on one hand, we seem to diminish omnipotence on the other.

9. Fourth, if God's omnipotence can be known by natural light, it follows that supernatural mysteries can also be known by the light of nature to be possible, such as, for example, a man to be

conceived from a woman without the work of a man, or to be born from a virgin, or to rise after death, and similar things. The consequence is proven, because if once a man persuades himself that God is omnipotent, he will most easily gather that these and similar things can be done by him. But the consequent seems to detract greatly from the dignity of our faith, which is entirely supernatural, and therefore its mysteries cannot be acquired without the aid of grace.

### *Concerning the Object of Omnipotence*
### *Regarding the Difficulties Posed*

10. In these objections what is chiefly sought to be explained is this: what is understood by "everything possible," when we say that God's power extends to everything possible, and therefore is omnipotence; for in these very words a circle seems to be committed, or the same explained by the same. Because "possible" is denominated from power; but here the denomination is not taken from passive power, because none is presupposed to God's active power; it is therefore taken from active power, and no other than that of God himself, because none is prior. Thus therefore that God's power extends to everything possible will be nothing other than that he can do what is denominated possible by that power. Therefore the same is explained by the same, and it remains equally obscure what is that which is possible to God. And according to that explanation, even if someone denied that God can create anything else besides this universe, he could nonetheless say that God is omnipotent, because he can do everything possible, in that nothing besides this universe is denominated possible by his power. For this reason therefore theologians rightly, to declare God's omnipotence and its adequate object, say that whatever does not involve contradiction is possible through God's omnipotence. Thus teaches St. Thomas, I, q. 25, a. 3, and I Contra Gentiles, c. 25; Alexander of Hales, I p., q. 20; and the

rest, In I, dist. 34; Albert, a. 4 and 6; Capreolus, Gregory, and Durandus, q. 1; Richard, q. 3 and 4; Scotus, dist. 44. And the reason can be taken from what has been said; for "possible" can be said in two ways. First, positively, and thus it is denominated from power, and therefore cannot be taken thus in the present case, as the argument made proves. Second, through non-repugnance; it will therefore necessarily be taken in this way in the present case; therefore everything that does not involve repugnance is possible with respect to God's omnipotence. And thus no principle is begged, but the infinite power or capacity (so to speak) of that power is explained, such that whatever does not repugnate from itself is possible through it. But it is established that what involves contradiction repugnates maximally; for nothing repugnates being more than non-being, and therefore what involves contradiction is outside the latitude of being.

11. Objection. You will say that from this it is rightly gathered that what involves contradiction is not possible, nor does it pertain to God's omnipotence that he can do it; but it does not follow conversely that everything that does not involve contradiction is possible, or does not repugnate from itself; for there can be other modes of repugnance besides contradiction. Whence Soto, book III Physics, q. 4, says that not only those things that imply contradiction are impossible from themselves, but also some things that, when proposed to the natural light of the intellect, immediately appear so repugnant that the intellect dissents and recoils, because what repugnates the natural light of the intellect is rightly said to repugnate by its nature. And he confirms, first, that we confess many things to be impossible to God that do not present such open contradiction, such as that the Son in the divine persons should generate, or that a man should be a horse. Clearer examples are that God cannot lie, or not fulfill a promise. He confirms, second, from that word of the Angel, Luke 1: "No word will be impossible with God"; for "word" signifies what can be conceived by the mind as doable and not repugnant.

12. True response. But it must be said, with St. Thomas and all the cited theologians, that only what actually involves implication is truly repugnant from itself, and therefore only that is outside the object of divine omnipotence. What chiefly proves this is the reason made above, because just as only that is possible which does not involve anything repugnant to the nature of created being, so only that is impossible which involves something destructive of the nature of being, because what is not of this kind is not excluded from the nature of being by virtue of its intrinsic nature, and therefore is not impossible from itself. If therefore it were impossible, it would be only from defect of extrinsic power, which is contrary to God's infinity and omnipotence. Therefore everything that from its nature does not involve anything repugnant to the nature of being falls under God's omnipotence; but whatever does not involve contradiction does not include anything repugnant to the nature of being, because nothing repugnates being as such except non-being. For although one being may repugnate another, they do not repugnate insofar as they are beings, nor does any of them include anything repugnant to the nature of being, but only to such a being repugnant to itself. Indeed, where no contradiction intervenes, there is no true repugnance, and therefore contradiction is said to be the first opposition, because it is included in all others; for privation manifestly includes negation of the opposed form; but relatives or contraries are repugnant insofar as one implies the negation of the other, and the same is true of every form that is said to repugnate another. But if through divine power they can be prevented from one excluding the other, then they are not repugnant, but rather are brought into harmony. Therefore only that is true repugnance in a thing which involves contradiction; therefore, conversely, what does not involve contradiction is not repugnant or impossible from itself; therefore it cannot be impossible to God either, otherwise this would be from a defect of his power, not from repugnance of the thing.

13. Furthermore, the natural light of our intellect cannot be the rule of what is possible or repugnant to God's omnipotence; otherwise, many things would have to be judged truly repugnant which we believe with certain faith do not repugnate. For what presents a greater appearance of repugnance, viewed by natural light alone, than that three things should be one and the same most simple thing, and that God the Father should generate God the Son really distinct from himself, who nevertheless are numerically one and the most simple God? The same is true of the mystery of the Incarnation and the Eucharist, which, if proposed to the intellect destitute of the light of faith and the aid of grace, immediately recoils and cannot conceive them as non-repugnant. But if someone should say that these mysteries are not against reason and nature, but above them, I respond that we learn this very thing with the aid of faith, and the same must be applied to any work not involving contradiction. For even if our intellect recoils and by its powers cannot conceive how that can be done, it nevertheless does not have sufficient foundation to judge that to be impossible to God, or to be against, but above reason or nature. For it is evident to us that natural things themselves are imperfectly conceived by us, and therefore it is also evident that our natural light cannot be the rule of those things which in reality include or do not include true repugnance. It is indeed true that sometimes we do not find in some work any definite, certain and evident implication of contradiction, but there are so many signs of repugnance, and our intellect finds so many inconveniences in such a work, that it probably believes it to be impossible, not however because it judges this impossibility to be without implication of contradiction that exists in reality, but rather because it conjectures that it lies hidden there and is in some way manifested by many indications.

14. But if perhaps Soto wished to signify this very thing, he did not sufficiently declare the matter itself or his mind. Nor is his reason sufficient, for many things seem to repugnate according to our natural reason which truly and actually do not repugnate. But the

examples brought forward in the first confirmation rather confirm the matter; for what implies clearer contradiction than that a man should be a horse? For he would be simultaneously rational and non-rational. But that in the Trinity there can be only one Son is not from things and objects that pertain to God's omnipotence, but to God's very being, and in this too there is implication of contradiction, although perhaps, because we do not comprehend the mystery of the Trinity, we do not exactly understand the proper cause of that repugnance, but we believe it to exist because it repugnates that the Word be adequate and be multiplied. Whence, if the Word could generate, it would follow that it is not adequate to the divine intellect, and consequently is not the divine Word. Similarly, if God could lie, he would be the first truth, because he is God, and would not be the first truth, because he is mendacious, just as, if he could sin, he would be the supreme good and the first rule of honesty, because he is God, and would not be the first rule, because he is defectible. And similarly, if he could not fulfill a promise, he would be either mendacious or changeable, and thus not God. Whence Paul indicated this implication when he said: "He cannot deny himself." Explaining this, Dionysius, chapter 8 On the Divine Names, says: "To deny oneself is to fall from truth; but since God is truth itself, to fall from truth would be to fall from God's being," or (to speak more clearly) to deny oneself is to profess by deed that one is not God; therefore this impossibility is always founded in true repugnance and implication of contradiction. Nor, finally, are those words of the Angel Gabriel foreign to this sense; for, to omit that "word" there can be taken for God's saying or promise, so that the sense is: "It will not be impossible for God to do whatever he has promised or said he will do"; likewise it can be taken absolutely for any thing, which is the usual phrase of Scripture; even if it refers to a word or concept of the mind, it should not be limited to the human intellect naturally conceiving and judging, but should be taken absolutely of any intellect truly conceiving a thing as it is possible or not repugnant from itself.

### *A Response to the First Difficulty*

15. From this explanation, therefore, the difficulties touched upon will be easily resolved. For to the first it is responded that, properly speaking, there is nothing that God cannot do; for if anything is said that he cannot do, that is impossible from itself, and thus is not something contained in the latitude of being, not only actual but not even possible. Whence Ambrose, book VI, epistle 37: "What," he says, "is impossible to God? Not what is difficult for power, but what is contrary to his nature. That impossibility belongs not to weakness, but to power and majesty." And Anselm, in the Proslogion, chapter 7, similarly says: "To be able to do those things that repugnate is not power, but impotence." And Augustine, declaring this more, in Against Faustus XXVI, chapter 5, says that God, who is supreme truth, cannot make it so that things that are true should be false; and in City of God XV, chapter 15: "It is," he says, "great power not to be able to lie." Therefore, that God is said not to be able to do certain things that are impossible from themselves is not contrary to his omnipotence, just as that God does not know those things that are false is not contrary to his omniscience; indeed, because he has exact knowledge of all things, he cannot know what is false.

### *Whether God can Simultaneously do All Things that He can Do*

16. To the second, perhaps someone might admit that God can simultaneously do all possible things, and deny that this is contrary to the infinity of power, because those things would be infinite. But this opinion is false. First, because it is more probable that an actual infinite cannot exist; then, because the infinity of power regards not only being able to do simultaneously any possible thing, but also not being able to be exhausted (so to speak), but being able

always to effect, however many or great things it may have effected previously. Indeed, there is clear repugnance that power should remain whole and be sufficient from itself without dependence on another, or on matter from which it effects, and that it can now effect nothing. To the argument therefore it is responded that God can do everything possible can be understood in two ways: in one way, divisively or individually, designating any thing, or even a finite multitude of possible things, and thus it is simply true without any distinction. Second, it can be understood collectively, and thus it is neither necessary nor true. Not necessary indeed, because for it to be truly said that God can do all those things, it suffices that any of them compared to divine power can by virtue of that power be so constituted in reality as it is said to be possible. But it is not necessary that he can do any of those simultaneously with all the others, because in this repugnance can be involved which is not involved in the production of individual things. And therefore not only is this not necessary, but it is not even true.

17. But if you insist because the whole collection of possible things is truly conceived as possible; therefore that conception or its object is one of those words of which it was said: "No word will be impossible with God," it is responded in the same way that that collection is possible according to any thing contained in it, which suffices for God to have absolute power over that whole collection; but that collection is not so possible that the whole simultaneously, or any thing simultaneously with any others whatever can be made, for in this special repugnance can be involved. A common example is in the division of a continuum; for all its divisions are possible to God, or even to an angel, if taken divisively; but collectively it is not possible that all those divisions be posited in reality, neither successively, because they will never be finished, nor simultaneously, because it implies that a continuum be actually divided into every one of its parts. Just as also God has the power either of conserving or destroying a thing that he created, yet he cannot simultaneously effect

both. Therefore that collection of all possible things, because it is infinite in potency and as it were the adequate object of infinite power, cannot be posited whole simultaneously in act.

### *On the Power of Making the Infinite, or Infinitely*

18. In the third argument, two extremes must be avoided. One is that of those who admit that it pertains to God's omnipotence that He can make an infinite thing. If this is understood concerning the infinite in essence simply and absolutely, it is evidently false; because, as we showed above, it belongs to the essence of infinite nature that it be independent, and dependence is an imperfection repugnant to infinity simply speaking. And from this very omnipotence which we are treating, an evident argument can be taken; for omnipotence belongs to the nature of infinity simply speaking; therefore, if God were to make a creature infinite simply speaking, He would make an omnipotent creature; but this is repugnant in many ways. First, because such a creature would be able to produce itself, since it belongs to the nature of the omnipotent that it can act upon everything makeable; but that creature would be makeable, as is supposed. Second, because it could resist God, since it would be of equal power with Him; whence, if it wished to remain in being, it would necessarily remain, whatever God might will; for it belongs to the nature of the omnipotent that whatever it wills, it can do, as Augustine says in Enchiridion, chapter 96; therefore, if a creature is omnipotent and wills to exist, it achieves what it wills. Whence, on the contrary, it would result that God would not be omnipotent, because willing that such a creature should not exist, He could be resisted so that He would not achieve this. But if there is no discussion about the infinite in essence, but in extension, or magnitude, or multitude, thus the matter is more controversial, whether such an infinite can be made or not; but for the present it

does not matter, for it is certain that it does not pertain absolutely and formally to God's omnipotence that He can make such an infinite, but only under this condition: if that thing is possible of itself or does not involve repugnance. But it is more probably believed that such infinity is repugnant to being in act, as St. Thomas noted in I, q. 7, a. 3 and 4, and Quodl. IX, a. 1, especially toward the end. But we leave this controversy to the philosophers.

19. The other extreme to be avoided is that of certain theologians who said that divine power cannot always make more or better species of things, but that some creatable species can be known by God Himself to be so perfect that God cannot make a more perfect one. This was the view of Durandus in I, dist. 44, q. 2 and 3; and Aureolus was of the same opinion, as Capreolus reports in the same place. Nor does Scotus seem to disagree in III, dist. 13, q. 1. This is founded only on the fact that there cannot be an infinite progression in specific perfections. They persuade this with very weak arguments, which I therefore omit, since they have been sufficiently touched upon in the third argument, to which we now respond. The contrary opinion, therefore, is far more true, which St. Thomas taught in I, q. 25, a. 6. For the preceding opinion greatly derogates from God's omnipotence, because, given any created substance however perfect, if God cannot make a better one, this could not be from the repugnance of the thing; for since that substance is finite and imperfectly participates in divine being, no repugnance is involved on the part of the thing in there being another creatable substance more perfect and more participating in divine being; therefore, if that cannot be made, it will be only from a defect of divine power. And I confirm this, for if this were true, by consequent reasoning it could be said that God cannot create other species of things besides those which He produced, which Durandus considers probable; but truly all who think correctly condemn this as error in Peter Abelard, Wycliffe and other heretics, that they said God cannot do other things than He has done. It is true that they spoke both of species and of individuals, and

of absolutely all works; which is much more injurious to God, and evidently false, for man can do many things which he does not do, even good things, and otherwise than he does; why not God? For this power does not conflict with His immutability, as we showed above. Read St. Thomas, I, q. 25, a. 6; Hugh of St. Victor, lib. I de Sacramentis, p. II, c. ult.; Augustine, XXIII de Trinitate, c. 19. But, speaking even of species alone, that consequence is intolerable, not to say erroneous. For what reason can be given why God cannot make an angel of better nature than Michael or Lucifer, when in the concept of a more perfect angel no repugnance is involved, which would either destroy the nature of the supreme angel already produced, or destroy the nature of being in that superior nature, which is conceived as possible; therefore no reason for such repugnance or implication can be shown on the part of the thing itself, whence it is necessary that such impotence be ascribed to God. It is furthermore confirmed and declared, because every intellectual substance is in the image of God, and none is a perfect image of Him, but is infinitely distant; therefore, whatever is made, however perfect it may seem in itself, another can be made more similar to God, and more purely and simply understanding. And the same argument could be made concerning species of other grades, insofar as they participate in divine being and are vestiges of it.

20. It follows that the foundation of those authors is very weak; for no repugnance is involved in proceeding infinitely in possible species. For it is established that in the species of numbers one can proceed infinitely, just as in the divisions of the continuum. Likewise in the magnitude of a possible body; for what Catholic would dare to say that there can be a finite body of such magnitude that God cannot make a greater one? But no greater inconvenience follows from infinite progression in possible species than in these things. For what they infer, namely, that in that multitude of possible species there must be given one supreme species of all, which eminently contains the perfections of all the others, and consequently is infinite simply speaking, this (I say) fails in many ways. First,

because it is not necessary that a species superior to others eminently contain the inferior ones; indeed, this rarely happens, except in equivocal causes with respect to their effects. Second, because it is also not necessary that a species which contains infinite ones under itself be infinite simply speaking, but it suffices that it be of another order and nature, as was declared above when treating the formal cause. Third (and more to the point of what we are treating), because that consequence not only does not follow, but even the opposite necessarily follows from infinite progression. For, whenever one proceeds infinitely, one cannot arrive at a supreme term, otherwise one would reach a terminus, which is a contradiction in terms. Therefore, in the whole collection of possible species, which God has most present to Himself, He knows none more perfect than all the others; nor is this inconvenient, because there is none; just as He also does not know the greatest part of the continuum, because there is none. That progression of possible species, therefore, does not have an intrinsic terminus (so to speak), but an extrinsic one, namely God Himself, who knows that He cannot create Himself or anything equal to Himself, but can create anything less perfect; which is not something of determinate perfection, but is a certain infinite collection syncategorematically (as they say), in which no supreme terminus is given. From which it also follows, what we said above, that the whole collection cannot be produced simultaneously, nor even successively exhausted.

21. Certain notable points concerning the preceding. However, it must be noted, first, that all these things are to be understood about species, not about grades or orders of things, for grades are like certain heads or classes to which we reduce by intellect all species of things, according to various agreements or operations; and therefore it is not inconvenient that these grades be finite. And thus we distinguish four grades of beings: those merely existing or inanimate, vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual; in which there can also be given a supreme possible grade, because, according to generic

or confused reasoning, it is not inconvenient that there be given a supreme agreement or likeness to God which can exist in some order of creatures, as we shall say again below, when treating created intelligences. But it is otherwise with ultimate species, because they have determinate and indivisible essences, and therefore it cannot happen that there be given some created species having the supreme perfection which can exist in a created substance.

22. Second, it is to be observed that the doctrine given is chiefly to be understood about species of substances, and thence it follows that it also holds true in accidents connatural to such substances, because they are commensurate with them. Whence, remaining within natural reason alone, nothing would need to be added, because natural reason does not know other accidents besides those which are connatural to substances, under which I comprehend all things that can be made through natural causes. But theology, besides these, acknowledges the order of sanctifying grace, which extends even to the beatific vision; which order is without doubt the supreme of all possible orders among accidental perfections. And in that order perhaps there can be given some supremely perfect species among all possible species of accidents, because it is a certain supreme participation of the divine nature, than which none can be understood as essentially greater, although according to intensity it can receive more and less. Again, beyond this order of accidental grace, theologians acknowledge another superior order, which they call the grace of union, in which there is given a certain work than which God cannot make a greater, because through it God communicates not only something created, but also Himself in a substantial manner. These things must be explained more broadly in theology.

23. From this, however, a certain response can be taken to the inconvenience which was inferred in that third argument, namely, that God can never make anything best; for the consequence is denied; for God can make God-man, which is the best. But because this response is theological, it is therefore answered that God always makes the best

according to essence, comparison being made to the thing which He makes and to its proper and perfect exemplar; but according to accidental perfection He does not always make the best, but as it pleases Him. But in comparison to His power, He never makes the best simply speaking, indeed He cannot even make it, excluding the hypostatic union; which is so far from derogating from His omnipotence, that it rather necessarily follows from it, as has been declared. And on account of this it is also necessary that divine power be optimal in its mode of acting, namely, through intellect and free will, so that by His choice He can make what He wills; otherwise He could operate nothing determinately, which has also been touched upon above.

### *How God's Omnipotence May Be Demonstrated by Reason*

24. In the fourth argument it is asked whether divine omnipotence, as we have declared it, can be known by natural reason; for some theologians absolutely deny this: Scotus, Gabriel, and others, in I, dist. 42. They rely on certain foundations disapproved by us above, namely, because it is not evident by natural reason that God immediately concurs in all effects of secondary causes. But this is both irrelevant, because we are not now treating whether He acts, but whether He can act; and it is false, as was seen above, in disputation XXII on causes. They also argue because it cannot be proved by natural reason that God can create. Also because, according to natural principles, God acts necessarily, which is repugnant to omnipotence. But both assumptions are false. The things we touched upon in the fourth argument have greater difficulty, because it cannot be known by natural reason that God can invert the order of natural causes, or act without them in anything which ought to be done through them according to the natural order; and much less can it know that other mysteries surpassing nature are possible through divine power.

25. I respond, nevertheless, that we can speak of God's omnipotence in two ways, namely, formally only, or both formally and materially. To know God's omnipotence formally, I call knowing it according to its precise formal nature, namely, insofar as it is a power having of itself efficacy for everything possible or what does not of itself involve repugnance. But to know it materially will be to know distinctly that nature as applied to individual effects which can be made through God's omnipotence. In the former way I more truly think that God can be known by natural reason to be omnipotent. For the reasons made above seem to demonstrate this truth sufficiently, and yet all proceed from natural principles alone. And others can be seen in St. Thomas, II cont. Gent., c. 22 and following. Aristotle seems to have touched this truth in this sense, in VI Ethics, c. 2, approving Agathon's verses: "This alone even God Himself seems to lack, to make undone what has been done and accomplished." In which opinion he seems to confess that God can do everything that is not repugnant; indeed, he seems to except only one impossible thing, namely, to make past things not to have happened; nevertheless, under that we can understand all things that involve a similar contradiction. And thus St. Thomas interprets Aristotle's opinion there, confirming it by the reason touched above, that God's power is most universal, having as its adequate object being insofar as it is being; and therefore only that is withdrawn from it which is repugnant to the nature of being; such is only that which implies contradiction. But more about Aristotle's opinion below.

26. But in the latter way divine omnipotence cannot be known by natural reason, as the reason given correctly proves. Nor should this seem strange, since even after the revelation of faith we doubt about many works or effects whether they are such that it would be repugnant for them to be made through God's absolute power; and (what is more worthy of admiration) even believing that certain supernatural mysteries have been done by God, we still doubt whether other things not very dissimilar, and sometimes lesser, can be made.

As, believing the mystery of the Eucharist, there are those who deny that God can constitute the same body in two places in a proper quantitative way; and so concerning other things. Therefore, with much greater reason, natural light, destitute of faith's aid, even if it achieves that God is omnipotent, will very easily err in particular cases, believing many things to be impossible which really are not. But it will be a material error, that is, not from false estimation of the limitation of divine power, but from the fact that in the object repugnance is thought to exist where there is none.

27. In this there is a great difference between natural ingenuity taken by itself or illuminated by faith, for a double reason. First, because through faith itself we believe many things to have been done by God which, destitute of faith, we would without doubt think to be impossible, especially the mystery of the Incarnation and Eucharist, and those things annexed to them. Second, because, illuminated by faith concerning certain mysteries, our natural light itself is as it were concomitantly helped and strengthened to better conceive and penetrate natural principles themselves, and therefore understand many things to be possible to God which by itself alone it could not have conceived. And the reason a priori is that natural light imperfectly conceives the natures and properties of things, and what properly pertains to their essences and is inseparable from them, but what is only annexed and conjoined to essences. As, for example, natural reason by itself alone does not comprehend the essence of accident, and therefore perhaps would think that an accident cannot be conserved without a subject, because it would think that actual union and dependence on a subject is essential to it; but illuminated by faith, we acknowledge that actual union is not the essence of accident, but something annexed to essence, and therefore can be separated. But because we do not yet believe that a similar separation of matter from form has been made, many still doubt, or even believe its dependence on form to be altogether essential, and therefore that it cannot be conserved separated from it; although those who

philosophize better from things believed do not doubt that these and much greater works are possible to God.

28. From these things, therefore, it is easy to respond to what is inferred in the fourth objection, by denying that all the supernatural mysteries enumerated there can be known by natural light alone to be possible; for they could easily be thought to involve of themselves repugnance and contradiction. As, for example, virgin birth, with virginity remaining intact, would be believed repugnant, because it would follow that quantified bodies are not quantified inasmuch as they penetrate each other in the same place; which appears so difficult to human intellect that even after faith's illumination Durandus thought it impossible for two bodies to penetrate each other in the same place, but that the Virgin's birth was done otherwise, namely by leaping to a distant place, without passage through the medium, in which indeed he erred; nevertheless his error indicates the difficulty of the mystery and how distant it is from the natural light of human ingenuity. And this doctrine can be accommodated to other mysteries and examples adduced, although perhaps not to all.

## *Whether it Can be Proven by Reason that God can Operate Something Above Nature*

29. Furthermore, it can still be inquired whether, at least in general, it can be known by the light of nature that God can do something supernatural or beyond the natures of things. This question is very broad and largely theological; therefore, to resolve it briefly in proper metaphysical terms, let us presuppose the distinction of theologians, who say that some things are supernatural as to substance, that is, both in becoming and in being, while others are supernatural as to mode, that is, only in becoming. Of the first kind are principally all qualities that cannot be connatural to any creature, such as grace, the light of glory, etc. Then, all modes of being that in fact cannot be connatural to the things to which they are communicated,

such as the hypostatic union, the mode of Christ's body existing in the Eucharist. And concerning all these things, I judge it certain that it cannot be known by the light of nature that God's omnipotence extends to them; this is proven a fortiori by all that has been said in this response to the fourth objection. Hence, if human ingenuity were to reason by the light of nature alone, it would either never fall upon such questions about the possibility of these mysteries, because it would not even arrive at apprehensive knowledge of them; or certainly, if by hearing something or by some other chance it should encounter them, it would think there is repugnance and contradiction in them, or at most, if someone were exceedingly prudent and wise, he would understand that he cannot make a judgment about such things. For in nature there are no principles that directly show there is no repugnance in these things; nor are there any that sufficiently show repugnance.

30. In the second order are effects that in their term or actual being are natural, but are produced by God in a preternatural mode, such as giving sight to the blind; and in this order is the resurrection of the dead taken precisely as regards natural life, and the generation of a human being from a woman without the work of a man. And in these we must still observe that, in that supernatural mode of producing such effects, sometimes there is nothing else except that they are done by divine power and command alone, but sometimes there is added some other mode that otherwise surpasses the natures of created things, such as that God should raise a man by a human voice, or that through water, for example, he should effect something in the soul, or that through fire he should torment a spirit. And, as regards this latter mode, I also judge it certain that such a supernatural mode cannot be known as possible by the light of nature; because, although with respect to the term it is only supernatural in becoming, nevertheless, with respect to the action itself it is so supernatural that such action cannot in any way be connatural to a creature, or to the proximate principle from which it proceeds. But whatever is of this kind cannot

be known as possible by the light of nature alone, for the same reason that other things supernatural as to substance cannot be known, because that action according to its nature and species can be called supernatural as to substance.

31. Doubt concerning things supernatural only as to the mode in which they occur. Opinion of some. Opinion of others. Therefore, the entire question is reduced to those effects that are natural in themselves and are done by God only in an extraordinary mode. These effects are still of two kinds: some that could be done by the course of natural causes, such as, for example, the generation of man, the production of light, rain, wind, etc. Others are those that can no longer be done by the course of natural causes, such as the illumination of the blind, the resurrection of the dead, etc. Concerning the former, Ockham, Scotus, and others above particularly dispute the question. And in that sense they define that God's omnipotence cannot be naturally known, that is, that God can by himself alone produce these effects without the intervention of secondary causes. They would say this a fortiori of the latter effects, and, as I said, they are principally founded on the fact that, according to philosophy, God acts from necessity of nature. This foundation has been overturned by us. But indeed Soncinas, in book XII of the Metaphysics, question 18, uses a distinction; for he says that divine power can be considered either in divided sense or in composite sense. The divided sense, as far as can be gathered from him, is a consideration of divine power according to itself and before every determination; but the composite sense is if that power is considered as already determined by necessity of nature to producing this universe and this connection of causes. In the former way he says that God can by himself produce these effects without secondary causes, and this can be known by natural reason. Indeed, he adds that Aristotle knew this, which he does not prove by any testimony of his. But the reasons he adduces are chiefly founded on the infinity of divine power. And indeed, supposing the infinity of such power taken absolutely, as has been proven by us, the inference is

excellent, which we have deduced and declared above in various ways. But whether Aristotle knew the infinity of divine power in that sense is not sufficiently clear to me; yet I certainly know this, that he did not sufficiently prove it, as has been seen above.

32. But in the latter mode Soncinas denies, according to the opinion of the Philosopher, that God can change the order and connection of natural causes, or do anything except through them; because divine power has already been naturally determined to producing this order of things and causes, which it cannot change unless it itself is changed. Hence Aristotle, in Metaphysics II, text 8, says this order of causes is essential or immutable. And this doctrine can be explained from another that theologians hand down, distinguishing God's power into ordinary and absolute, as is found in St. Thomas, I, question 25, article 5, ad 1. They call absolute power the power of God according to itself, without any other supposition or determination of will, and without any relation to the natures of things or other causes. But ordinary power is explained in two ways: the first is that ordinary power is called that same power of God insofar as it has joined to it the knowledge and will by which God has decreed to make these effects and not others, of whatever order they may be, that is, whether natural or supernatural. In another way and more commonly, ordinary power is called that same power of God insofar as it operates according to the common laws and causes that it has established in the universe. And according to this latter explanation, God can do many things according to ordinary power that he never does; according to the former, however, those things alone will be said to be able to be done according to ordinary power that he is going to do at some time. And according to that opposition, ordinary power includes the composite sense that Soncinas spoke of, but absolute power includes the divided sense. Hence it is the same as if it were said that it is known by natural reason that God can immediately and by himself alone make those effects by absolute power, but not by ordinary power, that is, which is to be reduced to act at some time.

33. The author's opinion. Nevertheless, this distinction of Soncinas is not approved by me, because it is entirely founded on the fact that God acts from necessity of nature and that he cannot change the order of natural causes in any effect unless he himself is changed in himself; but both of these are false and contrary to natural reason, whatever may be about the mind of Aristotle, as has been seen above. Then, in those two members, as they are explained by the said author, such open repugnance is found that they can in no way be persuaded simultaneously by natural reason, and it is almost incredible that Aristotle sensed both simultaneously. For if God's power, considered according to itself, is capable of these effects and others, and of operating with these causes and without them, in what way can it be determined by its nature to these effects and not others, and to acting through these causes and not in another way? Truly this is a contradiction, for power of itself is inclined and indifferent to all these effects. Also, because if it determines itself to doing these and not those, such power to other effects is superfluous and impertinent with intrinsic necessity and determination to never doing those. Hence this composite sense is far different from that which St. Thomas, in the cited place, suggests, explaining ordinary power. For this composite sense is said to be through determination intrinsic to the power itself and entirely necessary and connatural, and therefore this composite sense destroys the divided sense, because such determination truly is nothing other than a limitation of such power to these effects alone. But the other composite sense is through free determination of the will, which very well admits absolute power to something else, because God could simply not determine his power to these effects, but to others, although in a determination once made he perseveres immutably, and therefore in the composite sense cannot operate otherwise.

34. Therefore I think it should be said that it can be known by natural reason that God is absolutely capable of making by his power alone all the effects that he works through secondary causes, insofar as

pure efficiency intervenes or is considered in them. I say this because, if another kind of formal or material causality is joined from elsewhere, on that account it may be unknown to the natural light whether such an effect can be made without a secondary cause, on account of the imperfection that such causes include, and because they are more intrinsic, and therefore it is more obscure and more beyond nature that they be supplied by another kind of cause. Examples of this thing can be seen in vital acts and in some proper passions that are very intrinsic and similar. Setting these aside, standing in pure efficiency, I think it evident that God can both change the order of natural causes and produce their effects without them. The first is clear from God's freedom, by whose will all things were made and are conserved; and both are known by the light of nature. Hence, just as from eternity he established to make things at such a time, and therefore does this without change in himself, so he could have established to conserve them only up to such a time, and as it pleased him; therefore without change in himself he can absolutely change this order. And this is what Augustine said, in book XXVI Against Faustus, chapter 3, and from him St. Thomas, I, question 105, article 5: that divine power is not subject to the order of causes, but rather has it subject to itself. This saying was not only believed, but is also evident by natural reason, because this pertains to God's perfect dominion; which necessarily follows from God's infinite perfection and omnipotence joined with freedom. The second is also excellently proven from the infinity of God's omnipotence, and from the reason treated above, that the complete power of effecting with respect to any effect expresses perfection simply, because to effect as such has no admixed imperfection, and therefore is found formally in God, and not only eminently or remotely. Add that against this truth and this demonstration there is no natural reason, even apparent, that proves this to be impossible.

35. Hence I further say that it can be known by natural reason that God is capable of producing effects natural in themselves, which

according to their species could be made by natural causes, although in the individual they are in that state in which they could no longer be made by such causes, such as the resurrection of the dead, taken precisely as regards nature and excluding the gifts of grace, about which I have spoken extensively in volume II of part III, disputation XLIV, section 8. And the reason briefly is that in this effect there is no trace of repugnance or contradiction, nor even in the action itself; for although it is not owed to nature nor can it follow from the order of natural causes, and in this respect is called supernatural, nevertheless, with respect to divine omnipotence, it is as proportioned to it as creation, and on the part of the term it requires no other power besides non-repugnance, for by the very fact that a thing does not involve repugnance, it is apt to depend on God through any action consonant with divine power. This principle is very noteworthy, and becomes evident from what has been said about God's omnipotence and its object; for all those things are sufficiently founded in natural principles. And from them it evidently follows that, if the thing that is made is natural, as is here supposed, and in the action or mode by which it is said to be made by God alone there intervenes no special repugnance and contradiction, God can effect it in such a way, whether such action be resurrection, or illumination of the blind, or any other similar thing.

36. Hence I again add that it can be known by natural reason that God is capable of producing other effects besides those that could be produced by the natural causes of this universe, both according to species and according to individuals. This is proven from the principles demonstrated above; for it has been shown that God can create; also, that his power is simply infinite, even in the breadth of its object; also, that he operates freely. But from these principles it evidently follows that he can make other things besides those that are in the universe and that are contained in the power of its causes. And thus it happens that even that distinction of God's power into absolute and ordinary has a place within the limits of natural reason. For

although natural reason cannot know the entire breadth (so to speak) of absolute power, as has been seen above, nevertheless it knows that God's power of itself extends to more things than he actually works or has decreed to work, or than he can work through the natural causes of the universe. It also knows that this limitation (so to speak) or determination of divine absolute power to the mode of operating according to ordinary power does not belong to God from necessity of nature, but from the choice of his will. From which it can further reason that God can sometimes operate beyond ordinary power in fact, speaking of ordinary power in the second sense explained above, that is, not as it includes the composite sense of divine determination, but as it expresses the mode of operating through natural causes and according to their laws. For God can have decreed from eternity to operate otherwise at times. This power is necessarily gathered from the principles posited, although that he sometimes operates thus cannot be sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason. But when we say (which we want noted once for all this matter) that all these things can be known by natural reason, we speak insofar as it is on the part of the object and of natural principles and truths that are contained in them, especially taken individually concerning each of them; for on the part of the subject, that is, of man himself, and from the difficulty and slowness with which he philosophizes about these things, and from the impediments he suffers in investigating and finding these truths, he often fails in understanding them, and, although he can attain individual ones, nevertheless not all without special grace from God. Hence it also happens that, now illuminated or strengthened by the light of faith, we understand many of these truths as contained in natural principles, which perhaps we would not attain if we were philosophizing in pure natural reason. For it is clear that this has happened even to very acute philosophers lacking the light of faith.

*How Power is Distinguished from*
*Knowledge & Will in God*

37. Fourth, it must be said principally that this divine power is nothing other in reality than the divine essence, knowledge, and will itself, but is distinguished from them by reason. This assertion as to its first part is evident from what has been said above; for it has been shown that in God there is no accident, nor any composition in reality itself; therefore his power cannot be his accident, nor be distinguished from him in reality; otherwise, since it is in him, it would make a composition with him. From which it happens that in reality it is also not something distinct from knowledge and will, since his knowledge and will are nothing other than God's essence. And finally, all these perfections are of the essence of the divine substance, as has been seen above.

### *The Opinion is Treated that Knowledge is the Very Power Operating Through Command*

38. But concerning the distinction of reason a question is raised by the Doctors, which is necessary for explaining formally and precisely what God's power is. In this matter some think that God immediately causes things outside himself through his knowledge. Who consequently say that power, even according to reason, is knowledge itself, signified under a different respect; for knowledge is called only as it is cognition; but power as it is cause or principle of action outside himself. This opinion is usually explained in two ways. The first (and indeed the first opinion absolutely) is that the divine intellect, besides the act of knowing created things, which is as it were speculative, has a practical act of command, which in Scripture is usually explained by those words: let there be light, let there be a firmament, etc. By this act it immediately executes the will by which it decrees to make something, just as a man, by commanding a servant, causes him to execute his will. But God in the production of things does not command others as ministers, but commands the things

themselves to come forth into light, according to that of Psalm 149: He spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created. And thus it happens that the intellect, insofar as commanding pertains to it, according to St. Thomas, I-II, question 17, is the very power by which God produces things outside himself, but the command itself is the actual production on God's part.

39. The foundation of this opinion (staying within reason) is only that this mode of acting seems most perfect and most consonant with intellectual nature. For God operates, as has often been said, through intellect and will. But these two faculties in us are so subordinated that, although in the order of intention or internal affection the intellect precedes and moves the will, nevertheless, in execution and external action, the will precedes by choosing and decreeing what is to be done, but the intellect follows by commanding the execution; therefore according to reason they preserve the same order in God. There is, however, a difference, because in us command is imperfect and inefficacious for physical execution, and therefore only moves morally, and needs other ministers or powers proximately executing. But God's command is perfect, and therefore through itself is efficacious so that what it commands is executed through itself and immediately.

40. Judgment concerning the preceding opinion. But this opinion cannot be proven, for in the intellect no act can be understood, even one ordered to work by way of impelling or applying to the work itself, unless such an act is either some judgment, if it is with respect to the one commanding himself, or some speech, if it is with respect to others; for besides these two, whatever is feigned in the intellect as an impulse to work is feigned both without cause or reason, and cannot be understood or explained what it might be. For in the intellect no act can be conceived except by way of apprehensive or judicative cognition; for it is essentially and adequately a cognitive power, and therefore command cannot be understood in it except either by way of absolute judgment, if it is to itself, or by way of

judgment ordered to others, if the command is referred to others, as is explained more broadly in I-II and in the science of the soul. Therefore divine command, which is said to follow the free decree of the divine will concerning things to be made and to execute it, is understood to refer either immediately to God himself, so that God is understood to command himself to create, just as a man commands himself to walk; or to refer immediately to creatures to whom God commands that they be. The first cannot be said consistently according to that opinion, both because such command will not be the immediate reason of acting outside himself, but will be as it were an efficacious application by which God applies himself or his power to the work, just as when a man commands himself to move, the command is an efficacious application to motion, not the proximate principle of it; and also because after the free decree there cannot follow in the divine intellect any act of it that deals immediately with God himself or his things, unless either cognition by which he knows that he has already decreed this, or judgment by which he judges that what he has decreed must entirely be done and nothing else can now be done, which judgment, if anyone wishes to call command, I will not contend about the word, although it is sufficiently metaphorical with respect to God. Yet no one can probably think that such cognition or judgment is the proximate reason through which God acts outside himself, since it deals proximately only with God's own free decree and with its immutability and efficacy. But besides this act no other act can be feigned or understood in the divine intellect posterior according to reason to the free decree of the will concerning things to be produced outside himself, which has the character of God's command to himself by which he practically applies himself or his power to the work, because neither can it be explained what such an act might be, or what is known or judged through it, or what is its necessity, since God through his will known and manifest to himself is sufficiently applied to the work.

41. But if the other part is chosen, namely, that such command is immediately ordered to the creatures themselves to be produced, first this cannot be said of command in the proper sense, but only in the metaphorical. For creatures, as they are brought from non-being to being, are not capable of proper command, which is most evident in inanimate things. But it is the same in all intelligent things as well, because, as they terminate creation, they do not exercise an act of understanding, nor is this per se necessary for them to be created, as is evident of itself; indeed, it is necessary that terminating creation precede the act of understanding, at least in the order of nature. But command properly said is ordered to an intelligent being as such, which is clear from its correlative; for to command properly said corresponds obedience; but obedience properly said is only in intelligent things. But these things, namely command and obedience, are accommodated by a certain imperfect and as it were material participation to certain brute animals, insofar as from a certain custom they can perceive signs by which command or motion is intimated. But by metaphor creatures are said to obey God when they begin to be, or receive from God's efficacy and at the nod of his will, because they so conduct themselves as if they understood and obeyed at his nod. Hence, conversely, for God to command creatures that they be made is nothing other than to procreate them efficaciously at the nod of his will. Therefore, through that manner of speaking no proper act of God's intellect speaking to creatures is explained, but the efficacy of divine power operating at the nod of his will is metaphorically declared. This kind of metaphor is frequent in Scripture, as in Job 13, God is said to speak to the sea: "Thus far you shall come, and no farther," etc., of which it is said in Proverbs 8: "And he gave a law to the waters, that they should not pass their bounds." So also in Romans 4, it is said: "He calls things that are not, as though they were"; by which manners of speaking the efficacy of divine will and power is declared. Therefore there is no act in the divine intellect that is proper command with respect to the effect to be produced. And therefore St.

Thomas, in the places to be cited immediately, places divine command for producing effects in the will.

### *The Second Opinion is Treated, that Knowledge through Ideas is the Proximate Power of Acting*

42. The second opinion can be that the divine intellect, through the ideas or exemplars of things that it has in itself, is the proximate reason of acting, and thus the very power through which God produces things outside himself. For God, as we have touched upon above, in his infinite knowledge has the reasons or exemplars of all possible things, which are nothing other than the intellectual concept itself that God has of individual natures of things, which, as it intentionally or intelligibly represents each nature makeable by God, is called its reason, exemplar, or idea. But these divine exemplars do nothing outside themselves from necessity of nature, but must be determined through the will, and therefore according to themselves, and as prior to the will in our mode of understanding, they are called reasons of things; but after the will is joined to them by which God wills to make this or that nature according to this or that exemplar, they are called practical ideas. From these ideas, therefore, as applied and determined through the will, this opinion says creatures flow per se and immediately, not through another immanent act of the divine intellect, for none such can be devised, as has been shown against the first opinion, but through immediate efficiency or influx into the things themselves. As, for example, a human artisan first conceives in himself the idea of a house, and then wills to make a house conforming to the conceived exemplar; if therefore that exemplar were so perfect and efficacious that without hands and instruments it would immediately produce such an artifact as the will wants, then the intellect through the conceived exemplar would be the power immediately executing and producing artificial things. In this manner, therefore, this opinion imagines divine ideas and their efficiency.

43. And from this exposition this opinion can be persuaded; for this mode of acting pertains to great perfection of knowledge and art, as can be seen in the example given; for if a man's intellect through its exemplars had that efficacy, his art would be higher and more noble than it now is; but every nobility and perfection is to be attributed to divine knowledge, especially where no imperfection is mixed in nor repugnance intervenes; but in this no imperfection can be thought, because having the power of effecting is a perfection. Nor is repugnance found in this, because, although an immanent act per se does not require efficiency outside the one understanding, nevertheless nothing is repugnant to it being, as it is a certain intellectual form, active of its object or of the thing represented through it. Indeed, this is most consonant with divine exemplars, both because, just as they are most perfect, so also they ought to be most efficacious, and also because what in created artisans are divided, in the supreme and most simple ought to be united. Durandus touches on this opinion, In I, distinction 45, question 2, and attacks it not very effectively; for truly, explained in the aforesaid way, it is neither improbable nor can it easily be attacked; but what I think about it, I shall immediately reveal.

### *Third Opinion, that the Will is Power*

44. The third opinion is that the divine will itself is the power through which God immediately operates outside himself, through absolute and efficacious willing that such a creature be at such a time, in such a manner, etc.; for from this willing creatures that are made by God immediately flow and receive being. This opinion is usually attributed to St. Thomas, in the places to be cited below; but that his opinion was different I shall show in the same place. Nevertheless Cajetan inclines toward it, I, question 25, article 1, saying it is perhaps more true. But Ferrari, II Contra Gentiles, chapters 1 and 16, only says that God's acting outside himself is either willing or understanding;

Scotus also suggests this, In I, distinction 37. Nor are theologians lacking who think this opinion certain because of the mode of speaking of Sacred Scripture, which attributes efficacy in operating to the divine will, and says: "Whatever he willed, he did"; and: "He works all things according to the counsel of his will." Hence Pope Leo, sermon 2 on the Nativity: "God (he says) whose nature is goodness, whose will is power, whose work is mercy." And Augustine, in the Meditations, chapter 29: "Whose will is work, whose willing is power; who created all things from nothing, which you made by your will alone." But the reason is that God's will is most efficacious; therefore it pertains to its perfection that through itself it be operative of those things it wills to be done, so that, although it is conceived precisely, setting aside every other power, through itself it is powerful to execute what it wills; therefore it itself is the formal and proximate principle of every effection and divine action.

### *Fourth Opinion, Distinguishing Power from Knowledge and Will by Reason*

45. The fourth opinion is that divine power is distinguished by reason from intellect and will according to their precise formal concepts, and is nothing other than the divine nature itself, which, insofar as it is being itself through essence, is per se the effectrix of any participated or participable being, if will is added as applying, and knowledge as directing. And this seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, I, question 19, article 4, ad 4, where he says: "In us knowledge is the cause as directing, will as commanding, power as executing and the immediate principle of operation." And he concludes: "But all these in God are the same," signifying that they are indeed one in reality, but distinguished according to reason. This he explained more expressly below, question 25, article 1, ad 4, saying: "Power is not posited in God as something differing from knowledge and will according to reality, but only according to reason, insofar as

power imports the notion of a principle executing that which the will commands, and to which knowledge directs." But he adds then that also divine knowledge and will, according as it is an effective principle, has the character of power, in which he does not destroy or deny what he had said before, but adds that knowledge and will, according to their mode of causality, can participate in the name of power; nevertheless he never attributes to them the mode of causing by proximately executing and as it were eliciting action outside himself, but only by commanding or directing. Hence below, same question, article 5, ad 1, he again repeats: "Power is understood as executing, will as commanding, intellect and wisdom as directing." And at the end of that solution he concludes: "Therefore God does something because he wills, but nevertheless he can not because he wills, but because he is such in his nature." And Durandus also holds this opinion, In I, distinction 38, question 1.

46. And it can be persuaded thus, for God does not act outside himself insofar as he is infinite only in the notion of knowing or willing, but insofar as he is simply infinite in the genus of being; for all this infinity is necessary for creating, as we have said above, and for acting without dependence on a superior, in which way God always operates; therefore power belongs to God not formally by reason of intellect or will, but by reason of being itself through essence, insofar as it is infinite and eminently includes every perfection participable by itself. And it is confirmed, first, because God is not omnipotent because he knows all things, but rather knows all things because he is omnipotent and eminently contains all things; for thus we were saying above, with Dionysius, St. Thomas, and others, that God, by comprehending himself and his power, knows all possible creatures; therefore knowledge of creatures is distinguished by reason from omnipotence, and that knowledge, as determined to creatures, supposes, in our mode of conceiving, in the divine nature the eminential containment of all creatures, by reason of which it can be the first principle of them. And a similar discourse can be made about

the will; for God cannot create a thing because he wills, as St. Thomas well said, indeed nor can he create because he can will, but rather he can will to create because he is omnipotent to execute; therefore will also according to reason presupposes omnipotence. And it is confirmed, second, because there is no sufficient reason why the executive and elicitive power immediately of action outside himself should be attributed more to the will than to the intellect, or conversely; therefore it should be attributed to neither. The antecedent is clear from what has been said; for on one hand knowledge surpasses will, because, according to its formal reason, it is a more excellent perfection, and more formally constitutes or pertains to God's being, and contains in itself the forms or ideas of things to be done, which seems most necessary for their production. On the other hand, will surpasses intellect because execution of works pertains to it, because it is more impulsive than intellect. But the first consequence is proven, both because there is not, absolutely speaking, greater reason about one power than about the other, and also because in neither is there sufficient reason that execution be attributed to it, because neither without the other is sufficient for effecting, and each in its reason has its proper mode of causality, which it does not transcend, precisely standing in its concept and formal reason, but in that it has its infinity. For knowledge as knowledge, however practical, only has to direct action; for it is knowledge representing and as it were illuminating, hence it has this function in an agent through intellect, for it directs its action. Therefore, even if it is infinite, precisely standing in the notion of knowledge it will only have infinite perfection in directing with infinite clarity and infallibility. But the function of will is to direct, intend, choose and use, and in this way to apply other powers of the same appetitive being to work. But if the will is infinite, under this precise notion it will have infinity in applying, so that it can also efficaciously apply infinite power to work, if it is necessary; and in this consists the efficacy of divine will, because of which actions outside himself are attributed to it, because power is

subject to it, when it has willed, as is said in Wisdom 12; therefore neither is there sufficient reason for drawing any of these powers to another mode of causality, nor is there greater reason about one than about the other. Nor indeed can it be said, as some suggest, that intellect and will together are the very executive power, both because the action of this power of one and simple nature is conceived by us, and therefore it cannot happen that a power precisely conceived include the act of intellect and will, and especially because the discourse made, and what we shall immediately touch upon, proceed equally about both will together as about individuals.

### *The Fourth Opinion is Approved*

47. This position seems to me to be worthy of approval without qualification, which I finally declare and confirm in the following way. For either we are here inquiring about a power which is, as it were, a proximate principle of action distinct from the principal and radical one, or as it only refers to the principal principle itself which is also immediate. In the former way, it is not necessary to imagine or conceive in God a power rationally distinct from the essence; but in the latter way, it cannot be knowledge as knowledge, or will as will, but essence as infinite entity, and being itself through essence; therefore. I explain the minor premise thus: for in creatures, heat, for example, insofar as it is a form giving hot being, and insofar as it is a principle of heating, is in reality one and the same form, which by reason of itself is active; whence, although according to these diverse relations or causalities it can be conceived by us through diverse inadequate concepts, nevertheless the proximate and principal power of heating are not thus distinguished even rationally, but heat itself by reason of its entity is the proximate and principal power for accidental heating, resting precisely in that. The same would be proportionally true in the substantial form of fire, for example, if through itself it were productive of a similar form; but now, if it cannot

be the proximate principle of its communication, but only the principal one, this is because it is a limited and finite form needing accidental dispositions. But in the divine substance this reason ceases, because it is unlimited and contains all power of acting in its substantial being. Therefore the divine nature as such is without doubt the principal and radical principle of every action ad extra. That reasoning also concludes this, because it is not such a principle except insofar as it eminently contains all things; but it has this not precisely by reason of knowledge or will, but by reason of its entire infinity. Likewise, because it is the source of all being insofar as it is being itself through essence; which being, insofar as it is conceived formally by us in God himself, is called his nature or essence; but insofar as through itself it is communicative of itself, it is called the principle or reason of acting ad extra.

48. Besides this principle, however, it is not necessary to conceive in God another proximate principle also rationally distinct, more immediately eliciting action, because, since that is unlimited and infinite, although it may be substantial, and also efficient in the nature of proximate power, it does not need a mediating faculty. For in created substances, the distinction of these principles arises from imperfection, and a principle will be more perfect if it is sufficient under both aspects than if under only one; but to God must be attributed what is most perfect; therefore divine being itself through itself is the proximate principle as it were eliciting and executing every action ad extra, which is to be power itself. But because it accomplishes this in the most perfect way, it needs intellect and will, the former as directing, the latter as applying. But because knowledge and will themselves are not anything other than his being in God, therefore through that God has whatever is necessary for acting in the most perfect way. And thus finally divine knowledge and will are the cause of things, in reality indeed by properly and most appropriately effecting them, insofar as in reality they are the very being and omnipotence of God; but according to their proper aspects, one

directing, the other applying the executing power, from which they are distinguished according to reason.

49. From which it plainly follows that action ad extra is compared more immediately to power as such than to knowledge or will as such, because it is compared to that alone as to an eliciting principle. Whence it further follows that that action ought to be transient, which is consistent with those things which we said above, when treating of causes, concerning creation and divine concurrence, and all those things are also better understood according to this manner of explaining divine power. Nor is it true what some object, that power of this kind, which thus operates as efficiently immediately eliciting transient action, is imperfect. For this is only true when such power acts in a merely natural way without intelligence and freedom; but truly, if it has these intimately conjoined, it can be most perfect. As, if we understood the sun to have freedom to illuminate or to restrain the influx of light, it would illuminate in a perfect way, even if its light were the immediate principle eliciting illumination, which is a transient action. But it would be a much greater perfection if not only the sun, but also the very light of the sun intimately included in itself that freedom and intelligence necessary for that; but thus this divine power is disposed, from which external action proximately flows. Which according to our manner of conceiving is compared only remotely to divine knowledge and will, namely, as to that which applies or directs the executing power.

50. But you will ask to which of those it is compared more remotely. Durandus, In I, dist. 45, q. 2, says it is compared more remotely to knowledge, because knowledge moves the will, and the will moves the executing power. But Durandus only remembers that motion by which the intellect moves the will by proposing an object to it, according to which there is no doubt that knowledge concurs more remotely. He omits, however, actual direction, which is immediately necessary for correct execution; just as art does not concur for painting by moving the will, but by immediately directing

the hand, which properly pertains to the exemplar cause; for the other motion pertains more to the final cause. Therefore it must be said that each of these powers concurs immediately, each in its own order: the will as to application and exercise, for this is its function; knowledge as to direction and (so to speak) as to specification, because the exemplar is the reason for effecting this or that nature; but I speak of knowledge insofar as it is practical and has the nature of art, for insofar as it induces the will to will to effect, thus it rather has the nature of prudence and concurs more remotely, as we have said.

### *That the Power of God is One*

51. The final assertion is that the divine power is in itself and formally one and most simple, but contains every perfection of active power, and therefore in relation to various actions can be distinguished by us through inadequate concepts into several according to reason. This conclusion as to all its parts is very easy, and is to be explained and proved according to those things which have been said about knowledge and will. For that it is entirely simple in reality is established from the simplicity of the divine nature, to which this power adds nothing in reality. Likewise, from its universality and that of its object, which is participable being itself as such. But that it can be distinguished rationally through inadequate concepts is very easy; for we also divide finite power in this way, for example, our intellect into superior and inferior reason, through various functions of the same intellect, without a distinction which exists in reality in the faculty of understanding itself. Thus therefore, according to various actions, we can distinguish in God creative and generative power ad extra, or effective power through the eduction of form from the potency of the subject, which can be further distinguished into active power through the mode of proximate cause or through the mode of universal cause only, because God can act in both ways. Some add conservative power; but this is not properly distinct from the

effective according to concept, but only according to name, according to what was said above about effection and conservation. Others add the power of annihilating; but this is not so much a power of acting as of not acting; whence it does not add even according to the intellect a proper notion of power, but connotes freedom or subordination to the will. According to these things, however, divine power can be distinguished theologically into natural and supernatural, just as God is called the first natural and supernatural cause. But power is thus denominated supernatural, not with respect to God himself, for all his power is most connatural to him, because it belongs to him from his own natural perfection, but it is denominated supernatural in relation to actions which are above the nature of created things; about which it is proper for theologians to dispute.

### *On Divine Providence*

52. And let these things be sufficient concerning divine power; but concerning its actions, nothing occurs here to be added to those things which were said above concerning the causality of the first cause. And therefore we also add nothing here specially about divine providence, because this adds nothing beyond knowledge, will, and operation, but formally expresses the aspect by which God decreed from eternity to govern the things of this universe and to direct them through suitable means to their ends. Since therefore it has been shown both that this whole world was established by God, ordering all its parts to one end, or common good, and that nothing happens in it without the influx and will of God, it is established that God has in his mind an eternal principle by which this world is ruled, which is called providence. Which, although some philosophers have either entirely or partially ignored it, like Plin., lib. I, c. 7, and Cicero, and others, who denied knowledge of particular or contingent things to God, nevertheless more serious philosophers have acknowledged it, especially Seneca, lib. de Provid., where he says it is superfluous to

show that so great a work does not stand without some guardian. The same, lib. I Natur. quaest., Aristot. signified the same in those things which we related above, and II Phys., where he says that nature, as it is under the first intellectual agent, operates for an end, and XII Metaph., c. 10, from this he concludes that there is one ruler, so that the governance of the universe may be best, and X Ethic., c. 8, he attributes to God care for human affairs. Plato also, in Epimenide, thinks correctly about providence; which also D. Augustin. relates from Plotinus the Platonist, lib. XX de Civit., c. 14, where Vives also gathers some things. Cicero also, apart from human and free affairs, does not think badly about providence in other matters, as is clear from the dream of Scipio, and from lib. I de Natura Deorum. But philosophers have especially touched upon providence as to the conservation of this universe and as to the course of things and corporeal effects which happen in it. But they say few things about the moral providence of human affairs, and especially about the reward of good and punishment of evil, around which matters turn the most important difficulties which can be treated concerning divine providence; but those are entirely connected with those things which pertain to divine grace and supernatural providence, for concerning those things which pertain to general concurrence with free will, it has already been said above, and therefore we leave the rest to theologians.

# DISPUTATION XXXI

## ON THE ESSENCE OF FINITE BEING AS SUCH AND ON ITS EXISTENCE, AND ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM

After treating the first and supreme being—the being that is both the primary object of metaphysics as a whole and the first meaning and primary analogate (analogatum) of the term "being," the standard by reference to which all other uses of "being" are understood—it now remains to discuss the second member proposed in our initial division, namely, finite and created being. Now, this latter is not "one" in the strict and absolute sense (unum simpliciter), as though it were a single reality; rather, it is "one" only by abstraction, that is, under a common formal notion (ratio communis) that the intellect forms by considering together what various created things share. Moreover, under this common notion there fall many and diverse formal accounts (rationes) of beings. Therefore, in order to expound this second member, two tasks are necessary. First, we must explain in what precisely the common formal notion of created or finite being consists—this is the task set for the present disputation. Second, we must set out its divisions and subdivisions, proceeding step by step until we reach the ultimate formal accounts of beings that are included under the object of metaphysics as established above.

## SECTION I
## WHETHER EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE OF CREATED BEING ARE DISTINGUISHED IN REALITY

1. Since, as has been seen in what precedes, being, insofar as it is being, is said from existence and through existence or through order to existence has the nature of being, therefore, to declare the nature of created being, we take our beginning from the comparison of essence and existence. Concerning this, many things occur to be treated which are altogether necessary for understanding the essence of created being as such and its properties; but the root of all is what we have proposed, namely, how existence and essence are distinguished.

2. I suppose, however, that by existence we understand the actual existence of things, lest there be equivocation in words nor be it necessary afterwards to distinguish concerning the existence of essence, of existence, or of subsistence, or of the truth of a proposition. For the existence of essence, if it is truly distinguished from existence, adds nothing real to the essence itself, but differs from it only in the mode in which it is conceived or signified; whence, just as the essence of a creature as such from the force of its concept does not say that it is something real actually having existence outside its causes, so the existence of essence as such, remaining precisely in that, does not say actual existence by which the essence is constituted in act outside its causes, for, if existence in act in this way is not of the essence of a creature, neither will it be able to pertain to the existence of its essence; therefore the existence of the essence of a creature as such by itself prescinds from actual existence outside causes, by which the created thing comes to be outside nothing, which we signify by the name of actual existence. But the existence of subsistence is more contracted than the existence of existence, for this latter is common to

substances and accidents, while the former is proper to substance; and besides, the existence of substance (as I suppose from what will be proved below) is something distinct from the existence of created substantial nature and separable from it, because it does not constitute the nature in the notion of actual entity, which pertains to existence. But the existence of the truth of a proposition by itself is not real and intrinsic existence, but is a certain objective existence in the composing intellect, whence it applies also to privations. For thus we say blindness exists, or a man is blind, as more broadly in Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 7. The discourse is therefore concerning created existence. Concerning which we suppose further that it is something real and intrinsic to the existing thing, which seems evident in itself. For through existence a thing is understood to be something in the nature of things; it is necessary therefore that existence itself also be something real, and be intimate, that is, existing within the thing itself. For a thing cannot be existing through some extrinsic denomination, or some being of reason; otherwise how would existence constitute a being actually real and outside nothing?

### *First Opinion Affirming Real Distinction*

3. Concerning this existence of a creature, then, there are various opinions. The first is that existence is a certain thing altogether really distinct from the entity of the essence of a creature. This is thought to be the opinion of St. Thomas, which in this sense almost all the ancient Thomists have followed. The principal passages of St. Thomas are I, q. 3, a. 4; II Contra Gentiles, c. 52; De Ente et Essentia, c. 5; IV Metaphysics, lect. 2. These are thus interpreted by Capreolus, In I, dist. 8, a. 1, q. 1; Cajetan, loc. cit. I p., De Ente et Essentia; Ferrara, dicto loco Contra Gentiles; Soncinas, in IV Metaphysics, q. 12; Javellus, tract. de Transcendentibus. Also Giles, In I, dist. 2, q. 4, a. 1, and very extensively in De Ente et Essentia, q. 9, and following, and

Quodlibet I, q. 2. There are also cited Albert, super lib. de Causis, propos. 8; Avicenna, lib. V suae Metaphysicae, c. 1.

4. The arguments by which this opinion is usually persuaded are many. The first[24], because essential predicates belong to a creature without the intervention of an efficient cause; for this reason it was true from eternity to say that man is a rational animal; but existence does not belong to a creature except through an efficient cause, and therefore a creature cannot be said to actually exist unless it has been made; therefore the existence of a creature is a thing distinct from its essence, because one and the same thing cannot exist and not exist through an efficient cause. But if you say that when a creature is made, not only does existence come to be, but also the essence of the creature, it is responded that the essence does not come to be, but the essence comes to be under existence or the essence comes to be existing, and therefore it does not follow that the essence made is distinguished from the essence absolutely, except by reason of the existence which it adds to it.

5. Second, I argue[25], because the existence of a creature is existence received in something; therefore in essence, for nothing else can be conceived in which it is received; therefore it is a thing distinct from essence, for the same thing cannot be received in itself. The first antecedent is proved, because unreceived existence is existence subsisting through itself from the force of its actuality, for it is completely abstracted from a subject or potency in which it is received; it is therefore most perfect and supreme existence, and thus pure act and something infinite in the notion of being; therefore it is repugnant for the existence of a creature to be completely unreceived. And it is confirmed, because such existence has nothing from which it might be limited; for it is not limited by the potency in which it is

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[24] This first reason is treated extensively below, sect. 12, at the end. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 13.

[25] This second reason is treated extensively below, sect. 13. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 14.

received, if it does not have that, nor even by act, or by a difference which relates itself by way of act with respect to existence, for, since existence is ultimate actuality, it is not constituted through an act by which it is limited. Therefore, in order that the existence of a creature be finite and limited, it is necessary that it be the act of an essence in which it is received and through which it is limited.

6. Let the third reason be, because every creature is composed with true and real composition; but the first and general real composition can only be from existence and essence; therefore every creature is composed from existence and essence, as from act and potency really distinct. The major is established, because, if there were given some creature in which there was no real composition, there would be given some creature completely simple; as the substance of an angel actually existing, if it were not composed from existence and essence, would be substantially and completely simple, and thus would in some way equal the divine perfection. But if you say that in it there can remain composition from genus and difference, or from nature and supposit, and from subject and accident, none of these satisfies, because the first composition is not real, but of reason; whence it does not exclude perfect real simplicity. But the second composition first is not universal to all things, because it does not apply to accidents; then it has the same controversy as the composition from existence and essence; if therefore that is admitted in created substances, why not also this? The third composition finally is not for constituting substance; but now we are dealing with substantial composition and simplicity. And then there is taken from these a universal argument, because it follows, at least concerning the possible, that it is not repugnant to a creature as such to lack all real composition, and thus to be supremely simple, which is inconvenient, because this seems to be proper to God. And the consequence is clear, both because there is no reason why it should be more repugnant for the other compositions to be excluded than this one from existence

and essence, and also because a simple substantial nature can be conserved without any accident.

7. Fourth[26], in a substance composed from matter and form, existence is something distinct from matter and from form and from the nature composed from both; therefore it is a thing distinct from the whole essence of such a substance; therefore the same will be in the remaining created beings. This consequence is evident regarding less perfect things; but regarding more perfect things, such as spiritual substances, it can seem weak, because those substances, just as they are more perfect, so they can be more simple. Nevertheless, according to the subject matter, it is an excellent inference, both because if in some created thing real distinction of existence from essence is admitted, no reason can be brought why it should be denied to be distinguished in others, because, if it is not repugnant to be distinguished from the force of existence and essence as such, it will not be repugnant from the force of such essence and such created existence. And also, because, if in some creature distinct existence and essence are found, it is not from the fact that it is such, but from the fact that it is a creature, and because in it essence is compared to existence as potency to act, which is outside its quiddity, and without which it can be conceived, which reasons are common to every creature. It remains that we prove the first antecedent, which is proved, first, because either the existence of a composite substantial nature is one simple entity, or composite; it cannot be composite, as I shall show; but if it is simple, it cannot be matter, as seems evident in itself, nor even form, both because the reason is almost the same, and also because it will then be concluded that the essence of matter exists through existence really distinct from itself, since form is really distinguished from matter, and then all the reasons made proceed, so that the same must be said of any created essence. Nor even could that entity be the same as the whole essence composed from matter and

[26] Concerning this fourth reason there is extensive discussion below, section 11. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 15.

form, because a simple entity cannot be the same thing as a thing composed from distinct things, for an open repugnance is involved; if therefore such existence is a simple entity, it is necessary that it be a thing altogether distinct from such essence.

8. But that that existence is not a composite entity but simple, must be proved first, because otherwise it would be necessary to distinguish parts in that existence from which it is composed. From which it would follow, first, that one of those parts is the same as matter, and the other as form, and thus matter will not have existence from form, but from itself; whence it will not be pure potency, but will have some act from itself, against the common opinion of philosophers. It follows second that from matter and form there does not come to be one simply, because from two beings in act there does not come to be one simply. It follows, third, that matter, as much as is from itself, can exist without form, and any form without matter, not only from absolute power, but from its nature. But the consequent regarding the former part is against philosophy, regarding the latter part indeed also against faith; otherwise the souls of brutes would be immortal. But the consequence, regarding the first part, is proved, because, if matter has partial existence, either that is sufficient to constitute matter outside its causes, and thus the intended conclusion is had, namely, that, although form is absent, it will conserve that. Or it is insufficient, and thus in reality it is not existence, because it is of the nature of existence that it be sufficient to constitute a thing outside its causes, just as it is repugnant to be whiteness and not be from itself sufficient to constitute white. Also because, if matter cannot exist except dependently on form and on the whole composite, whose existence can be terminated and actuated, it would have been superfluous to give proper partial existence. Also, because, if matter has proper existence, through it it will be understood to exist by nature prior to being actuated through form; therefore, even if the actuality of form is separated, matter will remain from the force of proper existence, because the prior does not depend on the posterior.

And these reasons prove also the other part, namely, that every form can naturally remain existing, even if it is separated from matter, namely because it has proper existence sufficient to constitute it outside its causes, through which it exists prior by nature, and thus sufficiently. Whence theologians, especially St. Thomas, principally conclude from this that the rational soul is immortal, because it brings with itself proper existence, which first belongs to it and through it is communicated to the whole man.

9. Finally it follows, that from these two partial existences one is compared to the other as potency to act; the consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is clear, for, besides those partial existences, it is necessary to constitute integral and total existence of the whole nature, which cannot be simple and altogether co-distinguished from the partial existences, as is evident in itself from all that has been said; and because otherwise partial existences in man would be superfluous, it is evident that such total and simple existence cannot be feigned as altogether co-distinguished from the existence of the soul, because it would be neither spiritual nor corporeal, since it is posited as adequately accompanying and actuating substance consisting from body and spirit and depending on it. It is necessary therefore that such existence consist from the partial ones; therefore it is also necessary that those partial existences be united through themselves to constitute one total existence. Otherwise that total would not be existence through itself one, but an aggregate of many; therefore it is necessary that one of those partial existences be compared to the other as potency to act, otherwise they could not be united through themselves. But this ultimate consequent is proved to be false, because existence is the ultimate actuality of any thing; indeed from its proper nature it is pure actuality having no potentiality mixed in according to itself, but only by reason of the essence or nature whose existence it is. For which reason existence is said to be more perfect than any substantial form, because it has more actuality than the form itself, as is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.

10. Fifth[27], besides metaphysical reasons we can add a theological reason, because created essence is separated in reality itself from its existence; therefore it is really distinguished from it. The consequence is proved from what was said above concerning distinctions of things. The antecedent is commonly proved, because created things, when they are corrupted or annihilated, lose existence, but not essence. Whence through corruption of a thing, existence is separated from essence. But that antecedent is better proved from a twofold mystery of faith. One is of the Eucharist, in which through consecration quantity loses natural existence, through which it existed in bread, and acquires another, by which it exists through itself and is able to sustain the remaining accidents. The other is the mystery of the Incarnation, in which the humanity of Christ lacks proper and natural existence, and has been assumed, so that it exists through the uncreated existence of the divine Word.

*Second Opinion Positing Modal Distinction*

11. The second opinion is that the existence of a creature is indeed distinguished from the nature of the thing, or (as others speak) formally, from the essence whose existence it is, and is not a proper entity altogether really distinct from the entity of essence, but its mode. This opinion is attributed to Scotus, In III, dist. 6, q. 1; and to Henry, Quodlibet I, q. 9 and 10; concerning whose opinion I shall speak later. The same opinion was held by Soto, I Physics, q. 2, and In IV Sentences, dist. 10, q. 2; and some moderns follow it. Their foundation is because some distinction from the nature of the thing between existence and essence of a creature seems altogether necessary; but a greater distinction than this modal or formal one is not necessary; therefore a greater one is not to be asserted, since distinctions are not to be multiplied without necessity. They seem to

[27] Concerning this fifth reason extensively below, sect. 12. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 18.

prove the major first by all that has been adduced in favor of the first opinion. Second, it seems to be proved efficaciously, because what is outside the essence of a thing, it is necessary that it be distinguished from the nature of the thing, at least formally, from the essence of the thing; but existence is outside the essence of a creature, and it seems evident, since it is separable from it. Whence this enunciation, "a creature exists," is not essentially necessary and essential, but contingent; therefore. Third, because otherwise a creature would be its own existence, and consequently pure act, which is to attribute to a creature what is proper to God. Whence Hilary, book IX De Trinitate, attributes to God as proper to him that existence does not happen to him, but that he is existence itself subsisting; and Boethius, book De Hebdomadibus, c. 1, says that in created things it is different what exists from existence. The minor is proved, because this distinction suffices so that one be outside the essence of the other and for true and real composition, because wherever distinction intervenes in things, true composition is made from extremes thus distinguished. Also that distinction is enough so that one extreme be separable by divine power from the other, although it does not suffice for mutual or convertible separation, as was said in what precedes. From which this opinion can be confirmed, for, although created essence is separable from proper existence, conversely however existence itself is not separable from the essence of a creature; for up to now it has not been done nor is it likely that it can be done that the existence of whiteness be conserved with whiteness not conserved, and that a man have the existence of white and not be white, and so of others; therefore it is a sign that there is not real distinction between essence and existence, but only modal.

### *Third Opinion Positing Only Distinction of Reason*

12. The third opinion affirms that essence and existence of a creature, when compared proportionally, are not distinguished really

or from the nature of the thing as two real extremes, but are distinguished only by reason. Thus Alexander of Hales expressly held and excellently declared, VII Metaphysics, ad text. 22. Aureolus also held it, according to Capreolus, In I, dist. 8, q. 1, where Capreolus also cites Henry, Godfrey and Gerard de Carmel for the same opinion. And there Durandus, in the first part of the distinction, q. 2, holds the same; and Gabriel, In III, dist. 6, and there the other nominalists. And Hervaeus, Quodlibet VII, q. 9; Gregory, In II, dist. 6, q. 1, ad arg. Aureoli. And the Scotists follow this opinion, as is clear from Antonius Andreas, IV Metaphysics, q. 3; Lychetus, In III, dist. 6. The same is held by Alexander Achillinus, lib. I de Elementis, dub. 3; Palacios, In I, dist. 8, disp. I; John Alensis, in Lexicon Theologicum, verbo Esse. This opinion in reality is also held by Niphus, lib. IV Metaphysics, disp. V, although he differs in words, and at the end of the disputation contends that the controversy is about the mode of speaking. Again there he distinguishes, from the opinion of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, so that in the former existence is distinguished from essence, but not in the latter, which John Gandensis also holds, IV Metaphysics, c. 3. But this is not to be examined in this place, because it depends on that question, whether these things, in the judgment of Aristotle, are produced by God, or not, concerning which has already been said above. Fonseca also seems, lib. IV Metaphysics, c. 3, q. 4, to dissent nothing in reality from this opinion, as will be declared by us, although he professes to follow the second in words. There can also be adduced in favor of this opinion all theologians who hold that humanity could not have been assumed by the Word without proper existence, for that cannot be rightly founded except in the identity of essence and existence of created nature, concerning which matter can be read what we wrote in tome I of the Third Part.

*The Third Opinion is Explained & Approved*

13. This third opinion is to be explained thus, that the comparison is made between actual existence, which they call existence in act exercised, and actual existing essence. And thus this opinion affirms that existence and essence are not distinguished in reality itself, although essence, abstractly and precisely conceived, as it is in potency, is distinguished from actual existence, as non-being from being. And I think this opinion thus explained is altogether true. And its foundation briefly is, because no thing can be intrinsically and formally constituted in the nature of real and actual being through something distinct from itself, because, by this very fact that one is distinguished from another as being from being, each has that it is being, as co-distinguished from the other, and consequently not through that formally and intrinsically. But because the force of this reason and full decision of this question with solutions of arguments, depend on many principles, therefore, so that we may proceed more distinctly and without equivocation of terms, which I fear is frequent in this matter, we must proceed gradually, and individual points must be explained in distinct sections.

## SECTION II

## WHAT THE ESSENCE OF A CREATURE IS BEFORE IT IS PRODUCED BY GOD

### *Resolution of the Question*

1. First, it must be established that the essence of a creature, or the creature in itself and before it is made by God, has in itself no true real being, and in this sense, with existence set aside, essence is not something, but is absolutely nothing. This principle is not only true but also certain according to faith. Hence Waldensis, book I Doctrin. fidei antiq., chapter 8, rightly places among the errors of Wycliffe that he said creatures have from eternity some real being

distinct from the being of God; and the Thomists gravely reproach Scotus because he asserted that creatures have a certain eternal being, which is their diminished being, namely objective being or of essence in cognized being, as may be seen in Cajetan and other recent authors, I, q. 17, a. 5, who think that cognized being, according to Scotus's view, is some real being distinct from the being of God, which they rightly attack as completely false and contrary to the principles of faith; yet they wrongly attribute this to Scotus, for Scotus himself clearly declares that this cognized being, which as it were results in creatures from God's knowledge, is not in them some real being intrinsic to them, nor is it sufficient to found a real relation, but only a relation of reason, as may be seen in Scotus himself, In I, dist. 35, § Ad ista, and dist. 36, § Ad secundum dico, and In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2, and in Quodl., q. 1, and 14, a. 2. Nor could Scotus think otherwise, for he holds that this cognized being belongs to creatures as necessarily as it belongs to God himself to know creatures, which does not depend on God's will or freedom; but it would be erroneous to say that God by necessity and without freedom communicates to creatures some real being participated from himself, however diminished, since it is of faith that God works all things according to the counsel of his will. Therefore in this respect Scotus agrees with us in the principle established, that the essences of creatures, even if they are known by God from eternity, are nothing and have no true real being before they receive it through God's free efficient causality.

2. Rather, the same Scotus, in the cited dist. 36, attacks Henry because in various places he asserted that the essences of things have from themselves a certain being of essence, which he calls real, eternal, and unproduced being, belonging to creatures independently of God, and which is supposed in them not only before efficient causality but also before God's knowledge, so that by reason of it they might be objects of that divine knowledge which theologians call simple intelligence. Thus writes Henry in Summ., a. 3, q. 23 and 25, and Quodl. VIII, q. 1 and 9, and Quodl. IX, q. 1 and 2, and Quodl. XI, q. 3.

The Thomists also attack his opinion, as is evident from Hervaeus, Quodl. XI, q. 1; and Soncinas, IX Metaph., q. 4; and recent expositors of St. Thomas, I, q. 10, a. 3, q. 46, a. 1. Although Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, in response to the fourth argument of Aureolus against the fourth conclusion, does not differ much from Henry's opinion and manner of speaking, where, responding to Aureolus who asks whether, when a thing is created, that is made which was absolutely nothing, he says that indeed that is made which was nothing of existential being, and adds: "But beyond the nothingness, which is the lack of actual existence, there was essence in the being of essence, which, considered absolutely as nature or quiddity, can be abstracted from the nothingness of existence and from the quiddity of existence, that is, from actual being itself or not being of actual existence, and it itself according to itself is always something in the genus of essences, and in intelligible being, and in the active power of the creator, although not in actual real being, as Henry, Godfrey, and Bernard of Gannaco declare." But this being of essence Capreolus later explains in such a way that on the part of the creature, before it is produced by God, he does not think there is some true thing distinct from God which is simply outside nothing, but that on the part of the creature he speaks of a certain aptitude, or rather non-repugnance, to be produced by God in such being; for in this the essences of creatures are distinguished from fictitious and impossible things like chimeras, and in this sense creatures are said to have real essences even if they do not exist; but they are said to have them not actually but potentially, not through intrinsic power but through the extrinsic power of the creator, and thus they are said to have them not in themselves but in their cause, either material, as a generable thing is said to be in the potency of prime matter, or efficient, in the way that the whole creatable being is contained in God's power before it is made, concerning whose possible essence in general we now treat. And in this same way such essence, before it is made, is also said to be real, not by proper and true reality which it actually has in itself, but because it can become real by

receiving true entity from its cause, which possibility (as I shall say more fully immediately) on its part only signifies non-repugnance to being made; but on the part of the extrinsic cause it signifies the power to effect it. And in the same way and for the same reason, the being which they call of essence before divine effection or creation is only potential objective being (as many speak, concerning which immediately), or by extrinsic denomination from God's power and non-repugnance on the part of the creatable essence.

3. Nor could it come into the mind of any Catholic doctor that the essence of a creature, from itself and without God's free efficient causality, is some true thing having some true real being distinct from God's being, which Capreolus expressly confesses finally in the cited place, alleging the words of St. Thomas, q. 3 de Potentia, a. 5, ad 2, where he says thus: "From the very fact that being is attributed to quiddity, not only being but the quiddity itself is said to be created, because before it has being it is nothing unless perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not creature but creative essence." And it is proven by reason from the principles of faith, because God alone is being necessary from himself, and without him nothing was made, and without his effection nothing is or has any real being in itself. Hence the holy Fathers rightly say that whatever has not been made by God is either God or nothing: Justin, in Expositione fidei; Cyril, book I in Ioan., chapter 6; Augustine, book I de Trinit., chapter 6. But it is certain from faith that God did not make the created essences from eternity, because neither from necessity (as we argued against the opinion attributed to Scotus), since it is of faith that God does nothing simply necessarily; nor from free will, for thus it is of faith that he began to work in time. And moreover it is evident that if the essences of things had been made by God from eternity, they would also have been existing from then on, because every effection terminates[28] in

[28] terminates, 1960; confirms, other editions and the Vivès edition. "The word confirms, which is read in some editions, including that of Vivès, seems to us manifestly erroneous." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 24.

existence, as I shall show below. And it is confirmed because otherwise God could not reduce any thing to nothing, because something of the thing would always remain, namely, the essence. And similarly God would not have created all things from nothing, but would have changed them from one being to another being.

4. Nor does it help that Capreolus above, from the opinion of others, responds that God created all things from nothing of existence, but not from nothing of essence. For either that which has nothing of existence is simply and completely nothing, or not. If not, then God absolutely and simply did not create all things from nothing, nor did he produce all beings, or everything that is truly something real, and consequently he properly created no being, but produced one from another, as from a real receptive and unproduced potency, namely existence or an existing thing from a real essence, which is said to be the receptive potency of being itself and unproduced. Whence it further follows that the creature can as it were boast that it has from itself something which it does not have from God nor participated from him. But all these and similar things are against faith and natural reason. But if finally someone should confess that what has nothing of existence is simply and completely nothing, it remains that the distinction about nothing of essence and of existence is frivolous and vain, because what is simply and completely nothing cannot truly and really be something in any notion of true being. Also because, with existence and the efficient causality of the first cause removed, nothing at all remains in the effect, as has been shown; therefore neither can essence remain under any true real being distinct from the being of the creator.

5. This is finally explained in this way: for let us grant that created and existing essence is an entity distinct in the nature of the thing from existence and separable from it, and let us conceive that entity of essence which is under existence, mentally prescinding one from the other, as for example the humanity of Christ, if that is an entity only of essence; therefore no Catholic can think that that thing

of the essence of humanity, according to all that which is conceived in it with existence set aside, has actually had that entity from eternity and only lacked union to the Word and to every other existence, otherwise there would be given an eternal and uncreated entity outside God; therefore it must necessarily be confessed that, with the entity of existence which is communicated to the creature through some effection set aside, the entity of essence itself is absolutely nothing.

### *Objections Against the Established Resolution*

6. Against this truth, however, certain things are objected which are of little weight; but to satisfy everyone, I shall indicate them. First, that the essence of a creature, before it exists, terminates God's knowledge; but in order to terminate, it requires some being. Second, because essential predicates are truly predicated or can be predicated of essence from eternity; but every truth is founded in some being. Third, because created things according to the being of essence are placed under a certain genus and species, whence a rose is of the same species whether it exists or does not exist; indeed the humanity of created and creatable Peter is numerically the same essence. Therefore in both states it retains some entity of essence. Fourth, because if the essence of a creature according to itself and as it is presented to God's simple intelligence is nothing real, then it will be a being of reason; how then is it truly said to be something creatable, since a being of reason is neither something nor can be created? How also is knowledge about real being, since it is properly about essence and not about existence? Then how can essence have in God a true exemplar or exemplary cause, for in beings of reason this has no place? Finally, commonly in creatures a threefold being is distinguished: of essence, of existence, and of truth of proposition, as may be seen in St. Thomas, In I, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; therefore, with existence set aside, essence can still retain the being of essence, for it does not have this from

existence but from itself; therefore, with all extrinsic efficient causality set aside, it has such being, and consequently it has it from eternity.

*Response to the Objections*

7. To the first objection, omitting the opinions of theologians which were touched upon above and are treated more fully in I, q. 14, I grant that the essence of a creature, as it is the secondary object of divine knowledge, terminates it thus; for it is not a moving object but only a terminating one. But for this no real being which it actually has is necessary, because to terminate is neither something in it nor something from it, but is only an extrinsic denomination from God's knowledge, which denomination posits nothing in the denominated thing, nor does it even suppose, properly speaking, any real being, but such as is known through knowledge, for this itself is necessary for the truth of knowledge. Since therefore God through the knowledge of simple intelligence does not know creatures as actually having some real being, but only potentially, he does not require in them any real being to terminate such knowledge, but potential being suffices, which as such is only actually in the cause, as St. Thomas rightly said, I, q. 14, a. 9, and I cont. Gent., chapter 66. But if there is talk about the knowledge of vision by which God intuits existing things, that indeed requires existence in the object in the measure (as they say) of eternity; yet in its proper and temporal duration it is not, except for that time for which it is known to exist. And thus from the force of the termination of knowledge no real being is required in the known thing, but only that which is adequate to the knowledge for its truth. This is more evident in the knowledge which an angel has of a possible rose or of a future eclipse.

8. To the second objection, what is eternal truth of propositions: I shall speak more fully in solving the first reason put forward in the preceding section in favor of the first opinion. Now it is briefly responded with St. Thomas, I, q. 10, a. 3, ad 3, that from

eternity there was no truth in those propositions except insofar as they were objectively in the divine mind, because subjectively or really they were not in themselves, nor objectively in another intellect. But in order that the knowledge by which God from eternity knew man to be a rational animal might be true, it was not necessary for the essence of man to have from eternity some real being in act, because that being does not signify actual and real being, but only the intrinsic connection of such extremes; but this connection is not founded in actual being but in potential being. You will say that through that knowledge it is not known that man can be a rational animal, but that he necessarily is a rational animal; therefore potential being alone is not a sufficient foundation of it. It is responded by absolutely denying the consequence, because that necessity is not absolute of being according to some real being in act, but as to this it is only possibility; yet it includes conditional necessity, because namely if man is to be produced, he will necessarily be a rational animal, which necessity is nothing other than a certain objective identity of man and animal, which identity God knows most simply, but we through the composition which the verb "is" signifies when we say that man from eternity is a rational animal, which being pertains to that third mode by which being is sometimes said to signify the truth of composition.

9. To the third objection, it must be said that possible things not yet made are placed under a certain genus and species in the same way that essential predicates are said to belong to them or are truly attributed to them, namely as they are objectively in the divine intellect or some other; for this coordination or placement under certain genera and species is not formally in things but in the intellect; yet it has a foundation in things, either as they actually exist or as they can exist and objectively terminate the knowledge by which they are known to be of such nature and essence if they should be made. When therefore a possible and made thing is said to be the same numerically or specifically, if there is talk about real or positive identity, it is false, because this exists only between positive and real extremes; but

negatively they are said to be one thing or of one species, because the producible and produced thing are not two things but one, nor do they have two species or two essences but one; but this unity or negative identity is apprehended by us in the manner of positive identity, because we compare the thing positively existing objectively in the intellect to the thing actually existing, as if they were two positive extremes, when however in reality they are only one, as will be more evident from the following paragraph.

10. To the fourth objection, it is responded that the possible essence of a creature objective to divine knowledge is not a being fabricated by the intellect, but is a being truly possible and capable of real existence, and therefore is not a being of reason but is somehow comprehended under real being. For I have already declared above that the essence of a creature, even when not produced, is in some way a real essence. And in the preceding sections treating the concept of being, we showed that not only what actually is is comprehended under it, but also what is apt to be. Hence Cajetan rightly says, de Ente et essentia, chapter 4, q. 5, that real being is taken in two ways: in one way as it is distinguished against being fabricated by the intellect (which is properly being of reason); in another way as it is distinguished against what does not exist in act. Therefore the essence of a creature according to itself is real being in the first way, namely in potency, but not in the latter way and in act, which is properly to be real being, as Cajetan noted there. Wherefore, if the essence of a creature taken precisely and according to itself and not yet made is considered as actually being, or actual being is attributed to it, thus either it is not to be considered in itself but in its cause, nor does it have other real being than the being of its cause; or if it is considered as having being in itself, thus it is true that according to that consideration it is not real being but being of reason, because it is not in itself but only objectively in the intellect. Yet that creatable or possible nature is said to be such insofar as it is real according to itself and apt to exist, and in the same way it can have a real exemplar in

God; for this does not always represent actual being but also possible being. And finally in the same way, the sciences which consider things abstracting from existence are not about beings of reason but about real ones, because they consider real essences, not according to the state they have objectively in the intellect, but according to themselves, or insofar as they are apt to exist with such natures or properties.

11. To the fifth objection, what and how manifold is the being of essence: Concerning the fifth argument it must be noted that there can be equivocation in the first member, namely the being of essence. For it is attributed to created things in two ways. In one way according to themselves, even as they are not yet made nor actually existing. And in this way the being of essence is not true actual real being in the creature, as has been demonstrated, but is possible being, and is referred to that third member about the being of truth of proposition or of knowledge; for as we have shown, the essences of creatures in this way only have being either in their cause or objectively in the intellect. A difference can only be established between those two members in that the being in truth of proposition does not only have place in real essences but also in beings of reason and fictitious ones; for thus it is true that blindness is a privation, and that a chimera is a fabricated monster, and therefore the being of essence is particularly attributed to created things before they exist, to denote that that truth is founded in potential being apt to exist. In another way the being of essence is taken as it actually belongs to a creature already existing, and this being is without doubt real and actual, whether it is distinguished from existence really or only by reason, which we shall see later, because it is certain that in an existing thing the essence itself is actually being, and consequently the essential being of that thing is actual being. Yet it does not have this actuality except through the creation or production of an agent, and as the essence is really joined to existence. Wherefore, although we grant that the being of essence taken in this way is actual being and distinct from the being of

existence, nonetheless it is true and certain that the principle established is that the essence of a creature does not actually have this being of essence except through effection, and consequently that according to itself and from itself as unproduced it has no being in act, neither of essence nor of existence. And this distinction must be kept before our eyes to remove equivocation and understand the efficacy of the reasons which are usually made in this matter.

## SECTION III
## HOW AND IN WHAT BEING IN POTENCY AND IN ACT DIFFER IN CREATURES, OR ESSENCE IN POTENCY AND IN ACT

1. In this section another principle and foundation of what is to be said must be established, namely that in created things being in potency and in act are distinguished immediately and formally as being and non-being simply. This distinction is called by some real negative, because one extreme is a true thing and not the other; but by others it is called a distinction of reason, because there are not two things but only one, which is conceived and compared by the intellect as if there were two. And this principle is commonly received even in the school of St. Thomas, as is evident from Soncinas, IX Metaph., q. 3, and others.

### *On Objective Potency, What It Is*

2. But in order that this principle, which is very necessary for what we shall say, may be understood, it must be noted that some have thought that being in potency signifies some positive mode of being of that thing which is said to be in potency, which is diminished and imperfect being compared to that state in which the thing is said to be

in act. According to this opinion it would have to be said that those two are positive and real extremes. This opinion is usually attributed to Scotus, In II, dist. 16, q. 1, § Rationes istae, because he distinguishes potency from which being in potency is denominated from active and passive potency, and therefore it is usually called objective, from the same Scotus, In II, dist. 12, q. 1, and according to him it is thought to be something real and positive on the part of the being which is said to be in potency. But neither did Scotus say this last thing, nor does it have any verisimilitude in itself. For Scotus never understood purely objective potency to be something real and positive distinct from the producing cause and presupposed to its action on the part of the possible thing. Indeed, if he is read attentively, he openly denies this in the said dist. 12; therefore he only called being in objective potency the possible being itself because it is related as object to productive potency. Hence he differs only in name by calling being in objective potency what we call potential being, and concerning that objective potency he thinks Aristotle speaks, IX Metaph., when he says that potency and act are in the same genus; but concerning the sense of this axiom it was said above and for the present it makes no difference.

3. Therefore that that being in potency or that objective potency cannot be some true and positive thing in the very thing which is said to be in potency is first evident from what was said in the preceding paragraph, because either that potency is produced or completely unproduced; if it is unproduced, it is nothing distinct from the creator; if it is produced, either from eternity and from necessity, and this cannot be said without error, or freely and in time, and thus before it was produced it itself was in objective potency, and consequently the whole thing, without such potency produced in the thing, was in objective potency; therefore this being in objective potency signifies no real and positive potency which actually exists. Second, for either such potency remains in the produced thing or does not remain. If it does not remain, it can be nothing real and positive; for how could that being, whatever it might be feigned to be, if it were

something positive and real, be destroyed by the production of being in act? But if that potency remains in the produced thing, now that potency is not only objective but also subjective, nor would things be made from nothing but from presupposed potency, as from a subject or matter from which the thing is made. Third, it was shown above that in possible essence, before it is made, there is nothing of the thing (properly speaking of positive and actual thing); therefore there cannot be in it real positive potency; for every real positive potency is some true thing or founded in some reality and entity. Wherefore, as St. Thomas rightly noted, I, q. 9, a. 2, creatures are not said to be possible except by denomination from some active or passive potency; but when this denomination is taken from passive potency or from active potency of a secondary cause, it already supposes such potency produced by another; for neither can a secondary cause nor any real passive potency be completely unproduced. Wherefore (says St. Thomas) all creatures, before they existed, were not possible to be through any created potency, since nothing created is eternal, but through divine potency alone, insofar as God can produce them in being. Therefore on the part of creatures only non-repugnance is supposed so that they might be made thus, because nothing of the thing can be required or supposed in them.

4. Nor can that potency with respect to which they are said to be in objective potency be something in them, but in the cause from which they can be made, because to be in objective potency is nothing other than to be able to be presented to some potency, or rather to the action or causality of some potency; but a thing cannot be presented to itself, just as it cannot be made by itself, but by another; therefore it is said to be in objective potency in order to another's potency, and by denomination from it the thing is said to be possible. It remains therefore that being in potency as such does not signify a state or positive mode of being, but rather besides denomination from the agent's potency includes negation, namely that it has not yet actually proceeded from such potency; for it is said to be in potency because it

has not yet gone out into act, and therefore even when the thing is created it ceases to be in potency, not because it ceases to be subject to divine potency and contained in it, but because it is no longer only in it but also from it and in itself. Therefore that state excluded what was in potency.

### *What Essence in Act Adds to Essence in Potency*

5. Second, it must be principally observed concerning the other extreme, namely being or essence in act, that authors frequently say that essence in act adds existence to essence itself. This manner of speaking, according to the opinion of those who affirm that existing essence is not distinguished in the nature of the thing from its being, must necessarily be understood as addition according to reason or improperly said. For if there is talk about essence in act with respect to essence in potency, it seems to be said less properly to add existence, because real addition is not properly made except to real being, for something of entity has that to which addition is made; but we have said that essence in potency has nothing of entity; therefore addition is not properly made to it, except perhaps according to reason, insofar as essence in objective potency is apprehended in the manner of being, and it would be said more properly that essence as actual being is distinguished by actual existence from itself as it is in potency. Hence if there is talk about essence in act, it cannot in any way be said, according to this opinion, that existing essence adds existence above essence in act, because essence which is actual being formally and intrinsically includes existence; for through it it is constituted actual being and is distinguished from being in potency, according to this opinion, as has been said. Wherefore authors who think that being is distinguished in the nature of the thing from the essence of a creature use that manner of speaking more frequently, as is evident from those cited above, among whom Giles, Quodl. I, q. 7, says that being is impressed on essence while it is created and made existing. Which

saying, if it is understood about essence in potency as it was, or rather was thought before God's effection, is either completely false or most improper and metaphorical; for in what way can act be impressed on that which is nothing? For act is not impressed except on receptive potency; but essence under that consideration is not in receptive potency but merely objective. Therefore in order that that expression and similar ones may have some true sense, according to the aforesaid opinion, it is necessary to understand it about essence in act, which, compared to being, is receptive potency of it, yet is not actual essence except while it actually receives the act of being.

6. From this however it necessarily follows that, although actual essence does not differ from potential except while it is, or even because it is under the act of being, yet formally and precisely it does not differ immediately in the act of being but in its essential entity, or in the actual being of essence. This (I say) it is necessary to say, distinguishing in the nature of the thing actual essence from existence as real potency from act. Because being in objective potency, as we have shown, is simply nothing or non-being in act; therefore any actual entity formally, immediately, and precisely differs from being in potency through that by which it is actual entity in its genus and ceases to be potential; but actual essence in the being of essence differs from essence in potency, as is evident of itself, and does not differ formally and precisely through existence but through that actuality which it has in itself distinct from existence, because it did not actually have that while it was in potency; therefore. Also because according to that actual entity it is in receptive potency of existence, in which it was not as considered in objective potency alone. Moreover it is declared openly in the humanity of Christ, if it is supposed to exist through the uncreated existence of the Word, because nonetheless it itself, precisely conceived, is actual created entity; and therefore even thus precisely conceived it differs from itself as it was from eternity in objective potency alone, and therefore is now conceived as proximately apt for union to the Word, which it did not have before

creation; therefore that humanity, as actual entity of essence, differs from itself in potency through its very created entity of essence and not only through the uncreated being of God.

7. This is further explained and confirmed, for if essence and existence are diverse things, just as essence can be in potency and in act, so created existence is in potency and in act; and just as essence cannot be actual unless joined to existence, so neither can existence be actual unless joined to essence; yet formally and intrinsically actual existence does not differ from itself potential through essence, but through its actual entity which it did not actually have while it was in potency; therefore the same is true of essence, if according to the precise actuality of essence it is compared to itself in potency. Similarly, not only essence precisely and existence precisely, but also the whole composite of being and essence can be conceived by us as in potency and in act, as is evident of itself; but this being in act is not distinguished adequately from itself in potency because it adds existence to essence, for in both states it includes existence proportionately; but it differs through its whole adequate entity, because namely while it is in act it has the actuality of essence and of existence, but while it is in potency it has neither.

8. Therefore it is universally true according to the principle established above, namely that being in act and being in potency are distinguished formally and immediately as being and non-being, and not as one being adding upon another being. And consequently it is also true that essence, as actual being, is distinguished immediately from potential essence through its very actual entity, whether it requires another entity or another mode to have it or not; for it is the same reasoning about essence in act as about any being in act. Hence, that we may speak formally and abstract from every opinion, it is not to be said that actual essence is distinguished from potential because it has existence, for although this can also be verified either formally and proximately or radically and remotely according to various opinions, yet most formally and immediately in every opinion actual essence is

separated from potential through its very actual entity which it has in the nature of real essence.

## SECTION IV

## WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF A CREATURE IS CONSTITUTED IN THE ACTUALITY OF ESSENCE THROUGH SOME REAL BEING, UNDISTINCT FROM ITSELF, WHICH HAS THE NAME AND NATURE OF EXISTENCE

1. We have spoken of the essence of a creature as possible and as in act, and of what kind their distinction is; it remains to speak of the being by which essence is most formally constituted in act.

2. I say therefore first: a real essence, which in itself is something actually distinct from its cause, is intrinsically constituted by some real and actual being. This follows clearly from what has been said, for every real entity is constituted by some real being, since being is said to derive from esse, and real being from real esse; therefore, while real entity ceases to be potential and becomes actual, it is necessary that it be constituted by some actual real being. Again, actual real essence in its genus is a true and actual real being, now differing from being in potency; therefore it is necessary that it be formally constituted in such actuality by some actual real being, communicated to it through some efficiency.

3. I say second: this constitution does not occur through composition of such being with such entity, but through complete identity according to reality. This is proved first from what has been said, because actual essence differs from itself as potential immediately through its entity; therefore through that very thing it has that actual being by which it is constituted, etc. Second, it is explained in this way: for either actual essence is distinguished by nature of the thing from

existence, or not. If not, it is manifest that it has no distinct being by which it is constituted in such actuality. If indeed it is distinguished, therefore the being of actual essence is also distinguished by nature of the thing from the being of actual existence; therefore the being of actual essence is not distinguished by nature of the thing from actual essence, otherwise one would proceed to infinity; therefore in every opinion that being by which actual essence is constituted as such, cannot be distinct by nature of the thing from itself.

### *Proper Resolution of the Question*

4. I say third: that being by which the essence of a creature is formally constituted in the actuality of essence is the true being of existence. The two preceding propositions, as proposed by us, are common in every opinion, whether we hold that existence is distinguished by nature of the thing from essence, or not; but this third one is indeed admitted, indeed necessarily asserted by those who do not distinguish existence from actual essence; but by those who feel the opposite, it is more frequently denied. Indeed, if they speak consistently, I do not see by what reasoning they can admit it. But this assertion is proved in various ways. First, because this being taken precisely is sufficient for the truth of this locution with second adjacency, "essence is"; therefore that being is true existence. The consequence is clear: for, according to the common signification and conception of men, "is," with second adjacency, is not absolved from time, but signifies actually being in the nature of things, which we all understand by the name of existence or through the being of existence. You will say that "is" is always truly said of actual essence, yet not formally on account of the actuality of essence, nor on account of that being by which it is formally constituted in such actuality, but because it never has this being without existence, although distinct from such being or actuality of essence. But against this response the antecedent of the reasoning made is proved; for through this being of

actual essence taken formally and precisely, such essence is a being in act and is distinguished from being in potency; therefore by virtue of that being such essence is; for it is correctly inferred: it is a being in act; therefore it is, because being a being in act does not diminish the notion of being which the verb "is" includes. Whence, even if we grant that this being of actual essence depends on a further term or act as on a necessary condition, or on something of this kind, nevertheless that being itself will formally constitute being in act and distinguish it from being in potency; therefore by virtue of that it is truly and absolutely said that the thing is; just as an accident by virtue of its being is said to be a being in act and absolutely to be, although that being requires inherence in a subject, so that without it it naturally cannot be.

5. Second, I argue, both simply and ad hominem, for to this being of actual essence belong all things which are customarily attributed to existence, indeed even all those things on account of which the authors of the first and second opinions think existence is distinguished by nature of the thing from essence; therefore it is true being of existence. The antecedent is proved, for first this being of actual essence is not eternal, but temporal, for, as was shown above, creatures had no real being from eternity, but the being of essence, insofar as it is distinguished from the being of existence, is said to be eternal, which cannot be true except of that potential being; therefore actual being, just as it is temporal, so also is true existence. Then, this being belongs to a creature contingently or not necessarily, since both, before it was made, it did not have it, and it can, after it has it, be deprived of it; but these are the conditions of existence, on account of which it is especially considered to be distinguished from essence; for essence is said not to belong to a thing contingently, but necessarily and inseparably; therefore this being of actual essence has all the conditions of existence. You will say: if this reasoning is effective, it concludes not only that this being is existence, but also that it is distinct from essence. It is answered that in the opinion of others it is thus concluded; yet, according to our opinion, it is rather concluded

that it is not correctly proved by those reasonings that existence is distinguished by nature of the thing from essence, concerning which more below. Whence further, to this being of actual essence it belongs that it be conferred on a creature through the efficiency of the creator; but through efficiency the being of existence is proximately conferred; therefore in this also this being agrees with existence. Finally, no condition necessary for the being of existence can be conceived which does not belong to this being. Unless perhaps someone, begging the question, should say that one of the conditions required for existence is that it be distinguished by nature of the thing from actual essence, which would surely be said absurdly; for now we are inquiring into the conditions by which we can know what existence is, and why it should be distinguished from essence. It would therefore be a voluntary begging of the question to place such distinction among the conditions necessary for the being of existence. Especially since distinction, being a negation or a certain relation, is not a condition per se required for the being of a thing, but is something resulting from such being of a thing. Therefore distinction is not to be placed among the conditions necessary for the being of a thing, whether of essence or of existence; but in the remaining matters no condition can be feigned which constitutes real being in the being of existence, which is not found in the being of actual essence. Therefore this is true being of existence.

6. Third, this same thing is explained from the proper nature of existence, for the being of existence is nothing other than that being by which formally and immediately some entity is constituted outside its causes and ceases to be nothing and begins to be something; but of this kind is this being by which formally and immediately a thing is constituted in the actuality of essence; therefore it is true being of existence. The major seems to be known per se from the very signification of the term and the common conception of all. Likewise, from the immediate and formal opposition explained above between being in act and being in potency; for being in act is the same as

existing, otherwise a medium could be given between possible being and existing being, which however is unintelligible; therefore that being by which being in act is formally constituted in itself and outside causes, is also the being by which the existing is constituted; therefore that being is true being of existence. Likewise because such being, if, through the possible or impossible, it were understood to remain without any other distinct being, is sufficient for distinguishing actual entity from possible, and consequently for constituting it in a new and temporal state, which it does not have from eternity, and for terminating the action of an agent or for founding a real relation and dependence on an efficient cause; therefore such being by which a thing is formally constituted actually outside causes is existence. But the minor proposition, namely, that that being by which intrinsically and immediately possible essence is understood to become actual essence, constitutes essence outside causes, or outside nothing, is almost known per se from the terms, because through that being it is something in act. It is also demonstrated from the principles posited, because it has been shown that through this being essence is formally constituted outside the possibility which it had from eternity in our way of conceiving; for to be drawn out, so to speak, from possibility and to be constituted outside causes are the same.

7. An objection is met. Nor does it matter if someone should say that this being of actual essence depends on another distinct being, which by others is called actual existence, both because, although we admit this dependence, it cannot be in the genus of cause or formal term intrinsically constituting essence in the nature of actual essence; but we have spoken of being thus formally and intrinsically constituting the actuality of essence, and concerning that we have shown that it has the true nature of existence. The assumption has been proved by us, because we have shown that that being by which essence is constituted in the actuality of essence, cannot be distinct by nature of the thing from itself; if therefore that other being, which by others is called existence, is distinct by nature of the thing from the

actuality of essence, it cannot formally constitute it in such actuality; if therefore there is any dependence of actual essence on such existence, it will not be as from an intrinsic formal constitutive, but as from another cause or necessary condition. Moreover, because, if this reasoning is attentively weighed, it proves that no existence is given so distinct from the being of actual essence; and if perhaps some condition, or term or necessary mode is given, so that such actual essence exists, that it is not nor can be called existence, but subsistence, or inherence, unless this whole controversy is reduced to a question about the name. Because indeed the understanding of this whole question depends largely on this, this must be directly and explicitly explained and proved in the following section.

## SECTION V

## WHETHER BESIDES THE REAL BEING OF ACTUAL ESSENCE THERE IS ANOTHER NECESSARY BEING, BY WHICH A THING FORMALLY AND ACTUALLY EXISTS

### *The Function of Existence is Explained*

1. It is certain among all that existence is that by which formally and intrinsically a thing is actually existing; for although existence is not properly and strictly a formal cause, just as neither subsistence nor personality, it is nevertheless an intrinsic and formal constitutive of what is constituted by it, just as personality is an intrinsic and formal constitutive of a person, whether this be through composition, or without it, for constitution extends more widely than composition, as theologians teach more broadly, I, q. 40, or In I, dist.

26 and 33; but this constituted[29] by existence, that it may be signified by one word which all admit, is nothing other than the existing as such, although under this word it remains equally obscure what that is, unless the concept or nature of the existing as such is further explained. Whatever that may be, nevertheless it is certain that the existing as such is formally constituted by existence alone, and in this genus of quasi-formal cause depends on it alone; this however does not exclude that in other ways or in other genera of causes an existing thing depends on other things in its actual existence, which must be attentively considered, because some Thomists seem to have either ignored this or dissimulated it, as was touched upon in the arguments of the first opinion and we will see in their solutions. But this is evident also in their opinion; for, if existence and essence are distinct by nature of the thing and from them existing being is composed as from act and potency, it is necessary that that composite in the nature of existing being intrinsically depend, both on the entity of essence and on the entity of existence, although on this formally, on that materially; indeed it is necessary that the very entity of existence depend on the entity of essence in the genus of material cause, just as conversely essence depends on existence in the genus of formal cause.

2. Again, in every opinion it is necessary that the existence of a created thing depend on the existence of some thing, at least in the genus of efficient cause. But if the existing created thing is imperfect or incomplete in the genus of being, it is necessary that the whole actual entity, and even the existence itself of such a thing, depend on another, either as on a subject, or as on what sustains, or as on union with another, or as on the ultimate term of complete entity. This is proved by induction, which can be made by various examples, according to various opinions; for thus the humanity of Christ and its created existence depends on the Word as on what sustains, and on the Incarnation as on the union by which it is joined to the Word; thus

[29] constitutum, 1960; alit. constitutivum. "En algunas ediciones, constitutivum en lugar de constitutun." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 42.

also the humanity of Peter and its existence depends on subsistence as on the ultimate term completing the substance; just as also a line, however much it is conceived as actually existing, can be said to depend on a point as on its term. But one example is almost beyond all controversy; for an accidental form brings with it its existence, which existence naturally depends on the subject, as on a material cause, and on union or inherence in the subject, as on the mode by which it is sustained by the subject through mediation; and (what is more certain) a material substantial form brings with it its existence, which naturally depends on matter as on a material cause. But the general reason is because every being which in its order is imperfect and incomplete can depend on another being, either as on an intrinsic cause, or as on an extrinsic one, according as it will have been accommodated to its nature; for this involves no repugnance, and otherwise it is consonant with the imperfection of such being. But if this is easily admitted and without controversy in the entity of actual essence, there is no reason why it should be denied in the entity of existence, since that also can be imperfect and weak for sustaining itself, as is evidently established in every existence of an accident.

*Point of Controversy*

3. From these things therefore it is correctly concluded that actual essence as such, even if in its intrinsic and formal being it includes the being of existence, as has been proved, nevertheless can naturally need some further term, or mode or union, so that it exists in the nature of things, either simply, or in a connatural way, as the discourse made and the examples and reasons adduced in it clearly explain and confirm. Hence therefore the proposed question has arisen; for some say that, even if essence through its real being of essence is a true actual being, nevertheless it needs another further actuality distinct from it so that it can exist, and they call this existence.

4. Nevertheless it must be said that real and actual essence can indeed naturally postulate a mode of subsisting or inhering, so that it may be; yet this mode or further term is not the existence of that essence itself, nor can another be conceived besides these modes or terms, which both is distinct by nature of the thing from actual essence, and is the true existence of it. This is easily proved by running through individual essences and their modes. And beginning from the clearer ones, an accidental form besides the actual entity essential to it, includes actual union or inherence to the subject, which the mystery of the Eucharist has sufficiently shown to be distinct by nature of the thing from the entity of the accidental form, in which actual inherence has been separated and destroyed, with the entity of the accident preserved; just as also the same mystery shows that the same actual inherence is outside the essence of the accident. But this inherence is not the being of existence of the accident; for who has ever said this? For in the sacrament of the altar no new being of existence is created, by which the consecrated accidents exist, as almost all theologians teach; therefore the consecrated accidents retain the existence which they had in the bread and do not retain inherence; therefore inherence is not the existence of the accident, but a certain mode of it, by which through mediation, that existence naturally depends and is conserved by the subject, which dependence God supplies in the separated accident. And the same is true, proportion being preserved, in a material form with respect to matter, and in matter with respect to form, as we will say more broadly below.

5. Substantial existence is something distinct from subsistence. But substantial nature, which exists per se, besides the actual entity of essence, includes a certain ultimate term, by which it positively subsists, as we will say below in its place against Scotus and others. We also now suppose this term to be distinct by nature of the thing from the actual entity of the whole nature or substantial essence. We likewise deny that this term is existence, but the subsistence of the nature or supposit. And although perhaps those who speak thus, so as

to call that term or subsistence substantial existence, might disagree with us only in the mode of speaking, nevertheless there can also be a real difference, and if it is only in words, they do not speak correctly. For indeed, if they call subsistence itself existence, because they truly think substantial essence is first and formally constituted in the being of being in act and distinguished from possible being through subsistence itself as such, this is plainly false, as Thomists also more frequently hold, and we will see below when treating of subsistence. And this can be proved from what has been said thus far. For we have shown that that being by which essence is first and formally constituted within the latitude of being in act and is distinguished from possible essence, cannot be something distinct by nature of the thing from the actual entity of essence; therefore this cannot be the formal effect of subsistence, since we suppose this to be distinct by nature of the thing. Moreover, just as this mode is distinct from the entity of essence, so the entity of essence can be conserved with such mode destroyed, and then it retains all that intrinsic being by which it is constituted in such actuality or actual entity; therefore it is not formally and intrinsically constituted in that actuality through subsistence. The antecedent is supposed from the mystery of the Incarnation and from those things which we will say below concerning nature and subsistence. But the consequence is proved first, because the same constituted in number cannot be conserved with the intrinsic and formal constitutive destroyed, just as the same person cannot remain with personality taken away, even if the same nature remains. Second, from similarity; for we correctly prove that the formal constitutive of an accident in the nature of being in act is not inherence, because, with inherence taken away, the same accident in number is conserved in the nature of being in act; therefore the same is true in the present case. Therefore in this sense it cannot truly be said that the mode of subsisting is the very being of existence of substantial nature.

6. But in another sense someone could speak thus, namely, because the actual entity of substantial essence cannot exist in the nature of things without such a mode, and that on account of this cause that being by which essence is intrinsically constituted being in act, is not called the being of existence, but of essence only, because by itself it does not suffice for constituting an existing thing, yet it suffices for constituting the essence of a thing; but the term or mode of subsistence is called the being of existence, because it completes the entity of the thing, and, with that posited, it suffices that the thing exist. And this mode of speaking is indeed only diverse from our opinion in the use of terms; for we especially contend this, and we think the whole matter lies in this, that in created beings, besides the actual entity of essence and the mode of existing per se or in another, no other being of existence should be feigned distinct by nature of the thing from the actual entity of essence and from the mode of existing per se or inhering in another, which that opinion explained in that way already concedes to us. Nevertheless that mode of speaking greatly displeases us. First, on account of the abuse of terms, because by the being of existence no one understands everything without which the actual identity of a thing cannot be conserved, but that by which formally such entity is constituted in the nature of being in act and outside its causes; therefore, although the actual entity of substantial essence cannot be without subsistence, if through that it does not formally have that it be outside causes, it cannot be said that through that it exists, and consequently neither can that be called existence.

7. Second, because otherwise the subject of an accident would have to be called the existence of the accident, because without it it cannot naturally exist. Indeed, matter could be called the existence of a form depending on it in being, and form of matter. And further, if they speak consistently, they ought to call actual essence the existence of its subsistence, because subsistence cannot exist without the nature, which it terminates and on which it depends. If therefore all these things are to be denied, only because that dependence in existing is

not as from a formal constitutive of actual entity, by the same reasoning it must be denied that subsistence is the existence of that nature which it terminates.

8. Third, because at least supernaturally existing nature is conserved, with proper subsistence taken away, as is evident in the mystery of the Incarnation. You will say that it is indeed conserved without proper subsistence, yet not without some other existence, which can supply the place of the proper one, which can also be called the existence of the nature. But against this is, both that it is still under controversy whether created nature can be conserved without any subsistence, both proper and alien, and Cajetan with others holds that it can, and it is probable, as we will see later; and also because, although, with proper subsistence taken away, another is substituted in its place, the nature always remains the same in number in the nature of such existing entity, which could not be if it existed formally through subsistence, because with the formal constitutive varied it is necessary that the constituted be varied.

9. Fourth, because subsistence is related to substantial nature, just as inherence to accidental nature; for per se and in another, taken with proportion, are opposed to each other and are concerned in their way with the same divided thing; whence, just as actual inherence is a mode of existing nature, so actual perseity, which is proper subsistence, is a mode of existing nature; therefore it cannot correctly be called the existence of it. Nor do I see by what reasoning those who speak thus are moved, unless so that at least in words they may defend that existence is distinguished by nature of the thing from essence, when in reality they only think thus about subsistence.

### *The Principal Intended Assertion is Persuaded*

10. It remains that we prove the other part principally intended by us, namely, that besides the actual entity of essence and

that being by which it is constituted in it and which is not distinguished from it in reality, and besides the mode of subsistence or inherence, no other being of existence is given distinct by nature of the thing from these. But a sufficient proof of such truth seems to be, because every other entity or real mode is superfluous and fabricated without proof; why therefore should it be multiplied? The antecedent is explained, because the reasons which are brought forward to prove such distinct existence, either prove only about subsistence in substantial nature, and inherence in accidental, or are entirely ineffective, because they suppose I know not what eternal being of essence of a creature, which in truth is nothing. Wherefore those reasons would equally prove that actual and temporal being of essence is distinguished by nature of the thing from the essence of a creature, which no one can assert who moderately conceives the things which are signified by these words.

11. And from this it is also sufficiently established that such entity or mode is superfluous. First indeed, because, if there were any necessity or utility of it, it could be explained and persuaded by some probable reason. Then, what, I ask, is the formal effect of such entity or mode, on account of which it is attributed by nature or by God? For it cannot be that essence becomes actual being and is constituted outside its causes, for this it has formally through the actual being of essence, as we have often proved; nor also that the entity of essence actually be per se or in another, for it has these modes of being through subsistence or inherence; what therefore does another existence confer? You will say: it confers existing, or formally constitutes essence not in the nature of essence, but in the nature of existence. But this is begging the question, or explaining the same through the same; for this is what we inquire, what existing adds beyond actual being outside causes, communicated through the effecting of an efficient cause, by which essence is truly constituted in the nature of being in act, when we suppose there is no discussion of subsistence or inherence; and similarly we inquire what existing adds

above being in act outside causes, supposing that it does not add being subsistent or inherent. Because therefore no real reason distinct from the aforesaid can be conceived, we conclude that being in act and existing signify the same thing and formal reason, and therefore no being of existence can be feigned distinct from that being by which each thing is constituted in the actuality of its essence.

12. And from this we further infer that such entity of existence distinct in the said way, is not only superfluous, but plainly impossible. First indeed, because this entity is not posited as extrinsically added by God for some greater perfection of things, but as connatural and due and altogether necessary so that a thing may be outside its causes. If therefore it is not necessary, it is also not possible in this way, because nature does not love nor postulate what is superfluous. Second and a priori, because where there is no formal effect or it is not possible, neither is form possible; but here there is no formal effect which such entity can give. This is easily evident from what has been said, because neither being[30] being in act, nor being in such a way, namely, in itself or in another, can formally proceed from such entity; but besides these formal effects no other can be conceived fitting to created being, insofar as it is created being and existing.

13. And in this matter an open difference is perceived between subsistence and that existence which is feigned to be distinct from actual essence; for concerning subsistence, the formal effect on account of which it is necessary can easily be declared; for it is not posited in order to constitute substantial nature in the character of being in act, but to complete and terminate its being in such a way and render it so existing in itself and through itself and as if sufficient unto itself for sustaining intrinsically its own being, that it is rendered incapable of alien subsistence or of union to it so as to be sustained in its being through it; just as, conversely, in accidental form the quasi-formal effect which inherence has in the essence of accidental form is also easily declared, which is not to constitute it in the character of

[30] esse, 1060; alit. om. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 49.

being in act, but to unite it to something by which it may be sustained. But truly concerning existence it cannot be declared what formal effect it has regarding essence, except to constitute it in the character of being in act, which effect nevertheless cannot formally and intrinsically be from existence, which would be an entity distinct from the very being itself, or essence which is constituted in act, as has been shown and will again be proved below; and therefore, although a mode distinct from actual essence by the nature of the thing, which is subsistence or inherence, is easily understood, nevertheless one which would be existence and would be distinguished both from subsistence or inherence and from actual essence is not understood.

### *An Objection Against What Has Been Said is Satisfied*

14. But someone objects, for this entire discourse seems to suppose that the whole actuality of essence comes formally from existence, which however is false, because within the breadth of essence the lower grade is actuality with respect to the higher; and form is actuality with respect to matter, not through existence, but through the being of essence, although existence is a condition without which it does not actuate it. And it is further declared, for it is one thing for a man to be, another thing for a man to be rational, or to be animal. The first he has from existence, the second from the being of essence; and in each there is its proportionate actuality.

15. To the objection I respond that there is equivocation in the word actuality or act; for it can be taken either as it is opposed to objective potency, or as it respects receptive potency; we speak of actuality in the former sense, in which it is most true that all actuality of being comes intrinsically and formally from the being of existence, because being in act is formally the same as existing. But the objection proceeds in the latter sense; for form is the actuality of matter, as act received in it; but the difference is only act of the genus according to

reason, because it is conceived as if it were received in it; for between a higher and lower grade there cannot be a real relation of act and potency, since in reality they are not actually distinguished. But the prior or entitative actuality is so compared to the posterior or formal act, that sometimes they are distinguished in reality, sometimes only by reason; for that actuality is transcendent, and is participated not only by formal act, but also by receptive potency, whose entitative actuality is really distinguished from the actuality of form; but in form itself, to be the act of matter, at least in aptitude, and to be such a being in act are distinguished only by reason, because by one concept is explained the proper relation to receptive potency, which is not explained by another. And thus not only is it true that being in act, distinguished from being in potency, is constituted formally and intrinsically through the being of existence, but it is also true that all formal actuality, or rather actuation, as I may say, just as it comes from some partial actual essence, so it comes from some existence, for form does not actuate matter except as it itself is such actual being, which it has through its being of existence. To the confirmation it is responded that according to reality it is the same for a man to be, and for a man to be a man, if in both propositions "being" expresses act and not mere aptitude or truth of the proposition. And similarly in reality it is the same for a man to be a man, and to be rational, or animal, etc., because all these things in reality are the same. Therefore from the same actuality and from the same thing all these predicates are taken, whether that thing be called actual essence, or its actual being, and only through precisions and compositions of reason are all these things distinguished. There is not therefore in one thing except one being by which it is constituted being in act, and that very being is the being of existence.

## SECTION VI
## WHAT DISTINCTION CAN INTERVENE OR BE UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN ESSENCE AND CREATED EXISTENCE.

### *The Real Distinction Between Actual Essence & Existence is Excluded*

1. If those things which we have said are sufficiently proved by us, it is not difficult from them to gather what should be thought regarding the proposed question and concerning the opinions related in the first section. For it must be said first that created essence constituted in act outside its causes is not really distinguished from existence, so that they would be two things or distinct entities. In this conclusion I suppose the signification of terms and the distinction already declared concerning essence in potency or in act. I also suppose that there is no discussion concerning subsistence or inherence, but concerning the proper being of existence. Therefore the conclusion thus expounded can be proved from Aristotle, who everywhere says that being added to things adds nothing to them; for it is the same to be a being-man as to be a man; but this, with the same proportion, is true of a thing in potency and in act; therefore being in act, which is properly being and the same as existing, adds nothing to the thing or actual essence, according to the opinion of Aristotle, who speaks thus, III Metaph., c. 2, lib. V, c. 7, lib. X, c. 4. Averroes imitates him in the same places, reproving Avicenna.

2. But it is chiefly demonstrated by reason, because such an entity, added to actual essence, can neither formally confer the first (so to speak) actuality or first character of being in act, by which it is separated and distinguished from being in potency, nor can it be necessary under any character of cause, properly or reductively, so that

essence would have its actual being of essence; therefore such a distinct entity cannot be feigned for any reason. The consequence is evident from a sufficient enumeration of parts, because neither has anything else been devised up to now, nor certainly can anything else be devised as another function of such an entity. But the first member of the partition posited is both admitted by all authors, even by those who really distinguish existence from essence; and it is plainly evident from the very declaration of terms themselves, now sufficiently given in the suppositions posited; for it is repugnant that an entity be constituted in the being of entity through something distinct from itself.

3. Which I further demonstrate in this manner: for every form really distinct from the potency which it actuates composes with it one composite. Whence such act can be called formal cause, either with respect to the composite, or with respect to the potency or other quasi-part composing, if without such act or form it cannot be. Therefore with respect to the composite such act is most excellently and most truly said to constitute it formally and intrinsically, nevertheless it cannot be completely distinguished from it, but is necessarily included in it, and is distinguished as part from whole, because such act cannot be the total entity of the composite, which necessarily includes another co-part or other component. But truly if the act be compared to another thing or potency of which it is the act, it cannot intrinsically and formally constitute the proper being of it, because that being is not composite, but simple; otherwise it would not be the other composing part, but the whole composite, which in real composition from distinct things is altogether repugnant. Likewise otherwise that being or part which receives[31] the act would consist of that act and some other thing, concerning which I would again inquire whether it is constituted intrinsically and formally through that act; for, if this is affirmed, we will proceed further to

[31] recipit, 1960; alit. incipit. "The substitution of recipit for incipit in some editions seems to us less accurate." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 53.

infinity; but if it is denied, the intended conclusion follows, namely, that potency properly composing with act really distinct cannot be intrinsically and formally constituted through that very act with which it composes. And thus, when the ultimate resolution to first or most simple components is made, it is necessary that that entity which is compared to another as potency not be constituted intrinsically and formally in its entity through the other, which is act, although perhaps it may postulate it in order to be, just as matter postulates form. Thus therefore one would have to philosophize concerning the entity of essence and the entity of existence, if they were distinct; for they would compose one thing, for example, this existing thing, with respect to which existence would be related as intrinsic and formal act; nevertheless with respect to the entity of essence it could in no way intrinsically constitute or compose it, because one would be distinguished from the other, as simple entity from simple entity. Nor can it be said that the entity of essence so conceived and distinct is not actual, because otherwise it would not compose really, since entity in objective potency does not make real composition with act. Thus therefore it is openly evident that the entity of existence distinct from the entity of essence cannot be required in order to intrinsically constitute the very entity of essence in its proper actuality.

4. But the other member, namely, that such distinct entity is not required in any other genus of cause so that the very entity of essence can be in the nature of things, has been sufficiently (as I think) proved in the preceding sections, when we showed that, besides the being of actual essence and the mode of subsistence or inherence, there is no necessity for another existence. Or certainly let it be shown to us or declared what this causality is and to what genus it is to be reduced. Some say that entity is a necessary condition, without which the entity of essence cannot remain in the nature of things. But first this response, which is easily said, not only in this but also in many other questions, is not to be admitted, unless both a sufficient reason for the necessity is given, and the mode or causality of such condition

is declared, otherwise someone could gratuitously postulate several such conditions for some effect, by the fact that no greater reason can be given for one than for several. Since therefore in the preceding sections it has been shown that there is no utility, much less necessity, on account of which this entity should be multiplied, it is gratuitously said to be a necessary condition; and with what facility it is said, it ought to be rejected. I add further from what has been said above that, even if that entity were a necessary condition, it could not therefore be called the proper being of existence of the actual essence itself, because it would not constitute it in the character of being in act. Otherwise every other condition or thing without which essence itself could not remain in the nature of things would have to be called its existence, because there is no greater reason for this than for the rest. Besides this, granted that entity is a necessary condition by the nature of the thing, since it is not the formal cause of the actual entity of essence, why could not at least by absolute power the entity of essence remain and be conserved in the nature of things in its actuality, so that it would truly be being in act, without that entity or necessary condition, which they call existence? For, formal intrinsic causality being excluded, no implication can be brought forward. But if God can do this, therefore then the actual entity of essence has its proper and intrinsic actual being, by which it is in the nature of things and outside its causes. But what else is it to exist than thus to be? Therefore that other entity is not simply necessary for existing; therefore truly it is not existence.

5. But it can finally be said that there is a double respect of formal cause: one is to the composite which it constitutes; and in this way it is true that the entity of existence is not the formal cause of the actual entity of essence; and this can be called intrinsic formal cause, because it intrinsically composes its effect. But it has another respect of formal cause to the subject which it informs, because if by informing or actuating it, it contributes to its being, it can rightly be called the formal cause of it, and in this way in natural things form is

not only cause of the composite, but also of matter. And in the same way it can be said that the entity of existence is the formal cause of the entity of essence, because by constituting existing being with it, it actuates it, and thus formally makes it remain in being. And a proportional reason can be given, because, just as matter is pure potency in order to formal act, so the essence of creature is pure potency in order to existing, and therefore, just as matter requires form in order to be, although it does not compose it, but with it, so essence requires the entity of existence in order to be, although it does not compose it, but with it.

6. And this way of responding and declaring this opinion is less improbable than the rest. But truly it has the same difficulties, and can give no sufficient reason why that formal act would be necessary, if it is not necessary in order to intrinsically constitute being in act and outside causes. Therefore we very easily admit that distinction of formal cause in a good sense, according to what has been said above concerning causes. It is also most true that existence cannot be formal cause intrinsically constituting actual entity of essence. Hence however we conclude that no constituted thing can be assigned on account of which such entity would be necessary; and consequently we infer that it cannot be necessary as formal act, as if coming to essence and composing with it something else. The prior inference has been proved in the preceding sections; for the constituted thing intrinsically through existence could not be except existing; but existing and being in act, that is, not in potency, are altogether the same. If therefore that entity is not necessary for intrinsically constituting being in act, it is also not necessary for intrinsically constituting existing being; therefore no proximate constituted thing can be assigned on account of which it would be necessary. And hence the posterior inference is also evident; for form is through itself first for the sake of the composite, and hence consequently it can be necessary for the sake of the other composing part, if that is such that it cannot be outside the composite. If therefore there is no composite

on account of which a distinct formal act would be necessary, it cannot be necessary on account of the other composing part.

7. Moreover hence it is established that what is assumed in the proportion assumed in the superior reason is false; for, although the essence of creature before it comes to be can be said to be in pure objective potency on its own part, nevertheless that essence as it is now actual entity through the bringing about of its cause, is not in itself and on its own part pure potency in order to being, but intrinsically and altogether identically has some real and actual being, which being is true existence, since it constitutes formally and intrinsically entity outside its cause, all of which have been proved in the preceding sections; therefore without any foundation it is said that entity depends on another formal and distinct act in order to be. Especially because the reasons by which the necessity of distinct existence is usually proved, all are founded on this that to be in act is not of the essence of creature, since that essence can be understood in objective potency alone on its part, and effective on the part of the creator; therefore, if now some actual and entitative being is supposed by which that essence is outside objective potency, no reason remains on account of which another formal act distinct from the prior being would be required, since also that actual being cannot be of the essence of creature. And since the very entity of existence can be sometimes in potency, sometimes in act, and consequently also concerning it one must confess that it is not of its essence to actually exist, nor to actually constitute existing thing, which reason we will urge more broadly in solving arguments and turning them back against the contrary position.

8. Moreover here also has place the reason made, that at least through divine power the actual entity of essence could be conserved, without that further other formal act, because, although God cannot supply formal cause as intrinsically composing, he can nevertheless supply the dependence of one composing part on another, even if that is formal act. Just as, although he cannot supply material cause as

intrinsically composing, he can nevertheless supply the dependence of form or accident on material cause, as has been said more broadly in the preceding sections. But if God conserves actual essence without further act of distinct existence, that entity thus conserved truly exists, and consequently, whatever is feigned to be added, cannot have the true character of existence, and is said without cause to be naturally necessary for the formal effect of existing. And for the force of this reason, precision alone through our concepts suffices, for, by this very fact that we understand the entity of actual essence made by God, even if we do not understand that another entity has been added to it, we sufficiently conceive it as existing, nor in this objective concept do we include anything false or self-contradictory; hence however we rightly infer that no distinct and superadded entity can be necessary for the formal effect of existing, because formal effect cannot even mentally be prescinded from formal cause. But if on account of constituting this formal effect that entity is not necessary, it can neither truly be called existence, nor can a probable cause be given on account of which it would be necessary as condition, or posterior cause in some extrinsic way.

### *The Modal Distinction Between Actual Essence & Existence is Excluded*

9. Secondly it must be said that existence is not distinguished from the actual entity of essence as a mode distinct from it by the nature of the thing. This conclusion follows, in my judgment, evidently from the preceding one; and therefore I think that those who, denying the prior distinction, admit this one in the present matter do not speak consistently. For, although speaking in general, this distinction, which is lesser, can intervene where the prior, which is greater, does not intercede, nevertheless in the present case the reasons which prove that existence is not an entity distinct from actual essence simply prove that such existence is nothing at all, or (which is

the same) that besides actual entity of essence nothing further can formally be required for existing as such, but only for subsisting or inhering, or something similar. Which will easily be established by applying all the reasons made; for we have shown that that real being by which actual essence is immediately and intrinsically constituted being in act cannot be distinguished by the nature of the thing from essence itself as it is entity in act. And besides the reasons made above, sect. III, it is easily declared in this manner: for positive distinction by the nature of the thing on the part of both extremes cannot intercede except between two extremes, one of which is the mode of the other, so that the thing, as prescinded from the mode, is positive and real being in act, otherwise the distinction will be either of reason, or such as can be between being and non-being; if therefore essence, as it is being in act, were distinguished by the nature of the thing from that being by which it is first and intrinsically constituted in such actuality, as thing from its mode, essence itself, precisely conceived and distinguished from that mode, would be true being in act; therefore, as such entity is, it could not be intrinsically constituted in such actual entity through that mode, or through distinct being, but rather with it would compose some third composite. For from those things which are distinguished by the nature of the thing as being and mode there comes true real composition; but the very extremes from which real composite is made and into which it is resolved, are necessarily so compared, that one does not compose nor intrinsically constitute the other, as has been declared at the beginning of the superior assertion; therefore such mode, distinct by the nature of the thing, cannot be the first and intrinsic real being constituting actual entity of essence itself; therefore that being by which it is so constituted, whatever that may be, cannot be distinct by the nature of the thing from the very entity of actual essence.

10. And I confirm, for the entity of essence in an angel, for example, precisely conceived without any real mode distinct from it by the nature of the thing, is still conceived as actual entity; for it is

conceived as something temporal and outside nothing, and as sufficient for composing really with another thing or mode added to it, which cannot be understood except in real entity; therefore essence in its entity is not constituted intrinsically through a mode distinct from itself by the nature of the thing; otherwise it could be resolved into another entity and that mode; and thus we would proceed to infinity until we stop at simple actual entity not composed from thing and mode distinct by the nature of the thing, and we call that the entity of essence. Which in the angel of whom we speak is simple entity, and similarly in matter and form, although in these it is partial in order of essence or nature, and therefore from them is composed the integral essence of material thing, which by the same proportion and reason does not include in its entity [of essence][32] any being distinct from itself as a whole, or from matter, form and their union taken together.

11. Again we have shown that this very real being by which essence is first constituted being in act is the true being of existence; therefore from this part it has already been sufficiently proved that such being of existence is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from actual essence. But we add further that, besides this being of existence, no other being is necessary so that a thing may exist, because intrinsic and entitative being itself suffices, and to it alone can be added the mode either of subsisting, or of inhering, and every other entity or real mode instituted solely for existing is utterly fabricated. And thus it remains proved not only that there is not given existence which would be entity distinct from entity of essence, but neither even which would be mode distinct by the nature of the thing. And it is confirmed by the argument also insinuated above, because, if anything would compel to this modal distinction, it would be especially that the essence of creature can exist and not exist; but also that mode, which is said to be distinct existence, can actually be and in objective potency alone, which is to be able to exist and not exist; therefore also in that mode there will be distinction by the nature of the thing between it

[32] [essentiae], 1960; alit. om. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 59.

and its actual being, which is impossible; otherwise the same argument will be made concerning the being of existence of that mode, and thus we will proceed to infinity. If therefore in existence itself it can be understood that sometimes it is and sometimes it is not, without distinction by the nature of the thing, why cannot the same be understood in actual essence?

12. I know that certain Thomists[33] deny that the act of being, by which created essence exists, is its own being. But I do not see in what sense this can be true, speaking of its own being, only as regards identity or indistinction, for, if it is not its own being, therefore it has being distinct from itself, and then concerning that it will be necessary to inquire whether it is its own being. For, if it is so, why is not the same said of the first act of being? But if it is not, we will proceed further to infinity. Unless perhaps they say that the act of being of [created][34] essence neither is its own being, nor has any being, but only is that by which another is. But this is rather to play with words than to solve the difficulty, for, although existence is not said to be or exist as subject, which most properly is, nevertheless there is no doubt but that, speaking more generally, it truly exists just as accidents exist, or parts and other incomplete beings. For, if this existence is being distinct from essence by the nature of the thing, therefore, in the way that it is being, it has being; for being is named from being. Likewise such being before the creation of things was only in potency; and after creation it is being in act; therefore it is outside causes or in the nature of things; therefore it is necessary that it have proportionate being, or that it be its own being. Then, even if we speak thus, that existence, namely, does not exist, but is that by which essence exists, in this very thing we can consider the difference posited, namely, that sometimes such existence actually constitutes existing thing, sometimes only in objective potency; whence also, although we may argue that it is not of

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[33] Bannes, I p., q. 44, aa. 1, ad 4 argum. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 60.

[34] [creatae], 1960; alit. om. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 60.

the essence of existence to actually constitute existing thing, because in existence in potency is conceived all that which is of the essence of created existence, even if it is not conceived as actually exercising or being the act of existing or constituting existing thing; and nevertheless existence is not distinguished by the nature of the thing according to its essential character from itself, as it actually exercises the function of existence, so that distinction is conceived between two members which are something in act; therefore the same is true of essence existing or not existing. And in this way all the reasons by which others attempt to prove distinction by the nature of the thing between essence and created existence, are plainly weakened and rendered feeble by the instance or example of created existence, as is sufficiently evident from what has been said and we will often emphasize in the solutions of arguments. And hence is excluded the response of others, saying that existence does not need another existence by which it may exist; for, since it is the reason of existing for another, consequently it can exist through itself. Just as action comes about through itself, by this very fact that through it the terminus comes about, and the duration of motion endures by itself, and quantity extends itself. But this response proceeds as if the force of the reason made were founded on this that the formal principle of some effect could never through itself participate in some way in that effect, which we do not say, nor is it universally true, as the induction made rightly proves. Therefore the reason is not founded on that, but on this that from the fact that something sometimes is and sometimes is not, distinction by the nature of the thing between that which exists and that by which it exists cannot be gathered. But if from this principle it is not gathered, there is no other from which it can be gathered. But in the examples adduced, either there is not always distinction by the nature of the thing between that by which and that which, as perhaps between duration and that which endures, or if there is, it is to be gathered from elsewhere; and it is never to be admitted without sufficient indication, as has been treated above.

## Section VI

### *In What Way Essence & Existence Are Distinguished*

13. I say thirdly, in creatures existence and essence are distinguished, either as being in act and in potency, or, if both are taken in act, they are distinguished only by reason with some foundation in the thing, which distinction will be sufficient so that we may say absolutely that it is not of the essence of creature to actually exist. To understand this distinction and the locutions which are founded on it, it is necessary to suppose (which is most certain) that no being besides God has from itself its own being, insofar as it is true being. Which I add in order to remove equivocation concerning entity in potency, which truly is not entity, but nothing, and on the part of the creatable thing says only non-repugnancy or logical potency. We speak therefore of true actual entity, whether it be entity of essence, or of existence; for no entity outside God exists except through the efficiency of God. Therefore no thing outside God has from itself its own being; for that "from itself" includes the negation of having from another, that is, it expresses such nature which without the efficiency of another would have actual being, or rather would be actual being.

14. And hence is gathered in what sense it is most truly said that to actually exist is of the essence of God and not of the essence of creature. Because, namely, God alone from the force of his nature has [actually][35] to exist without the efficiency of another; but creature from the force of its nature does not have to actually exist without the efficiency of another. In this sense however it is also not of the essence of creature to have actual entity of essence, because from the force of its nature alone it does not have such actuality without the efficiency of another; and thus all actual being by which essence in act is separated from essence in potency is said not to be of the essence of creature, because it does not belong to creature from itself alone, nor is

[35] [actu], 1960; alit. om. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 63.

it itself sufficient so that it may have this being, but it must come from the efficiency of another. From which it manifestly happens that for the truth of this locution distinction by the nature of the thing between being and the thing of which it is said to be the being is not necessary, but it suffices that that thing not have its own being, or rather that it neither be nor be able to be that being unless it is made by another, because through that locution is not signified distinction of one from another, but only the condition, limitation and imperfection of such being, which does not have from itself the necessity of being what it is, but only has this from the influence of another.

15. And hence it follows further that our intellect, which can prescind those things that are not separated in reality, can also conceive creatures by abstracting them from actual existence, because, since they do not exist necessarily, it is not contradictory to conceive their natures prescinding from efficiency, and consequently from actual existence. But when they are thus abstracted, they are also prescinded from the actual entity of essence, both because they do not have this without efficiency, either from themselves or from necessity, and also because actual entity cannot be prescinded from existence, as was proven above. From this mode of our conceiving, however, it comes about that in the thing thus conceived, prescinding from actual entity, something is considered as wholly intrinsic and necessary and as it were the primary constitutive element of that thing which is presented to such conception; and this we call the essence of the thing, because without it the thing cannot be conceived; and the predicates that are drawn from this are said to belong to it wholly necessarily and essentially, because without them it can neither be nor be conceived, although in reality they do not always belong to it, but when the thing exists. And for the opposite reason, we deny that actually existing or being actual entity belongs to the essence, because it can be prescinded from the aforesaid concept, and in fact may not belong to the creature as it is presented to such a concept. All these

things happen differently in God, because, since He is a being necessary from Himself, He cannot be conceived in the manner of potential being, but only as actual, and therefore to actually be is truly said to belong to His essence, because actually being belongs to Him necessarily both in reality itself and in every true objective concept of divinity.

16. How the distinction of reason between essence and existence is explained by some. From these things, therefore, the whole matter is briefly explained, and from the same doctrine the individual parts of the assertion set forth can be declared and proven. And first, there is no theologian who does not admit a distinction of reason between essence and existence, although not all explain it in the same way. Some say that existence expresses individual nature, while essence only expresses specific nature abstracted from individuals, and therefore they say there is between them a distinction of reason, such as exists between species and individuals. But these do not reach nor achieve the meaning of the question. For this question is different from that concerning the distinction of specific nature from the individual; for essence can be not only specific, but also individual and singular, just as was the essence of man in Christ, concerning which it is inquired in what way it is distinguished from its existence; and similarly existence itself can be conceived in common and can be singular; for the existence of Peter is one thing and that of Paul another; therefore existence no more expresses a singular thing than essence does, nor are essence and existence distinguished as common and particular; therefore the distinction of existence from essence is not the same as that of the individual from specific nature. Although by way of example or similarity that distinction might serve to declare how a distinction of reason between existence and essence might suffice for denying that actually existing belongs to the essence of a creature; for a similar distinction of reason between individual and species suffices so that the specific character alone is said to be the whole essence of the thing, and not individuation.

17. The exposition of others. Others say that the essence and existence of a creature differ only in relation to God, because essence as such does not regard God as efficient cause, but only as exemplar; existence, however, adds to essence a relation to God as efficient cause from which it is participated. Nevertheless this exposition either does not clarify the matter, or includes many false things. For first, as regards the being of essence, either it speaks of actual essence, or that which includes the true reality of essence, or of potential essence. In the former way it would be more than false to say that the essence of a creature is not from God as from efficient cause, as was proven above. In the latter way, however, it is gratuitously said that the essences of creatures only regard God as exemplar cause, because in truth essences thus conceived have no cause in act, since they are nothing in act; in potency, however, or in first and virtual act, they have not only an exemplar cause, but also an efficient one. Indeed, setting aside causality, or order, or application to causing, God is rather said to have the reasons of possible things, than exemplars; for the former only indicate speculative knowledge; the latter, however, more denote a practical relation of cause. Again, the essences of creatures are not such, or do not have such a connection of essential predicates, because they regard such reasons or divine exemplars, but rather therefore God knows each possible thing in such essence and nature, because it is thus knowable and makeable, and not otherwise; therefore essence taken in this way, although it has a reason or exemplar in God, is not called essence from this relation alone to the exemplar as such. Add also that created or possible existence has an exemplar in God, although not distinct from the exemplar of essence itself. For nothing can have an efficient cause in God that does not have an exemplar, because God operates nothing except as an intellectual agent.

18. Moreover, as regards the other part concerning existence, which they say only adds above essence a relation to God as to efficient cause, either they think that existence consists in this relation, or that it brings this relation with itself. The first is plainly false,

because the existence of an absolute thing[36] is not a relation, but something absolute. Also, because that relation, in order to actually be in the nature of things, is founded in or adheres to an existing creature. And indeed, if it is understood to be a real predicamental relation, it presupposes a creature already made and existing; but if there is talk of a transcendental relation of dependence on God, this is not the existence of the creature, but its causality; whence it is distinguished not only by reason, but by the nature of the thing from the existence of the creature, as was shown in disputation XVIII, and below, in disputation XLVIII, it will be touched upon again. The second, however, is true, namely, that the actual existence of a creature has this relation to God joined with itself, but nevertheless actual essence has the same joined with itself, which cannot be such except through the efficiency of God; therefore essence is not correctly distinguished from existence by this relation. And moreover, if existence has this relation joined to it, therefore it is something distinct from it; therefore concerning existence itself, as distinct from such relation, it remains to be explained how it is distinguished by reason from essence; indeed that is more obscure which Henry says, that they are distinguished neither really, nor by reason alone, but by intention. For what is it to be distinguished by intention except by mental conception? Finally, in that very relation of creature to God, essence can be distinguished from existence, as distinct by reason, and not through the relation, as is evident per se.

19. The explanation of others. Others distinguish by reason the being of existence from the being of essence, because one is conceived in the manner of the concrete, the other in the manner of the abstract; so thinks Lychetus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, where he first says, according to the mind of Scotus, that the being of existence and the being of essence are the same and wholly inseparable, although

[36] absolutae, 1960; absolute, ed. Vivès. "Nos parece más acertada la lectura de absolutae que la de absolute, como figura, entre otras, en la ed. Vivès." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 66.

Scotus, there, in the section "As to this article," does not say they are the same, but that the being of essence is never really separated from the being of existence. Nevertheless this is quite probably gathered from the mind of Scotus; for since he there says that essence is not separable from existence, and In III, dist. 6, he expressly teaches that the humanity of Christ could not have been or been assumed without proper existence, he clearly thinks they are not distinguished in reality itself. Whence Lychetus above, in the marginal note, which is his gloss, adds: The being of essence and existence express one and the same reality, and are the same really and are distinguished formally as concrete and abstract, which are distinguished only by reason. Nevertheless in this opinion it remains obscure how the distinction of concrete and abstract has place here. For if we speak of essence and existence, as they are signified by these names, both are conceived in the manner of the abstract, like matter and form, or like act and potency; the concrete, however, will be created being consisting of being and essence. But if we speak under these names of the being of essence and the being of existence, both have the same mode of signifying and are subordinated to the same mode of conceiving. And sometimes, according to the usage of philosophers, this word "being" is usually taken in the force of an abstract name for the very act of being, which they also call existence, which word is not found among the Latins; sometimes, however, it is taken in the force of the infinitive, which is the proper and Latin use of that word, and thus it is properly neither concrete nor abstract, but approaches more to the signification of the concrete, because it signifies the formal effect of the very act of being, but the act itself only as exercising that effect, like running, knowing, and similar things.

20. Hence, however, someone could take occasion to say that essence and being are distinguished by reason, so that the former is abstract in the manner of form, the latter however quasi-concrete in the manner of formal effect exercised; being, however, is properly concrete, as constituted from such form and formal effect; just as

course, to run, and runner are related; wisdom, to know, and knower. According to which mode of distinction, essence is properly abstract; for it is as it were the form whose formal effect is being; the thing constituted through it and being, however, is being itself, which constitution is not through composition of thing, but through identity. This mode of speaking can have foundation in Augustine, book XII of the City of God, chapter 1, saying: Just as from that which is to know is called wisdom, so from that which is to be is called essence. And book II of the Morals of the Manicheans, chapter 2: That very nature (he says) is nothing other than what is understood to be something in its genus. Therefore, just as we now with a new name from that which is to be call essence, which we also usually name substance, so the ancients, who did not have these names, named nature in place of essence. Whence Calepino, citing Augustine, says the word essence is used by philosophers for the very being of any thing. According to this propriety of words, however, although essence and being or existing are distinguished by reason in the aforesaid way, nevertheless essence and existence will not be distinguished among themselves by reason, just as neither being and existing among themselves. For being simply and substantively said is the same as existing, as was said above and is evident from the common use of the words themselves, and because the diversity in things signified by those words and in the ultimate concepts to which they are subordinated cannot be explained. Thus therefore also essence and existence will be the same and differ only in names, because, just as from the verb "I am" and "to be" essence was said by the Latins, because through it the thing is, or because it is that by which something is, so from the verb "I exist" and "to exist" the name of existence was taken by philosophers, by which the thing exists. And for the same reason it must consequently be asserted that the being of essence and of existence, if both are properly taken for true real being, do not differ even by reason, but only in name, because the being of essence and of existence are thus compared among themselves, just as

essence and existence are compared among themselves. And Gabriel seems to have thought in this way about these words and concepts, in the cited place, where he says that being, entity, and essence do not differ according to the thing signified, but only according to grammatical modes, like verb, participle, and noun; and similarly being and existing signify the same, and therefore also essence and existence are the same. And other cited authors embrace the same mode of speaking, and it is indeed probable. It is only necessary to declare some greater difference or distinction of reason between essence and existence, as they are signified by these words by many philosophers, by reason of which it is truly denied that existence belongs to the essence of a creature, which cannot be denied of essence itself.

21. The opinion of others on this matter. Therefore others add that essence and existence differ in this, that essence does not express a thing outside its causes, but absolutely; existence, however, expresses a thing having being in itself and outside its causes. Fonseca disapproves of this mode of speaking, because it does not declare what it is for a thing to be outside causes, for either this is to be referred to causes, and this is not to exist, as was proven against Henry, or it is to have received being from causes and not to have lost it, and this indeed is as it were preliminary to being, but is not properly and formally being itself. Or finally it is for a thing not to be only objectively in the intellect, or in the power of causes, and this indeed declares what it is not, but not what existence itself is or how it is distinguished from essence. But it can be responded that for a thing to be outside causes is nothing other than to be in itself a being in act; it is said, however, to be outside causes, so that it might be declared that it does not have that actual entity from itself, but from another. More difficult indeed is that in that opinion being and not being outside causes is common to essence and existence, for both essence is outside causes when the thing is made, just like existence; and existence was only in the potency of the cause and objectively in the intellect, before

the thing was made; therefore the difference between essence and existence cannot be constituted in this. To this, however, it must be said, according to the distinction posited, that it is one thing to speak of essence and existence according to the propriety and rigor of these words, another however extending the aforesaid words to the same or similar signification. For this word existence in rigor does not signify existence (as they say) in signate act or as conceived and only in potency, as Capreolus also indicates in the cited place, but signifies it only in exercised act or as actual; for nothing prevents this state of existence from being signified by some word and the word existence seems invented for this end. Whence, by this very fact that a thing is abstracted from existing in exercised act, existence as signified by this word is no longer conceived. And because this state or this exercise of existing is not from the concept of the essence of a creature as signified by this word, therefore it is correctly said that existence adds to essence the act of being outside its causes; this state, however, in reality does not differ from the very actual entity of essence. But if the name of existence is extended to that which is only in potency or objectively, it must be confessed that the posited difference does not have place, but, proportion being preserved, existence in potency is altogether the same as essence in potency, and existence in act the same as essence in act.

22. According to this true doctrine and reason of distinguishing essence and existence, it plainly follows that essence is distinguished from existence taken in that rigor only as being in potency from being in act; and thus they are distinguished not only by reason, but also really privatively, as being and non-being, because being in potency, as I said above, is simply non-being. The consequent, however, seems false, because we distinguish at least by reason between essence and existence, as between two positive and real extremes. You will say that indeed those extremes are conceived as positive and real, but not as actual, but abstracting in that latitude in which being abstracts from being in act and in potency. But against

this is that we conceive essence under the proper character of essence, not only as potential, but also as actual, and thus also we distinguish it by reason from existence. For when we say that a thing has in act its essence and its existence, we do not say the same thing twice; therefore those words are not synonymous; therefore their significates are distinguished at least by reason; whence in Christ we suppose there are two essences, and we ask whether there are two existences; and in humanity there are two partial essences, namely, soul and body, and it is controversial whether there are two existences; therefore something must be added to declare this distinction of reason.

23. The author's explanation. It must be said therefore that the same thing is essence and existence, but it is conceived under the character of essence, insofar as by reason of it a thing is constituted under such genus and species. For essence is, as we declared above in disputation II, section 4, that by which something is first constituted within the latitude of real being, as distinguished from fictitious being, and in each particular being its essence is said to be that by reason of which it is constituted in such degree and order of beings. As Augustine said, XII of the City of God, chapter 2: The author of all essences gave to some more being, to others less, and thus ordered the natures of essences by degrees. And for this reason essence is usually signified by the name of quiddity, because it is that which is explained through definition, or some description, through which we declare what the thing is or of what nature. But truly this same thing is conceived under the character of existence, insofar as it is the reason of being in the nature of things and outside causes. For because the essence of a creature does not necessarily have this from its own force, that it be actual entity, therefore, when it receives its entity, we conceive that there is something in it that is the formal reason of being outside causes; and we call that under such character existence, which, although in reality it is not other than the very entity of essence, is nevertheless conceived by us under a diverse character and description, which suffices for a distinction of reason. The foundation

of this distinction, however, is that created things do not have being from themselves and can sometimes not be. For from this it comes about that we conceive the essence of a creature as indifferent to being or not being in act, which indifference is not by way of negative abstraction, but precisive; and therefore, although the character of essence is conceived by us absolutely even in being in potency, nevertheless we understand much more that it is found in being in act, although in it we prescind all that which necessarily and essentially belongs to it, from the very actuality of being; and in this way we conceive essence under the character of essence as potency; existence, however, as its act. For this reason, therefore, we say this distinction of reason has some foundation in reality, which is not some actual distinction that intervenes in reality, but the imperfection of the creature, which, by this very fact that it does not have being from itself and can receive it from another, gives occasion to this our conception.

24. And hence also the last part of the conclusion is evident, for in this way of speaking by the name of creature is not to be understood real actual entity or actually created thing, for if discourse is made with this reduplication or composition, truly the creature essentially demands to actually exist, in order to be a creature. And in this sense, just as whiteness belongs to the essence of white insofar as it is white, so existence belongs to the essence of a creature insofar as the thing is actually created, for it constitutes it equally or more formally than whiteness constitutes white. Whence, just as whiteness is inseparable from white without white being destroyed, so existence is inseparable from a creature without the creature being destroyed, and therefore it is not correctly inferred that, if existence belongs to the essence of a creature taken in the aforesaid way, the creature cannot be deprived of existence, because it only follows that it cannot be deprived of it without being destroyed and ceasing to be a creature, which is evidently most true from what has been said, and will be confirmed more fully from what is to be said. Nevertheless equivocation must be avoided in that phrase "of the essence," for as I

was saying at the beginning of this section, sometimes to have being of its essence signifies to have it from itself and not from another, in which way no creature, even if it actually is, has being of its essence; nevertheless we do not now speak thus, but as that is said to be of the essence which is the first and formal constitutive of the thing; in which way whiteness is of the essence of white as such, although it has it not from itself, but from another. In this way, therefore, existence can truly be said to be of the essence of a creature actually constituted or created, as it is such. But when it is denied that actually existing belongs to the essence of a creature, the creature must be taken as it abstracts or prescinds from creature created and creatable, whose essence objectively conceived abstracts from actual being or entity, and in this way it is denied that actually existing belongs to its essence, because it is not included in its essential concept thus prescinded. For all these things a distinction of reason suffices, or real negative, which is between potential and actual essence.

## SECTION VII

## WHAT THE EXISTENCE OF A CREATURE IS

1. The opinion of some authors. Having set forth the distinction and understood what essence is, it will be easy to declare what existence properly is, and this exposition will further confirm the doctrine that has been handed down. Some authors therefore speak in such a way as to say that the existence of a creature is its accident. Avicenna speaks thus in book V of his Metaphysics, where he says that being is predicated accidentally of creatures, because formally it signifies the being that happens to them. St. Thomas imitates him in Quodlibet II, article 3, citing the Commentator on book V of the Metaphysics. Some of those who hold that existence is a thing or mode really distinct by nature from actual essence think this is true in every respect, asserting that existence is a certain accident belonging to a certain category, namely to the category of when or of quantity.

Their foundation is that duration and existence are the same thing; for to endure seems to be nothing other than to exist. But duration is an accident of the thing that endures, and is properly placed in the category of quantity under the species of time, if the duration is successive, or in the category of when, if it is of another nature.

2. This opinion is rejected. This opinion, however, is rejected by almost all teachers, for being extends as widely as being itself, since being is named from being (esse). Hence, just as being does not belong to a certain genus but transcends all categories, so also does being (esse). Likewise, because it is per se incredible that the existence of a substance should be its proper accident. First, because otherwise it would not be being simply, but being in a qualified sense, whence even the generation of substance would not be generation simply, but generation in a qualified sense, because it would be terminated to some accident; for it is terminated to being (esse), as is said in Physics V, chapter 1. Second, because if existence were an accident, it would be either common or proper. Not the first, because a common accident can be absent without the corruption of the subject and comes from something extrinsic to the pre-existing subject. Nor can it be a proper accident, because the proper follows upon and results from a thing already existing; and therefore it does not come to be per se primarily through generation or creation, but results from the thing produced by generation or creation. Third, because otherwise existence would have to be inherent in the subject and dependent upon it; hence it would be necessary to suppose that subject as existing. Fourth, because act ought to be proportioned to potency; but substantial essence, especially according to this opinion, is in substantial potency so as to be actuated by existence; therefore existence cannot be an accident, but must be its substantial act. Finally, because otherwise every existing substantial essence would be one per accidens and not per se, which is highly absurd. And these reasons also prove that the existence of each accident cannot be a thing of another category, but that the existence of quantity

participates in the same nature as quantity, since it has per se an extension proportioned to quantity, and per se belongs to completing the formal effect of quantity, which is to be quantified, and the same holds proportionally for quality and the others. Concerning duration, however, either it must be denied that it is entirely the same thing in reality as existence, or, if they are entirely the same, it must be denied that duration is really an accident, but only according to a certain mode of our predication or denomination, which suffices for distinguishing categories; concerning which matter we shall speak below when treating of the categories.

3. The opinion to be held. Therefore those who think better, even supposing the distinction of essence from existence, say that existence is a certain act or terminus of essence belonging to the same category as essence, although it is placed in that category not directly, but by reduction. This is taken from St. Thomas, Quaestiones de Potentia, question 5, article 4, ad 3; and extensively from Capreolus, In I Sententiarum, distinction 8, question 1, conclusion 3; and Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia, chapter 4, just before question 5, and chapter 5, question 10, ad 8. This opinion, supposing the distinction, can easily be defended. For what some object—that if existence has its proper entity or mode of being, there is no reason why it should not be a complete being, or why it should not be placed directly under some genus—this (I say) is very easily resolved, and in a similar question must necessarily be solved by all, since otherwise it would equally prove that subsistence is an accidental mode directly constituted in some category, and that the mode of inherence also constitutes its own category. Therefore it must be said in that opinion that existence is not a complete being, because it is per se instituted to be the act of essence, constituting one per se with it; and for the same reason it belongs to the same genus as essence, not directly, however, but by reduction, because it is by way of a part or act of the same genus, composing one per se with it. And therefore we have not used

this kind of argument against the aforesaid distinction of existence and essence—whether existence is or is not an accident.

4. Response to an objection. It could only be objected that when something is reduced to some category as a constituting act, at least it is necessary that the very thing constituted be placed directly in such a category; but an existing thing, as existing, is not placed in any category, because the series of categories abstract from actual existence; for in a category only those things are placed according to those predicates which necessarily or essentially belong to them; therefore existence cannot even reductively belong to a category. Whence, on the contrary, we can also argue: for complete things are constituted in a category according to the total complement which they have in their genus; but they are not constituted insofar as they are existing; therefore existence does not belong to their complement; therefore it will be their accident and will not make one per se with them, but per accidens; for what makes one per se belongs to the complement of that being which it constitutes. Some say (perhaps to avoid these and similar arguments) that the existence corresponding to the essence of each category is not so much reduced to that category as it is above every category and participated by each one, as something more excellent than every thing and every essence placed in a category. But I think that existence as actually exercised is not properly placed in a category, not because of its excellence (of which we shall speak below), but because such existence is not properly other than potential existence or existence conceived in signate act, which is placed in a category; but as it is in act, it expresses a certain state minimally necessary for the series of categories.

5. The arguments proposed therefore correctly declare how actual existence cannot add a thing or real mode above the total entity of individual essence, insofar as it is a created substance and entirely complete, and placed directly in the category of substance under the ultimate species. Because only singular things exist per se primarily; therefore a thing actually existing adds no thing above the total

individual substance placed in a category. The consequence is evident, because that thing is neither an accident, as has been proved, nor a partial or incomplete substance; otherwise it would further complete the substance to which it would be joined, which cannot be, because the substance was taken as complete in every way in its genus, and as thus placed in the category of substance. Therefore it must be said that an existing substance is placed in the category of substance; nevertheless, because to be placed in a category is not something of the thing, but of reason, therefore it does not need actual existence in exercised act in order to be placed in a category; nevertheless it is placed no less insofar as it is something existing in signate act, or as possibly existing. From which it necessarily follows that the thing actually existing does not add a new thing or new mode above itself as a whole as possibly existing, so that the addition would be of one thing or actual mode above another actual thing, but rather adds (so to speak) its whole self; because, when it was only in potency, it was nothing; and when it is in act, it is wholly something.

6. And hence it also follows that existence cannot be some incomplete being in such a way as to be really distinct by nature from another real and actual being, of which it would be the mode or act and with which it would compose one complete being. Because every composite or complete created being can be conceived with its whole complement and every mode of its own, as prescinding from the actual exercise of existence, or as including it in possible being or in signate act. Because therefore the teachers cited call existence in this sense an incomplete substance and a mode or act of substance, therefore their opinion[37] is not approved by us. But if they were speaking only according to the metaphysical abstraction of reason, thus it could very well be conceded that existence, as conceived by us as rationally distinct from essence, is something incomplete, and conceived as a mode or act of essence. Just as we call incomplete

[37] sententia, 1960; substantia, ed. Vivès. "Some editions, such as that of Vivès, inexplicably substitute sententia for substantia." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 77.

beings the differences by which genus is contracted, or the thisness (haecceitas) by which species is determined to individual being, and the modes by which being is determined to inferior things, all of which are distinguished not really, but rationally from the things which they contract or constitute; and indeed many of the authors cited for the second opinion say that existence is a mode of essence only in this sense. Which Fonseca especially explained, who compares this mode with the modes determining being to the highest genera; and he differs from us only in that he calls such distinction formal and from the nature of the thing; we, however, call it only a distinction of reason founded in the thing. And Fonseca cites for his opinion Alexander of Hales, Metaphysics VII, text 22, where in the last little question he treats ex professo the present question and expressly teaches our opinion, and declares it better and more clearly than the other authors.

7. In what sense existence is said contingently of a creature. And according to this same sense must be explained what is sometimes said by serious authors, that existence or to exist is said of creatures contingently or accidentally. For it is said contingently of a creature taken absolutely, because of itself it prescinds from being created or merely creatable; and the name 'creature', as I said, in that manner of speaking must be taken in this breadth. For if 'creature' is taken only for a thing actually created, to it, as such, being belongs not contingently, but necessarily; but that necessity is not absolute, but conditional, according to which Aristotle said that a thing, when it is, necessarily is. But to exist is said accidentally of a creature, not according to the thing which is predicated, but according to the figure of predication, because to a creature conceived according to itself, to exist and not to exist can belong, although, when it does not exist, it is not really a creature, except objectively only, or rather creatable. But this contingent or accidental predication is not a sign of real distinction, or distinction from the nature of the thing between actual essence and existence, because predications are made according to our

mode of conceiving, and thus when to exist is said to be predicated contingently of the essence of a creature, essence is not conceived as actual. Just as also the dividing difference is said to be predicated accidentally of genus; and similarly individuation of species; and it could be said to belong contingently to it, although in the thing itself the individual is not distinguished from the species, or the difference from the genus, because for these manners of speaking our mode of conceiving and prescinding suffices.

### *Why Aristotle Wanted the Question Whether a Thing Exists To be Distinct from the Question What It Is*

8. And hence it is understood in passing how Aristotle distinguished a double question about things, namely, whether they are and what they are; from which some conclude that he distinguished existence, which is inquired into in the question whether it is, from essence, which is investigated through the question what it is. But this is no conclusion at all, because Aristotle distinguished those questions not only in created being, but in being simply; and we distinctly inquire about God whether He is and what He is; therefore for this a distinction of reason suffices. But there is a difference in this respect between God and creatures, that in God these questions are distinguished only from our mode of conceiving the relation or connection of predicate with subject, namely, confusedly or distinctly; for we sometimes conceive some predicate as belonging to some subject, not distinctly conceiving in what way it belongs, whether per se primarily or secondarily, whether per accidens; and therefore concerning God Himself we can first know that He is, and doubt how being belongs to Him, and whether it is of His essence. And for this reason we distinguish the questions whether God is and what God is, although in reality being itself is of the quiddity of God. But truly in creatures there is a greater foundation for distinguishing these questions, if the question whether it is concerns

actual existence. For the sense of the question whether a thing is can be twofold. One, whether it actually exists; the other, whether it is a true real being, which can be. In this latter sense the question whether it is truly does not differ from the question what it is, except as the common from the particular, because being taken in potency, or being insofar as it expresses that which is able to be, is an essential predicate, or of the quiddity of a creature, as has been demonstrated in what precedes, although, because it is transcendent, it is not put in the definitions of things, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics VIII, text 19, because it is included in all things, both genera and differences. And therefore, with being taken in this way, the question whether it is is distinguished, in which the precise notion of being is included, from the question what the thing is, in which the proper essence and definition of the thing is investigated. But in another sense the question whether a thing is can be understood concerning actual existence; and thus with much greater reason, founded in some way in the thing itself, the question whether it is is distinguished from the question what a created thing is, namely, because to exist actually, speaking absolutely, is not of the quiddity of a creature. Nevertheless, just as this is true without distinction on the part of the thing between existence and actual essence, so also those questions can deservedly be distinguished without distinction of things.

## SECTION VIII

## WHAT CAUSES, ESPECIALLY INTRINSIC ONES, CREATED EXISTENCE POSSESSES

1. Although the nature of existence and its identity with actual essence seems sufficiently declared and proven from what has been said, nevertheless for the completion of this subject matter and greater confirmation of the truth, and for the solution of the foundations of other opinions which were proposed in the first

section, it is necessary to treat exactly many other things which can be inquired into and desired concerning created existence. Among these, knowledge of causes holds the first place, which we investigate here.

2. Concerning this matter, all philosophers, especially Catholics, agree on this point: that every being or existing thing outside God needs an extrinsic efficient cause, and consequently a final cause, because an efficient cause does not operate by itself except for the sake of an end. Nor is it necessary, even according to Aristotle, to distinguish in this matter between corruptible and incorruptible being, material or immaterial, because whatever it may be, if it is not divine being, it must necessarily have been made, even according to Aristotle's mind, as we showed above when treating of causes and the first being. And from what was said there it is also established that this efficient cause of created being itself must be God, either alone or with another. For since He alone has being from Himself, other things cannot have it except as participated from Him, and consequently through His causation. This reasoning is extensively pursued by St. Thomas in Quaestiones de Potentia, q. 3, a. 5, from Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 1; and by Avicenna, book VIII of his Metaphysics, c. 7, and book IX, c. 4. In this, therefore, all agree. They disagree, however, concerning other causes, namely material, formal, and proximate efficient, and the disagreement arises from the treated diversity of opinions concerning the distinction of existence from essence.

### *On the Material Cause of Existence*

3. Therefore, as regards the material cause, those who think that existence in reality is distinguished from actual essence attribute to it some material cause—not indeed taken as corporeal and quantified matter, but generally as a receiving subject and concurring in that genus toward the becoming and being of something. For thus they say that essence is the proper receptive principle of existence,

outside of which it can neither come to be nor exist. If you object that from this it follows that no thing's existence is created by God, because creation is incompatible with the concurrence of a material cause, they respond that it is indeed not created, but is concreated by the creation of the existing supposit, and in this way it is not repugnant for something incomplete and quasi-partial to come to be, or rather to come to be together through creation with the concurrence of a material cause; for thus the form of the heavens is concreated. But truly, once the distinction from the nature of the thing between existence and essence is removed, this material causality is not necessary for the production of existence, because where there is no distinction, there cannot be true and real subjective potency receiving and received act, and consequently neither true concurrence of material cause. Nor is the metaphysical constitution[38] from act and potency distinct by reason sufficient for this, because material causality is physical and real; and therefore no one has ever said that a difference comes to be from a genus as from a material cause, or anything similar.

4. Nor, speaking absolutely, can that genus of causality be sufficiently understood, because it cannot be attributed to essence as considered in mere objective potency; for thus, as I have often said, it is simply non-being and nothing; but what is nothing, according to that precise state, cannot have real influence, nor receive anything, nor can anything else adhere to it. For how will that adhere to it which is nothing? Nor can that causality be attributed to essence as already made and constituted in the nature of being in act; for as such, in itself, as receptive, or as it is co-distinguished from another act, it intimately includes some actual being outside causes, which has the entire essential nature of existence, as we proved above; therefore with respect to that, essence cannot be compared as receiving potency, because the act which is received in potency is not included

[38] constitutio, 1960; alit. distinctio. "En otras ediciones, constitutio está sustituido por distinctio." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 81.

intrinsically in the potency itself, or in the entity which it requires in order to be receptive, as was also sufficiently declared in the preceding sections; therefore created existence, as such, does not require this genus of causality on the part of essence. Hence, since one essence has only one existence, as we also proved above, no created existence requires this causality on the part of essence.

5. Therefore, some existence can require a material cause only when actual essence has demanded it; for since in reality they are the same, they must necessarily arise from the same physical causes. Thus it happens that the existence of immaterial substances has no material cause; but the existence of material substances has one, in the same way as their essence does. Hence, if we speak of complete substance, its being has a material cause intrinsically composing it; but the being of material form similarly has a material cause, not indeed composing (for that is always simple and partial), but sustaining and receiving it. In which way also every being of accidental form, whether spiritual or material, has by its nature a material cause by which it is sustained. But the being of spiritual substantial form, such as the rational soul alone is, has no material cause, not because that being is complete existence, as some say (for if existence is not another thing from essence, since the essence of the rational soul is not complete in the genus of substance, neither can its existence be complete), but because that being is spiritual, and therefore independent of matter; and since it is otherwise substantial, it is also independent of a subject and by its nature apt for subsisting with at least incomplete subsistence. Finally, the being of matter itself has no proper material cause, just as matter itself, since it is the first subject, cannot have a material cause.

### *On the Formal Cause of Existence*

6. Again, we must speak of the formal cause of existence. In this matter, almost all who distinguish existence from essence from the nature of the thing say that form is the formal cause of existence.

And they think this is the teaching of Aristotle in Metaphysics V, c. 8, text 15, where he says: "Another is the substance in things, which is the cause of existing, as the soul in an animal"; and in De Anima II, c. 4, text 36, where he says the soul is the cause of being itself, or why the animal exists; and in Physics II, c. 1, text 12, he says that things are in potency through matter and are in act through form. And Boethius, in his book On Unity and the One, says that all being flows from form. St. Thomas also often speaks thus, as in Summa Theologiae I, q. 48, a. 1, Summa contra Gentiles II, cc. 54 and 55; the Commentator in Physics II, text 12, and De Anima II, text 8; and there Themistius, chapters 1 and 6 of his Paraphrase. And finally, this axiom is so common among philosophers that it seems it can hardly be denied; for through form a thing is constituted in act, and every act is from form; but existence is the most powerful act. Likewise, generation is change from non-being to being; but generation is toward form; therefore being is also from form; for generation is toward being because it is toward the effect of form. But other authors use a distinction, for being is twofold. One they call entitative, the other formal; they say this latter is from form, and thus they understand the cited places of Aristotle; but they deny that the former is always from form, because matter has its own proper existence, which it does not have from form.

7. But I, although I consider the latter opinion true in the sense in which it is handed down by the authors, nevertheless judge that in the true and proper sense, it should be said simply and without distinction that every being is either of form or from form in its genus of cause. To make this clear, I suppose that the question concerns the being of substantial existence; for accidental being is certainly from accidental form with respect to the subject or the whole composite; for with respect to the form itself, it is not properly from itself through proper and real causality, since in reality it is the very form itself, in which there is the same reasoning and proportion concerning substantial form, as we shall say. Next I suppose that we are speaking

of being in material substances; for in spiritual ones there is not properly a substantial form which can have formal causality; for although those substances are usually called subsisting forms, they are not so called because they are informing forms, but because they are perfect essences, having through their formal differences perfect and complete being of essence; therefore in those substances existence has no physical formal cause; but whether it can be said to arise formally from the very essence will be established from what is to be said. Again, that form is the cause of total existence in material causes can be understood in four ways. The first is because form formally completes the proper receptive principle of existence. The second is because existence results from form as from an intrinsic formal principle. The third is because form intrinsically composes the existence of the whole substance by way of act. The fourth is because all being of substance depends in some way on form.

8. Therefore, those who think that existence is a certain simple entity really distinct from matter and from form and from the nature composed of both, neither say nor can say that form is the formal cause of existence in the third way stated above. Nor can they say that existence is the primary formal effect of form, both because such an effect is inseparable from the informing form, but existence in their opinion is separable, as in the humanity of Christ; and also because this effect must necessarily be somehow composed of the form itself, and intrinsically including it; hence it cannot be distinguished from it as simple entity from simple entity, but as whole from part. And thus they say that the being of essence or the constitution of essence is the primary effect of form; but existence is secondary, in one of the first two ways stated above. Of these, the former is more accepted among Thomists, as is clear from Capreolus, In I Sententiarum, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 Henr., and ad 3 Gerard. against the first conclusion; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 22, especially in the solutions of arguments; and Cajetan in the places cited above, De Ente et Essentia, where he compares form and

existence to transparency or perspicuity and light; for through transparency air is constituted formally in the nature of proximate receptive principle of light, and in this way form completes essence in the nature of proximate receptive principle of existence, which is immediately received in the whole essence and not in form alone. This they understand when form is material and inexistent; for if it is spiritual and subsistent, like the rational soul, by nature it first receives proper existence in itself and then communicates it to the whole composite. Hence such a form not only completes the receptive principle of existence, but is itself the first receptive principle of existence, according to the mind of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 76, a. 4, and De Ente et Essentia, c. 5, at the end, where Cajetan extensively defends this. Hence it happens that angelic forms are much more receptive of existence through themselves.

9. Nevertheless, this way of speaking does not really declare formal causality, but rather material causality of form with respect to existence. For to be receptive of existence is not to be its formal cause, but rather material; therefore what completes the receptive principle of existence, even if it formally completes it, cannot be called the formal cause of existence. Likewise, the rational soul or angelic essence, because it is by itself receptive of its existence, is not called its formal cause; therefore much less can an inferior form, because it is a part of the essence receptive of existence formally completing it, be called its formal cause. Moreover, who has ever said that quantity is the formal cause of all material qualities, because it formally constitutes their proximate receptive principle? or that perspicuity or light is the formal cause of sensible species, of which it constitutes the proximate receptive principle? In these examples and infinite others which could be brought forward, the form constituting the receptive principle is referred to material cause, either as proximate receiving potency, or as disposition. Thus therefore it should be said in the present case. And although this may seem to pertain to manner of speaking, nevertheless it matters much for declaring the thing, for

hence it is established that this mode of causing existence is not different from the preceding one concerning material cause, and consequently is no more possible or true than the preceding one. Hence, by the same reasoning by which we showed that essence cannot be the material cause of existence, it can be concluded that form cannot be its cause in this way. It is added that in this mode of causality it is supposed that form by nature first unites to matter in the thing itself and has its primary formal effect in it, before it has existence, which is as unintelligible as that a thing is or is conceived to be in the nature of things, with existence excluded, of which I shall speak again below. Finally, even if we granted that form is related in this[39] way to the integral existence of the whole essence, nevertheless it has not yet been proven that partial existence cannot be given, or that any part of essence cannot be by itself receptive of its accommodated existence, just as by itself it is capable of its proper being of essence and its proper actuality. For this reason, therefore, I judge it false that form is the formal cause of existence in that first way.

10. Therefore other Thomists also add the second way, which they do not persuade to be true otherwise than because, since being inseparably accompanies form, it is consonant with reason that it should emanate from it. But against this the reasons made against the preceding can be more urgently applied. First, because this genus of cause is not formal, but efficient; just as although properties result from form, it is not their formal cause, but efficient. And similarly substantial nature, although subsistence results from it, is not its formal cause, but efficient through natural resultance; and the same is true in all similar cases. Then hence it is more evidently established that it is impossible for created essence, by nature prior to being understood as affected by existence, to be understood as having sufficient entity and sufficient being for this genus of causality; because, as thus conceived, either it is being in potency, and thus cannot be an efficient principle nor reduce itself to act, or it is

[39] hoc, 1960; alit. alio. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 86.

conceived as being in act, and thus is already conceived as including actual being outside causes, which is the being of existence. Finally, St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 22, and in other places, and all his disciples ex professo prove that a creature cannot be the efficient cause of its own existence, whose reasons, if carefully weighed, equally prove concerning all effective causality, even through natural resultance, because this mode of causing also supposes existence in its principle; and therefore it is no less repugnant for the same thing to be the cause of itself in this way, than through proper action and by itself efficiently causing. Finally, even if we admitted this genus of emanation of existence from actual essence, it has not been proven by any reasoning that proper and accommodated partial existence cannot emanate from any partial essence.

11. Therefore, because of some of these reasons, already some Thomists absolutely deny that form is the formal or efficient cause of existence; because neither those two modes are proven to them, nor do the other two posited by us have place, given the real distinction of existence from essence, which they themselves defend. But with the contrary opinion supposed, it is excellently and consistently said that form formally constitutes and intrinsically composes the existence of nature or supposit consisting of matter and form, because it formally completes and composes its actual essence and its whole entity. But that the expressions may be formal, it is necessary to distinguish essence from existence by reason in the form itself; for when form is said to compose existence in this way, it is not to be understood of the essence of form precisely conceived, for as such it actually causes nothing, but is conceived as able to cause; it is therefore to be understood of the essence of form as actual and as it is its very existence. And in this way it is easily established how form is the cause, in its genus, of the total existence of natural things; concerning which the sayings of Aristotle and other authors could not unsuitably be explained, for this existence alone is being simply, of which they speak.

12. Whether form causes the existence of matter. But form cannot be in this way the formal cause of the proper and intrinsic existence of matter, because it is not a part of matter itself, nor does it intrinsically compose it in its actual entity and essence, in which existence must necessarily be included, as was shown above. Nevertheless, form is in some way the formal cause of the existence of matter, because, in order for matter to be, it needs the information of form and depends on it in the way declared above, disputations XV and XXVIII, and thus there is no being of existence in the composite, neither integral nor partial, which either is not the being of form itself, or does not depend on form in some way. For the partial being of form itself does not depend on itself in the genus of formal cause, because it is not the formal cause of itself, speaking physically and according to the propriety of formal cause, and therefore I did not say absolutely that all being proceeds from form as from formal cause, but either is of form itself, or depends on it as on formal cause. But metaphysically or according to reason, form can be called the formal reason of its own proper existence, because through itself or through its entity it formally has it, although it has it effectively from another; in which way also angelic forms exist through their formal entity. And according to these things we can also generally interpret the testimonies adduced above.

13. The objection is sufficiently answered. You will say: therefore also every existence of material substance either is of matter, or is from matter in its genus of cause; therefore there is no reason why this should be peculiarly attributed to form. It is answered by conceding the former consequence, formally understood of the existence of material substance as such, or of material existence. Which I add because, although the existence of the rational soul alone does not depend on matter, nevertheless it is not material substance, and insofar as it is the form of matter, it also depends on it as to actual union. But the being of the whole composite intrinsically consists of the being of matter, and the being of all other forms depends on

matter itself, and in this way matter is the cause in its genus of all existence of material substance. Nevertheless, the posterior consequence is denied; for being is attributed to form for a peculiar reason, because it is the act completing and perfecting being simply. Just as also essence or the being of essence is specially attributed to form, although matter is also part of essence, because form is what completes essence and what determines matter to be part of this essence, since it is of itself indifferent to be part of this or that nature. Indeed, if Aristotle is carefully read, in the cited place, De Anima II, he speaks more clearly of the being of essence than of the being of existence; for when he had said that the soul is the cause of the being[40] of living things, he adds: "But to live for living things is to be." But it is established that to live in first and radical act (of which there is discussion there) is the being of essence of living things, and that also the body is the material cause of the life of living things; therefore living is attributed to the soul itself, because it completes it and distinguishes it from other being, not because it excludes the consortium of material cause. The same therefore should be said, even if by being we understand existing, which I do not deny Aristotle understood. Indeed from this place I gather that, according to the opinion of Aristotle, the being of actual essence and the being of existence are really the same being, for Aristotle only speaks of being in act, as St. Thomas and all expound, which is plainly the same as existing, and yet he says that living in living things is this kind of being which is essential to the very living thing.

14. Whether essence is the final cause of existence. But finally someone will object[41], for from what has been said it follows that essence is in no way the cause of its proper and adequate existence, through which it immediately and formally exists; because we have excluded every reason of intrinsic cause, and yet it is also established

[40] causam esse, 1960; alit. om. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 89.

[41] Bannes, I p., q.3, a. 4, dub. 4. Cf. BHF, Madrid 1960, t. V, p. 89

that it cannot be an extrinsic cause. To this some Thomists concede that essence is not the formal, nor efficient, nor final cause of existence; they except, however, the material. In which they speak consistently given the distinction they posit, yet they do not speak consistently in the reasons they use to exclude the genus of efficient cause, because essence also, in order to be a truly receiving cause, requires the being of actual essence. Then I do not see why they exclude final cause, since existence exists for no other reason than to constitute that very essence in the nature of things. Hence they themselves say that existence is not being, because it is not that which is, but that by which essence is; it is therefore (so to speak) the being of being, and consequently is for the sake of that, namely for the sake of essence, at least as existing. But in the principle posited by us, it must indeed be conceded that essence has no true real causality concerning its proper existence, because where there is no distinction in reality, neither can real causality exist. Nor is this any inconvenience, because there is no necessity that the existence of a creature have an intrinsic principle in itself, except insofar as the very essence can have such a principle, namely matter or form; but it suffices that it be from an extrinsic efficient cause, concerning which alone it remains to be said, which we shall accomplish in the following section, that we may proceed more distinctly.

## SECTION IX

## WHAT IS THE PROXIMATE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF CREATED EXISTENCE

1. Concerning the efficient cause of the existence of those things which come to be through creation alone, there is no question, because we suppose that God alone is the cause of that existence, since he alone is the creator of all things. But concerning the existence of things that are generated and corrupted—under which we

comprehend all things that come to be through change from a presupposed subject, whether they be substances or accidents—the difficulty is whether this existence also comes to be from God alone. On this matter I find three opinions.

### *First Opinion, Attributing Efficacy of Existence to God Alone*

2. Certain modern interpreters of St. Thomas assert, citing I, q. 3, a. 4, that God alone, without any proper efficiency of any secondary cause, whether principal or instrumental, effects the existences of all things, and they adduce St. Thomas, I, q. 8, a. 1, q. 45, a. 5, II Contra Gentiles, c. 21, and book III, c. 66. Their arguments are: first, because God alone is being[42] through essence and all creatures have participated being; therefore God alone is he who produces being. The consequence is proved, because the causative power of existence presupposes being itself in the acting cause; but a creature does not have being through itself, but from an extrinsic cause; therefore it is not through itself causative of existence, just as water, because it is not hot through itself, is also not heating through itself. Second, because every creature in its action presupposes something produced by God alone, since it cannot act from nothing, but from a presupposed subject; therefore the action of a creature presupposes being; therefore it is not the cause of being itself. Third, because God alone gives existence to prime matter, since it can be made and conserved by him alone; therefore secondary causes do not make the existence by which prime matter is conserved and exists, because otherwise they would produce and corrupt it; but matter does not exist except through the existence of the whole; therefore secondary causes do not effect the existence of the whole substance. Fourth, because we cannot explain in any other way that God is the cause of

[42] [ens], 1960; other editions omit. "Word omitted in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 91

the whole being, unless because he alone causes the being of both the form and the matter of the whole. Or if creatures effect this very thing, they will also be said to be causes of the whole being.

3. But if you ask what secondary causes effect, if they do not give being, or how they generate, since generation tends toward being, they respond that secondary agents complete the receptive principle of being itself by inducing form in matter, and because such form is always determinate, they consequently determine and limit existence or the action of God, so that he confers such and so much (so to speak) existence, for every act received is limited by the receptive principle. Whence it follows further that they also effect that existence be united to essence, because they ultimately dispose and determine the essence for the reception of such existence. And thus finally, although they do not effect existence, they effect an existing thing, just as man generates man, although he does not effect the soul, because he unites it.

### *Second Opinion, Which Besides God Admits only an Instrumental Cause of Existence*

4. The second opinion is that existence comes to be from God alone as principal cause, with secondary cause concurring, but only as an instrument. Thus Ferrara, II Contra Gentiles, c. 21, whose opinion could be understood in two ways: in one way, using the name of instrument broadly, insofar as every inferior cause subordinated to another and needing the influence of that other for all its operation can be called an instrument of that other, and in this sense Ferrara speaks above, and it does not differ so much in reality from the true opinion to be explained immediately; and therefore he there criticizes Scotus, because he imposed upon St. Thomas that he said secondary causes do not effect being. In another way that opinion can be understood concerning a proper instrument, as it is distinguished from a principal cause, even a secondary and proximate one, and in

this sense this opinion is usually referred to, which asserts that a secondary cause, as principal and acting by its own power, effects an essence similar to itself, but existence only as an instrument and in the power of God, although in this sense I do not remember reading any assertor of this opinion. But it is usually founded on certain expressions of St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 5, q. 5 De Veritate, a. 9, ad 7, q. 3 De Potentia, a. 1, where he says that nothing gives being except insofar as there is in it a participation of divine power, and he adduces proposition 3 from the book De Causis, by which it is said: The noble soul has a divine operation insofar as it gives being. He also says there that God alone gives being as such, but secondary causes truly determine that being to this or that being. And he adduces proposition 18 of the book De Causis, where it is said that God gives being to all things through the mode of creation; but secondary agents give living or knowing through the mode of information. Finally III Contra Gentiles, c. 66, he proves ex professo that a secondary cause does not give being except insofar as it acts by divine power. The arguments that can be made for this opinion are reduced to the arguments made for the first opinion.

### *Third Opinion, Attributing to Secondary Causes Proper Efficacy of Existence*

5. The third opinion is that existence, when it comes to be through generation, comes to be from a proximate cause as from a proper and principal cause in its own order, subordinated per se to God as first cause. St. Thomas intends this opinion in the cited places, and III Contra Gentiles, c. 13, and I, q. 104, a. 1, and q. 7 De Potentia, a. 2; and all the ancient Thomists understand and hold this opinion, especially Cajetan and Ferrara on St. Thomas, in the cited places; and Scotus, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, ex professo, although he falsely thinks St. Thomas felt the contrary. And this opinion is most true, and can be demonstrated, as I think, by almost evident reasoning.

*Resolution of the Question, & Confirmation of the Last Opinion*

6. Therefore it must be said first that secondary causes truly and properly effect the existence of their effects, insofar as these come to be from them. I show this conclusion, first by demonstrating the weakness of the arguments by which the opposite is proved; for if there is no reason why this effect should be denied to secondary causes, no one (I believe) will deny that it should be attributed to them; for God created them with all power to communicate themselves and to produce perfectly those effects of which they were capable by their nature. What therefore is there on account of which a creature should be incapable of the power to make existence? Is it because it does not have existence from itself, but from an extrinsic agent, God? But indeed it does not have essence from itself, but from an extrinsic agent, God; therefore neither will it be able to make essence; what therefore does it make? Therefore that it does not have something from itself makes no difference, provided it has it in itself, from wherever it may have it. Let the first argument of the first opinion therefore be turned back in this way: God alone is his real essence through essence; all creatures truly have essence participated from God, whence in the book De Causis, proposition 18, it is thus said: All things have essence on account of the first being; therefore God alone effects every essence. Just as therefore this consequence is null, because a creature through participated essence, which it has from God, is effective of similar essence, so applied in similar form to existence, it has no force, but only concludes that a creature cannot effect being except through being received from the first cause, which is most true.

7. But (they say) at least a creature does not effect being through itself, just as hot water does not heat through itself. But on the contrary, for although heating is not attributed to water through itself,

nevertheless it both truly and properly heats, and insofar as it is hot, it heats through itself, even if it heats through heat received from an extrinsic agent; therefore a creature, insofar as it is existing, will be truly and through itself able to effect existence, even if it has its being from another. Whence in this we admit the comparison, but in another respect between water with respect to heat and creature with respect to its being; for water not only does not have heat from itself, but also includes it in no way nor requires it in order to be water, nor does it have that adjunct through itself, but entirely accidentally, and therefore the action of heat is said to belong to water accidentally, speaking of water absolutely. But truly a creature, although it does not have being from itself, nevertheless, in order to be actually a creature, necessarily and through itself includes and requires it; but a creature does not effect existence when in potency, but a creature in act; therefore it makes it as a cause through itself and from the force of its proper and connatural entity which it received from God. This is confirmed, for here also can be applied the argument made, that a creature would not cause through itself essence or the being of essence in its effect, because neither does it effect this through essence which it has from itself, but which it receives from God; which nevertheless even other authors do not deny to be false. It is established therefore that the first argument by which this efficiency is denied to a creature is entirely invalid.

8. The second argument is disproved. The second argument is equally ineffective. First, because at most it concludes that a creature does not effect that being which is presupposed to its action; from which it is also correctly concluded that a creature cannot effect all being, for some must be presupposed as made by God alone. But that a creature does not effect some being, namely, that to which its action is terminated, or which belongs to the effect produced by it, can in no way be concluded by that argument, because that being which terminates the action is different from that which is presupposed to the action; therefore a creature can effect the former, although it

presupposes the latter. And this reasoning is further clarified, for a double subject can be understood to be presupposed to the action of a creature. One remote, which does not remain in the term of the action, and has the character of a terminus from which, as is wood from which fire is generated. Another proximate, remaining under both terms, as is prime matter. Concerning the former it is true, speaking naturally, that its existence is presupposed to the action of a secondary cause; nevertheless that existence is destroyed by the action of the same cause; therefore this presents no obstacle to the existence of the thing generated being made by the same cause. Indeed, one naturally follows from the other, for from that which is the corruption of one is usually the generation of another, speaking per se. Concerning the latter subject, considered precisely as it is presupposed per se to the action of the agent, the authors of that argument cannot say that some being of existence is presupposed in it to the action of a natural agent, but only the being of essence; for they think that prime matter, as it is in the instant of generation, prior by nature to receiving form through the action of the agent, has no existence. But that it had existence throughout the preceding time, insofar as it was under the form of the corrupted thing, presents no obstacle, as was declared in the prior member, and is accidental to the effection of substantial existence, which occurs in the instant of generation; therefore in their opinion also it is not true that all efficiency of a secondary cause presupposes per se and directly some being of existence on the part of the subject. As, if we should imagine God creating prime matter in some instant, and in the same instant a secondary cause inducing form into it, with God concurring (as perhaps happens in the generation of worms, or nutrition from consecrated species), then that substantial generation (according to their opinion) does not presuppose existence in matter, neither prior in time, nor prior in nature; therefore that such action presupposes a subject presents no obstacle to existence being made through it.

9. An objection is met and the third argument is answered. Perhaps they will say that something else which is added in the third argument presents an obstacle, namely, that then prime matter would have from a secondary cause the existence by which it exists. But this in their principles is no inconvenience, because matter (as they say) does not have existence immediately through the action by which it is created, but through the action by which the whole composite receives existence, whether that whole is created or generated, because it does not exist by its proper existence, but through the existence of the whole; therefore it is no inconvenience that it has from that secondary cause the existence from which the whole composite is generated, since for the effection of that existence matter is already presupposed as a sufficient subject, from which a secondary cause can act upon something. But they say it follows that prime matter is generated and corrupted by secondary causes, because through their actions it acquires and loses existence. But why, I ask, do they not infer the same thing with proportion regarding God, if that existence is from God alone, namely that matter is corrupted and generated by God himself, because through the action of God it loses and acquires existence? But both are evidently equally false, since matter is ingenerable and incorruptible. They respond that there is not equal reasoning, because the term of divine action is only being, which is never lacking to matter; but particular causes determine this being, which is changed into something else. But this is impertinent and false, for if, in order that a thing be corrupted and generated, it suffices to change the being of existence, it makes no difference whether this is done in one way or another, and through this or that action; but if that does not suffice, provided being in general is not interrupted, but the same being of essence remains as it were continuously under both existences, even if that change of existences is made through the action of a natural agent, there will not therefore be generation and corruption of matter. Especially since it cannot be denied in that opinion that at least dispositively that change of existence is made

through the action of a natural agent, because it dissolves the proximate receptive principle of one existence and composes or disposes another; therefore, just as for this reason it is said to corrupt one existing thing and generate another, it will also be said to generate and corrupt prime matter. Or, if this cannot be said, because the same being of essence of matter always remaining presents an obstacle, by equal reasoning this will not follow, even if a secondary cause effects existence. It is also false that the action of God is terminated only to being as such, and not to determinate being; for although the effective power of God from itself is not limited to this or that being, but extends itself to all being, nevertheless when it operates in particular, it truly effects determinate being, and changes one into another, and by itself alone can corrupt one and generate another. Whence, although according to the aforesaid opinion determination to such being in the genus of material or dispositive cause comes from a secondary cause, nevertheless in the genus of efficient cause per se it is from God alone, because he alone effects existence and such existence; therefore he alone also will generate and corrupt prime matter, if that reasoning is effective; therefore these arguments are not solid nor consequently adduced in their doctrine.

10. Speaking simply however, it is true that in the proper subject of generation which remains under both terms, which is prime matter, some being of existence made by God alone is presupposed to every action of a natural agent, because prime matter is presupposed as created and having its proper being of essence in itself and outside its efficient cause, which cannot be understood without being of existence, as was proved above. And for the same reason it cannot happen that prime matter changes its proper and intrinsic existence, without changing the proper entity and actuality of its essence, and consequently not only is it generated and corrupted, but also annihilated and created, or transubstantiated. But from this true principle it can only be inferred that a secondary cause cannot effect the total existence of a being or composite as to all its parts;

nevertheless it will be able to effect the existence of form in matter and generate the being of the whole, not indeed presupposing none of its parts, because this would not be to generate, but to create, but by composing it, uniting the parts from which it consists and adding the ultimate and formal complement to it.

11. The fourth argument is refuted. And thus it is also established that the fourth argument is ineffective, for although secondary causes effect existence by generating the whole, nevertheless not by creating nor by directly effecting the whole being as to its singular parts, presupposing none, which is proper to God, in the way it is said to be proper to him to effect the whole being, as we shall declare at length a little below. Therefore by no probable argument is the power to effect the existence of their effects denied to secondary causes.

12. Second, the conclusion is proved principally by showing false the mode by which the aforesaid opinion declares secondary causes to concur to being. For what it says, that a secondary cause effects determination to such being, but not being itself, either the sense is that a secondary cause effects in being itself some difference or intrinsic mode by which it is determined to such being, and this is impossible unless by effecting the whole being itself, because physical action does not attain a metaphysical mode or difference, but the thing itself as it is in itself, nor do the said authors intend this sense. Or the sense is that only on the part of the subject secondary causes determine being, by preparing the receptive subject of such being and not of another, as the said authors plainly seem to intend, and this is also shown to be false. Because that doctrine supposes that whenever some effect proceeds from a creature, two actions intervene there: one, which is from a secondary cause inducing form in matter only according to the being of essence; another, of God alone conferring existence. But I demonstrate in many ways that this is false. First, by that common axiom, that just as things, so also actions are multiplied in vain, when reason or necessity does not compel; but here there is

no reason for multiplying these actions, as sufficiently appears from the preceding discourse. Second, because, if that action of a secondary cause which is said to precede in natural order the action of God by which existence comes to be is considered precisely, it is necessary that on account of it some being of existence be given, because through it some real being is given, by which the thing that immediately comes to be through that action is constituted outside its causes, which cannot be except being of existence, as is evident from what was said above, and must necessarily be conceded by the cited authors, with whom we dispute; for they say there that existence is that by which formally a thing is understood to be actually outside its causes, and they think it probable that existence is said to be from "extra sistere," because through existence a thing stands outside the potentiality of causes.

13. And this can be declared and confirmed in this way, for through that first action, which is said to be proper to a secondary cause, form is educed from the potency of matter; for this is the office and this the action of a natural agent, as sufficiently appears from I Physics, and from what was said above, disputations XV and XVIII. But eduction from potency cannot be understood unless what is educed is as it were extracted from the potentiality in which it was before and reduced to act; but it is not reduced to act except through being, as was shown above, and therefore generation, as generation, is terminated to being, as is said V Physics, c. 1; therefore from the force of that action of a secondary cause some being of existence is given to its effect; therefore another action of God alone is superfluous. The consequence is evident, both because it is necessary that the prior action of a secondary cause also be from God, since every action of a secondary cause essentially depends on the first. Whence it also happens that that being which is given through such action comes to be from God. For what therefore is it necessary that God confer another being? And also because it does not contradict that God suspend every other action which he was going to make by himself

alone; for if those actions are distinct, why will God not be able to suspend the posterior one? Or certainly (whatever may be the case concerning possibility), although we conceive it to happen thus, nevertheless we understand from the force of the prior action that form is educed from the potency of matter and actually informs it, and consequently that another form is excluded and the whole existence of another thing corrupted; therefore, even if we understand every subsequent action to be suspended, nevertheless we will understand from the force of this first action that a thing is actually generated and outside its causes; therefore it is also understood from the force of the same action to have received existence; therefore every other action is superfluous.

14. Finally this is declared in this way, for either the effect receives through that action some real being, or not. If it receives none, how can it be a real action, since every action tends to being? For where no being is made, neither can there be becoming. But where there is no becoming, neither is there making, and consequently neither is there real action. Nor is it sufficient if it be said that in the same instant in which that action exists, being is given to the effect through another action; for from this it only results that concomitantly with the prior action being is given to the effect, but not that through it some being is given; but it is of the nature of real action not that with it, but that through it some being be given, because otherwise through it nothing will be made or will have been made. But if through that action some real being comes to be, I ask again whether that is being of existence or of essence. If the first, we have what is intended. If the second, I ask further whether that being is only in potency, and this cannot be said, because this being is nothing in the thing made, nor is it a denomination from action, but from potency of acting, as was shown above; therefore that being is actual and new or temporal, because the effect anew has it in itself and outside its causes; therefore nothing is lacking to it to be being of existence. And this same is further confirmed and urged, for

concerning that very action which is from a secondary cause it can be asked whether it is existing in the nature of things or not, as it proceeds from a secondary cause; for action has its proportionate existence, like other accidents; but it cannot even be conceived in mind that action has proceeded from an agent and is not existing in its way, because neither can the actuality of action be greater, nor can it be understood otherwise to be outside its causes. Also, because otherwise it would be necessary to imagine another action of God alone, through which existence is given to that action, which is altogether ridiculous; just as there cannot be another action to action, so neither to the being of action, and because action and being of action express relation to the same principle, just as universally accident and being of accident express relation to the same subject, for form and being of form preserve proportion among themselves. But if that action, as it proceeds from a secondary cause, is existing, we collect from this in the first place that some being of existence flows from a secondary cause, namely the existence of its action. Then, we conclude that through that action being of existence comes to be in its term, because existing action, as such, is terminated to an existing thing as such; for all the being that is in action, whatever that may be, tends to the term, and such being corresponds in the term in "having been made" as is in action in "being made." If therefore a secondary cause exercises true, real and existing action, through it it communicates being of existence to the effect, and consequently that other action which is said to be from God alone is superfluous.

15. And these arguments are to be noted in passing, for from them, as I think, it is manifestly concluded in general that every real action and efficiency most formally tends to giving some being of existence to its intrinsic term, for if they are correctly applied, they proceed equally concerning every action. And from this is further confirmed the identity between existence and actual essence; for those things that are posited and destroyed simultaneously entirely by the same formal action are the same in reality, as was treated in what

preceded; but existence and essence are related in this way; therefore they are not distinguished in reality. Then, by the same arguments it is shown that it is impossible for any cause effectively to dispose a subject to receive some existence without giving it some existence, both because it was shown in general that there cannot be real action that does not give existence, and also because that disposition, which was previously in potency, through that action is in act; therefore it has its essence in act, and this is to exist. This argument is efficacious not only simply, but also ad hominem against the said authors; for they themselves say that proper passion can flow from essence, because it presupposes essence in act; but existence cannot flow from essence, because it would be necessary to presuppose essence in act, which is repugnant to existence. In a similar way therefore we say that it is repugnant for essence to be disposed effectively to existence, because it would be necessary to presuppose essence in act; for effection does not deal with essence in potency, but with essence in act.

16. Finally I show that doctrine to be false on the part of the other action which is attributed to God alone, so that through it he alone effects existence. And I ask whether that action is proper creation, or eduction of the act of existing from the potency of the subject or essence; for between these no middle can be devised. But that action cannot be said to be proper creation. First, because from this it follows that every existence is created as subsistent and independent in being and becoming from every receptive principle. Which the aforesaid authors think in general to be impossible, and at least it is established to be false in the existence of accidents and material forms. Second, because, if existence is not distinguished from essence, it is clear that it cannot be created if essence is not created; but if it is distinguished, at least it is certain that existence cannot naturally come to be nor be except in its essence and by actualizing it; therefore it depends on it in becoming and in being; therefore, when it comes to be in a connatural way, it does not come to be through creation. Third, because otherwise it would be necessary to add a third

action, by which existence would be united to essence, just as in the generation of man, because the soul is properly created, besides its creation and another accidental action by which the body is disposed or organized, a third substantial action is necessary, by which the soul is united to the body, which is proper generation; but this multiplication of actions in the present case is shown to be fictitious and superfluous a fortiori from what was said, and because no philosopher has hitherto devised them.

17. But if the other part is chosen, namely, that that action is not creation but eduction, it is attributed to God alone and not also to a secondary cause without reason. The consequence is proved, because such action neither from the mode by which it is made, nor from the term to which it tends, surpasses the power of a created agent. The first is evident, because it is action from a presupposed subject; but this mode of acting does not exceed the powers of a created agent. The second is evident, because whatever is in the term or effect of that action does not exceed the perfection of a created agent. For what some say, that being of existence is something most perfect, and therefore cannot be made by a created agent, is of no moment, for although being of existence, as such and from its genus, is perhaps the highest perfection (which we shall see later), nevertheless this being of existence which comes to be in fire or in water, for example, is not most perfect, nor more perfect than similar being is in fire or water generating; therefore from no aspect does the action productive of existence exceed the perfection of a created agent. And this is confirmed, for otherwise a created agent would effect neither the existence of its effect, nor the union of existence with essence, as the prior opinion said. The consequence is proved, because when form or act comes to be through eduction from the potency of the subject or receptive principle, it comes to be and is united by the same action, because it does not come to be without the material concourse of the subject, and the subject cannot concur except through union, as was declared more extensively above, and in tome I, in part III;

therefore, if existence does not come to be through creation but through eduction, it is united by the same action by which it comes to be; therefore, if a secondary cause does not make existence, neither does it unite it.

18. Our assertion is directly shown. And from these things by which both the foundations of the first opinion and the mode of explaining it have been disproved, there is an easy direct proof of our assertion. First, because by a single and the same action an existing thing and its existence come to be, as was shown; but secondary causes effect their real and existing effects; therefore they effect their existences. Second, because every true efficiency is terminated to some being of existence, as was also proved; but secondary causes truly effect something; therefore they truly effect being of existence in their effects. Third, and most a priori, because existence is not distinguished in reality from actual essence; but secondary causes through their efficiency extract the forms or essences which they produce from potency to act, and thus give them some actual being or entity of actual essence; therefore they give them existence.

19. I say second: the existences of things that are generated and corrupted not only come to be from secondary causes as from instruments, but also as from proximate principal causes, and in general existences so come to be from these causes just as essences do. The authors of the first opinion teach this assertion with us in part, insofar as they deny that secondary causes are instruments properly so called for producing existence. This part is to be understood with respect to all causes that are principal in producing effects as to being of essence. For if in this also they are only instruments, as is heat, for example, for the production of fire, or seed for the production of an animal, it is no wonder that they are also instruments for producing the existences of such effects. Indeed, this is necessarily consequent according to the final part of the conclusion, and therefore I proposed the conclusion under those words, namely, that secondary causes in effecting existences are not only instruments, but also principal causes,

so that this might be referred to diverse causes, and be as it were a suitable (as dialecticians speak) distribution; for the same causes do not have both relations, but diverse ones do. Thus therefore this part explained is proved by the said authors in no other way, except because it seems absurd that a secondary cause of the same effect should be both principal and instrumental. They add then that God is voluntarily said to confer on secondary causes a flowing and instrumental power by which they produce existence. But I do not see why they themselves can regard that first thing as absurd, since they say that in the same created effect there are essence and existence, and that the former comes to be from a secondary agent as from a principal cause, but the latter comes to be from God alone. If therefore in the same effect there are distinct things, which are said to come to be from God in diverse ways, namely, either by himself alone, or through a secondary cause, why will they not also be able to come to be in diverse ways from a secondary cause, namely, as a principal agent and as an instrument? Or, if the actions through which essence and existence come to be are diverse, what is absurd if the same proximate agent, which elicits one by proper and principal power, is assumed as an instrument for effecting the other, if it does not have similar principal power for exercising that? For it is not unusual for natural agents to operate instrumentally, when they cannot principally.

20. For which reason, given that doctrine, this other opinion about instrumental action cannot be sufficiently effectively attacked. Nevertheless, from the principle posited in the preceding assertion, this second one is evidently inferred. For the action by which the effect of a secondary cause comes to be, the same is terminated to the being of existence of that effect; therefore whenever a secondary cause is principal in its genus with respect to its effect, it is necessary that it effect the existence of that effect in the same way, because it cannot be a principal cause and an instrument with respect to one and the same action and term. Second, because a secondary cause effectively concurs to the existence of its effect, as those concede who admit it to

be an instrument; for an instrumental cause truly effects; but such an effect does not exceed the power of such a cause, as was already proved, because neither in the perfection of the thing that comes to be, nor in the mode by which it comes to be; therefore it effects as a principal cause, and not as an instrument, for that is called a principal cause which acts by its own power accommodated and proportioned to the effect. Third, because fire, for example, produces fire according to being of essence or the form of fire as a principal cause for no other reason than because the effect does not exceed the power of the cause, neither in itself, nor in the mode by which it comes to be from the agent; but the same is true concerning the existence of such an effect; therefore. For which reason, even given the real distinction between existence and essence, I do not see with what probability this assertion can be denied. But it is much more evident, supposing the identity of existence and actual essence, on which the final part of the conclusion is founded, because, if these are the same in reality, they cannot come to be from one and the same cause in diverse ways simultaneously and by one action. Also because to effect a thing or actual essence is nothing other than to give it existence, as was sufficiently declared; therefore a proximate agent cannot be a principal cause of one, and instrumental of the other.

### *By What Peculiar Reason the Production of Existence is Attributed to God*

21. I say third: God has something proper in effecting existence, in which He surpasses creatures; yet He has the same excellence in effecting the essence of creatures. The first part is posited so that the diverse passages of St. Thomas cited above may be understood and reconciled. And it is explained in this way: for first of all, the adequate object of divine power is created being insofar as it is such, which cannot be the adequate object of any created power, since it cannot effect itself, nor anything more excellent than itself. But the

proper and adequate act of being is to be (esse), and therefore God primarily confers being (esse) per se, and thus the creature only makes this or that to be. Not that either God does not effect in every being every determinate nature of it, or that, when a creature effects some being, it does not effect in that being every common nature of being that can be abstracted by us; for these things are impossible, as is evident of itself; but rather that the nature under which God attains that effect, and which is adequate to His power, is being itself as such; whereas with respect to creatures, it is such or such being.

22. The second difference is that God can confer upon creatures total being and totally, so to speak; but a creature cannot so much give total being as complete or perfect what has been begun, by adding partial or accidental being. Cajetan touched on this difference in I, q. 8, a. 1; but since he himself does not admit in substances partial or total being, but only one simple being of the whole supposit, he therefore explains it through causes or conditions required for existing. For God alone effects in a thing everything that is necessary for existing; for, if a thing be immaterial, God alone makes the entire substance of the thing; but if it be material, at least God alone effects the matter. This exposition contains truth, but we consistently add that in every created thing there is something of existence, or some total or partial existence, which is made by God alone; but there is none that is made by a creature without God, and in this way we say that God effects all existence totally. We also say that God alone in every thing places the first foundation of existence, without which a creature cannot effect any existence. And the reason is that all efficiency terminates in existence, as I have proved; but in every effect of a creature some efficiency of God alone is presupposed; therefore also some existence made by Him. The minor premise is proved by similar induction, for, in order that a creature may effect the existence of an accident, it presupposes the existence of substance, which, if it be spiritual, is made by God alone; but if it be material, it at least has matter from God alone. Hence, if a creature effects substantial being, it

also presupposes matter effected by God alone, and consequently under some being of existence, to which that effection of God alone terminates.

23. The third difference is taken from this: that God makes existence from no pre-existing created thing, but a creature never gives being except on the presupposition of another being. Hence it happens that also for this reason God is said to make being per se primarily as such, but a creature only as it is such; for, as we said with Aristotle when treating of causes, an effect is said to be made per se primarily according to that nature of being which is not presupposed on the part of the effect itself; as when fire is generated from air, fire is made per se primarily, but not element or body, because these natures were already presupposed in the air. According to these proper natures of God, therefore, St. Thomas sometimes says that God is the proper and per se cause of being itself, but he does not exclude the proper efficiency of secondary causes regarding the particular existences of their effects, as has been sufficiently manifested above from other passages of his doctrine.

24. Creatures concur in the production of essence in the same way as in the production of existence. From these reasons, however, if they are rightly weighed, it is manifest that these differences obtain not only in the effecting of existence, but also in the effecting of essence, even if we imagine them to be distinct. This is proved, for God alone is also the effector of every creatable essence, and consequently He alone regards essence as makeable, as such, as the adequate object per se primarily makeable by Him. Similarly, God alone can make, as proper and principal agent, the total essence of a thing totally or according to all that intrinsically composes or in some way constitutes such essence in the being of actual essence, as is evident from the same induction; for, if an essence be spiritual, God alone makes it; but if it be material, at least as regards matter it is made by God alone, and according to it is presupposed to the action of a secondary cause, which at most adds the other part of the essence, and thus consummates it. You will say:

granted this is so in substances, yet not in accidents, because the subject is not part of the essence of an accidental form, and thus a secondary cause entirely effects the whole essence of an accident. It is answered that the same can be said of the existence of an accident, because also the subject or the existence of the subject is not part of it, and both can be applied to substantial form, because matter also is not part of it. Hence either the discourse must be said to concern both complete essence and complete existence, for that which is incomplete either cannot be made by a natural agent, like prime matter, or, if it can be made by a natural agent, it presupposes another part of essence made by another, like substantial form; or certainly, if it be of lesser entity, as is an accident, it presupposes substantial essence, upon which it naturally depends, and although this may not be of the essence of such form taken in the abstract, it nevertheless pertains in some way to its essence. Secondly, it is said that, just as substantial form is not properly generated, but the composite, so neither is accidental form properly made in the abstract, but the concrete itself which is intrinsically composed of subject and form. And in this way such effection presupposes something from which the effect itself intrinsically consists, whether it be considered in the being of essence or in the being of existence.

25. And from this the other differences are also easily applied; for God alone makes essence with no essence presupposed, and consequently He alone makes per se primarily created essence as such. They will perhaps say that, although God makes the being of existence from no existence, because He makes from nothing, He does not however make essence from no essence, or from nothing of essence, because, unless essence be presupposed, it cannot be understood that a thing is makeable by God. But those who respond thus clearly labor in equivocation, for, if by essence they understand a thing in mere objective potency, we do not treat of that, because that as such is nothing, nor is it truly made or is a terminus of effection, unless perhaps it be said to be a terminus from which, which matters nothing,

because in the same way existence will be said to be made by God from non-existence in act and from existence in potential and objective being; because, unless existence were possible and as such were foreknown by God, it could not have been made by Him. But if we speak of actual essence, which truly is some entity outside God, it is most false that God does not make created essence simply and absolutely from no essence, because He neither makes created essence from His own essence, since that is impossible, for essences are primarily diverse; nor from another essence outside His own, since it is necessary that every such essence be created by Him. It is established therefore that God has the same eminence and singular nature in effecting essence as He has in effecting existence. This also necessarily follows from the identity of actual essence and existence, according to the last part of the preceding assertion. For, just as from that principle we inferred there that essence and existence are made in the same way by a secondary cause, so here it must be said that they are made in the same way by the first cause; for it is entirely the same reason, and this same doctrine concerning the same efficiency of existence and created essence confirms the doctrine given above concerning their identity among themselves.

## SECTION X

## WHAT EFFECTS EXISTENCE HAS, AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM ESSENCE IN THIS RESPECT

1. With the causes of existence explained, a treatment of its effects opportunely follows, since from these some are accustomed to derive indications of some real distinction or distinction ex natura rei between essence and existence; but we, on the contrary, think that from this the doctrine of their identity can be confirmed.

*The Title of the Question is Explained*

2. But existence can be compared in the nature of a cause either to the essence whose existence it is, or to other things; here we do not treat of the prior comparison, but of the latter; for concerning the prior, enough has been said above, and all agree on this, that existence with respect to the essence existing has the nature of act, and imitates formal cause. And all similarly teach that it is not properly and rigorously a formal cause. This we declare with very easy work, because a proper formal cause is distinguished ex natura rei from the subject in which it has its formal effect, and with it makes a true and real composition; but existence is not distinguished ex natura rei from essence, and therefore it cannot be a true form, nor a physical act, but a metaphysical one, and a mode so intrinsic that it is not distinguished from the thing which it modifies, just as difference is the act of genus, and is not its proper form. Those who hold that existence is distinguished ex natura rei from essence declare this with greater difficulty; nevertheless those who say it is not distinguished really, but only modally, can say that the mode of a thing extends more widely than form, although it behaves in the manner of act or form. And they have the example of subsistence, by which they may declare it; for subsistence is a mode of nature distinguished ex natura rei from it, yet not properly form, since it is neither accident, nor can it be substantial form, since it presupposes an integral and complete substantial nature which it modifies, as we shall say more extensively below. Therefore authors of this position ought to speak in this way concerning existence. But those who think that the act of existence is a thing [43] really distinct from essence can with greater difficulty give a reason why it is not properly form. Nevertheless they too can use the argument made, because it is not accidental form, as has been shown, and it cannot be substantial, since it presupposes a perfect and

[43] [rem], 1960; alit. om. Cf. BHF, 1960, t. V, p. 111.

complete form. Also, because otherwise it would formally constitute the very essence and nature. There is also a theological argument, because according to that opinion the act of existence can be supplied without information; for thus they say that the Word supplies the existence of humanity, although it does not inform it; therefore the existence of created nature by virtue of its mode of actuating it does not require that it be a true form. Nor indeed does it have this by reason of its entity, because it is not an accident; therefore it is not properly form, but is a certain ultimate terminus and act of essence. It is said nevertheless to imitate form, because it is that by which essence is constituted under such a nature, and because it ultimately terminates it and reduces it from potency to act, just as a point can be said to be compared to a line in the manner of form, insofar as it constitutes it as terminated, under which nature it actuates it; yet it is not a proper form.

3. But it can be objected that essence is the material cause of existence; therefore existence is the formal cause, for these two have themselves correlatively, as it were. In our opinion it is answered by denying the antecedent. But others ought to say consistently, with the same proportion, that essence indeed imitates material cause and receptive cause, but is not properly and rigorously matter or subject. Yet there always remains for them to explain what this formal effect is, or what formal actuality existence gives to another thing distinct from itself, since it cannot be the very entitative actuality, and every other actuality superadded and distinct from subsistence or inherence can neither be necessary nor intelligible, as has been extensively shown above.

4. The proper sense of this doubt, therefore, concerns the effects and causality that existence can have regarding other things, or rather an existing thing by reason of existence. And the question can concern all genera of causes. Let us omit final cause for now, since its causality is very intentional, on account of which it is a philosophical dogma received by all that an end, in order to cause, does not require

actual existence, because it moves only metaphorically as apprehended, and therefore objective being in the intellect suffices for it. Although an end does not really cause except in relation to its existence, and for that reason the final causality could be attributed to the existence of the good apprehended; existence (I say) not now exercised, but apprehended in the very good which has the nature of end, because good does not move, except insofar as it is in reality, or being or future being or being able to be is apprehended, concerning which matter enough has been said above in disputation XXIII.

### *Can Existence by the Causality of Form or Matter Cause Anything?*

5. First opinion. Concerning material and formal causality, therefore, almost all who distinguish existence from essence really or ex natura rei say that existence formally and properly never exercises the office of formal or material cause regarding another thing; moreover, that it is not even a condition per se necessary and anteceding by order of nature to the causalities of these causes, although according to duration of time it is a necessary condition, and according to order of nature consequent to the aforesaid genera of causes. These things are declared and proved at the same time. For prime matter, for example, does not receive form through its existence, but through the entity of its essence, for rather it itself, through the mediation of form, receives existence, and similarly substance does not receive accidents in its existence, but in the entity of essence; as in the humanity of Christ, if we understand it existing through the uncreated existence of the Word, we understand the accidents of humanity received [44] in it according to the entity of essence, and not in the uncreated existence of the Word. And this part can be proved by reason, because existence as such speaks the nature of act and not of

[44] recepta, 1960; alit. repleta. "La sustitución de recepta por repleta, en algunas ediciones, modifica notablemente el sentido." Cf. BHF, t. V. p. 113.

potency, on account of which it is called by many the ultimate act; therefore existence as such cannot be the reason of receiving something, because this is the office of potency; therefore it cannot be the reason of any material causality. And from this the other part concerning formal cause is established, for these two causes mutually regard each other and maintain proportion between themselves; if therefore matter does not cause or receive through existence, but through essence, neither does form inform through its existence, but through essence.

6. From which it further necessarily follows that these causes do not formally require existence for causing, nor according to the order of nature, because matter has being only through form; therefore by nature it receives form before it exists; therefore also form by nature informs before existence is given to matter or to the whole composite by reason of it; therefore also by nature before it itself has existence, because it has it only in the whole composite. This at least is true in material forms, for the rational soul indeed has existence by nature before it informs, yet this is not on account of the necessity of informing, but on account of the excellence of such a thing. And it is confirmed concerning accidental forms, which are dispositions to substantial form, for they dispose to it by nature before they exist; for they dispose matter and exist in the composite, and yet disposing pertains partly to material cause, insofar as it is a certain determination of matter, partly to formal cause, insofar as the coarctation of matter to this form is made through the information of heat or another similar ultimate disposition.

7. This is refuted. This doctrine cannot consist with the foundation posited concerning the identity of essence and existence, and therefore, in order that we may declare the truth, it must be noted that it is one thing to speak of the thing itself according to itself, another insofar as it is signified by the word existence, and as it is conceived by an abstract and precise concept corresponding to it. Again it must be noted that it is one thing to speak of existence as

such, another of this or that existence; for, speaking in the former way, it is manifest that existence as such does not of itself postulate material or formal causality regarding another thing; indeed, the more perfect existence is, the more it abstracts and is separated from causalities of this kind, as is established not only concerning the existence of God, but also concerning angelic existence and any complete substantial existence. We treat therefore of existence in its whole latitude, whether, namely, within it there is some existence that can participate in such causality; and consequently whether the nature of existence as such, although it does not require, at least permits this genus of causality.

8. I say therefore first: actual existence is altogether necessary for exercising material and formal causality, not only in duration of time, but also in antecession or order of nature. And concerning the first indeed, in duration of time, all agree, because the causality of matter or form, if it be referred to the composite, consists in the actual and intrinsic composition of it; but if they be referred to each other, it consists in this, that matter sustains form, and form actuates matter, and thus they mutually foster and conserve each other in being. But it cannot be understood that they mutually exercise this office, or compose the whole, unless they actually exist; otherwise neither will the composite actually exist, but it will be possible or in objective being, and similarly the causality will not be in act, but in potency and in objective being.

9. And this same reason, if it be rightly weighed, proves that the existence of a thing which is actually material or formal cause is prerequired from the intrinsic nature of such actual causality; and consequently is necessary not only in the same duration but also in antecession of nature. First indeed, because, if a cause actually causes, it is necessary that the causality itself exist in the nature of things; therefore it is necessary that it proceed from a cause existing as such; therefore not only according to duration of time, but also according to order of nature, existence is prerequired in the cause so that actual

causality may proceed from it. The first antecedent is proved, because if causality is now in act, from this precisely it is outside its cause, as much as it can be; therefore from this also it is existing. But the other consequences are evident, because nothing existing can be really caused except by an existing thing.

10. Second, because a creature can really cause nothing, unless by order of nature it is first itself caused and made by some efficient cause; but it has been shown above that all efficiency terminates in some being of existence, because it terminates in some being in act outside causes; therefore also by order of nature the being of existence of material and formal cause is presupposed to their causality. The major seems evident per se, because a creature, while it is not understood as caused or effected, cannot be understood as being in act, but only in potency; as such, however, it cannot be understood as actually causing. Because, if it itself is not outside causes, but in their potency, how can it constitute something outside causes? And, to speak in particular and make the matter more evident, how can matter actually be united to form or sustain it, if it itself is not actual, but only in potency? But it itself cannot be actual, if it be not actually effected. And similarly form cannot actually inform matter, unless it be created or educed from the potency of matter. I know it is customary to respond that it is created or educed by nature first as regards the being of essence. But I have already demonstrated above that this being of essence, since it is not only potential, but actual and outside causes, is also true being of existence, nor does created being formally require another being for existing.

11. Third, because actual existence of matter (and the same is true of form) is necessary to it for causing in the same instant of time at least, as all confess, and it is not necessary as consequent to its causality, otherwise it would cause itself, for it would cause its own being; therefore it is necessary as antecedent to its causality by order of nature. The consequence is evident, because this necessity is not per accidens and from mere concomitance, otherwise it could be impeded

at least by divine power, and thus it could happen that matter would be actually united to form and form to matter outside an efficient cause, and yet that they would have no existence; but this cannot even be conceived by the mind.

12. The existence of matter and form is in reality that by which they cause. I say second: the existence of matter (and the same is proportionally true of form) in the thing itself is that by which matter causes in its genus; but according to the mode of signifying and conceiving it is apprehended as a necessary condition or as a mode constituting the thing in a state sufficient for causing. The first part of this conclusion is sufficiently established from what was said concerning the identity of existence and actual essence; for matter does not cause except through the actual entity of its essence; for according to it, it is in potency to form and receives it in itself; but in reality the actual essence of matter does not differ from its existence; therefore it really receives form in its existence, or in itself existing, as it is existing. This is confirmed and declared, because neither of these causes exercises its office or causality except insofar as it is being in act, namely, insofar as being in act is distinguished from being in objective potency; but being in act of this kind is constituted formally and intrinsically through the being of existence, as has been proved above; therefore each of these causes causes actually insofar as it is constituted through the being of actual existence; but that constitution is through complete identity in reality, as we have shown; therefore it causes insofar as it is its very existence.

13. The objection is satisfied. You will say that matter does not cause insofar as it is being in act, but insofar as it is being in potency. It is answered that in these words there is great equivocation, both from receptive potency to objective potency, and from being simply or completely to being secundum quid or partially. Matter therefore causes insofar as it is in receptive potency of form, and consequently causes insofar as it contains material form in some way, namely, in passive potency, and therefore it can also be said to be

being simply and completely, not in act, but in potency. But truly it does not cause insofar as it has the being of matter (which is partial and secundum quid being) in potency, but in act, and thus it does not cause insofar as in its grade it is being in objective potency, but as in act. And to be being in act in this way, that is, outside causes and outside nothing, and to be in receptive potency of another act, are not opposites, but rather per se subordinated; for potency cannot be in proximate aptitude, or in a state in which it is apt to receive its act, unless it itself has something actual of entity, since potency itself ought to be real being and real and outside causes, all of which things have been extensively treated above in disputation XIII. And finally this part is confirmed, for a cause ought to be proportioned to its effect and to its causality; but the causality of matter or form, in the way in which it proceeds from it, is something existing outside causes, and terminates in a thing insofar as it is something outside causes, as has been shown above; therefore it also causes as existing; therefore it causes insofar as in reality it is its very existence.

14. Existence is conceived by us only as a mode required for causing. The other part of the conclusion, which regards only the mode of conceiving and signifying, must be declared from what was said above concerning the distinction of reason between essence and existence; for existence is signified by this word as precise and as distinguished by reason from essence; as such, however, it is not conceived as a sufficient reason of causing something outside the essence whose existence it is, but only as a reason or mode of being of the very essence; nor indeed can form or matter cause except by communicating their very essence, and therefore existence, as precisely conceived, is not the proximate and physical reason of receiving or informing, but existing essence. For this reason therefore it is rightly said that existence as such is conceived and signified rather as a condition or mode constituting the thing in sufficient state for causing, than as a cause or as the proximate reason of causing. And it is confirmed, for causality is exercised through physical entities insofar

as they are in reality, and not through grades or modes metaphysically conceived or precise; as the formal cause physically constituting man is not the rational, but the rational soul, although metaphysically it is said to constitute him. But existence is metaphysically conceived as a mode constituting essence in entitative act; therefore under this precise concept it is not apprehended as the physical reason of causing, but as a mode or condition of the causing essence. But it must be soundly understood when existence is said to be a condition of matter or form necessary for causing, lest it be thought to be one of those conditions which, although they are necessary, nevertheless do not per se concur to the effect, as is proximity or approximation, for example, which for this reason a condition considered of itself is usually called a per accidens cause; yet existence is not necessary only in this way, but as intimately and indivisibly (so to speak) constituting the thing which through itself is material and formal cause, and thus it pertains not per accidens, but per se to the nature of causing.

15. To the foundation of the contrary opinion it is answered that it is false that substantial or accidental form is received in the entity of essence precise from the entity of existence, just as it is also false that it is received in existence precise from essence. But it is received in the essence of the existing subject as it is existing. To the proof concerning matter, it is denied that matter, properly speaking, receives existence through the mediation of form, but just as it is immediately created, so it immediately receives existence, although dependently upon form, and thus in the way in which in its genus of cause it is presupposed to form, it is presupposed as existing, because it is presupposed as created, and consequently outside its efficient cause, which is to exist. To the other part concerning accident, I respond that it is false that an accident does not inhere in substance as existing, and really in its existence; otherwise the inexistence of an accident would not per se and intrinsically presuppose the existence of substance, but only per accidens; nor would the existence of substance sustain or be the reason of sustaining the existence of an accident,

which things are false. Nor does the example of the humanity of Christ help anything, for it assumes something false; and that argument could be retorted, so that it would be an indication that the humanity of Christ does not lack proper existence of nature, but only subsistence, as we have treated more extensively in its place. Nor indeed is it incongruous for one existence to be actuated in reality through another; because this signifies nothing other than that one existing thing is potency to receiving an existing act. In what way, however, existence is said to be ultimate act, and in what way some receptive potentiality does not repugn it, we shall say in the following section. To the final confirmation (all other things having been dispatched) it is answered that something false is also taken in it, for dispositions, if they are preparing matter or subject, just as they dispose by nature first, so also they exist by nature first; but if they are only consequent, conserving or adorning the composite, just as they do not exist by nature first, so neither do they dispose by nature first, nor are they properly cause of form or composite, but its properties.

### *On the Effective Causality of Existence*

16. From these considerations it is easily established what should be said concerning effective causality. For what we have said about material and formal cause can and should be applied to the efficient cause, since they have place in it with even greater reason; nevertheless, a few things must be added. For those authors who think that essence is a thing distinct from the existence of a creature say that existence has no influence by itself in effective causality, yet it is required as a necessary condition. And some of them teach that it belongs to those conditions which, in the order of nature, must necessarily precede efficiency itself. Others, however, deny that this is necessary universally. And indeed, those who deny that existence is made by secondary causes, but by God alone, speak consistently when they deny that the existence of a secondary cause influences the effect

of that same secondary cause by itself; for if a secondary cause only effects essence in its effect, a sufficient principle of that will be through its essence. But these can offer no sufficient reason why they assert that existence is a necessary condition for acting. And much less can they prove that it is antecedently necessary according to the order of nature, although Báñez also affirms this in his commentary on the First Part, where cited above, conclusion 5.

17. In the proof of this, he rightly says that an efficient cause operates according as it is in act through existence; nevertheless, he cannot demonstrate this very point by consequent reasoning. Hence the reasons which he adds are indeed valid, but they completely destroy his position. The first is this: for a cause not actuated through existence is only in potency; therefore it cannot confer act upon an effect, unless it is considered as it is under a similar act. He infers correctly indeed; but I ask, when he assumes that a cause not actuated through existence is only in potency, whether the discussion concerns a cause not actuated in temporal duration, or in the order of nature. He cannot speak in the former way, otherwise he would not correctly prove what he intends, namely, that existence cannot flow effectively from essence; for concerning this, an antecedence according to the order of nature in the actuality of essence would suffice. It is necessary therefore that the assumed proposition be taken in the latter sense already mentioned, in which it is also most true, and evidently (as I think) proven by us in the preceding sections. But then I ask further, if a cause not actuated through existence is only in potency, in what way does it actually materialize or inform? Again, if a created cause confers upon an effect only the act of essence, why is it not sufficient that it be considered under a similar act, so that it may effect its effect? If therefore it is prior by nature under the act of essence than under the act of existence, as they themselves say, they require without foundation the act of existence in the order of nature in a secondary cause so that it may effect. But supposing (what we have shown) that no thing is prior by nature in the act of essence than in the act of

existence, it is excellently inferred that it needs the act of existing in order to effect, not only in temporal duration, but also in natural antecedence.

18. But truly, those who concede that a secondary cause influences and effects the being of existence in its effect, I do not see on what foundation they can deny that the existence of the cause influences by itself and effects existence in the effect, because neither by reason of existence as such does it conflict with being effective, nor even for such existence because it is such. Wherefore we must say the same thing about this causality as we said about material or formal causality. For in reality, the very existence of an active form is the very reason or principle of acting by itself. First, because in reality it is the very actual essence of the form, which is the principle of acting. Second, because like is produced most excellently and fittingly by its like, according to that in which it is like; just as therefore the being of existence of an effect is the formal terminus toward which the effecting is terminated, so the similar being of the cause will be the formal principle of such efficiency. Third, because God is supremely effective, in that He is being itself through essence, supreme and most perfect; therefore a creature will be effective from some perfect participation of such being; therefore created existence can most excellently be a principle of effecting; for why would this be repugnant? Not indeed because it is the being of existence, since the being of existence of God is active. Nor because it is the finite being of existence, both because the being of essence of a creature is also finite, and also because for acting from a presupposed subject infinite perfection is not required. Nor because it is being received in essence, both because a material form is also received in matter and an accident in a subject, and nonetheless they are active, and also because, according to reality, being is not properly received in essence, but only according to reason, concerning which it will be said below. Or finally because being is an act so imperfect that it cannot be a principle of acting; and those who think that existence is a distinct thing and the most perfect act of

essence cannot say this; for if a thing acts insofar as it is in act and is constituted in most perfect act through existence, therefore through existence it is constituted in the nature of an active principle. But truly, according to our position, existence, as it is found in reality itself, is not so much an act of essence as essence itself in act, and therefore on account of imperfection of act it cannot be repugnant to it that in reality itself it be a principle of effecting.

19. But according to reason, existence, as thus conceived abstractly and precisely, is not signified as a formal principle of effecting, but as constituting a form in a state apt for effecting and operating; but the proper principle of acting is an existing form or a form which is actual entity, as has been explained in other causes, and more broadly above, in disputation XVIII.

20. From this it is understood that created existence, from its common and abstract nature, does not claim for itself some determinate genus of causality, but is not repugnant to any of them; but according to a determinate degree of existence, or according to the perfection of the essence whose existence it is, it can participate in this or that genus of causality. Hence, because the essence of matter is most imperfect, even if it is constituted in act through existence, it is not effective, but only receptive, and therefore its existence does not participate in the genus of efficient cause, but only of material cause. But it is otherwise concerning the existence of form, and thus one must philosophize about the rest.

## SECTION XI

## OF WHAT THINGS EXISTENCE BELONGS, AND WHETHER IT IS SIMPLE OR COMPOSITE

1. Having explained the common nature of existence and its causes and effects, it follows that we should speak about the multiple existence of created things; and at the same time we shall incidentally

resolve the fourth argument proposed in section 1 in favor of the first opinion.

*Whether Existence Belongs Only to Singular Things*

2. The higher degrees of a thing exist by the very same existence as the lower degrees. First, therefore, one may doubt whether existence belongs only to singular things, or also to common natures. For some say that, although common natures do not exist outside of singulars, they nevertheless have in them their own peculiar and partial existences by which they formally exist, from which, together with the existence of the singular thing or rather of its singularity, one singular existence is made, by which the individual itself adequately exists. This manner of speaking would be quite probable if the common nature were by nature of the thing distinct in the thing itself from the individual. But since this is impossible, as we have demonstrated above, therefore it is also impossible to distinguish the existence of a common nature from the existence of a singular thing by any distinction found in the thing itself. This is so self-evident that it needs no proof.

3. But I add further that neither should nor can the actual and exercised existence of common degrees existing in a singular thing be distinguished by reason from the particular existence of such an individual. For although a common nature can be conceived as abstracted from individuals, nevertheless as such it cannot be conceived as actually existing, unless it is conceived in error, or as something imaginable, but not as something possible; and although it can be conceived as apt for existing, not however as having immediately and according to itself such an order to being, but by means of the individual in which it exists. Whence it happens that actual existence exercised in the thing itself cannot be conceived as immediately actuating the common nature as such, but only as contracted and made individual. This is proved because the common

nature, prescinding from individuation, is not proximately capable of existence; indeed, according to that state actual existence is repugnant to it; therefore, conceiving existence as the act of essence, it cannot according to reason be conceived as having immediate relation to the common nature as common, but only to the individual thing, to the common nature only as it has been made singular in the individual thing. Therefore in Peter, for example, there cannot be distinguished a double existence, even according to reason, one of Peter and another of man, but there is only one, by which Peter immediately exists and man exists mediately according to reason.

4. You will say: the existence of man as such can be abstractly conceived, just like man himself, and be distinguished by reason from the individual existences of singular men; therefore in this way the existence of a common nature can be distinguished by reason from the existence of an individual. It is answered by absolutely denying the consequence, because when existence is conceived abstractly and universally, it is not taken as actual and exercised, but only in signate act. Which I explain thus: for man cannot be conceived as actually existing through human existence in general, but through this or that existence, and therefore when he is conceived with relation to existence in general only, he is conceived as something abstracted from the actual exercise of existing. Therefore actual existence, which exercises this function in the thing itself, must be conceived intrinsically as individual and singular, and consequently as having immediate relation to individual and singular essence, and in this way there is no existence, even distinct by reason, which immediately regards the common nature, but only as existing in the individual and made singular in it. Wherefore it must be said simply that existence properly and immediately belongs only to singular things, on account of which Aristotle says in I Metaphysics, in the prooemium, that generation belongs only to singular things, because generation tends toward being, which belongs only to the singular thing; and therefore also in the chapter on Substance he said that second substances are

only in first substances. And the reason is clear from what has been said, because no being can actually be except as individual and singular; but existence in the thing is nothing other than the very actual entity of the individual thing. But truly, if in one and the same individual thing we distinguish by reason the individual of the species from the individual of the genus, so also by reason we shall be able to distinguish the existence of one from the existence of the other; nevertheless both will be conceived as the existence of a singular and individual thing, to which it has immediate relation according to reason; therefore every existence, both according to the thing and according to the true manner of conceiving, is immediately of some singular thing.

### *Whether Existence Belongs to the Suppositum Alone, or Also to the Individual Nature*

5. But then it can be further asked whether in created substances existence belongs to the suppositum alone, or also to the nature. For all philosophers and theologians who think that existence is not distinguished from the entity of essence consequently judge that not only the suppositum, but also the individual substantial nature has its own proper existence, and thus in Christ the Lord his humanity retained the proper existence of its nature, even though there was no proper and created suppositum in it. But truly the disciples of St. Thomas feel the contrary; they are divided, however, for Capreolus and others teach indeed that substantial existence belongs first and per se to the suppositum alone, yet in such a way that existence does not presuppose the suppositum as constituted by order of nature and actuate it in the character of existing, but formally constitutes the suppositum itself. Whence it happens that, according to this opinion, if we prescind from what is as it were the subject or receptive of existence, there is truly no suppositum, but the nature itself; for the suppositum is rather composite or constituted from nature and

existence, and thus existence will be of the suppositum as constituted, but of the nature as actuable potency. This opinion is false in that it confuses existence with subsistence and does not attribute to existence its proper formal effect, which is to constitute the thing in act in the character of actual being, which matter we touched upon above and about which we shall speak more extensively below, when treating of nature and suppositum.

6. But truly Cajetan and others teach that existence presupposes the suppositum constituted in the character of suppositum, and actuates it and first and per se constitutes actually existing being. Their foundation is that only the suppositum is that which is, properly speaking; just as only the suppositum is what operates, because it belongs to the same thing to be as to operate; therefore existence is first and per se the act of the suppositum; consequently it is communicated to the nature and its parts. And indeed this opinion would be probable if existence were a thing distinct from substantial nature, although it could hardly be explained what subsistence does regarding substantial nature precisely considered as essence and prior by nature to existing, about which we shall treat in the cited disputation on the suppositum. But speaking simply, this opinion does not speak of accidental existence, as is clear per se; but regarding substantial existence it can be understood either of every existence of whatever actual substantial entity, or only of existence complete on every side. Regarding this latter it can be admitted that it belongs to the integral suppositum alone, as we shall soon explain; nevertheless this cannot be true of every existence. Because it has been shown that the actual being of nature or essence is true existence; but supposital character cannot terminate and modify nature except by presupposing in it some actual being and extramental existence; therefore it necessarily presupposes in it some being of existence; therefore not every existence can be the act of the suppositum, but there is given some existence which is the act of nature. Moreover, supposital character is distinguished by nature of

the thing from actual essence, as we shall show below, but the proper existence of nature is not distinguished by nature of the thing from it as it is a certain actual essence; therefore it is necessary that some existence be proper to the nature itself, namely that which in the thing is not distinguished from the same nature.

7. Wherefore existence has been correctly divided; for some existence is entirely complete in the genus of substance, which is usually called per se existence and includes not only the actuality of essence or nature, but also the mode of such nature which is called subsistence, and its actuality. Therefore such existence belongs to the suppositum alone, not as its simple act, but as composite from the existence of the nature and the existence of supposital character itself, about which will be said below. And by reason of this existence the thing is said to be simply that which it is, or complete being, and therefore it is proper to the suppositum, and this is presupposed, per se speaking, for operation, and therefore to operate is properly attributed to the suppositum or subsistent thing. But the other is substantial existence not entirely complete and terminated in its genus, because it can still be terminated through subsistence. And this is the existence of nature as nature, belonging to it more immediately than to subsistence; for just as substantial nature, even if it is complete in the genus of nature, is nevertheless not entirely complete simply in the character of substance until it is subsistent, such nature can preexist subsistence by order of nature, just as in the mystery of the Incarnation nature preexisted assumption; for everything that is assumed is presupposed to assumption, as St. Thomas said, III, q. 4, a. 2 and 3; and therefore q. 6, a. 4, ad 3, he says that the humanity of Christ was by nature first a being before it was united to the Word; but he speaks of actual being, for potential being was from eternity; but actual being is constituted through existence. Therefore this existence, which is preunderstood to subsistence, must proximately and immediately affect nature and not the suppositum.

## *Whether Existence Immediately Actuates Parts or Only the Integral Nature*

8. Third, it can be inquired what kind this existence of nature is, and whether it is immediately the act of the complete substantial nature alone, or also of its parts. In this matter, omitting the opinion of those who really distinguish existence from essence, who must consequently speak according to what was said in the previous section, we must say that existence, generally speaking, is not the act of complete essence alone; but just as essence is distinguished into total and partial, or complete and incomplete, so also existence must be distinguished within that order. Therefore partial existence immediately belongs to a part of essence, although the integral existence of nature immediately regards complete essence. This clearly follows from the established foundation that existence is not distinguished in the thing from actual essence; for just as the whole actual essence is being, so also its parts are actual beings, although partial; therefore they include their own partial existences, which are not distinguished in the thing from the very parts of essence. Likewise, because prime matter, as it is supposed to form when conserved or created by God, is actual entity including some being of existence, as has been shown in what preceded; therefore it has its own partial existence, because under that character and as prior by nature it is supposed to form, it cannot exist through the existence of the whole, as is manifest per se. Again, form, since it is more actual than matter, much more brings with itself its own proper existence, which, joined to the existence of matter, will complete the integral existence of the whole nature. For the existence of form per se alone cannot be integral and total, both because form alone is not the whole essence of the thing, according to the truer opinion, and also because, since the existence of form presupposes the existence of matter and must be

united to it, it is fitting that it not be total, but partial, so that it can compose one per se with that.

9. And hence it is gathered that existence is not always simple entity, nor always composite; but is such as the essence requires. And so, if the essence is simple, and at the same time is complete and integral, existence will similarly be simple and total in its order, or according to the character of nature, and of this kind is the substantial existence of angelic nature. But if the essence is simple and partial, existence will similarly be simple and incomplete or partial in that order, and of this kind are the existences of matter and substantial form. But if the essence is composite from form and matter, and is complete and integral, in a similar way existence will be composite from the existences of matter and form and integral and total in its order. Finally, if the essence is indeed composite from matter and form, but is not the whole essence, but an integral part of another, it will have similar or proportional existence: for thus the head, for example, or hand has partial essence composite from its matter and form, which is therefore partial because it consists of partial matter, and of form either partial, or certainly partially (so to speak) and inadequately informing that part of matter. Therefore according to the mode of essence such is the existence of each thing, which clearly follows from the established foundation that actual essence and existence are the same in the thing.

10. But against this resolution many things are usually objected, but they can be reduced to three principal headings. The first contains authorities and reasons by which it is usually proved that matter has no existence, but receives all from form, because of itself it is pure potency and near to nothing; but if it had existence from itself, it would have actuality from itself and that most perfect; for existence is perfect act and most perfect participation of divine being, as Dionysius testifies, c. 5 On the Divine Names. Likewise, because it follows that form causes nothing in matter, because it confers neither essence nor existence. Finally, because otherwise matter could be

without form, at least by absolute power, the opposite of which St. Thomas often teaches. But about all these things much has been said above, disp. XIII and XV, and therefore it is briefly said that matter having no existence from itself, but receiving all from form, can be understood in two ways. First, that it does not have that existence except as dependent by its nature upon form, and in this sense we concede that matter receives existence from form, as was sufficiently declared in sect. 9. But another sense is that matter in its actual entity includes no proper existence, but borrows that entirely from form, so that through the very form, or through something that is given to matter by reason of form, it formally and intrinsically exists and is constituted in the being of actual entity, and this sense is false. And therefore in the opposite sense we concede that matter has its own proper existence, which it does not have formally from form, which has been sufficiently proved in what preceded. And there it was also declared how matter is pure receptive potency in order to formal act, but not to entitative act or act of existence. But it is said to be near to nothing because among substantial beings it holds the lowest place in perfection; nevertheless, by the very fact that it is said to be near to nothing, it is consequently said to have something of entity, by which it recedes from nothing, and according to that it has something of existence. Although being itself as such is said to be most noble, nevertheless not every being is most perfect, but degrees are found in it according to the diversity of things and essences. And thus, although matter has some proper being, nevertheless, because in the genus of substance it is most imperfect, therefore, notwithstanding such being, matter can be imperfect and near to nothing. Again, although matter has proper existence, nevertheless it has that existence as dependent upon form, and in this way form is said to confer being, as was declared in what preceded. But how great and of what kind this dependence upon form is, has been extensively explained in the cited place, and therefore it is not necessary to say more about those objections in this place.

11. The second principal objection is taken from the side of form, and especially from the rational soul, whose being is the same as the being of the whole man or humanity; but that being is simple and not composite, because it remains in the soul alone, and consequently is entirely spiritual; therefore, although humanity is composite essence, nevertheless its being is not composite; therefore for the same reason the same will be said proportionally about any composite substantial nature. The antecedent is very much received in the school of St. Thomas, from his teaching, I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 4, and On Being and Essence, c. 5. In which places Cajetan extensively defends and explains this, and Ferrara, lib. II cont. Gent., c. 63, near the beginning. And it can be persuaded by reason in this way, because the being of the whole man cannot be material, otherwise the soul could not exist through it; therefore it must be spiritual, because there is no middle between these two; therefore according to itself it is incorruptible and perpetual and per se first belonging to the soul, and remaining in it after separation. Second, because the soul, while it is in the body, exists through the being of the whole; therefore it does not have being distinct from the being of the whole, otherwise it would simultaneously exist through two beings, which is superfluous and impossible; therefore the being of the soul and of the whole composite is the same.

12. To this objection it is answered that those who judge existence to be a thing distinct from essence quite consistently opine that this being in man is immaterial being, and consequently first belongs to the soul and through it is communicated to matter and the whole composite. But truly, supposing the contrary foundation, namely that existence is not in the thing distinct from actual essence, it must necessarily be said that the being of the rational soul is compared to the being of man, or humanity, just as the soul according to its essence is compared to the essence of man, or to humanity. But the soul is not the whole essence of man, nor is it so co-distinguished from it that it is not included in it, but is distinguished as part from whole;

so therefore the being of the soul is not the whole being of man or humanity, nor is it so co-distinguished from it that it is not included in it; but it intrinsically composes it, and is that which is principal in the very being of man, although it cannot be the whole, because the body itself has some proper being, which also communicates to humanity in its genus of cause, namely material. And thus Scotus was of this opinion, In IV, dist. 43, q. 1, and in Quodl., q. 9.

13. Nor did St. Thomas ever expressly teach that the being of the soul alone is the total and integral being of the whole humanity; but in the cited place, On Being and Essence, c. 5, he rather says that from soul and body one being results in one composite, and he speaks manifestly about the being of existence. But truly, if the being of man were nothing other than the very spiritual being of the soul, communicated and as it were extended to the body, it would not properly be said that that being results from soul and body. But what St. Thomas immediately adds, that that being, as it belongs to the soul, is not dependent upon the body, does not have that sense that the whole being of man remains in the separated soul and is independent of the body, because neither do the words themselves bear this sense, nor is there anything that compels us to interpret thus. For the best sense is that that being, as it belongs to the soul, that is, as to the part of it which pertains to the soul, does not depend upon the body. And in this St. Thomas establishes the difference between the being of the rational soul and other forms, that other forms have being only as they inform matter and depend upon it; but the soul has independent being, which it communicates to matter when it informs it. Not because through that being matter formally exists, but because through it it is actuated, perfected and fostered or conserved. But when the soul is separated, it can retain that same being in itself, because it is spiritual and subsistent, although not entirely complete in the genus of substance. And for this reason St. Thomas could sometimes say that the being which was of the composite remains in the separated soul, as is clear from the cited places II cont. Gent., c. 81,

ad 3; Quodl. X, a. 3 and 6, in which places he never says that the being of the soul is the whole being of the composite, but only that it becomes or is the being of the composite while it is communicated to the body; but it can be called the being of the composite, as the act and principal perfection of it, although it is not the integral and total being of it. But if anyone finally contends that St. Thomas felt that that very immaterial being which remains in the separated soul is the integral and total being by which the whole man exists, which he suggests in the cited places and others, as can be seen In I, dist. 8, q. 6, a. 2, ad 1 and 2, and dist. 15, a. 3, and often elsewhere, he must consequently say that St. Thomas proceeds in that opinion that being is a thing distinct from essence, which we now do not defend.

14. To the first reason it is answered by denying that the being of man is entirely immaterial, but rather should be called absolutely material, just as the essence of man is material. But it is material nature, not because all parts from which it consists are material, but because one of them is material. For an immaterial thing is said to be that which does not consist of matter; for the negation included there excludes composition from matter. Whence every thing which consists of matter, although it is otherwise constituted by spiritual and immaterial form, simply exists as material and should be called such. Therefore in a similar way the total being of man is material, not because every partial being from which it is composed is material, but because it arises from the being of the body, which is material, and the being of the soul. But when it is objected that the soul cannot exist through material being, it must be answered that adequately and as through its proper act it cannot exist through such being, nevertheless inadequately or partially it can exist through such being, not insofar as it consists of the material part, but insofar as it includes another spiritual part proper and proportioned to the soul itself. Therefore this integral being of man is adequate to the whole man, but inadequate to the individual parts of him, that is, exceeding, and therefore does not actuate individuals according to itself as a whole, but according to

something of itself, preserving proportion with the individual parts. Whence the argument could be turned around; for also the material body cannot formally and intrinsically exist through immaterial being, because the body itself is material and extended actual entity, which is intrinsically constituted through some actual being, which must also be material and extended, which being is true existence, as has been proved in what preceded; therefore the body itself cannot intrinsically exist through immaterial being; therefore it is necessary that the being of the whole man be material, as composite from the material being of the body and the immaterial being of the soul.

15. And hence the response to the second reason is easy, which can be made about matter itself and about every part existing in the whole. Whence it must be said that the part existing in the whole exists through the being of the whole and through its own being, but in different ways, and therefore does not exist through two beings, but through one and the same considered under different aspects. For the being of the whole and of the part are not properly two, but are compared as including and included; just as therefore the part is included in the whole, so it exists through the being of the whole mediately and inadequately, or exceedingly (so to speak); but it exists immediately and adequately through its own being, which is partial and included in the being of the whole. Whence it does not exist through the being of the whole except by reason of that partial being which it includes, and thus does not exist through two beings, but through one and the same.

16. The third principal objection is the one proposed above in sect. 1, in the fourth reason of the first opinion, which tends to prove that the being of composite nature cannot be composite, in whose proof some things are touched upon which have already been resolved. The first is because otherwise matter would have its own partial being, and thus would not be pure potency. To which it has already been answered that it is indeed pure potency in order to substantial formal act, because of itself it has none, and thus is pure

receptive potency, but not objective, because it is necessary that it have some real entity, for otherwise it could not even have real receptive potency.

17. The second was because otherwise from matter and form one per se would not be made, because from two beings in act one per se is not made. To which it is answered, if there is discussion about beings in act, as they are co-distinguished from beings in potency (for in this sense we now speak of being in act, for thus through existence it is formally and intrinsically constituted as being in such actuality), therefore speaking in this way about being in act, not only does it not repugn that one per se be constituted from two beings in act, but indeed it is impossible that it be constituted except from beings in act, because being in potency, since it is nothing, cannot actually constitute anything, but only potentially, as has been said often in what preceded. Then that axiom understood in that sense can be founded on no probable reason. For why from two beings which are partial in their genus could not one per se be constituted in such genus, even if they themselves have in act, that is, extramentally, partial entities and through those are united for composing? Moreover, even in the opinion of adversaries it cannot be denied that matter and form have some proper actuality in the being of essence, through which they are united for composing essence, which in the being of essence is per se one, although it consists of two beings in act in the same being of essence; therefore the same will be with the same proportion in the being of existence; indeed in the thing it is entirely the same, because that actual being of essence is true being of existence. Likewise, in material beings, regarding composition from integral parts, it cannot be denied that, just as form is extended and divisible, so also is existence. For who would believe that the existence of a stone or tree is so indivisible that it is whole in the whole and whole in any part? therefore the existence of the whole stone or tree consists of integral parts; therefore those parts are united as partial actual beings, and nevertheless from them one per se is composed. Therefore in this

sense that inference must be denied; for the principle by which it is proved, according to the same sense, has no appearance or probability.

18. Therefore when it is said that from two beings in act one per se is not made, it must be understood of complete beings, from which one is not compared to another as potency to act of the same genus, nor as part to whole or to co-part, according to what was said above about being per se and per accidens. And it comes to the same thing if we say that it is understood of beings simply which per se are beings and not instituted for composing other beings. But in this sense that proposition is not correctly accommodated in the present case, nor is the inference correctly made, because matter and form are not beings simply, nor complete, but by their nature instituted for completing a being simply, and therefore, although proper entitative actuality is understood in them, one per se is excellently composed from them, which is simply and completely being.

19. Third, it was inferred from this our opinion that every form can naturally be without matter and matter without form, because if these parts have their own partial existences, each will be able to exist through its existence without any part or without the whole. It is answered by denying the consequence, and to the proof the assumption is also denied. Because by the very fact that existence is not complete, but partial, it can depend upon an extrinsic formal or material cause, if such existence is also material. But when it is insisted that it is of the nature of existence to be sufficient for constituting the thing extramentally, it is easily answered that its nature is to be sufficient in its genus, namely in the genus of formal act or intrinsic mode; but it is not of its nature to be independent of every other efficient or formal or material cause. And there is an evident instance in the existence of accident, which formally makes it exist, but not independently of the subject, as was also touched upon in what preceded. But what is added there, because if matter or form cannot naturally exist except in the composite whose existence can be terminated, partial existence would be superfluously given to it, this (I

say) has already been solved from what was said. For although these parts cannot exist except in the whole, nevertheless the existence of the whole is nothing unless it is composed from the existences of parts, nor can parts exist through the existence of the whole except insofar as it includes partial existences accommodated to individual parts. And therefore partial existences are not superfluous, but entirely necessary, so that parts may have sufficient actuality for composing the whole, and also so that from these the integral existence of the whole composite may be composed.

20. Finally, to that instance, that if matter or form had their own partial existences, one would exist by nature prior to the other, and consequently could naturally exist without the other, it must be said that prime matter, by the fact that it is made and conserved through creation, exists by nature prior to form; nevertheless it cannot be inferred from this that it can naturally exist without form, because it can require it as a necessary condition and disposition, or as formal act without which it is not owed to it that it be. As often happens that what is in some genus prior by nature cannot be without the posterior, about which matter has been extensively said in what preceded, treating of causes, especially disp. XXVIII, and in tome I, of part III, around q. 2 and 17, I touched upon many things about this matter. But truly material form, which is educed from the potency of matter, does not exist by nature prior to being united to matter, because the action by which it is made essentially depends upon matter. And in this is the difference between the rational soul and other forms, that it exists by nature prior to being united, because it is made through creation, which is an action independent of the subject, and therefore through it receives being, in which it subsists by nature prior to being united to the body, and therefore can naturally retain it, although it is separated from the body. But other forms, although they receive proper and partial existence, nevertheless not apt for subsisting in themselves by their nature, but dependent upon matter, so that they may be sustained by it, and therefore neither are they by nature in themselves

prior to being in matter, nor can they be conserved when separated from matter.

21. Fourth, it was inferred that one partial existence is compared to another as potency to act, which seemed to repugn the actuality of existence. But to this response has already been made in what preceded and it was declared how some existence, although it constitutes the thing in act, that is, extramentally and beyond objective potency, can nevertheless be compared to another existence as receptive potency to act, speaking physically and according to the thing about existence, as was declared above.

### *How Existence is Said to be The Ultimate Actuality*

22. From this it may be inferred in passing how we should understand what many say about existence being the ultimate act or the ultimate actuality of a thing. For thus speaks St. Thomas, in the single question De Anima, article 6, reply to the second objection; and Cajetan, in the First Part, question 3, article 4, concerning the second argument of St. Thomas. Other Thomists, however, also say that existence is rather the first actuality of a thing, since being is rather the first act of any thing than the ultimate act. This variation, given the doctrine we have handed down, can consist only in the signification of words. For actual existence is said to be the act or actuality of essence, not physically and according to reality, but metaphysically and according to reason, and in this way it can be called first or ultimate act for different reasons. In respect to essential predicates, insofar as one is compared to another as act to metaphysical potency, existence is called the ultimate act, because it constitutes in act the entire essence including all essential predicates and is that which, according to our way of understanding, ultimately comes to the essence in constituting the intrinsic and actual entity of the thing. But truly, in respect to those things which follow from the essence, whether they be

properties, or operations, or other accidents, the existence of a creature has rather the character of a first act than an ultimate one. Because, according to the doctrine of Aristotle in the first book of the De Anima, texts 2 and 5, form is the first act, because it confers being, upon which follows operation, which is the second act; therefore by the same reasoning, all being, compared to the operation or property which flows from it, has rather the character of first act than ultimate act. Therefore, of whatever kind the being may be, such will be its actuality and such character of first act it will be able to have, for if it be perfect being, it will be act by way of an efficient principle in respect to those things which flow from it; if however it be imperfect being, it will be able to be first act by way of receptive potency. It is not therefore of the nature of being as such that it be pure or ultimate actuality in such a way that it cannot be perfected by a further act, but this pertains to the supreme and most perfect being. Whether existence can be compared with essence in perfection will be discussed below.

### *On the Existence of Accidents*

23. Fourth, it can consequently be inquired whether accidental forms have and confer upon their subject a proper existence. For certain recent Thomists believe it probable that accidents do not have any other existence than the existence of the subject in which they are. And they seem to be founded only in this, that the being of the subject suffices so that through it all accidents which are really joined to it may exist; there is therefore no reason why many beings should be multiplied in the same subject. It is added that an accident is not so much a being as a being of being, as Aristotle testifies in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, at the beginning; and therefore it is commonly said that the being of an accident is to be in something, because, namely, it is neither a being nor has being except insofar as it participates in the being of its subject. Finally, the

existence of an accident is not the inherence itself, since, with the inherence changed, the accident can retain the same existence; nor is the existence of an accident the essence alone; for the essence of an accident consists in aptitudinal inherence, not in actual existence; it will therefore be the very existence of the subject, for besides these nothing else is found in the accident.

24. This opinion is rejected. This position is supported neither by firm reasoning nor by any authority. For all authors who hold that existence is not a thing other than actual essence must necessarily confess that an accidental form, just as it has its proper essence, so also has its proper existence. And thus taught Scotus, In IV, distinction 12, question 1, and others commonly. Again, those who think that existence is a thing distinct from essence, nevertheless teach that the essence of an accident has its proper existence proportioned to itself, distinct both from its essence and from the essence and existence of the substance. Thus hold commonly the Thomists, Soncinas, VII Metaphysics, question 5; Flandria, question 1, article 5; Cajetan, chapter 7 De Ente et essentia, after question 16, and First Part, question 28, article 2, and it is taken from St. Thomas, Third Part, question 17, article 2, and IV Contra Gentiles, chapter 14, and In I, distinction 3, question 2, article 3, and distinction 20, question 1, article 5.

25. It must therefore be said that an accidental form has its proper being of existence, which it communicates to the subject when it informs it. This assertion, as I have said, is most certain, if existence is not distinct from essence by nature of the thing, whence it can be proven by the same reasons by which we have confirmed that opinion, namely, because an accidental form, as distinguished from the subject, is an actual entity; therefore it intrinsically includes in itself existence distinct from the subject. Likewise, because an accidental form can come to be in a substance by a new proper action; but that new action must necessarily be terminated to some new being of existence. This is especially confirmed by the mystery of the Eucharist, in which the

same accidents in number are conserved without substance; but they are not conserved without existence. This reason also proceeds in the opinion which distinguishes existence from essence. For what some have dared to say, that after the consecration of the Eucharist, although the essence of bread does not remain, nevertheless the substantial existence of bread remains, so that through it quantity and other accidents may exist, this (I say) is more than false and improbable in theology, because, according to sound doctrine and the definitions of councils, only accidents remain in the Eucharist after consecration is made, as has been treated more broadly in the third tome, in the Third Part of St. Thomas. Since therefore the existence of the accident remains while the existence of the substance does not remain, it is necessary to say that the accident has its proper existence distinct from the existence of the substance.

26. It could however be responded (if existence and essence are distinct things), that the existence of bread does not indeed remain, but another is created by which the accidents are conserved; but this response posits first a new and unheard-of miracle. Then it posits that the same actual entity in number is conserved with existence varied, which, as we have shown above, is impossible, because, if the same actual entity in number remains, therefore that being remains from which intrinsically the thing has such actuality; but this is the being of existence. And finally, concerning that very existence which is said to be newly created, I will inquire whether it be substantial or accidental? The first cannot be said, because according to faith it is equally certain that no thing of any substance whatever remains in that sacrament besides the body of Christ, as it is certain that nothing of the substance of bread remains. But if the second be said, then accidental existence of a lower order than all substantial existence is already admitted; therefore such existence can also be naturally possible and connatural to the essence of the accident. Whence we can argue further, because such is the existence of things as is the essence, for, whether they are distinguished in reality or in

reason, they must preserve proportion among themselves; but the essence of an accident is such that by its nature it depends on a subject; therefore its existence also is such that it naturally depends on the existence of the subject; therefore it must be distinct from the existence of the substance, because the same existence cannot be dependent and independent of the subject.

27. And these reasons indeed are efficacious, given the supposed concept of existence, namely, that it is that by which formally and intrinsically a being is constituted in act as such. But if existence be imagined to be something else, for example, some condition necessary for the actuality of essence, distinct however from it, it cannot be proven by any efficacious reason that such a condition is required for the being of accidents besides the very being of the substance, unless such a condition be said to be the very actual inherence, which some confound with the existence of the accident, not considering that it is necessary that they be distinguished in the thing itself, since the existence of an accident can be conserved without inherence, as I have touched upon above and will say again in what follows. Besides actual inherence therefore, it is necessary to understand in the accident an existence distinct from the existence of the substance and by its nature dependent on the substance through the mediation of actual inherence, although it can be conserved by God without the existence of the substance and without actual inherence. But it is utterly incredible that an accidental form should place in the subject, besides its own actual or essential entity and its inherence, another distinct entity, which would be the existence of the accident, because neither can it be conceived what such an entity is for, nor what it confers on the subject or on the accident itself.

28. Thus therefore, concerning existence, which is not a thing distinct from the actual essence of the accident, it is for me a certain and clear matter that the accident has its proper existence distinct from the substantial one, and this very thing greatly confirms the position placed concerning the identity of essence and existence. But

that an accidental form confers upon the subject an existence really distinct from itself, I neither understand, nor do I see any foundation why it should be believed. For whiteness, by this very fact precisely that it inheres in the subject, through its own entity constitutes it white, and this is to give to it that it be white; therefore every other being of whiteness is superfluous and fictitiously contrived without foundation. Therefore, those who really distinguish existence from essence can say nothing constant in the present point. Hence indeed they will seem not unreasonably to proceed by attributing only one simple existence to the substantial supposit, which would terminate primarily the dependence of the substantial essence, secondarily however that of all accidents, lest they be compelled to multiply so many entities without cause. And because, if anyone denies that matter has proper existence on account of its imperfection, I do not see why he cannot deny that an accidental form, which is a less perfect being than matter, brings proper and distinct existence. On the other hand it is sufficiently established that this very way of speaking is also not sufficiently constant according to that opinion, because it cannot give a reason why a substantial form brings distinct existence, and not an accidental one, keeping proportion. Nor can it better explain what such distinct existence confers on the substantial form already previously by nature informing matter, than what accidental existence distinct would confer on the accidental form already inhering in the subject. And besides it cannot declare what it is to terminate the dependence of accidental essence, if already previously by nature that essence is supposed to be actual, that is, already effected in the nature of things and inhering in the subject. And finally the mystery of the Eucharist has sufficiently declared that opinion to be simply improbable. Therefore we have said these things only to show how consonant with truth is the opinion denying the real distinction of existence from actual essence.

29. How the being of an accident is to be in something. To the foundation therefore of the contrary opinion it is denied that

substantial being suffices so that through it accidents may exist, because it is not proportioned to them, and also because, as I have often said, no thing can be formally and intrinsically constituted a being in act (which is existing) through being or entity distinct from itself. To the second it is responded that an accident is called a being of being, not because it is intrinsically constituted in the nature of being through the being of its subject, but because it has its whole being with a certain transcendental relation to the subject; for it exists only to perfect it, and because such is its being and so weak and imperfect that it cannot be sustained except in another. And in the same sense must be interpreted that axiom that the being of an accident is to be in something; for, if it be understood of actual inherence, that formally is not the being of the accident; causally however it can be so called, because, speaking naturally, being is not communicated to the accident except through the mediation of inherence. But if that axiom be understood of aptitudinal inherence, thus to be in something is said to be the very being of the accident, because that being is such that the actual entity constituted through it is in proximate aptitude for inhering, and naturally postulates actual inhesion so that it may be. From which it is easily responded to the third reason that the existence of the accident is not actual inherence, nor is it potential essence or only objectively conceived, but is the very actual essence of the accident and produced in the nature of things.

### *On the Existence of Modes*

30. The true opinion. Fifth and lastly it can be inquired whether the mode of a thing, which is distinguished not really, but by nature of the thing or modally from it, has proper and peculiar existence, distinct from the thing of which it is the mode. For many defend the negative part, indeed they think that the modal distinction consists in this as being different from the real, that, although the mode has a distinct formal and essential character, nevertheless it does

not in any way have distinct existence. Nevertheless, given the principles handed down, it must necessarily be said, in the way that each thing is something made or produced in the nature of things, it includes proper being by which it is constituted in that actuality, which must necessarily be in the thing altogether the same with what is constituted by it and distinct from every other from which its constituted is distinguished, and in the same way; for all these things necessarily follow one another. And so, if there be a substantial mode, as for example, subsistence, which (as we now suppose) is distinguished not really, but only modally, that has its proper being of existence distinct also modally from the existence of the substantial nature. Which can be shown by the reasons made above, namely, because that mode, which is subsistence, is distinguished in the thing itself from the nature, as something actual and placed outside its causes, from another being also actual; therefore it is necessary that it include proper being in the same way distinct from the other being. Likewise because that mode can be destroyed, with the nature conserved with its existence, and then it loses some being; and similarly it can come to be in a nature already existing; but every becoming is terminated to some being of existence, as has been proven above; therefore it is necessary that such a mode, just as it is actually in the nature of things, so also has proper being.

31. And in the same way we must philosophize about the accidental mode in respect to that thing of which it is the mode, as for example, about figure in respect to quantity, and about action or motion in respect to its term, and thus about others; for the reasoning is the same in all these. But I have said in respect to that thing of which it is the mode, because in respect to that such existence is only modally distinct; but in respect to other things it will be able also to be really distinguished, just as the mode itself is distinguished. As figure, which is only modally distinguished from quantity, has the same real distinction from other things really distinct from quantity; concerning which matter we have spoken at length above, in disputation VII,

where we have also shown that the modal distinction is not distinguished from the real in this, that it does not include distinct existence, but in this, that the existence of one extreme is not of such essence that it can by itself alone found entity, but of a mode which essentially and immediately by itself rests in some other entity, as has been declared more broadly there.

### *Corollaries from the Superior Doctrine*

32. And from these things it is understood first in what sense what we said above should be taken, that existence is not a thing distinct from essence. For essence can be taken in two ways: in one way, in the proper and most usual signification, and in this way it signifies the nature of the thing, and thus we say that humanity is the essence of man, and theologians say that in the three divine persons there is one essence. In another way essence is taken more broadly for any essential character, in which way we say that whatever is, in the way that it is, has its essence, because it cannot be without its proper and intrinsic essential character, in which way also subsistence has its essence, and figure, and other modes, whether substantial or accidental. When therefore we compare essence with existence, we speak in this latter signification and generality; for thus we now treat of created being and essence in common, and thus also essence must be compared to proportioned existence. For each essence has identity with that existence through which it is constituted in its proper and precise actuality. And thus humanity is the same with its existence, by which it is precisely constituted in the being of such essence or actual nature; but if it be compared to the existence of the whole man, it is not altogether the same with it, because man includes not only the nature or essence of man, but also subsistence, and thus the adequate existence of man includes also the existence of the whole subsistence, according to which it is distinguished from humanity, as the including from the included. So that the comparison may be rightly made, it

must be made precisely between each actual essence and that being by which it is constituted in such actual character. And in this way the rule is universally true that each being in act is the same in reality with its adequate being, and each actual essence with its existence, substantial with substantial, total with total, partial with partial, accidental with accidental, and modal with modal.

33. Nor is there reason that we should except relations from this general rule, as some think, who, although they teach that accidental form brings proper being of existence, and at the same time also teach that created relations are things or modes distinguished by nature of the thing from foundations, nevertheless except them, nor do they judge that they bring proper existence, but exist through the existence of the foundation, because otherwise the very existence of the relation would express a relation to the term, and consequently the very existence would be relative, whence the relation would either be said twice to the term, if existence is another thing from essence, or, if they are the same, the same relation would be said twice, once to the subject by reason of existence, again to the term by reason of essence. And this opinion is usually attributed to Cajetan, First Part, question 28, article 2; but there he rather teaches that relation brings with it proper being really distinct from its essence, although he asserts that that being does not regard the term, but only the subject, from St. Thomas, In I, distinction 33, question 1, article 1, reply to the first objection. This exception therefore is not true, but in the way that relation has real, actual and proper essence distinct from other essences of things, so it is necessary that it have proper existence, so distinct from the existence of the foundation as the relation itself shall have been distinct. Whence, if relation is accidental entity really distinct from the foundation, it is necessary that it have existence also really distinct, especially in our opinion, that existence is the very actual essence. And similarly, those who think that relation is only distinguished as a mode of the foundation, must attribute the same distinction to its existence on account of the same cause, and because

the general reasons, made above, have the same force in the present case from the said supposition. But if relation is distinguished from the foundation only by reason of reason, in the same way it will have distinct and proper existence, on account of the same proportional reason.

34. Therefore it must consequently be confessed in our opinion that the existence of relation is in the same way respective as is the relation itself, if we speak according to reality, because in reality they are altogether and adequately the same. Likewise because relation, as actual and placed in reality, essentially includes both relations, namely, to the subject of which it is the form according to its whole self, and to the term to which it refers the subject which it informs: indeed these are not two relations according to reality, but according to reason only: for in reality there is one complete relation or difference of relation, by which it so regards the subject, that it refers it to the term, and so regards the term, that it refers the subject to it. Just as habit, for example, simultaneously and by the same intrinsic and complete relation regards the power of which it is the habit and the object to which it inclines the power. But this whole relation belongs to relation, not only according to essence, but also according to existence, because such is the actuality of relation that in its actual entity it includes both. Therefore relation has proper existence proportioned to itself, nor does it follow from this that relation is twice said or referred to the term, because it is not referred in act except insofar as it is such a form actually existing, and thus by one relation it is referred or rather refers the subject by reason of its essence or actual existence. But that it is referred to subject and term twice according to reason or expresses a relation, is no inconvenience, indeed it is necessary; although that relation which is to the subject, precisely considered, is not proper to relation as relation is, but common to other accidents. But there occurred here a theological difficulty, because it follows that also divine relations have proper

existences; but concerning this matter I have disputed at length in tome I of the Third Part, disputation XI, section 2.

35. How one thing is said to have only one being. Lastly from all that has been said it is understood how it is true that of one thing there is only one existence or one being. For this is true of adequate and proportioned being to that thing whose being it is, and thus both of the soul, and of humanity, and of man there is one being respectively (so to speak), although absolutely and in itself there is not one and the same being of all of them. For the soul is one being, and similarly humanity, and also man, but not in the same way, nor altogether the same being; for the soul is one partial being as a physical form, humanity however is one being as a certain whole in respect to the soul, and as one complete nature, but not as an altogether complete being or complete substance, because it is not a supposit, but a nature or metaphysical form; but man, or Peter or Paul, is one being as a certain complete whole in respect to humanity. And thus each of these has one being proportioned to itself, yet not altogether the same in itself, because the being of humanity includes more than the being of the soul, namely, the being of the body and the union of both, and similarly the being of man includes more than the being of humanity, namely, the being of subsistence. Whence the being of the soul is one as simple; but the being of humanity is one as composite from the being of form and matter; but the being of man is one as composite from the being of nature and subsistence. In this way therefore in every thing there is one complete and adequate being, which in composite things includes many partial beings, as Scotus rightly noted, In IV, distinction 11, question 3, § To the reasons, where he also says that he does not understand that fiction, that being is something supervening to essence, not composite, if the essence is composite, which I also (to confess the truth) do not understand, indeed I think it has been sufficiently proven that it cannot be true.

## SECTION XII
## WHETHER CREATED ESSENCE CAN BE SEPARATED FROM ITS EXISTENCE

1. The various ways in which essence is conceived to be separable from existence. This question is almost resolved from the principles thus far established; nevertheless I propose it in order to solve more clearly and distinctly certain difficulties and arguments made in Section I. Therefore, created essence can be understood to be separated from existence in various ways. First, by destroying the essence and conserving the existence, which some have thought to occur in the sacrament of the altar, where the substance of bread is destroyed or transubstantiated as to the entity of essence and conserved as to the entity of existence. In a second way it can be understood, if existence is destroyed while essence is conserved, which can still be conceived in three ways. One is if, when one connatural existence is removed, another is acquired, as many think happens naturally in prime matter, which remains according to the entity of essence under the form of what is generated and corrupted, but changes existence. In form, however, or in the composite of matter and form, almost all deny that this can happen naturally, because being follows immediately and per se from form, whence it is not separable from it, except insofar as the form itself is separated from the subject on which it depends, as is gathered from St. Thomas, I, q. 50, a. 5, and other places. There were not lacking those who said that in the intensification of form there occurs a change of existence; but this is improbable, as we shall see below in disputation XLVI. In another way this separation can be conceived, so that created essence remains without its proper existence under another superior and supernatural existence, which is clear cannot happen naturally; but supernaturally many think it can happen, indeed that it has happened in the

humanity of Christ the Lord, which is said to have created entity of essence without proper existence, but to exist through the uncreated existence of the Word. In a third way essence and existence can be understood to be separated, with the union dissolved and both conserved in the nature of things. Finally, one can conceive created essence to be so separated from proper existence that without it and without another that supplies its function, it is conserved in the nature of things, and in this way also (which is remarkable) certain modern expositors say, on I, q. 3, a. 4, albeit under the particle "perhaps," that God can conserve created essence outside its causes and outside nothing without any existence. Finally, it can be said that the essence of a creature is separated from actual existence so that it does not remain in the nature of things, but from existing becomes non-existing and not actually being.

### *Existence Cannot be Conserved Without its Proper Essence*

2. I say therefore first, it is impossible for existence to be so separated from essence that existence is conserved while essence is destroyed. I find no ancient theologian who taught the opposite of this assertion, but only one or another among the moderns. And first of all, supposing the true opinion about the identity of actual essence and existence, the assertion is evident, because the same thing cannot be separated from itself, and whenever one thing in reality is separated while the other is conserved, it is an evident sign of some distinction from the nature of the thing, as was shown above in disputation VII. Again, even those doctors who admit some distinction from the nature of the thing between essence and existence, not however real but only modal, consequently teach this assertion. Because, if existence and essence are distinguished modally, essence is not a mode of existence, but the contrary, as is known per se, because existence is or is conceived as the actuality of essence, and

consequently as its form or mode; but a mode is not separable from the thing of which it is a mode, because it is essentially joined to it through itself, as was treated in the aforementioned disputation VII; therefore existence, if it is only a mode of essence, is not separable from it in the aforesaid way.

3. But those who think existence is a thing entirely really distinct from created essence, although they commonly teach that it is not separable in the said way, or cannot be conserved without it, can scarcely give a sufficient reason for this statement, in relation to God's absolute power. For naturally it could easily be said that the entity of existence cannot be conserved without the entity of essence, because it depends on it, either as on a receiving subject, or in another way. Nevertheless, that God cannot supply that dependence certainly cannot be proven by sufficient reason. For it does not contradict because of identity, since real distinction is supposed; nor because of dependence, because, although that dependence is said to pertain to the genus of material or formal cause, nevertheless in that genus it is in some way extrinsic, that is, not through intrinsic composition of one entity from another, in the way the whole depends on parts, but through the influence of one entity in another; but God can supply this genus of dependence; for he does this when he conserves accident without subject; therefore from this part the said separation would not be contradictory. Nor can any other implication of contradiction be conceived, given the principle of that opinion. I signify this to show how difficult it is to speak consistently in all things that follow from that principle. For that the conclusion posited is simply true is shown in this way. Because, if in an existing thing essence is destroyed and removed and separated from existence, therefore some actual being outside causes that it previously had is destroyed in it; therefore some being of existence is destroyed; therefore the being of existence of such a thing does not remain; therefore it is impossible for existence to be separated from essence in the aforesaid way. The first consequence is evident, both because it was shown above that all becoming

terminates to some being outside causes; therefore, for the same reason destruction must necessarily terminate to some actual non-being and outside causes, or (which is the same) through it some actual being outside causes must be destroyed; and also because, when essence is destroyed, or not conserved, it does not lose being in objective potency; for that always remains, at least in respect to divine power; therefore it loses the actual being that it had outside causes. The second consequence relies on that principle demonstrated above, that all actual being and outside causes is being of existence. The third consequence is also evident from another principle proven above, that in one thing there is only one being of existence, and so, besides that actual being by which first and intimately essence becomes actual being outside causes, no other existence is found in it. And thus it is finally concluded that it is an open contradiction that actual essence be destroyed while existence is conserved, otherwise the same being would be destroyed and would remain.

4. You will say, when essence is destroyed, being itself is not necessarily destroyed, but separated from essence, which is thereby destroyed if no other being is conferred on it, just as matter could be annihilated, with form neither annihilated nor destroyed, through form's separation alone, to which another form would not succeed. It is responded that it is impossible for essence to be destroyed without some actually existing being intrinsically, that is, according to its proper actual entity, ceasing to be in the nature of things, and therefore it is not sufficient that the union of two entities be dissolved, because from this immediately follows only the destruction of the composite. In the present case, however, not only is the composite of essence and existence said to be dissolved, but actual essence itself is said to be entirely destroyed, and not to remain outside causes nor as actual being as it was before; therefore it not only loses union to another entity, but also loses its proper entity and actuality, and this is to lose its intrinsic actual being, and thus the argument proceeds. Nor is it true that such separation from essence was made in the mystery of the

Eucharist, because, as I said above, just as the essence of bread does not remain after consecration in that mystery, neither does existence; and just as the essence of accidents is conserved, so also existence.

### *It is Utterly Contradictory for Essence to be Conserved Without any Existence*

5. I say second, it cannot happen, even by absolute power, that created essence be conserved in the nature of things and outside causes without any existence. This assertion is also common in every opinion, although an efficacious reason for it cannot be given equally by all, as I shall immediately declare. The evident reason therefore is, because if essence is conserved outside causes in itself and in its entity, therefore it exists. For what else is to exist than to be outside causes? But if it exists, certainly it has existence, just as if it is white, it has whiteness; for these are compared as form and intrinsic formal effect. It is therefore ridiculous and plainly unintelligible what some say, that essence conserved in the nature of things without existence is indeed being and outside nothing, but is not formally in the genus of existing things. Although these speak somewhat consistently, for since they suppose such essence to be deprived of existence, they consequently say that it is outside the number of formally existing things, and therefore they should also say that it does not exist, because to exist and to be in the number of existing things are the same. But this is remarkable, that they do not see that there is an open contradiction in this, that a thing is said to be in the nature of things, outside causes and outside nothing, and not to exist, since these words are plainly equivalent. For what can be conceived to be added to a thing when it is said to exist, if it was already in the nature of things effected by its causes? Or, if we imagine real essence to be thus conserved by God's omnipotence without superadded existence, what is lacking to it that it might not be said to exist? For it befits it both to become, and to have been made, and to be real being in act outside its causes, and

consequently it will also befit it to cause in every genus accommodated to it; therefore nothing else can be desired for existing.

6. They will perhaps say that that thing lacks the act or term which they call existence. But unless they explain further the necessity or formal effect of such a term, the response is of no moment, but from this it is rather concluded that such a term is nothing, since it has no effect nor utility. Therefore also in this part the authors who believe existence to be a thing entirely distinct from actual essence seem to me to be sufficiently perplexed. For from this they justly blush to admit that actual essence can be conserved in the nature of things without any existence, because it is impossible to conserve essence without existence and existing, and it is no less impossible to understand essence actually outside causes and not existing. On the other hand, however, when they say essence and existence are co-distinct things, they can add no reason why God cannot conserve that entity of essence naked and without that formal effect which it receives from existence. Because, if those are distinct entities, the dependence of one on the other cannot be so intrinsic that one is constitutive of the other; therefore there is nothing for which God cannot conserve the entity of essence without the entity of existence. For to say confusedly that they have between themselves a relation and essential dependence, which God cannot supply, is to beg the question or to assert the same thing in other words, but not to explain in what this dependence consists, because it is not through mode of relative relation, as is known per se; it must therefore be reduced to some causality, because it is not entirely intrinsic, as I have declared; therefore there is no reason why God cannot supply it. The reason therefore must be given from this, that by the very fact that entity is actual and outside causes, it is intrinsically and most formally existing, nor can existence as such add any new formal effect to it, and therefore it is an open implication of contradiction that essence be conserved with actuality and without existence. But this reason, just as it

approves that actual essence cannot remain without existence, so it proves that in reality it is not distinguished from it.

### *Essence & Existence Cannot be Conserved Separately*

7. I say third, existence and created essence cannot be so separated that both are conserved on the part of the thing, with only the union between them dissolved. We speak of absolute power; for according to the natures of things the matter is very clear. The foundation however is, because between actual essence and existence there is not union, but identity, which cannot be divided or dissolved. Also, because the reasons that prove existence cannot be conserved when essence is destroyed, nor the converse, consequently prove that they cannot be conserved separate and without union between themselves. Both because, if they are once understood as separate, and nevertheless conserved in the nature of things, since they do not regard each other as relation and term, no reason can be given why one cannot remain when the other is destroyed. And also because, when union is dissolved, all formal or material causality of one in the other ceases; therefore if they could be conserved without union, one could also be conserved when the other is not conserved, for nothing stands in the way. And hence is declared the a priori reason already often inculcated, because actual essence cannot be conserved without the intrinsic effect of formal existence; but this effect would necessarily be destroyed, if per impossible the union of essence and existence between themselves were dissolved; therefore such union cannot be dissolved with both extremes conserved.

8. And this reason seems indeed to proceed even in the opinion affirming existence and essence to be distinct things, and is indeed absolute and efficacious; nevertheless, if its force is attentively considered, it cannot be efficacious without destroying that opinion and proving that between essence and existence there is not union,

but identity. And to exist is so called the formal effect of existence, that it cannot be as it were a physical effect proceeding or communicated from a distinct thing, but as it were a metaphysical effect proceeding from an intrinsic mode not distinct in reality or from the nature of the thing, but distinct in reason. Which can be declared and confirmed thus (beyond the reasons made), because if essence and existence are distinct things, therefore they are united between themselves, with some mode of union intervening between them; for all distinct things are so[45] united; why therefore could God not dissolve such a mode of union while conserving the extremes? Certainly no sufficient reason can be given, as the discourses made in the superior assertions easily prove, which can equally be applied here. And besides, it could be asked about that union, what existence it has; for in it there is also something essential which can be and not be: whence since it is not formally existence itself, it will be necessary that it have existence distinct from itself, which is sufficiently absurd; for thus it could proceed almost to infinity.

### *A Thing Cannot Exist Through Alien Existence Without its Own*

9. I say fourth: created essence existing through alien existence without its own cannot be conserved by God's absolute power. Thus think all theologians who affirm that in Christ's humanity there is created and proper existence, and that humanity does not exist formally through the existence of the Word. For these authors could not rely on any other foundation, except that they judged it impossible to happen otherwise. Otherwise why would they deny it, when the greatest substantial union should be attributed to Christ's humanity that is possible, saving the truth of both divine and human nature? The

[45] ita, 1960; other editions omit. "We believe it is necessary to add the word ita, although it is lacking, for example, in the Vivès edition." Cf. BHF, t. V. p. 156.

proper foundation of this conclusion must be what we have posited about the identity of existence and actual essence. For, if actual existence were either a thing or mode distinct from the nature of the thing from actual essence, no sufficient reason could be given (as I have often said) why God cannot conserve actual essence without proper existence and supply its dependence by another way; just as he conserves substantial nature without proper subsistence, and accidental form without proper inherence, although both subsistence and inherence are only a certain mode distinct from the nature of the thing from nature. If therefore God prevents this mode and supplies it by another reason, why could he not do the same in existence, if it were a thing or mode distinct from the nature of the thing from actual essence?

10. I see it can be said that existence is a more intrinsic mode, because it first and formally constitutes a thing outside its causes. Nevertheless this response either proves what we intend, namely, that existence is not separable because of identity, or it cannot declare in what that being more intrinsic consists, or how existence formally constitutes a thing outside causes, if it already supposes in natural order the actual entity of essence made by causes and in that actuality not constituted formally through existence. For in respect to such entity, existence will be as extrinsic as subsistence or inherence, or certainly not more intrinsic. Indeed according to the opinion of many Thomists, subsistence affects actual essence by nature prior to existence. Whence in this it seems to be in some way more intrinsic. Others however think the existence of substance to be the same as subsistence. If therefore real distinction or from the nature of the thing between existence and actual essence is once supposed, no efficacious reason can be given for the assertion posited. And therefore I said in the above that authors who deny that Christ's humanity could have been assumed without created existence, should consequently assert that existence is not a thing or mode distinct from the nature of the thing from actual essence.

11. This therefore is the entire foundation of the present assertion, which being posited the consequence is evident. Which is illustrated and declared further from the superior assertions; for actual essence cannot be conserved in the nature of things without proper and intrinsic existence; for the reasons made prove this. Because in reality it is not distinguished from its proper existence; whence just as it cannot be conserved without itself, so also not without proper existence. Also, because the very conservation of created essence is a certain effecting of it; but all effecting is communication of some being which the effect receives in itself and has outside its cause, and consequently is communication of some being of existence, intrinsic and proper to the essence made. Also because actual essence must necessarily be constituted in that actuality through some real being undistinguished from it, as was proven above; it is therefore impossible to be conserved in its actuality without such being being conserved in it; but it was also shown above that such being is true existence, because it is temporal being; therefore without such existence entirely intrinsic and proper, actual essence cannot be conserved.

12. From this however it is further concluded that God cannot conserve any essence existing through existence (so to speak) extraneous and foreign to it. First indeed, because essence cannot exist through alien existence, unless it is deprived of its own; but it cannot be deprived of its own, as was shown; therefore. Second, because the reasons made prove that formal effect which we can conceive to be given by existence, cannot be from a thing or mode distinct on the part of the thing from the existing essence itself; but it cannot be understood that a thing becomes existing through an extraneous thing, without that being distinct on the part of the thing from the essence to which it is said to be united so as to make it existing. Third, because God cannot make any created essence be actual essence or actually being outside nothing through actuality extraneous and distinct from it; but from this precisely that created essence is actually

being outside nothing, it is existing; therefore it cannot be made existing through actuality extraneous and foreign. The consequence is evident. The major and minor have been proven often in the above.

13. Objection. Resolution. Against this assertion no natural reason can be objected that is of any moment. For, what some argue, that existence is not an essential perfection of created nature, and therefore can be separated from it and supplied through alien existence, is of no moment. First, because the consequence is not formal, for the attributes of being are not essential predicates, and yet neither can they be separated, nor supplied extrinsically; identity therefore suffices without any distinction from the nature of the thing so that separation does not take place, even if the perfection is not considered essential. Indeed, there are those who think there are some properties neither essential, nor having identity, but rather distinction from the nature of the thing from essence, which neither can be separated, nor supplied extrinsically. But how probable this is, will be examined elsewhere. The best instance however is because, according to common doctrine, which those so arguing do not deny, the individuating principle as such or haecceitas simply is not an essential perfection of the individual (Peter, for example), and nevertheless neither can it be separated from Peter, nor supplied extrinsically so that Peter remains. But if perhaps they say that individual difference, although it is not absolutely of essence, is nevertheless of the essence of Peter as Peter is, we will say also that actual and exercised existence is not of essence absolutely, but is nevertheless of the essence of actual essence, as it is actually being outside nothing; and therefore, although essence can be understood absolutely in potential or objective being without actual existence, nevertheless essence made actually being and outside nothing cannot be understood without intrinsic and proper existence.

14. Some theological objections. From supernatural principles however another argument is usually taken, namely, because proper subsistence can be separated and supplied through

another; and similarly inherence can be separated, either absolutely, or through the opposite mode of existing per se; therefore also existence. But this also is resolved from what was said, because subsistence and inherence are modes distinct from the nature of the thing from actual essence, because they do not constitute it in the character of actual being, nor do they first and formally distinguish it from potential being, and therefore although they are separated from it, it can be understood that the same actual essence remains, although under another mode of being; but it is otherwise with existence, because it is the first formal constitutive of actual entity and is not distinguished in reality from it.

15. Whether Christ's humanity exists by the existence of the Word. But some press with a theological argument, because from this metaphysical principle posited by us it follows that the divine Word assumed humanity with its created existence, which not only seems to be against the doctrine of St. Thomas, but also of other ancient Fathers, especially Leo, Sophronius, Fulgentius, Damascene. It also seems to be little consonant with other truths which the Catholic faith teaches about that mystery, such as that the blessed Virgin conceived not only humanity, but a true man, and that Christ is not only one, but also one being simply, and that Christ's humanity exists not in itself, but in the Word, and finally that Christ's humanity cannot properly operate, but the Word through it.

16. This difficulty could be omitted in this place, both because it is theological, and also because it has been disputed by us to the best of our ability, in tome I of the third part, disputation XXXVI, where we showed to be true what is inferred in the proposed objection; because nevertheless some modern writers take badly the doctrine delivered by us in that place and have attempted to impugn it, I shall not be burdened to respond to them again, although they bring forward neither new testimonies nor new reasons, but only new and unusual exaggerations. For why should they wonder at doctrine not new, but received by many and grave theologians, both ancient and

modern, Altisidore, Albert, Scotus, Durand, Gabriel, Bonaventure, Almain, Hervaeus, Paludanus, and by St. Thomas himself, in the unique question on the Incarnate Word, article 4? Of whom it is not sufficiently certain that he ever changed opinion, as I declared extensively in the cited place. Where I also showed that Sophronius, Leo and Fulgentius taught nothing repugnant to this doctrine, which I had also touched on extensively in the same tome, disputation VIII, section 1. Concerning Damascene however I showed not only that he does not oppose, but even greatly favors this our doctrine. Whence I greatly wonder how a certain grave author, who without doubt had read through those our writings, dared afterwards to write, and commit to print, that Damascene, book III On Faith, chapter 22, expressly teaches that opinion which denies there to be created existence in Christ's humanity; when however in that chapter Damascene writes not a word about this matter, but only impugns the error of those asserting Christ to have progressed in grace and knowledge, which he confutes with these words: "But those who say he made progress in wisdom and grace as if he received increase of them, do not assert the union to have been made from the first origin of flesh, nor do they maintain personal union." And below: "For if flesh was united to the Word from the last origin, but rather existed in him, and had personal identity with him, what finally can be brought forward, that he did not overflow with all riches of wisdom and grace?" What, I ask, is found in these words, that patronizes the opinion? or what pertained to Damascene's purpose that there be no created existence in Christ's humanity? provided it was united to the Word from the beginning, which no Catholic denies; nor does it have repugnance with the created existence of that nature, because it could always exist in the Word, as Damascene speaks there. In which he rather favors us, because he does not say it existed by the Word or through the Word, but in the Word.

17. But they say that doctrine is little consonant with the principles of faith; but truly other grave authors think this opinion

follows almost evidently from the principles of faith. For faith teaches that Christ assumed true and real humanity, not having only objective being or potential being in its causes, but having some real and actual being, created outside its causes; but this is the being of existence; therefore he assumed humanity with some created being. The consequence is evident and formal; the major however is certain according to faith, which teaches Christ's humanity to be a created thing, and distinct from the divine Word, and assumed into unity of person, and from that nature Christ has human being, which is created being and consequently is actual and not only potential. The minor however was demonstrated in the above, and seems to us almost evident from the very terms, if they are properly understood, because actual being and outside causes is nothing other than to exist, as was declared extensively in the above.

18. Therefore from the opposite opinion these absurdities seem to follow. First, that humanity is not created being, which is openly false. The sequel is proved, because being is said from esse and is constituted actual being through esse; therefore if humanity is constituted actual being through uncreated esse, it is not created being, but uncreated, just as, because Christ is not constituted in being of person through created personality, but through uncreated, he is not created person, but uncreated. Also either humanity is said to be created being as it is actually existing, or only as it is actual according to being of essence; the first cannot be said according to that opinion, because humanity is posited as actually existing through uncreated existence, whence it is necessary that this existing as such, either be uncreated, if we speak formally and properly, or certainly not purely created, but consisting of created and uncreated. If however the second is said, I ask whether that being of essence is only in potency, and thus is not created, but creatable, and in itself is truly nothing, but in its cause is the creative essence itself; or it is actual being in itself and outside causes, and this must necessarily be being of existence, because to exist is nothing other than to be actually outside causes and

because creation formally terminates to existing, as was proven above; therefore purely created actual being cannot be understood without some created being of existence.

19. Second, it can be inferred that incarnation was not true and real union and assumption, because true union cannot intervene except between real and actual beings, one of which does not have its entity intrinsically from the other, although one could depend on the other, all of which were declared extensively in the above. But truly, if Christ's humanity existed only through the existence of the Word, it would be intrinsically constituted in the being of actual entity through the existence of the Word.

20. Third, it can be inferred that the Word was united to humanity as understood in being of essence only which it had from eternity, because besides that being humanity has no other except being of existence; if therefore this being of existence in Christ's humanity was not other than the being of the Word, therefore that being was immediately united to humanity, which according to itself was eternal; therefore to become incarnate was nothing other than to draw eternal essence to the uncreated being of the Word. But this is not incarnation, but fiction, because that eternal essence was nothing, nor is assumable according to that precisely which it has from itself and from eternity; therefore it is necessary that some other being be attributed to it first by priority of nature, or at least of reason, which suffices so that being be distinct from divine subsistence which is communicated through union.

21. Fourth, it can be inferred from that opinion that humanity does not have from God through His proximate efficiency the capacity to be united to the Word, which is also most absurd in the doctrine of faith. The consequence is clear, both because that capacity is not in humanity according to some existence of being, but only according to eternal essential being, according to which the essence of humanity is not effectively from God. Also because, if that capacity is in humanity through the actual efficiency of God, therefore it exists by virtue of

that efficiency; therefore it has some made and created existence; therefore this is the existence of humanity itself. And this reasoning also proves that humanity first by nature had existence before it was united to the Word, which could not have been except created existence, as is evident in itself. And the consequence is clear, because that humanity was first by nature capable of union before being actually united; but proximate capacity exists only in an entity already effected and existing outside its causes.

22. How the most blessed Virgin attained Christ's existence. But let us see what are the other truths of faith with which that doctrine is deemed little consonant. The first was that the blessed Virgin conceived not only humanity, but God made man, the opposite of which seems to follow if Christ's humanity had created existence. The consequence is clear, because then humanity would have had that existence from the mother, and consequently all the efficiency or causality of the mother, whatever it might be, would have been terminated at that created existence and would have stopped there; since therefore that existence is of humanity alone and not of Christ, the Virgin would have conceived humanity alone, and not Christ, nor God. But this difficulty (whatever it may be) presses much more if in Christ's humanity there is no created existential being, but only essential being. For from this it follows that all the action or causality of the mother was terminated at the essential being of humanity, and did not progress further; therefore it follows much more that she conceived humanity alone in essential being, and not existing humanity, much less Christ himself or God. The antecedent is clear, because (as we suppose) the blessed Virgin does not concur immediately to the union of that humanity with the Word; therefore she does not concur to the action by which that humanity was made existing, because that was the union according to this opinion; therefore all the causality of the Virgin was occupied with the essential being of humanity and stopped in it. And from this the second consequence is clear, both ad hominem, because it is of the same form

as that which they infer against us; and a fortiori, because humanity according to essential being alone is more distant from Christ than humanity already existing; and no one can deny that by natural order at least in some genus of cause, namely material, that humanity first by nature had at least essential being, before it was assumed or united to the Word.

23. From this argument therefore we gather one principle necessarily to be admitted by all Catholics, namely, that the Virgin is not said to be the mother of God or to have conceived God because she immediately effected the union of humanity with God, since it is established that she did not make that union either as principal cause or as instrument. She is therefore said to have conceived God because to her causality by which she concurs in uniting the body and soul of Christ and forming humanity, there was simultaneously joined the action of the Holy Spirit, by which that humanity, in the same instant in which it was formed, was united to God, whereby it came about that the whole conception, which includes both those actions, was terminated not at humanity alone, but at God made man. And in this way all must philosophize, whether they say the action of the Virgin was occupied with humanity as to essential being only, or also as to existential being. Indeed, those who affirm only the former attribute much less concurrence to the Virgin in that conception, as has been shown; and they can scarcely explain how there can be true conception and generation through which no existential being is communicated, and in this respect that doctrine is less consonant even with this truth of faith.

24. Nor therefore do we easily respond by denying the consequence, because that conception was absolutely terminated at God in the same instant and simultaneously according to real duration. Nor does it matter that the action of the Virgin and its terminus preceded by natural order, because that was only in the genus of material cause and with some connection and dependence on the other action by which that humanity was in that instant united

to the Word. Add that it is more probable that soul and body were first by nature united to the Word than to each other, and therefore, according to the communication of idioms, it is most properly said that the blessed Virgin conceived God, because she concurs in uniting to each other the soul and body of God, and which already subsisted with the subsistence of God, and thus necessarily gave birth to God, because generation is terminated at the suppositum, and such generation could not then be terminated at another suppositum, all of which has been more broadly declared in the cited places from tome I of part III, and in tome II, disputation I, section 1.

25. Another principle of faith which is said to be weakened by this metaphysical principle posited by us is that Christ is one simply and one being, the opposite of which seems to follow if in him there is created existential being of humanity. To this, however, we respond by denying the consequence; for Christ is said to be one simply because of the unity of person; but he is one person although he has two real and actual natures, which is to have them with proper existences. But Christ is called one being because of one complete being and one per se; but Christ as Christ is not one simple being, but composite (for he is a composite person), and therefore it is not necessary that he have one simple being, but composite, according to the doctrine demonstrated above. Therefore Christ has one being composed from the being of humanity and the being of the Word or his personality. Hence the double being of nature or extremes does not impede the unity of being, if there is true and real union between them, especially substantial, and which suffices to compose one being per se. And thus the present metaphysical doctrine derogates nothing, but rather is most consonant with the said truth of faith and confirms another which teaches that the unity of Christ is not simple, but through composition, with which truth the other doctrine is less consonant which attributes to Christ one being altogether simple.

26. How Christ's humanity is said to exist in the Word. The third principle of faith is that humanity exists not in itself, but in the

Word. For thus speaks Sophronius, in the sixth Synod, action eleven, and Damascene cited above, and it is a most certain thing; but what (I ask) is that consequence: Humanity exists by proper existence; therefore it exists in itself and not in the Word? For this is similar in form to: An accident exists by proper existence distinct from the existence of the subject; therefore it exists in itself, and not in the subject; and yet this is invalid, for the antecedent is true and the consequent false. But they prove that consequence, because to exist in something is nothing other than to exist through its existence and dependently on it. But of these two, the first is false, the second however is insufficiently stated, and not sufficiently declared. The prior part is proved by the example adduced of accident; for it exists in the subject, and not through the existence of the subject; and form, especially material, exists in matter, and thus all speak, and yet no one ever said that form exists through the existence of matter, and the reason will be established from what is to be said. The latter part is declared, because, first, for something to be said to exist in another, it is not enough to exist dependently on that. For matter exists dependently on form, and yet does not exist in form, and any creature exists in God in the way we now speak. Therefore for some thing to exist in another, in the present case signifies a relation to the terminus or suppositum by which that thing which is said to exist in another is sustained in its existence; just as for an accident to exist in a subject signifies relation and dependence on it in its existence in the genus of sustaining, although in a more imperfect way and with material causality. Thus therefore to exist in something is not to exist through its existence, but is to have one's existence sustained by another and in that genus dependent on it. Hence it rather supposes or includes the proper existence of that thing, but adds union or conjunction to another thing by which it is sustained, either as by a suppositum terminating dependence without any proper causality, or as by a subject, as is the case in inherent forms. The prior mode, however, befits Christ's humanity by reason of hypostatic union. And therefore

its proper existence is not said to be per se actual existence, because it is not terminated by proper subsistence, but is called inexistence, because it rests on the Word of God; which denomination it has not from itself, but from the mode of union, by means of which it has that it be in the Word.

27. If therefore that existence of humanity is considered precisely according to what it has from itself, it does not constitute a thing actually existing in itself or in another, but only substantially existing in such a nature; for those modes of existing which are indicated by those words "in itself" or "in another" are not essential to such existence, but are added to it to constitute or complete the suppositum, although not in the same way. For the prior mode of existing in itself is connatural and completes the suppositum without union to another, as the proper terminus or subsistence of such a nature, as we shall see below. But the latter mode of existing in another is supernatural with respect to complete substantial nature and does not formally constitute a person, but unites nature to a person, so that from this results one composite person. Because therefore Christ's humanity, although it had proper existence, nevertheless did not have it with the proper mode of existing in itself and through itself, but with the supernatural mode of union to the suppositum of the Word of God, therefore it cannot be said to exist or ever to have existed in itself, but always in the Word.

28. How Christ's humanity could in no sign operate, but the Word through it. It remains to speak of the fourth proposition very consonant with the doctrine of faith, namely, that Christ's humanity could never operate, neither in an instant of time nor in a sign of nature, before the Word operated through it, the opposite of which seems to follow from our opinion; for if it had proper existence, it existed first by nature before it was united to the Word; therefore also first by nature it could operate, for operation follows being. Nevertheless, we respond by denying the consequence, although there have not been lacking theologians and learned men who affirmed that

consequent, as I treated at length in the said tome I of part III, disputation X, sections 1 and 2; but in that they were deceived, as I showed there. Therefore the said consequence is denied. And first some think that, although humanity has proper existence, it does not follow from this that it existed first by nature before it was united to the Word, because it could receive that existence through action dependent on the Word as on a supposital terminus; just as an accident has proper existence, and yet does not exist first by nature before it is united to the subject, because it receives existence through action dependent on the subject, as on a material cause. This mode of speaking is not altogether improbable, yet does not seem true to us, as we disputed at length in the said tome I, disputation VIII, section 1. I therefore concede that humanity existed first by nature before it was assumed, I deny however that it operated first by nature or could operate before it was assumed, because existing nature is not capable of operation until it is terminated by some subsistence, which I showed at length in the said tome, disputation X, sections 2 and 3, which it is not necessary to repeat here.

29. I only add that the same argument can be turned back on the other opinion, and in the same proportional way must necessarily be solved by adversaries. For they cannot deny that Christ's humanity first by nature received actual essential being before it was assumed by the Word, as was proved above and they teach everywhere; I will therefore similarly infer that in that prior state humanity could operate through that actual essential being, for that is proper being from which operation follows as from a formal principle, and a sufficient condition will be that it be actually outside its causes. Especially since (according to their opinion) even according to that being, nature is capable of proper subsistence first by nature before it exists. They will therefore respond by denying the consequence, because for operating actual essential being does not suffice until it is terminated by existence; why therefore will they not admit our response, when we similarly deny the consequence, because existence does not proceed to operation until it

is terminated by subsistence? Especially because they themselves can render no sufficient reason why essence requires such existence for operating, if, prescinding from that, it already has in act all its essential perfection in itself and outside its causes, and especially if it has that also terminated by proper subsistence, because then it is not understood what existence could add that would be required for operating. We however render the reason, because subsistence is the substantial and intrinsic terminus of nature, pertaining in its way to the substantial complement of the thing, and therefore is most intimate, and first resulting from nature, or at least first effected with it; but operation is more extrinsic or accidental, and therefore according to the order of nature supposes subsistence, and in Christ supposes assumption, because proper and created subsistence is impeded.

30. I will not omit to note lastly that the aforesaid author does not little favor our opinion, while, after all those impugnations and exaggerations of words, he added that, although in fact Christ's humanity did not have proper existence, nevertheless it could have been assumed by absolute power with proper existence to hypostatic union. In which certainly he spoke ingeniously, because in the doctrine which he follows with others, he will scarcely be able to render a reason why that is impossible, since it involves no repugnance or contradiction at all, as has been more than sufficiently proved by us above. For they themselves teach that existence and subsistence in created nature are distinct things, and that the Word in the humanity of Christ the Lord impeded and supplied both. Why therefore could it not impede subsistence alone, and not simultaneously also existence? especially since, according to the doctrine of the same authors, subsistence is prior by nature to existence, and therefore, speaking consequently, union of nature to subsisting is prior by nature to existing; and therefore, since the prior can be separated from the posterior (as is commonly received by philosophers), if no special repugnance arises from elsewhere, union can rest in subsistence alone, and not proceed further, permitting proper existence to nature.

31. We therefore gladly admit this statement, yet we wonder that he did not notice that from this is overturned (whether they will or not) the whole opinion and all the foundations on account of which it is denied that Christ's humanity in fact has proper existence. First indeed, because, if proper existence does not conflict with true hypostatic union and with unity of person in double nature, whence or on what foundation can it be said that there is not in Christ's humanity such existence, namely proper and created? Because faith teaches nothing else except such hypostatic union by which one person subsists in double real nature. Indeed it additionally teaches that through such union the Word assumed whatever it planted in human nature, namely, that which does not conflict with such union; if therefore the existence of nature, as the above-mentioned author does not hesitate to concede, does not conflict with union, but could be conserved in personally united nature, on what foundation can it be said to have been removed? It is added that, according to that opinion, two unions of humanity to the Word must be posited, one to subsistence, another to the existence of the Word. For, although on the part of the Word there is no distinction in reality between subsistence and existence, nevertheless on the part of humanity distinction must necessarily be posited, since one is said to be separable from the other in the thing itself, which is an evident sign of some distinction, at least from the nature of the thing; there are therefore two distinct unions, which is hitherto unheard of, and the Thomists themselves gravely and deservedly reprove similar doctrine in Durandus.

32. Which I urge further thus, for those unions are distinct in reality; therefore, just as it is said that God can conserve union to subsistence without union to existence, so it must be said that he can conserve union to existence without union to subsistence; for there is equal reason, since there is the same distinction and one does not depend essentially on the other more than conversely. There would therefore then be a created person having nature existing by uncreated

existence alone; there would also then be substantial union between created nature and God without hypostatic union, which are unheard of and little consonant with the doctrine of the Holy Fathers and Councils. Indeed from this we further conclude that that union to existence is neither hypostatic nor intrinsically included in hypostatic union, and therefore is gratuitously feigned in the union which was made, for according to faith only substantial hypostatic union was made between humanity and the Word.

33. Finally, if that is possible, let us establish that it was done; would not Christ then truly be one and one being per se and simply? He truly would be, because he would be one substantially composite person, by reason of which truly and properly both man would be God and God man. And for the same reason, while that man was conceived from the mother, God would also be conceived; and his humanity, although it existed by proper existence, would not exist in itself, but in the Word, nor could it properly operate, but the Word through it; this case therefore openly declares that the reasons made above against us are not efficacious. And let these things suffice concerning this digression, which seemed necessary here so that it might be established that those metaphysical principles are handed down by us which serve true theology; for this we especially intend and desire. Now let us return to the begun disputation.

### *That Actual Essence can be Altogether Destroyed with its Existence*

34. I say lastly that actual existence is separable from the essence of a creature, so that with existence the essence itself simultaneously perishes or is destroyed. This assertion is certain and evident. First, because a creature does not have existence from itself, but from another, at least from God, on whom it always depends in its being; but God, just as he freely gives being to a creature, so also freely conserves it in being; therefore he can not conserve; therefore a

creature can be deprived of being; but if it is deprived of existential being it is necessary that its essence simultaneously be destroyed and perish, because, existential being being removed, essence is nothing, as was declared in the second section. From which the posited assertion is confirmed, because everything generable (according to Aristotle) is corruptible, and by the same reason everything that begins to be can cease to be, and ceasing is proportioned to beginning, that is, that very thing can be lost through ceasing which was acquired through beginning; but, when a creature begins to be, its essence begins to be something, which before was nothing or not yet; therefore, in a similar way, it can so cease to be or be separated from being, that it altogether loses the very entity of essence.

35. But someone will ask how being can be separated in this way from essence, if in reality they are altogether the same, since it plainly conflicts for the same thing to be separated from itself. For in this those who contend that existence ought to be distinguished at least from the nature of the thing from the essence of a creature make great force, and especially Giles, in the places cited above, and especially in his opuscule On Being and Essence, contending that neither can a creature be made nor destroyed unless its essence is something distinct from its being, to which being can both be impressed and separated from it. But Alexander before Giles reported this mode of speaking, VII Metaph., text 22, and elegantly refuted it. Because the being of a creature, before it is made, is purely objective, if we speak absolutely of the whole creature: And therefore (he says) it is not necessary to imagine that to be made from this, or that it is impressed on something, namely on essence itself; for if it were so, since that on which it is impressed precedes and is not made through that making, the whole thing would not be made. And the same reasoning can be made by us concerning ceasing, if it is ceasing simply, through which a thing passes into nothing, and, with due proportion, can be applied to corruption, as we shall immediately declare.

36. To the difficulty therefore posited the same Alexander responds that the making of a thing is not to be imagined as if being itself is impressed or conjoined to essence as act to potency, but only that the whole reality of essence, which previously was under the nature of the possible, afterwards is wholly in act: And some (he says) call this reason, as it precedes, essence; but as it is the terminus of divine action, they call it being. In a similar way therefore, it is not to be imagined that a thing ceases to be because being is separated from essence, as act from receptive potency, or as one thing is separated from another, or the mode of a thing from the thing itself, but through this alone that the whole thing, which was being in act, through the action of God loses its entity and ceases to be being in act. When therefore it is said that a thing cannot be separated from itself if there is no distinction from the nature of the thing, that is true of proper separation, by which that which is separated does not remain, and that from which it is separated remains, either in the same duration or in the same place, according to the mode of separation; but in this way being is not separated from essence, as we said. But if the same is said to be separated from itself because the whole ceases to be and passes from one state to another, that is, from the state of being to the state of not being, or from actual state to potential, thus it no more conflicts for the same thing to be separated from itself than it conflicts for the same thing now to be and afterwards not to be, or for the same thing now actually to terminate the action of its cause, but afterwards only to remain in potency or objectively in the cause. According to this mode therefore and according to this last separation, the essence of a creature is said to be able to be separated from being, because the same essence, which is actual while it is, can lose all that actuality and return to objective or potential being alone.

37. But it must be noted in this place that, although it is true of every created essence that it can in this way be separated from being, or rather be deprived of actual being, nevertheless it does not befit all equally or in the same way. For some are such that, after they

once receive being, they do not have intrinsic potency to lack it or be separated from it, but only through extrinsic potency of an agent, as are incorruptible entities, as was touched above, disputation XXVIII. But other entities are such that through intrinsic potency they can be deprived of being, as are corruptible entities which consist of matter capable of another being, from which follows corruption or ceasing of the existing thing. Again there must be noted a difference between ceasing of a thing through corruption and through annihilation; for, although in both the essence loses being or is separated from it, nevertheless in different ways. Because in annihilation essence is altogether destroyed according to itself as a whole and according to all its parts, because it is altogether deprived of being; for this is of the nature of annihilation, that it leave no being, neither integral nor partial, and therefore also leaves nothing of essence. Indeed it is also necessary that no being succeed such ceasing by virtue of such action or change, according to the more probable doctrine of theologians, which we declared at length in tome III of part III. But truly in corruption, although the essence which is corrupted, just as it loses being, is also destroyed so that the whole no longer remains, nevertheless it is not so destroyed that some part of such essence cannot remain; for the subject or matter always remains, and sometimes also form, as in the death of man. Then however as much remains of essential being, so much remains of existential being, because they are not so separable, as has been abundantly shown by us above. Whence it happens that through corruption alone essence is not separable from being according to itself as a whole and according to every part of it, unless annihilation is added to corruption. But this must be understood of proper corruption of the whole composite, for, if we speak of an accident or of substantial material form alone, its essence is altogether separated from being or destroyed when the whole is corrupted, but that is not properly deprived of being or corrupted, but is co-corrupted to the ceasing of the whole. And thus it is easily established how actually to exist is separable from any essence,

whether integral or partial, and how, being removed, essence also simultaneously and respectively perishes, which is also a great indication that those two are not distinct in reality.

### *An Objection Concerning Propositions of Perpetual Truth is Addressed*

38. However, a well-worn difficulty immediately occurs, which was touched upon above in section 1, in the first argument of the first opinion. For if, when existence is removed, essence perishes, then those propositions in which essential predicates are predicated of a thing are not necessary nor of perpetual truth; but the consequent is false and contrary to the opinion of all philosophers. For otherwise all truths concerning creatures would be contingent, whence there could be no science concerning creatures, since science exists only concerning necessary truths. The inference is proved because if, when existence is removed, essence is nothing, then it is neither substance nor accident, and consequently neither body nor soul nor anything of this sort; therefore no essential attribute can be rightly predicated of it.

39. The opinion of some. Because of this difficulty, certain modern theologians concede that these propositions about creatures are not of perpetual truth, but begin to be true when things come to be, and lose their truth when things perish, because (as Aristotle said) from the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is true or false. Nevertheless, this opinion is contrary not only to modern philosophers but also to the ancients, and indeed to the Fathers of the Church; for Augustine says in On Free Choice II, chapter 8, that three and four being seven is perpetually true, even if there is nothing that is numbered. And in the same sense he says in book IV of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 7: Six is a perfect number, not because God perfected all things in six days, but rather, conversely, therefore God perfected all things in six days because that number is perfect, which would be perfect even if those things did not exist. Similarly

Anselm, in the Dialogue on Truth, chapter 14, expressly contends that the truth of these statements is perpetual and is not destroyed even if the things themselves are destroyed.

40. Nor is it sufficient if someone responds with St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 10, a. 3, ad 3; q. 16, a. 7, ad 1; and On Truth, q. 1, a. 5, ad 11, and a. 6, ad 2 and 3, that when the existence of creatures is destroyed, these statements are true, not in themselves, but in the divine intellect. For in this way not only such statements in which essential attributes are predicated, but also all accidental or contingent ones that are true, have perpetual truth in the divine intellect. But if you say there is a difference because, although all are perpetually in the divine intellect, they are not there with the same necessity; for those truths in which an essential predicate is attributed to a subject are so in the divine intellect that they could not not be in it, whence they are simply necessary and without any supposition; but other contingent truths, although they were always in the divine intellect, are there not with absolute necessity, but only by supposition that they would be future at some time; if this (I say) is said, then the difficulty against the preceding opinion is more confirmed and increased, because those propositions in which essential predicates are said of subjects are not therefore true because it will be so at some difference of time, both because even if God had decreed that nothing would happen in time, He would nonetheless know them to be true, and also because they are not only true from eternity insofar as they can be stated about the future in relation to time, but simply and abstracting from every difference of time, and in both respects they differ greatly from contingent truths, which have truth only in relation to existence for some difference of time. Again, neither are those statements true because they are known by God, but rather they are therefore known because they are true; otherwise no reason could be given why God necessarily knew them to be true; for if their truth came from God Himself, this would happen through the will of God; whence it would come not from necessity, but voluntarily. Also, because with respect to

these statements the divine intellect is compared as merely speculative, not as operative; but the speculative intellect supposes the truth of its object, it does not make it; therefore such statements which are said to be in the first, and indeed also those which are in the second mode of being said per se, have perpetual truth, not only as they are in the divine intellect, but also according to themselves and prescinding from it.

41. The common opinion. Therefore it is a very common and received opinion that these propositions are of perpetual truth, which Albert the Great teaches with the ancient Arabs, in his commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 8, and in the Post-Predicaments, chapter 9; and St. Thomas seems to follow it in the cited places, although he refers this entire perpetuity to the divine intellect. Capreolus defends the same opinion from St. Thomas and Albert, On the Sentences I, dist. 8, q. 1, concl. 1; and Soncinas, Metaphysics IX, q. 5, where he reports Henry, Quodlibet X, q. 2 and 3, and Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 1; Scotus and other authors, On the Sentences III, dist. 21. Cajetan also holds it, Posterior Analytics I, chapter 9; and Ferrariensis, Against the Gentiles II, chapter 52, and it seems to be the opinion of Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, chapters 6, 7 and 9. Many of the said authors declare this opinion in such a way that they say the essences of creatable things are not eternal, speaking simply, as was proved by us above in section II, but the connections of essential predicates with the essences themselves are eternal. They also say that when things are created, the essences of things are created and come to be, but the aforesaid connection does not come to be, for it is one thing for an essence to come to be, and another thing for it to come to be that such an essence is the essence of such a thing, for example of man, horse, etc. For the first is true, since a created essence, speaking simply, has an efficient cause, because not only do the existences of things come to be, but also essences. But that an essence is of such a thing does not have an efficient cause, nor does it come to be, because it is necessary and perpetual of itself; which is to say that man, or

animal, indeed has an efficient cause; but that Peter is man, or man is animal, does not have an efficient cause, because that connection is altogether necessary of itself. Whence consequently they also say that although the essence of a creature has a cause, nevertheless the truth of the essence does not have a cause, because the truth of a thing consists in that necessary connection, which is perpetual of itself and has no cause, and in this way there is science concerning necessary and perpetual truths.

42. A judgment is made concerning the proposed opinion. But this opinion also, unless it is further clarified, does not seem able to be defended. First, because if that connection of such a predicate with a subject is eternal, I ask what it is outside God, for either it is something or nothing; if something, how is it eternal without an efficient cause? If nothing, it is indeed not surprising that it does not have an efficient cause, but it is surprising that it can be eternal, or that it is a real connection, if it is nothing. Also, connection is nothing other than union; but union must be a thing or a mode of a thing; therefore if no thing is eternal, neither can the union of things be eternal, because a mode of a thing cannot exist without the thing. Moreover, how can essence have an efficient cause and not receive from it that it be the essence of such a thing? For if essence comes to be, it comes to be in some thing or entity; therefore by the same efficiency it receives that it be the essence of such a thing. And it is confirmed, for just as the essence of Peter did not exist before it came to be, so neither did Peter have an essence before he was created or generated; whence he was neither man nor animal, etc.; therefore he received all this through generation from his efficient cause; therefore not only do essences come to be, but also essential connections. It is confirmed secondly, for when a form (for example, a soul) is impressed upon matter, it formally begins to give to the whole composite not only that it be, but also that it live, sense, etc.; therefore the efficient cause which united such a form to matter not only made that whole, but also made it to be living, animal, etc.; therefore it made

such an essence suitable to such a thing. Finally, either being in these expressions is taken in the same signification or in diverse ones; if in diverse ones, there is open equivocation and inconsistent doctrine; if in the same, it is necessary that it have the same efficient cause. Which I declare thus, for when it is said that essence simply has an efficient cause, it is necessary to say that it has one in relation to being, because nothing comes to be except to be. Either therefore this is understood concerning being in act, and thus it is true; or concerning being in potency, and thus it is false, if the discourse concerns an efficient cause in act rigorously, although it is true concerning a cause capable of effecting. But it is exactly the same when it is said that essence is of such a thing; for if the discourse concerns actual being, a created essence cannot be of some thing in act except through an efficient cause; because what is not in act cannot be in act of something. And the arguments made also prove this, because just as Peter does not exist unless he comes to be, so neither is he in act man unless he comes to be man, but he is only man in potency. Whence if the discourse concerns only this being, it is true that it does not have an efficient cause in act, but it nevertheless requires one at least capable of effecting. What therefore is it that is affirmed of one and denied of the other?

43. And hence it also seems false what is said, that essence has an efficient cause, but the truth of essence does not have one. For the truth of essence is in reality nothing other than the essence itself, or at most is considered as a property intrinsically joined with essence; therefore it is impossible that it not have the same cause, either equally primarily or concomitantly. For how can it be understood that some cause effects gold and does not effect true gold? But if by effecting gold it effects the essence of gold, how by effecting true gold does it not effect the truth of the essence of gold? Whence we can use the same dilemma. For either the discourse concerns truth in potency or in act: but whichever of these is said, the same reasoning applies to essence and truth in potency or in act, as will be easily apparent by

applying the argument made. Finally, either the discourse concerns complex truth, which is properly in the intellect composing and dividing, and this has an efficient cause just as the composition and division of our intellect itself, for it inheres in it and begins with it, in the way that it exists, as St. Thomas said, Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 7, ad 4. And the same applies, proportionally maintained, to the truth which is in the composition of voice as in a sign. Or the discourse concerns the truth of the thing, which founds the truth of the intellect, and this does not differ from being itself. Whence there is that statement of Aristotle: From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is true or false; therefore it has the same cause as being itself and is subject to the same change. Whence St. Thomas himself, On Truth, q. 1, a. 6, ad 4, says that the truth of pronouncements, even as regards the essential aspects of things themselves, is not altogether immutable unless the things remain.

44. This controversy (as it seems to me at least) consists entirely in the various signification of that copula "is" by which the extremes are joined in these statements. For it can be taken in two ways. First, as it signifies the actual and real conjunction of extremes existing in the thing itself, so that when it is said "man is animal," it is signified that it is so in reality. Second, as it only signifies that the predicate is of the nature of the subject, whether the extremes exist or not. In the prior sense the truth of propositions depends without doubt on the existence of the extremes, because according to that signification the verb "is" is not absolved from time, or (which is the same) signifies real and actual duration, which is nothing when the existence of the extremes is removed, and therefore such a proposition is false, for it is affirmative concerning a subject that does not supposit. And in this same sense the arguments just made excellently prove that the truth of these statements depends on the efficient cause on which the existence of the extremes depends. Also it is proved that not only created essence, taken absolutely, has an efficient cause, but also the application of essence (so to speak) to this thing has an efficient cause,

that is, not only man or animal has an efficient cause, but also that man is in reality animal has an efficient cause. For although there is not a double action or efficiency, one by which man comes to be, another by which man comes to be animal, nevertheless both really come to be when man is generated; and it differs only because by these words "man is animal" it is signified in a complex way as conceived by us, but in reality it comes to be by a simple action by which in the thing man and animal come to be, insofar as they are the same in such a thing. Thus Hervaeus taught at length, Quodlibet I, q. 10, whom Javellus defends, Metaphysics V, q. 12, against Soncinas, same book V, q. 10, who plainly labors in equivocation, as has been said. Finally, in this same signification our assertion proceeds that existence is not separated from essence except by destruction and cessation of the same essence. Nor does the objection made proceed against it; for it is denied that propositions in which essential predicates are said of subjects are true in that sense when actual existence is removed. For thus that statement of Aristotle is true, in the Categories, chapter on Substance: When first substances are removed, it is impossible for anything to remain; and in the same way Averroes said, Physics I, comment 63, when a thing ceases to be, the name loses both itself and its definition.

45. But in the other sense propositions are true even if the extremes do not exist; and in the same sense they are necessary and of perpetual truth, because since the copula "is" in the said sense does not signify existence, it does not attribute actual reality in themselves to the extremes, and therefore for its truth it does not require existence or actual reality. Also, this is clarified from the aforesaid authors[46], because propositions in this sense are reduced to hypothetical or conditional sense; for when we say man is animal, abstracting from time, we say nothing other than that this is the nature of man, that man cannot come to be without being animal. Whence, just as this conditional is perpetual, "if it is man, it is animal," or "if it

[46] Fonseca, lib. V, c. 5, q. 1 et 2.

runs, it is moved," so this is perpetual, "man is animal," or "running is motion." And hence it also happens that these connections in this sense do not have an efficient cause, because all efficiency is terminated to actual existence, from which the said propositions in this sense abstract. And this alone is proved by those arguments which Soncinas gathers in the cited places. Indeed, in this same sense not only do these connections not require an efficient cause in act, but they do not even seem to demand it in potency, if we formally and precisely stop at their truth. Which can be clarified by the argument made concerning a conditional proposition, whose truth does not depend on an efficient cause or one capable of effecting, and therefore is equally found in impossible things as in possible ones; for this conditional is equally true, "if a stone is animal, it is sensible," as this one, "if man is animal, it is sensible"; therefore also this proposition, "every animal is sensible," does not per se depend on a cause that can effect animal. Whence, if by impossibility there were no such cause, nonetheless that statement would be true, just as this is true, "a chimera is a chimera," or similar. Although in this we can assign a distinction between necessary connections, conceived and stated between possible things or real essences, and between fictitious things or beings of reason, because in the former there is a necessary connection according to the intrinsic relation of the extremes abstracting from actual existence, such that nevertheless it is possible in relation to actual existence, and all this can be signified by the copula "is," even as it abstracts from time, so that when it is said "man is rational animal," it is signified that man has a real essence thus definable, or (which is the same) is such a being that is not fictitious but real, at least possible; and in this respect the truth of such statements depends on a cause capable of effecting the existence of the extremes. But in fictitious beings, necessary connections are only made without relation, even a possible one, to existing, but only through order to imagination or fiction of mind. Finally, according to this sense the objection made against our assertion also ceases,

because although these connections are necessary independently of existence, nonetheless the essences which are signified through them are not true and actual entities if they are deprived of existence.

46. But two objections still remain. The first is because it is not yet explained what this necessary connection of non-existing extremes is; for since it posits nothing in reality, it is difficult to understand how it can found necessary truth. Nor does it satisfy if we say that, when the existence of things is removed, only this connection remains in the divine exemplar and from it arises such necessity; this (I say) does not satisfy, for although the truth of these connections, as real and actual truth, remains only in the divine intellect (in which sense St. Thomas spoke in the cited places, especially Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 7, and is also taken from Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, chapters 7 and 8), nonetheless the necessity of this truth and the first root and origin of such connection does not seem able to be referred to the divine exemplar. For the divine exemplar itself had this necessity of representing man as rational animal, nor could it represent him as of another essence, which comes from nowhere else except that man cannot be of another essence, for by the very fact that it is a thing of another essence, it is no longer man; therefore this necessity comes from the object itself and not from the divine exemplar; therefore the difficulty touched upon always remains, namely, how, if that object in itself is nothing, it can have from itself such a connection of predicates as to found in some way the necessity of such science, and such truth, and such exemplar. To this it seems should be said that this connection is nothing other than the identity of extremes which are in essential and affirmative propositions (and the same must be said proportionally concerning the diversity of extremes in negative ones). For every truth of an affirmative proposition is founded in some identity or unity of extremes, which although it is conceived by us in a complex mode and by way of conjunction of predicate with subject, nevertheless in reality is nothing beyond the very entity of the thing. But identity, since it is a property of being (for the same and diverse

are reduced to unity, as we said above), is found with proportion in every being or in every state of being. Whence, just as existing man and animal are the same in reality, so possible man, or one who can be the object of science or of an exemplar of man, has identity with animal taken proportionally; therefore this identity is sufficient to found that necessity, and can be found in a being in potency, although it is nothing in act, because it adds nothing to a being in potency except a relation of reason in order to our concepts.

47. A small doubt is resolved. But then a second difficulty arises, for it follows that this connection is also necessary, "man is or exists," or "is existing," and consequently is true even if he does not actually exist, which is plainly false and against all sense and force of words. But the inference is clear, because man and existing also have identity, either objective and possible, or actual, if they are taken with proportion. Also because, if that proposition is reduced to a conditional proposition, it will be found true and necessary, because man cannot come to be without being existing, just as he cannot come to be without being animal; but the entire necessity of this proposition, "man is animal," was said to be because man cannot be without animal, which necessity is called by some composite or by supposition; therefore the same exists in that one, "man is existing," because man cannot be without existence. It is responded that in reality there is scarcely any diversity, if existing is taken with the same proportion, either in act or in potency, as the argument proves and is sufficiently established from what was treated above. Nevertheless there is diversity in the mode of speaking, and therefore the inference is to be denied absolutely, because the verb of existing, said simply, does not signify potency but the exercise of existing. Whence that expression, "man exists," said simply, does not render a composite sense, that is, [if he is] man, he is existing, but a simple and absolute one, and therefore, if it were necessary, it would signify absolute necessity of existing, which cannot be suitable to man.

## SECTION XIII
## ON THE NATURE OF COMPOSITION FROM BEING AND ESSENCE, AND WHAT KIND OF COMPOSITION BELONGS TO THE NATURE OF CREATED BEING

1. This question is necessary both for explaining the difficulties touched upon in the second and third arguments for the first position proposed in Section 1, and for examining or clarifying many things written about this composition by various authors—especially by Cajetan in On Being and Essence, chapter 5, shortly after question 9—where, by comparing it to the composition of matter and form, he explains the composition of existence and essence, saying that the two compositions agree in two respects but differ in ten.

### *Comparison of Compositions from Being & Essence, & from Matter & Form*

2. The first point of agreement is that each composition is from act and potency. For the first composition this is self-evident; as for the second, he argues that any quiddity is posited in the order of real things because it acquires existence. This argument is very weak if one is speaking—indeed as one truly is—of receptive potency; for essence is not said to acquire existence because it was previously in potency to receive it and afterwards takes on act, but because earlier it was wholly in the objective (or active) potency of its cause, and afterwards becomes a being in act. The second point of agreement is that in each composition the act and the potency are reduced to the same genus. This is true; it holds even between a real composition and one of reason—that is, between physical and metaphysical

composition—as is clear in the composition of genus and difference. Yet here one can observe some diversity: in physical composition each part, namely matter and form, is placed only reductively in a category; in metaphysical composition, however, the difference alone is placed reductively in a category, while the genus—although as a part it can also be reduced and set 'to the side'—as a kind of whole is placed directly. Something similar obtains in the composition of existence and essence, which is likewise metaphysical, as I shall say below: the whole essence is placed directly in a category, whereas existence, conceived as a certain mode, is placed only by reduction—a point on which we have said enough above.

3. One can read the differences in the author just cited. The first six all presuppose a real distinction between essence and existence, and that existence is the act only of an essence complete and composed of matter and form. Hence they are neither necessary for us nor must we refute anew the many things said in them. For example, when he says that in the composition of existence and essence neither extreme is a part of the substance: this is true for the composition of a complete being, but not for every composition of existence and essence; for such composition is found also in matter itself, in form, and in the separated soul. Likewise, what is said in the second difference—that in the composition of matter and form one extreme is pure potency, but not so in the composition of existence and essence—is not at all general, since matter itself consists of existence and essence; moreover, if essence is prescinded from existence, it is a more potential being than matter prescinded from form, or than matter as supposed to a form with its existence, although these potentialities are of different kinds: in essence as such the potentiality is objective, whereas in matter it is receptive. Similar remarks could be made about the next four differences, which I pass over.

## *Whether One Per Se Arises from Being & Essence*

4. What he says in the seventh difference—that out of matter and form there arises a one per se, but not out of existence and essence—I judge to be false, even on the opinion that essence and existence are really distinct. First, because they are compared as act and potency within the same order, which by their very nature are set up to compose a unity; and essence without existence does not have complete actuality—indeed it is not even a being in act; why then should there not arise from them a being that is one per se? Second, because the unity that results is not a unity per accidens; therefore it is a unity per se. The antecedent is admitted and proved by Cajetan himself: a unity per accidens aggregates things of diverse genera; the consequence is proved because from essence and existence there truly results a unity, for they are really united to each other; indeed (what is remarkable) Cajetan himself says in the same place that essence is per se conjoined with existence; but between a unity per se and a unity per accidens no middle can be conceived. Third, otherwise no created being would be per se one insofar as it is a being in act. Fourth, Cajetan's reason is very weak, namely: a one per se arises from parts of the substance, but existence is not a part of the substance. The assumption is false; for a one per se also arises from a substance and its substantial act or terminus—otherwise no unity would arise from nature and subsistence, nor would a substantial suppositum, as such, be a one per se, which is plainly false. Hence we can also refute that doctrine theologically, for it would follow that Christ is not one per se, since He consists of humanity and the Word not as of substantial parts, but as of nature and subsistence, or as of essence and existence.

### *That Composition from Being & Essence is Composition from These*

5. From this it likewise follows that the eighth difference assigned by the same author is false—namely, that the composition of matter and form is a composition from these (ex his), and therefore a

third thing results therefrom; but the composition of existence and essence is a composition with these (cum his), because in it, properly speaking, there is no thing which consists of essence and existence as there is a thing consisting of matter and form; rather, essence composes with existence, and conversely, and therefore (he says) they are said to be conjoined per se, yet without composing a third. This distinction between two kinds of composition—from these and with these (as I have shown elsewhere in a similar case against Durandus)—is a fabrication; for every true composition, according to diverse relations, is both a composition from these and with these, or, more properly as Durandus said, of this with that. Relative to the terminus that results from the composition, it is called a composition from these, because the composite does not compose with its components but is composed from them. Relative to the relation of the components to one another, it is called a composition with these, or of this to that, because the one composes a third with the other. It is impossible that there be any true composition without something being composed by it which has a unity proportioned to the composition; therefore it is impossible that there be a true composition that is not a composition from these. The consequence is evident from what has been said and from the very meaning of the terms; for what else is it to be a composition from these than to be the composition of one thing constituted from many? The antecedent is clear: every true action, especially a transitive one, has some adequate terminus; therefore composition too has an adequate terminus at which it terminates, and this can be nothing other than the composite. Likewise, every composition is effected by the union of the components; but from union there results a one—not a simple one, but a composite. Therefore, if the composition of existence and essence is a true and real composition, as they themselves say, it cannot be denied that it is a composition from these; nor can it be denied that there results from it one composite thing; for if such a thing did not exist, what, I ask, is it that is composed of existence and

essence? Moreover, Cajetan brings forth no reason—nor can he—why one thing should not be composed from existence and essence. Otherwise, by the same reasoning he ought to say that from subsistence and nature there is no one thing—which is plainly false, since a substantial suppositum is one. The sequel is clear from the argument indicated above: for this composition too is not from substantial parts but from essence and the terminus or mode of essence. Hence the theological argument also presses here: it would follow that the Incarnation is not a composition from these, since it is a composition from nature and suppositum, or from existence and essence; and thus Christ would not consist of the divine and human natures—contrary to the language of the Councils, which say that Christ subsists from two natures and in two natures.

6. Omitting, then, those differences, on the opinion that asserts existence and essence to be distinct things, one would have to say that the composition of existence and essence agrees univocally with other compositions in the common notion of a true and real composition of a real potency and act that in some way pertain to the same genus or category, and therefore also agrees in the notion of a composition by which there arises a one per se from many. It differs, however, because the act in this composition is not, properly speaking, a form—neither substantial nor accidental—but a certain simple terminus of the essence, or an intrinsic mode proportioned to it; consequently it also differs on the side of the other extreme, namely the essence, because that is not proper matter but a receptive potency of another kind and proportioned to such an act.

### *Composition from Being & Essence is Called Composition Analogically*

7. But according to our own position, one must say that the composition of existence and essence is called a composition only analogically, because it is not a real composition but one of reason; for

a real composition is only from extremes that are distinct in the thing itself; but here the extremes are not distinct in reality, as we have shown; therefore the composition from them cannot be real. And just as a being of reason is a being only analogically and almost in name alone, so this composition does not have a univocal agreement with a real composition—such as that of matter and form—but only an analogous proportion. This is the first and, as it were, generic difference between this composition and that which is of matter and form. Joined to this is another difference that pertains to the present matter: the composition of matter and form is found only in bodies and sensible things, whereas the composition of existence and essence is common to all created beings that are beings in act; hence the former composition is physical, because it does not abstract from matter as to existence; the latter is metaphysical, because it abstracts and is common to immaterial beings. Whence it follows that the former is the foundation of physical change, while the latter is not, but of itself abstracts from physical corruption or change, except insofar as it is joined to things in which the former composition is found. It differs from other metaphysical compositions, speaking generally, because it is ordered to a different, quasi-formal terminus or effect. In particular, it differs from the composition of nature and subsistence, because that composition is real, whereas this one is of reason; and from other compositions of reason—such as of genus and difference —because those of themselves abstract from actual existence and are considered even in a being in potency; this composition, however, is considered only in a thing actually existing.

### *How Composition from Being & Essence is Only Rational*

8. Against this explanation certain objections arise, whose solutions will further clarify the matter. First: if this is only a composition of reason, it cannot be said to belong to the essence of a

creature, because either it is not common to all creatures or it is not proper to them; for a composition of reason is feigned by the intellect, and thus comes to creatures from without; therefore it is not of their essence nor can it be said to be common to all. If it be said to be common not insofar as it is actually conceived, but insofar as it can be devised with respect to all creatures—then in this way it will not be proper to the created being, for it could also be conceived or feigned in God; for a composition of reason does not conflict with perfect real simplicity, and therefore does not conflict with God. Thus theologians say that the divine Persons are constituted by relations or personal subsistences, which constitution is plainly a kind of composition of reason, since the relations are distinguished from the essence by reason, and the Persons are understood to be constituted and, as it were, composed by the relations and by the essence itself. Some theologians likewise attribute to God a composition of genus and difference. Nor have there been lacking those who thought that existence is distinguished by reason from essence even in God.

9. I reply that this composition of existence and essence is of reason in such a way that it is not a fiction made up by the intellect without foundation, but has some foundation in the thing. Therefore this composition is said to belong to the notion of the created being, not insofar as it is completed or conceived by the intellect, but according to the foundation it has in the created being itself. This foundation is nothing other than that a creature does not of itself have actual existence, but is only a potential being that can receive existence from another; hence the essence of the creature is conceived by us as something potential, while existence is conceived as the mode or act by which such an essence is constituted a being in act. In this sense it is easily understood how this composition belongs to the essence of the created being: for it belongs to its essence not to have existence of itself, but only to be able to participate in it from another. I say that this belongs to its essence if the created being is taken as a being in act; for if it is taken as in potency, it cannot belong to its essence to be

actually composed in this way—there is a repugnance in that—but it will belong to its essence to be apt to be with such a composition and not otherwise; and herein is completed the proper notion of the created being either in act or in potency, which in this whole disputation we chiefly intend to explain.

10. Again, from what has been said it is easy to understand how this composition is proper to a created being and cannot be attributed to God; for its foundation includes an imperfection repugnant to God, who is a being in act by His essence, and neither is nor can be conceived as a potential being, since potentiality in the essence is repugnant to God as God. Therefore, whatever may be said in general about "composition of reason," whether such composition as such repugns the divine perfection (for perhaps some composition does not repugn, unless the question is only verbal and, to avoid the odious term, we call it "constitution" and not "composition," even of reason), nevertheless that composition of reason which has in the thing a foundation that includes imperfection plainly repugns God; and for this reason those theologians who judge better deny in God a composition of genus and difference—even though it is of reason—because it requires in the thing some foundation that includes imperfection, namely a limitation of perfection such that it can be circumscribed by genus and difference, as was touched upon in the preceding disputation. Much more, then, does the composition of existence and essence repugn God. Those who attribute such a composition to Him or distinguish in Him existence and essence by reason either do not conceive what God is, or do not sufficiently understand wherein the notion of this composition consists, or are not speaking of the distinction of reason of which we are now treating, but of one that can be devised between existence and essence in general as these abstract from God and creatures.

11. A second objection can be framed as follows: on our view even a composition of reason cannot be devised from existence and essence. For the per se composition of something ought to be from

real extremes, even if the composition is itself of reason; it is not called "of reason" because the extremes themselves are fictions of reason, but because, although they are something real, nonetheless in the thing they are not two but one. But essence and existence are neither two in the thing nor can they be conceived as two real extremes; for whenever there are two extremes in the way of being two, the one is not included in the other; yet essence is not conceived as a real extreme except as including existence, as we said above; therefore the actuality which essence is understood to have from existence cannot be conceived under the mode of composition. The difficulty seems even more pressing in created existence itself: that existence is a created being, and thus it would be necessary that this composition hold also in it; for it is potential, able sometimes to be and sometimes not to be; and yet in it one cannot understand a composition of essence and existence—otherwise there would be an infinite regress.

12. I reply, first, that for a composition of reason it is not necessary that the extremes be or be conceived as actual real entities, especially when taken precisely and insofar as one is not included in the concept of the other; it suffices that the extremes be certain real rationes apt in some way for existing. This is plainly evident in the rational composition of a specific nature and the individuating difference: the specific nature, as it is made precise by our concept from all individuating differences, is not an entity in act, but only a certain real ratio apt to be in act in individuals (and we are speaking of that composition as attributed to real things, that is, as it has a real terminus). Thus that the extremes be real beings in act is necessary per se for real composition; for a composition of reason it is not. Hence a threefold composition of reason can be distinguished. One is from extremes as they are in the thing entities in act, though not actually distinct. Another is between extremes that are real by aptitude or by an objective real formal aspect, yet abstract from actual existence. A third is, as it were, intermediate, such that one extreme is only a ratio or real essence conceived precisely, while the other is actual existence.

This answer is the best and conforms sufficiently to the mode of our conceiving.

13. Second, one can say that not every composition of reason is from extremes that are mutually exclusive or such that neither is included in the concept of the other; it is enough that one can be prescinded from the other, even if conversely the other cannot. Thus substance is in a way composed according to reason, because it can be resolved into the two concepts of being and of a per se mode, although the concept of the mode necessarily includes being. So too in the present matter. And on either account the confirmation about existence itself can be handled. First, one can say with sufficient probability that actual existence—by the very fact that one abstracts from the exercise of actually existing—coincides with essence, and therefore existence as exercised is not conceived as composed, but as a simple mode that composes the created being in act. Accordingly, when it is said that this composition belongs to the notion of a created being, it is understood either of that which is conceived as that which is (and not as the precise ratio of being), or it is understood proportionally, namely that this composition belongs to the notion of the created being as composed by it, or as composing. Or, second, one can say that even in existence itself this composition can be conceived without an infinite regress, because existence—while it is the ratio of being for the essence—is also the ratio of being for itself, as was discussed at greater length above.

### *How the Being of Creature is Received Being*

14. A third objection, touched upon in the said second argument for the first position, is this: from what has been said it follows that the creature's existence is not received in any receptive potency, but is subsistent; and from this it was further inferred that it is most perfect and infinite, because it has nothing by which it is limited. The first consequence is proved thus: if in reality there is no

composition from existence and essence as from act and potency, then in reality existence is not an act received in a potency; therefore it is unreceived and subsistent of itself. This difficulty does not apply to the existence of accidents, for that is received in a subject. Nor does it apply to the existence of a material substantial form, for that too is received in matter, by which it can be limited. And for almost the same reason it does not apply to the existence of the rational soul, because although it is not received in matter as dependent on it, nevertheless it is fitted to matter and by its relation to matter it can be limited. From this it further follows that the argument has even less force with respect to the existence of matter itself, which is much more imperfect than the existence of form and can be limited by its relation to form even more than the existence of form can be limited by its relation to matter. This is nearly what those say who really distinguish essence and existence: they say that existence is limited by the essence of which it is the act, and essence by existence, because it is the receptive potency of it. Furthermore, the difficulty readily ceases as regards the existence of the whole composite substance: it will be limited by its component parts; for nothing composed of limited parts can be unlimited.

15. There remains only the existence of angels. In their case one must admit that it is not properly received in a subject taken strictly, neither according to a part—since it is indivisible—nor according to the whole—since it is substantial and complete. Yet one can say that their existence is received in the suppositum, which is distinct ex natura rei from the existence of the essence; and this suffices for its being limited and finite. This can be explained as follows. Either we are speaking of the existence of the angelic nature alone, or of the existence of its subsistence, or of the adequate existence of the whole suppositum. The existence of the nature is received in the suppositum, which is ex natura rei distinct from it; and in this respect it is limited, because it is drawn into a composition and limited and determined by that mode of subsisting. The existence of

the subsistence itself is clearly limited in that it is only a certain mode of such a nature. Finally, the complete existence of the whole suppositum, since it is composed of limited extremes, must itself be limited. Thus it is not necessary that a creature's existence be unlimited, even though it is not received in a subject.

16. As for the further inference that it would be subsistent, this can be understood in various ways. First, that it be essentially, adequately, and of itself a subsistent existence. Second, that it be subsistent, as it were denominatively, through some intrinsic mode or terminus. In the latter sense it cannot be denied on any opinion that created existence—if it is substantial and complete—is by its nature subsistent, because it does not inhere nor is it sustained by anything else, but is terminated by its own subsistence. And because this subsistence is ex natura rei distinct from such existence and it is from that subsistence that existence has its subsisting, I call it subsistent denominatively and not essentially. And this mode of subsisting indicates no infinity or illimitation in such existence, since it is an imperfect mode of subsistence and involves some composition. In the former sense, however, we confess that only the existence of God is thus subsistent in act—of itself, essentially, and per se primo—which it has by virtue of its infinity. Nor does it follow from the fact that in a creature the composition of existence and essence is not real that the creature's existence is subsistent in that manner. For if we are speaking of the existence of a substantial nature, this does not subsist except through a superadded mode; if of the existence of subsistence itself, that is not properly something subsisting, but the very ratio of subsisting; if of the whole suppositum, it is indeed subsisting, yet not per se primo and adequately, but through a certain other terminus or mode belonging to it. And thus the proposed difficulty is entirely answered, even if we admit certain principles not yet sufficiently demonstrated—such as that subsistent existence is proper to the divine existence, or that it requires infinite perfection.

17. One could also answer differently, by distinguishing two senses of "unreceived" (irreceptum). In one sense, that it is unreceived both in anything and from anything; and in this sense it does not follow, on our opinion, that created existence is unreceived—as is obvious; and of such existence it is rightly said that it is infinite, because it is independent and unparticipated, indeed the source of all participated existence; and such existence can with singular propriety be called subsistent existence itself, because, not being participated, it is of itself and subsists with every perfection of existing; and in this sense it is rightly said to be proper to God that He is subsistent existence itself. In another sense, existence can be called unreceived in anything, even though it is received from something; and in this sense I concede that created existence can be unreceived, yet I deny that it follows that it is unlimited and infinite. First, because although it is unreceived in a subject, it is subsistent only by some composition with subsistence itself; from this no infinity can be inferred, as was explained in the previous answer. Second, because it would not be pure act, but by participation. But, they object, if existence is by participation, then it is participated from something; therefore it is participated from the essence of which it is the existence; therefore existence must be distinct from essence and make a real composition with it. I reply with Alexander of Hales as cited above: when created existence is said to be by participation, we must not imagine that there is one thing that participates—namely the essence—and another that is participated—namely existence; rather, one and the same reality is, in a participated mode and by the power of another (namely of the agent). This reality of itself is only under a possible mode; that it is and can be called act it has by the power of the agent. The same is clear in the very essence or substance of a creature: it is an essence and substance by participation—not because it is participated subjectively (so to speak) from another thing or substance, but only because efficiently it is from the divine substance, of which it is a certain participation.

18. But it is urged: an existence not received in anything has nothing by which it is limited—neither by a receptive potency nor by any contracting difference. To this one could answer sufficiently in a word: it is limited by itself and by the force of its own entity, and does not need in reality any limiter or contractor distinct from itself; rather, it is intrinsically by its nature of such a degree of perfection through its formal entity; extrinsically it is limited by God, either efficiently—because from Him it receives so much perfection of existing and no more—or as by an exemplary cause—because it is commensurated to that divine idea which represents so much perfection and no more. To make this clearer, we can distinguish a twofold contraction or limitation: one metaphysical, the other physical. Metaphysical contraction does not require an actual distinction ex natura rei between what is contracted and the contracting principle; for that, a distinction of concepts with some foundation in reality suffices. In this way (if we wish to speak with many) we can admit that the essence is finished and limited with respect to existence, and conversely that existence is finished and limited because it is the act of such an essence. Under distinct formal aspects and in a different order of causes, such a "circle" is not repugnant; just as in essence itself we distinguish genus and difference, through which the species is constituted and limited to such and such a perfection; and the difference, as difference, can be said to be limited with respect to the genus, of which it is the act, and conversely. But, speaking physically, if the essence is simple, substantial, and complete—as is an angelic substance—it does not in fact need any formal and intrinsic limiter other than itself; rather, just as a composite substance is limited by its intrinsic components or principles (from which, taken together and united, it is not distinct in reality)—which is nothing other than being intrinsically limited by its very entity—so a simple created substance is physically and really limited by itself. It has that limitation either in potency before it is made or in act when it is made. Hence, since existence is nothing other than the essence constituted in act, just as

the actual essence is formally limited by itself or by its intrinsic principles, so the created existence has its limitation from the essence itself—not as from a potency in which it is received, but because in reality it is nothing other than the very essence as actual.

### *That Essential Diversity is Given Among Existences*

19. From these considerations it is understood that, just as the essences of created things differ in species, so too do their existences; and even those who hold that essence and existence are distinct things do not deny this. Indeed they maintain that the differences of essences—especially in immaterial substances—are taken according to their order to diverse modes of existence, as is gathered from Cajetan, On Being and Essence, chapter 6; this could not be true unless there were diversity in the existences themselves. Likewise, they say that existence is related to essence either as to an intrinsic principle from which it flows, or as to a proper and connatural recipient; therefore, in either respect, it is necessary that existence be proportioned to essence, and consequently that as great a distinction obtain among existences as among essences. This is much more necessary on our view; for if existence in reality is nothing other than the essence in act, then, just as actual essences are specifically distinguished, so necessarily are existences. You will say: then, just as genera and species are distinguished in essences, so they can be distinguished in existences; for as all created essences agree in the common and transcendental notion of essence, so all existences agree in the common notion of existence; and as some essences agree more among themselves than with others and then differ among themselves, whence the various genera and differences of essences are taken, so too the existences of angels, for instance, agree more among themselves than with the existences of humans and yet among themselves differ essentially; therefore from them one can abstract the

concepts of genus and difference. I reply: it is true that in reality a greater agreement or similarity is found among some existences than among others; indeed, in this there is almost the same proportion between existences as between essences, for the reasons given. Hence Cajetan also says in On Being and Essence, chapter 4, shortly before question 6, that actual existence is constituted by the proper principles of the being itself, and therefore is not of a nature alien to the being itself. From this it necessarily follows that it bears to the existences of other things the same proportion of similarity and difference as their natures or essences bear among themselves. And Scotus, Sentences II, dist. 3, q. 3, says that the existence—so far as it is distinguished from the essence's being—is not of itself distinct or determined, but is determined by the determination of the essence. Whence it also follows that the being is such as the essence is, and that one existence keeps to other existences the same proportion that one essence has to others.

20. Nevertheless, as Scotus says in the same place, one ought not to distinguish the differences of existences from the differences of essences, nor set up praedicamental orderings for them; for such orderings are properly distinguished only in that which is, or in that which has the character of a complete being within each category—that is, in what is conceived as a complete entity. Existence, however, is not conceived by us as "what is," but as a certain simple mode by which an essence is constituted in the status of an actual being. Likewise, even among specific differences themselves one can recognize that some agree more among themselves than with others; yet we do not for that reason distinguish in them the concepts of genus and difference, but only the simple modes by which each difference is determined to its own, quasi-specific notion. So too must we understand the case of existences, insofar as they are conceived by us metaphysically as modes of essences: they can be conceived under a concept more or less common or proper; but taken in particular these concepts do not bear the strict notion of genus and species.

Rather, they are either reducible to those notions, or they function more like a transcendental concept and its mode. In this way one can also understand, metaphysically, how each created existence is limited by its own proper and particular mode by which it is determined to be this or that existence. Nor does such abstraction and determination of concepts conflict with the actuality of existence. For although, in relation to essence, existence stands as act to objective potency, nevertheless within actual existence itself one can conceive likeness and diversity in comparison with another existence; and this suffices to ground the foregoing concepts with only a distinction of reason.

### *Whether Essence or Existence is More Perfect*

21. From this, finally, it becomes clear what one should think about the comparison, much debated by many, between essence and existence: which of the two is more perfect. Such a comparison properly has a place only in the opinion that admits a real distinction between actual essence and existence; and even among authors who follow that opinion there is a diversity of views. Some hold that in every thing existence is more perfect than essence, because it is that actuality without which the essence would have no perfection at all. Hence St. Thomas says (ST I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3) that "to be" (esse) is the most perfect of all things; for it is related to all as act, since nothing has actuality except insofar as it is. In the same vein Dionysius, On the Divine Names V, says that to be itself is the greatest of all the perfections we receive from God. And Aristotle, Ethics VIII, ch. 11, calls sheer being the greatest of God's benefits.

22. Others, however, contend that the entity of the essence is more perfect, because in each thing it is, as it were, its substance, whereas existence is only a certain mode or terminus of that essence. Indeed, it is intrinsically incredible that in man there should be some entity connatural to him more perfect than the rational soul according to its essence—by which he is made in the image of God and by which

he has the formal and principal power to carry out his most perfect operations. Likewise, if we argue theologically, the Word (according to their opinion) assumed the essence of man and not existence; therefore, if existence is what is most perfect in man, it follows that the Word assumed what is less perfect in man, and left unassumed what is most perfect—which is highly absurd. Finally (according to that view) one must necessarily say that the actual essence has its own entity which formally and intrinsically stands outside nothingness, and not by existence itself, as was shown above; otherwise one could not conceive in the essence its own entity by which it is distinguished from existence. Granted this, the very foundation for judging essence less perfect than existence collapses—namely, the claim that the essence derives all its actuality, as being, from existence. On that opinion, this is false and ill-concluded, since some actuality must necessarily be posited in the essence as such; thus in that respect it could surpass existence. Nor does it matter that existence is posited as the terminus or mode of the essence, for from this only a qualified superiority can be inferred. So too subsistence is a mode and terminus of the essence, and nonetheless it is simply less perfect, even though in a certain respect it surpasses the essence insofar as it actuates it, as we shall see below.

23. Yet although this reasoning is pressing when applied to man, or on the basis of the principles conceded by that side, nevertheless, absolutely speaking, the contrary position involves another inconsistency—namely, that actual essence as such should formally and intrinsically include actuality in the genus of being and stand outside nothingness, and yet not include existence in the same way; whereas the proper concept of actual existence can be understood and expressed only through the primary actuality by which a being in act is distinguished from a being in potency, as has been shown at length above. There is, then, a manifest contradiction when one says that an essence, existence being set aside, includes an actual perfection in which it can surpass existence. Wherefore, even if

this comparison is made properly in reality, supposing a real distinction, nothing firm or consistent can be said in it according to that opinion. But if we suppose that in reality existence is not distinct from essence, it is obvious that the aforesaid comparison has no place with respect to the thing itself and the actual essence; since they are the same, one cannot be more or less perfect than the other. If, however, they are compared according to a mental precision, existence is preferred to essence; for, with existence set aside, the essence is not understood to remain in act but only in potency, and since nothing is actually perfect except what actually is, "to be" is rightly called the perfection of all perfections and the greatest of all perfections. In this sense St. Thomas interprets Dionysius (De veritate q. 20, a. 2, ad 3), where he says that "to be" is said to be nobler than "to live" or "to understand," if the comparison is made by the intellect separating being from living. Consequently, if the comparison is made between existence, conceived precisely as a mode, and essence as actually existing, then essence is conceived as something more perfect, since it is conceived as "that which is," as including the whole perfection both of essence and of existence.

### *What Composition Belongs to the Nature of Created Being*

24. The fourth objection was the one proposed in the third argument of §1 in favor of the second opinion. It asks whether any composition belongs to the very notion of a created being, and what composition that is. Here it must briefly be noted that one can speak either of a composition "of reason," or of a real composition which arises from things really, or by nature, distinct. Again, we may speak of a created being either as it exists in reality, or as it is mentally abstracted according to some ratio—an abstraction that is sometimes grounded in a distinction that exists in the thing itself (as when we abstract nature from suppositum, or substance from accident), and

sometimes grounded in some convenience, property, or eminence of the thing without an actual distinction (as when we abstract genus from difference, and the like).

25. Therefore we must say that, of a created being existing in reality, there belongs a composition of reason—or rather the foundation for such a composition; for in this way the composition of existence and essence belongs to the notion of a created being, as was explained above. Again, we must say that there is no created being which, as it exists in reality, does not include some real composition, speaking by the nature of the thing; but that composition is not of existence and essence, but of other things or real modes. This is shown by induction. A created substance, as it naturally exists in the order of reality, includes a composition of nature and suppositum (of which below). An accident, since it naturally exists in a subject, includes a composition with that subject; and in itself it includes a composition with its very actual inherence as a mode of its entity (I speak of a proper accident really distinct from the substance). Therefore, even if we consider a substantial nature existing in a supernatural manner—such as the humanity in the Word—we shall still find in it a real composition, not only from its parts, but also with the Word and with the mode of union it has to the Word. Likewise, in an accidental form existing supernaturally—such as the quantity of the Eucharist—we shall find (according to a probable opinion) a composition arising from the identity of the accident with the mode of per se existence, which is incompatible with actual inherence.

26. Further, every created being necessarily has an actual dependence upon the First Cause, and this dependence is, by the nature of the thing, distinct from the being that is produced or conserved by it. Hence it makes with that being a real composition, inseparable from every created being actually existing; for neither can such a being exist without some dependence, nor can that dependence exist without some terminus. Finally, it is probable that there is no possible created being which, in reality, would not have

some composition of subject and accident. If such a being were a true accident or a real accidental mode, it would of necessity require a subject with which to form a composition, as is self-evident. If, however, it were a substance, then since it must necessarily be finite, it must necessarily have a determinate place or "where," or a local presence by which it can receive change; and therefore it must be distinct from that "where" and form a composition with it. For the same reason it can have a composition with accidents really distinct from it. Whether this is necessary for every created or creatable substance is not sufficiently clear, nor does it seem demonstrable from the mere notion of created being as such—though the affirmative seems the more probable opinion. We discussed some of this above in Disputation XVIII when treating powers as the proximate principles by which creatures act, and we shall add some points below when disputing about quantity and quality. From these considerations it is sufficiently clear that in every created being, as it exists in reality, there is found a real composition which is not founded on a distinction between existence and essence, but on other distinctions of the existing thing from some mode of itself or from some accident—a distinction that indeed arises from the limitation of the created being, and that we recognize from the separability or change that can occur between the thing and such a mode. But this sort of distinction has no place between existence and actual essence, as has been shown; hence the case is not the same for this as for the other compositions, such as that of nature and suppositum.

27. From this we gather further that, if we speak of a created being as it exists in reality but not according to everything it has in reality—rather, according to some mental precision—then it is not necessary that every created being include some real composition. This too is shown by induction. If we consider an immaterial substantial nature, abstracted from accidents and from its own actual subsistence or from union with another, then no real composition is found in it. In natures composed of matter and form, although the

complete nature cannot be abstracted from such composition, nevertheless in the parts themselves, precisely conceived, there is no such composition: thus matter precisely conceived is a simple substantial entity, and so is form—simple, that is, with respect to essential composition, since composition from integral parts cannot be excluded on account of the imperfection of matter. For the same reason an accidental form precisely conceived is simple, unless it is material (and so has a composition of integral parts), or unless it can be intensified and remitted and thus have a latitude of degrees and a corresponding composition—imperfections or compositions arising from the peculiar reasons of certain beings, not from the very notion of created being as such. Therefore, it does not conflict with a created being as such that, under some precise aspect, it be simple without real composition.

28. Nor can this be denied by those authors who really distinguish created essence and existence, for they are compelled to admit that existence, precisely conceived, is a simple entity—especially if it be a spiritual or angelic existence, in which no parts or extremes can be devised that are, by the nature of the thing, distinct and out of which it would be composed. Likewise, some created essence, precisely conceived, will be simple without real composition; for as such it does not include a composition of existence and essence, since it is supposed to be abstracted from its existence—which (according to that opinion) can occur not only in the mind but even in reality. For example, if we suppose an angelic nature to be assumed by the Word, then that nature, as distinct from the Word, would include no real and substantial composition; for as such it would consist neither of existence and essence nor of nature and subsistence. Therefore, it does not belong to the very notion of created being that it cannot be abstracted from real composition when it is not conceived integrally and adequately as it is in reality, but only according to some precise or essential aspect. Nor does anything objected in that third argument introduce a new difficulty or something that must not be

solved on every view—even by those who hold composition from existence and essence to be real and from distinct things. For that composition can be resolved into the components, and then the question can be raised whether those components are simple or composite. The latter cannot be said, for the reasons given, and because otherwise one would proceed to infinity. But if the former is said, we have what we intended, namely, that the essence itself which is said to compose with existence is a created and actual entity.

29. Accordingly, finally, it must be added that every created being—however precisely and incompletely conceived—includes at least an aptitude for composition, that is, that it can with another being or mode of being compose one entity; indeed, it includes even a need or indigence for some such composition with another being or mode of being in order to be able to exist in the order of things. In this it necessarily falls short of the perfection of pure act and of divine simplicity. All this is clear from what has been said; for neither can a substance exist except with some mode of subsisting, or with another that supplies for it, and with which it necessarily makes some composition. And there is the same, or even greater, reason in the case of an accident with respect to its subject and with respect to actual inherence. And (what is more certain) every created being requires actual dependence, and thus a composition with that dependence. This imperfection is sufficient to explain the nature and imperfection of created being as such; and for that reason a real composition from existence and essence is not necessary in creatures.

## SECTION XIV

## WHETHER ACTUAL DEPENDENCE AND SUBORDINATION AND SUBJECTION TO THE FIRST AND UNCREATED BEING BELONGS TO THE NATURE OF CREATED BEING.

## Disputation XXXI

1. Up to this point we have explained the nature of created being, considering absolutely its intrinsic composition and its entityness through order to its proper act of being, from which it formally has that it be being. Now this nature of created being must be explained and declared more fully through relation and comparison to the first and uncreated being, for since in comparison with that it is being analogically, its nature will be declared optimally through comparison to that.

2. Therefore in the beginning it must be supposed (what is certain among all) that created being, insofar as it is such, essentially includes dependence on the first and uncreated being. Because this is the first distinguishing characteristic of created being from uncreated, as has been shown above when treating this division. Likewise, because at least in this way it belongs to the nature of created being that it have being received from another, which is to have dependent being; therefore maximally from the first being, which has being from itself, not received from another. Finally every being of this kind is being by participation; therefore it essentially depends on that from which it participates the nature of being. Concerning this matter we have spoken extensively in disp. XX and XXI, where we explained what this dependence is and how it is said to be essential to the creature, because by virtue of its essence it needs it, not because dependence itself intrinsically composes the essence of the creature. But what relation or disposition to the creator created being includes, either by reason of its essence, or by reason of its actual dependence, will be established from what will be said below, disp. XLVII, concerning transcendental and predicamental relation, and in disp. XLVIII, concerning relations of all dependence or action.

3. From this principle therefore it follows first that every created being is under God's dominion as to its being, that is, it is so subject to God that by Him it can be reduced to nothing and deprived of its being through the sole suspension of that influence by which He conserves it. This is proved from what has been said, because created

being essentially depends on uncreated being in the sense explained; therefore from this dependence necessarily follows the aforesaid subjection; for by this very fact that the creature needs divine influence in order to be, it is of itself subject to annihilation, if it is deprived of such influence. But you will ask whether this very subjection in order to annihilation is as essential to the creature as the positive or radical dependence itself is. It is answered that as to what it posits in the creature, it is equally essential; but as to what it connotes or requires from God's side, it does not seem so essential, if we speak precisely and formally. This is clarified, for the essential dependence of created being on uncreated being formally only regards uncreated being as infinite principle and abyss of being, and most efficacious so that it can communicate participation of itself, and this perfection precisely taken would be sufficient for understanding in the creature the nature of created being. But truly the aforesaid subjection of the same being in order to annihilation connotes in God freedom in conserving the creature which He once produced, which freedom, although it is essential to God Himself, and thus from God's side the use of such freedom is necessary so that the creature receives being and is conserved in it, nevertheless from the side of the creature itself and for the nature of created being as such, this seems accidental; for if per impossibile we understood God to communicate Himself to the outside not freely, but necessarily, we would nonetheless understand in the creature the true nature of created being, without subjection to God in order to annihilation. Because we would understand in God the power of effecting and conserving created being, which would be sufficient for understanding from the side of created being itself essential dependence on God; nevertheless we would not understand from God's side full dominion over the being of the creature, because such dominion is not without freedom, and therefore neither would subjection in order to annihilation be understood in the creature, because this subjection and dominion are correlative, and with one removed, it is necessary to remove the other.

4. And for this reason I said that this subjection as to what it connotes from God's side is not included in the nature of created being precisely and formally taken; but as to what is imported by this subjection in created being itself and as to what it requires from its side, this subjection is essential, and indicates the very same root or the same grade of being which essential dependence does. For through this subjection nothing else is signified except that created being is of such nature and essence to which it does not repugn to be reduced to nothing, if from the side of the cause freedom to suspend the influence by which He communicates being to it is not lacking. And in this sense this subjection can be said to be essential to created being as such, especially because, although through our concepts we separate one perfection from another, nevertheless absolutely it is of God's essence that He have full dominion of all created beings, either actually or potentially, so that, if He wills to produce them, He cannot constitute them outside His dominion; therefore, conversely or by the same proportion it is of the essence of created being that it always be subject to God and under His dominion, so that by Him it can be reduced to nothing. Whence from this dominion, which seems to be better known to us, we optimally confirm the dependence which created being has on God, not only in being made, but also in being conserved, because, if it did not so depend, God could not at the nod of His will reduce a being once created to nothing, and thus He would not have full dominion of it, which repugns divine perfection. This argument is treated more broadly in the said disp. XXI.

5. From which we can further gather or add that another subjection or dependence on God is also intrinsic to created being as such, namely, in acting or in causing. But this dependence or subjection can be declared in two ways. First, absolutely, and in this way it can seem not to be universal, because it is not of the nature or essence of created being that it be able to act something. In another way this subjection can be understood only conditionally or ex hypothesi, namely that this is the condition of created being that, if it

can effect anything, in the very effecting it necessarily depends on the actual concurrence and aid of the first cause and uncreated being. And indeed if we speak of proper efficiency, this latter exposition will have to be employed; but if the discourse is about causality in general, this condition must be expounded in the prior way, because there is no created being which does not have some genus of causality; for if it is accident, either it is a proximate principle of effecting something, or at least it formally affects the subject; but if it is substance, either it is matter, and that has material causality, or form, and this has formal causality, and perhaps there is no form which is not a principle of effecting something, just as also every spiritual and complete substance has some operation of which it is the efficient principle. Therefore in every created being some genus of causality will be found and some mode of communicating its perfection in which it essentially depends on God's actual influence, although in diverse ways; for the effective causality of created being depends on God, also as on the first and principal efficient cause; but other causalities, for example material and formal, do not depend in the same genus, but in the genus of efficient cause; for what matter causes materially, it is necessary that God cause that very thing efficiently. All these things have been treated and declared more broadly above, disp. XXII.

6. But here it can also be asked whether this subordination in acting or causing formally pertains to the essential nature of created being as such, or is rather like a property of it. For it seems that this latter should be said, because causing or effecting, or even the power of effecting, do not pertain to the essence of created being, but to its properties; therefore dependence in causing does not pertain to the nature of created being, but at most it will be like a property following upon it. On the contrary, however, is that this dependence is not founded in some quality or property of created being which is outside its essence, but in its intrinsic limitation; therefore in this way it pertains to essence no less than dependence in being. And thus it must indeed be said that it is one thing to speak of formal causality itself or

dependence, another thing [to speak] of the condition of created being, by reason of which it can effect or cause nothing by itself alone, unless with God cooperating. Concerning the former it is clear that it does not pertain formally to the essence of created being, as the argument made proves, and because the integral essence of created being can be conserved without actual causality or actual aid of God for causing. But truly concerning the latter condition or root of this dependence, it must be said that in the thing it is nothing other than the very essence of created being as such, because even if everything else superadded to such essence is removed through the intellect, it will be found by virtue of its own [essence] to have this limitation and imperfection, that by itself alone it is not sufficient for acting or causing anything. And therefore by God's absolute power a created being cannot be made which does not have such subordination to uncreated being; therefore it is a sign that it is founded in the very essential nature of created being. Therefore, although through precision of reason and inadequate concepts of mind dependence in being can be apprehended as prior in reason to dependence in causing, and therefore can also be conceived as prior as first constituting and modifying the common nature of being to the nature of created being, but the latter can be conceived as property or attribute of created being; nevertheless in the thing itself this is not an accidental attribute, but quasi-transcendental, since in the thing it adds nothing to the essence of created being, although it is conceived through relation to something extrinsic and under that aspect is considered as a metaphysical rather than physical property, in the way that transcendental attributes of being are properties of it.

7. Finally it must be said that it belongs to the nature of created being that it be subject or subordinate to uncreated being for obeying it in receiving and acting whatever does not imply contradiction. This condition of created being pertains more to theologians than to natural philosophers; for this property differs from the preceding one, because that only consists in the dependence of

created being as to natural power of effecting or causing effects proportionate to its nature, and therefore such dependence can easily be known by natural light; but this latter condition adds that created being by virtue of its entityness is apt to obey God in receiving or acting any possible and non-repugnant effect, even if it exceeds the natural power or capacity of such being. Which cannot be so easily known by the light of nature, because it attains in some way or expresses relation to supernatural effects, which the creature cannot attain except as elevated by divine power, which elevation is more manifested to us through those things which have been revealed than by natural light. From these things therefore, which either have been revealed by faith, or are more consonant with revealed things, this property of created being is gathered quite probably. For we believe that man receives from God supernatural perfections which his nature did not demand nor were owed to it. Likewise, the humanity of Christ is elevated to hypostatic union, of which it was not naturally capable. Likewise, the same humanity and sacraments and other things of this kind are elevated by God to acting something beyond their natural power; but all these things suppose that such creatures from themselves and before they are elevated are born to obey God willing to operate in such a way in them or through them, and as to this there is the same reason concerning these creatures and all others; therefore it must be said that created being as such has this subordination to God, that it is born to obey Him in acting and receiving whatever would not be repugnant.

8. And from this arose the doctrine of theologians concerning the obediential potency of creatures with respect to God, which Augustine first indicated, lib. IX Gen. ad lit., ch. 17, and thence St. Thomas, I, q. 115, a. 2, and 4, and In I, dist. 42, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4, whom other theologians, especially his disciples, have followed, and they declare it more openly in passive potency; but there is the same proportional reason concerning active obediential potency, as I have treated extensively in tome I of part III, disp. XXXI, sect. VI. Finally

the reason for this subordination must be taken a priori from the full dominion which God has over His creature, so that He can use it for every use which would not involve repugnance or contradiction. For such full dominion pertains to God's infinite omnipotence; for dominion is not perfect in every part unless it includes power for every possible use. But to this full dominion of God corresponds in the creature full subjection, for these two are correlative; but for this subjection such condition is necessary from the side of the creature, by reason of which it is apt to execute whatever God wills, either receiving or acting. Whence, just as God cannot make a created being of which He does not have full and perfect dominion, so a created being cannot be made which does not have the aforesaid condition and subordination or subjection to God.

9. You will say: this condition or subjection neither formally pertains to the essential nature of created being precisely conceived, nor is it a property naturally and necessarily following upon it; therefore in no way does it befit created being per se or necessarily. The antecedent is clear as to the first part; because the essential nature of created being consists precisely in this and is sufficiently saved, that it be being essentially depending on God. But as to the latter part it is proved, because that subjection is in order to supernatural actions or effects, and therefore it does not pertain to the natural order, but to the supernatural; therefore it cannot follow from the nature of created being as such, because created being abstracts from natural and supernatural. It is answered that such condition of created being, which we have declared through this ultimate subjection to God, does not add to the very being to which it belongs any thing or real mode distinct by nature of the thing from the being itself, but only explicates the very intrinsic condition of created being under diverse relation to God and to His omnipotence and supernatural actions of it. Therefore through this condition in the thing itself nothing else is explicated than the essence of created being; but it is declared through the mode

of a certain attribute or metaphysical property, similar to the attributes of being, as we were saying in the next preceding point.

10. Therefore to the argument it is answered that, if we speak of the thing itself, the essential nature of created being is not declared fully and adequately through this alone that it is dependent being; for although in this relation all other subjection to God is implicitly contained, nevertheless it is not explicitly declared, which is done by us, when we explicate all the aforesaid subjections to God. Among which, as they are distinguished by us rationally through inadequate concepts, we also understand a certain order of reason, and we apprehend one as primary and essential nature, but others in the mode of properties. Whence under this consideration we concede that this is a property of created being; we deny nevertheless that it pertains per se and intrinsically to the supernatural order, because it does not constitute a mode or determinate order of beings, but is such as is the entityness in which it is found, as has been said by us more broadly in the aforesaid place. Indeed rather (which should be noted) not only this last subordination in order to divine omnipotence, as operating above the law of nature, is common to natural and supernatural beings, but also the prior one, which is in order to actions or causalities connatural to each thing. For we suppose from theology that some beings are natural, others supernatural, especially those which are called supernatural as to substance, which are only certain accidents which can be connatural to no created substance. These supernatural beings therefore have actions or causalities proportionate to their entityness, in which they are also subordinated to God and depend on Him, in which dependence they agree with other natural beings, proportion being maintained. And for this reason, the dependence of created being on God in all its own and proper causality is common not only to natural beings, but also to supernatural ones; but these supernatural beings can be elevated to acting or causing something beyond the causality connatural to them, for in this they are subjected to God no less than other beings of the

natural order, and for this reason all this subjection and dependence with respect to God abstracts from natural and supernatural being, and is common to every created being as such.

11. Through these things therefore the common nature of created being seems to be sufficiently declared, and incidentally we have already explained its causes, effects and properties. For created being as such taken precisely and abstractly requires no other cause than uncreated being itself, in which it has sufficient efficient, exemplar and final cause; but it does not per se and positively demand formal and material [cause] from the common nature of created being alone, but admits them in some beings, concerning which we shall see later. And in a similar way, although some created beings require other efficient causes besides God, at least so that they are made or exist in a connatural way, nevertheless the nature of created being as such does not require them. In a similar way we must philosophize concerning effects; for created being by virtue of this common nature, although it is capable of causality, nevertheless determines no definite genus of causality for itself, but only this, that in all its causality, whatever it may be, it is subordinated to God and depends on Him, as has already been declared. From which finally the properties of created being as such have also been sufficiently handed down; for it has no others, besides the common attributes of being, which it participates in a mode accommodated to itself, and others which accompany its limitation and imperfection, such as composition, dependence and subjection, concerning which we have spoken. But that first condition of created being, namely, that it must necessarily be finite or limited, could be explained more extensively in this place; nevertheless I have decided to pass it by, because limitation as to essential perfection of created being has no difficulty, since it has been demonstrated above that a creature cannot adequately receive divine perfection; but if it is inferior, it is necessary that it be infinitely distant from it, because a thing simply infinite (as God is) cannot surpass another by finite excess, otherwise through finite increase they could arrive at equality.

But if created being necessarily is infinitely distant from divine perfection, it is necessary that it itself be of finite essential perfection. But what pertains to infinity of being, either in quantity of bulk, or intension of some quality, is not of the present disputation, since it does not pertain to created being, as such, but to determinate natures of being, concerning which philosophers properly dispute, in III Physics, and are touched upon by theologians, I, q. 7, and In I, dist. 43.

# DISPUTATION XXXII

# ON THE DIVISION OF CREATED BEING INTO SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT

After explaining the common notion of created being, its division must next be set forth, so that by means of it we may proceed —as far as concerns metaphysics—to treat and discern the determinate notions of beings. Now such being is usually divided directly into the ten categories; nevertheless, the division we propose has seemed more apt for preserving the order of doctrine and for explaining all the common and quasi-transcendental notions that can be considered under being. Concerning this division, then, we shall briefly state how its members are opposed to one another and exhaust the whole that is divided, and how they agree in its common notion

## SECTION I

## WHETHER BEING IS DIVIDED IMMEDIATELY AND SUFFICIENTLY INTO SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT

1. A first reason for doubting is that substance is found not only among created beings, but above all in the uncreated. Therefore created being is not rightly divided by the notion of substance;

otherwise, something will be contained under a dividing member that is not contained under the divided whole. Or at least the mode that contracts or determines the divided whole will be more universal or common than the divided whole itself. And if perhaps one were to reply that in this division "substance" is not taken as abstracting from created and uncreated, but as definitively meaning created substance, another difficulty arises: namely, that being ought first to have been divided into substance and accident, and then substance into created and uncreated, since created substance does not agree with uncreated substance only in the notion of being, but also in that of substance. Consequently, in no way can the present division be attributed to created being.

2. Second, there are other divisions of being that are equally universal and divide being immediately; therefore there is no reason to prefer this division to the others. The antecedent is clear: for being can be divided into absolute and relative, a division adequate to being, since no being can be conceived that does not fall under one or the other member. Hence this division is immediate and proximate to being; otherwise, the dividing members could not divide it adequately. Likewise created being is divided into act and potency, an adequate and immediate division. Likewise being can be divided into complete and incomplete: for there are beings that are whole and total, as are substantial supposits, which may rightly be called complete beings; and there are others which are parts or affections of such a being, and these fall under the notion of incomplete being—under which member not only accidents but also the parts of substance are included. Hence it is clear that this division is very different from the former; and that it is adequate is self-evident, since its members include an immediate contradiction and immediately divide the very notion of being, for these modes are quasi-transcendent and determine and, as it were, qualify the notion of being at the most basic level. This partition moreover seems more apt for explaining the community or analogy of being, since only

complete being appears to be the principal member, and all the rest participate in the notion of being by their relation to it.

3. Third, from this there arises the chief difficulty, namely, that the division appears plainly insufficient. For beyond substance and accidents there is something that participates in the notion of being and is neither substance nor accident. For example, the mode of a thing is not the thing's substance, as is evident, nor is it an accident, because it does not inhere but, by a kind of identity, qualifies the thing of which it is the mode. This is made especially clear by the creative dependence by which a created being is produced and conserved by God. This dependence is something of the thing and is thus included under being; and it is not an accident, because it is not in a subject nor from a subject, but is by nature prior to any subject, since it is from nothing; nor is it a substance, because by its nature it is distinct from the substance which is produced by it. The difficulty is confirmed and increased by certain properties of substance or of being which, in their formal notions, are not counted as substances but as properties of substance, and yet are not accidents either, because in reality they are not distinct from substance, whether really or modally, but only formally, by a mental precision which is a distinction of reason. The assumption is clear: it is a property of substance to be apt to underlie accidents, and yet this property neither adds any accident to substance nor expresses the very notion of substance. Similarly with the property of being the principal power of acting, and the like. The same argument holds a fortiori for the properties of being in general, which can be neither accidents nor substances—since they are common to both—and yet are beings (otherwise they would be nothing). Therefore those two members do not divide being sufficiently.

### *Resolution of the Question*

4. Nevertheless, it must be said that this is the best and sufficient division of being. This view is so common that it has been

received by all as something self-evident; therefore it calls more for an explanation of terms than for proof. That among created things some are substances and others accidents is manifest from the continual change and alteration in things. Water, for example, changes from hot to cold and back again; and a man is now sitting, now walking. Through such changes, something in the thing must be lost or acquired; otherwise there would be no real change. But the substance is not lost or changed; the substance of the water or of the man remains intact whether it is heated or cooled, whether he sits or walks. Therefore that in which the change occurs is an accident; hence in beings there are certain things that are accidents. From this it further follows necessarily that there is some being which is substance; for an accident is the accident of something, namely of a substance. If someone says that there can also be an accident of an accident, the reply is that we must necessarily come to rest in some substance. For although one accident can belong to another accident, since in this order we can neither proceed to infinity nor rest in some accident that belongs to no subject (else it would no longer be an accident but a substance), we must necessarily rest in some being that is a substance and is the first and, as it were, radical subject and foundation of accidents. The accidental changes just mentioned also show this: under the termini of such changes the same subject must remain, and that subject can only be a substance, whether bare and alone or qualified by other accidents. Thus it is sufficiently clear that being is fittingly divided into substance and accident.

5. That being is also divided sufficiently may be concluded almost by the same reasoning. For either a being is such that it does not belong to another, or it is such that it belongs to another—that is, that it adheres to some being and qualifies it accidentally, that is, outside its essence. Whatever is of the first kind is included under the notion of substance; whatever is of the second kind, under that of accident. No middle can be found between these two members as thus explained, for they include an immediate contradiction, as is

sufficiently evident from the very words we have proposed. This coincides with the common dictum that "what exists in itself" and "what exists in another" stand in immediate opposition, whence one or the other mode must belong to every being. But what exists in itself constitutes substance, whereas what exists in another constitutes accident; therefore they adequately divide being. What is signified by these two modes—in itself and in another—cannot be briefly explained; it must be treated in the following disputations. For now let it be taken for granted that each is taken so as to include the immediate negation of the other: thus whatever is not in another after the manner of an accident—that is, by inhering or qualifying a thing outside its essence—is said to be in itself and is a substance; conversely, whatever does not exist in itself but adheres to something and is in another is called an accident. Although of these two modes, "in itself" is better conceived and explained by us through the negation of the other, because it is simpler than the mode of existing in another. Let this suffice for now to explain the sufficiency of this division; for an exact statement of these modes will be given below, as I said. And in answering the difficulties raised, this division will be further clarified.

### *Reply to the First Reason for Doubt*

6. To the first reason, first we say that in this division, as we have expressed it, the dividing members must be taken proportionate to the divided whole. Since the divided whole is created being, each dividing member must be taken as constituted in a manner fitting to created being. As to the accident, no special explanation is needed; for according to sound Catholic doctrine there is no uncreated accident, since there is no uncreated being outside God, nor is there any accident in God, as was shown above. As to the other member, namely substance, we grant indeed that God is an uncreated substance, and that consequently the notion of substance in general can be abstracted

from created and uncreated. Yet in this division substance is not taken in that way, but as constituted in the proper mode of created substance. This mode can be explained in two ways. First, substance may be called not only what exists in itself, but what underlies—or can underlie—accidents, in which way Aristotle seems to have taken and described substance in the Categories. This explanation presupposes first of all that every created and creatable substance is apt to underlie accidents, which perhaps will not seem altogether evident to some; to me, however, it is indubitable, as is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation on the compositions of created being. This description, however, explains the notion of created substance by a relation to something extrinsic, whereas its absolute notion is contained within its own genus.

7. Hence a second way of explanation is this: the mode of "existing in itself" which essentially constitutes created substance is imperfect—either because it includes some composition in such a substance, or at least because, though it includes the negation of inhering, it does not by the force of its precise and essential notion express the actual mode of subsisting by which substance seems ultimately and perfectly to be completed and constituted. Uncreated substance is of itself subsisting, substantially and essentially, and thus by virtue of its essence it has the complete notion of substance. Created substance, however, if it is incomplete, by that very fact falls short of the perfect notion of substance, and of itself either does not actually subsist except in another, that is, in a whole, or does not subsist perfectly nor entirely in an absolute manner, but in order to compose some whole—as prime matter does. If it is a complete substance, although it actually subsists, it does not do so formally and precisely by virtue of its essence, but through some mode and act of its essence; therefore a created substantial nature, as I shall say below, is not essentially a subsisting act, but only by aptitude. Thus it is clear that under this division, as here given, uncreated substance is not included.

8. Nor was it necessary first to divide being into substance and accident and then to divide substance into created and uncreated. Although it cannot be denied that such a way of dividing has a foundation in reality and is therefore not to be rejected as containing something false or repugnant to things themselves, nevertheless it does not follow that this way of dividing is by nature to be preferred. Rather, if one attends closely, these divisions cannot be conceived and taught by us in a single series and order such that they could not, according to other resemblances and differences of things, be conceived and coordinated in other ways. To turn the argument: even if being were divided into substance and accident, substance need not be divided immediately into created and uncreated, but into spiritual and material, and then spiritual substance into created and uncreated. Or again, substance could be divided into living and non-living, then living substance into rational (i.e., intellectual) and irrational, then intellectual into simple (purely intellectual) and composite (discursive), and finally the simple and purely intellectual into created and uncreated. In these and other ways the divisions can be multiplied indefinitely, because the resemblances and differences of things can be conceived by us in almost infinite ways in relation to their various actions or properties.

9. Therefore, in order to constitute a way of dividing that is most suited to the order of teaching, we shall consider, as was noted above, the highest and primary distance and diversity of beings that we find between created being and uncreated being. For although uncreated being can, besides the common notion of being, agree under other aspects with some created beings—as under the aspect of substance, and in the other aspects already proposed, and under the aspect of absolute or relative being, and the like—nevertheless, all things considered, there is a greater distinction and diversity between uncreated being and any created being than there is among all created beings when compared with each other. Therefore we rightly divided being first into created and uncreated, rather than into substance and

accident—especially because God exists outside every genus or category. Thus, although he agrees in some way under the aspect of substance with some created beings, it is not univocally but analogically, as can be easily gathered from what was said above about created and uncreated being; and therefore, in order to establish under being the ten highest genera or categories of things, it was necessary first to separate uncreated being from the rest, and then to distinguish created being in an ordered way into the remaining members.

*Reply to the Second Reason*

10. From this the reply to the second reason is clear. We grant that other divisions of created being can be devised which divide it immediately and adequately besides the division into substance and accident; the examples adduced sufficiently show this, and in this respect the same is to be said of created being as of being in general. Nevertheless, this division of created being into substance and accident is preferred by us to the others for the reasons indicated above. The first is that the diversity between substance and accident is greater than that between any other members that can be devised under created being, because they include a greater opposition and because the analogy of being with respect to them is greater (as will be said immediately)—a sign of lesser affinity and greater distance. This can also be understood from the examples adduced in the argument. The first was the division into absolute and relative. If "relative being" is taken for transcendental relation, it can scarcely be really distinguished from the absolute, but only by reason; for there is no created being so absolute as not to include in its entity some transcendental relation, as was touched upon above. If, however, it is taken properly for categorial relation, such a relation either adds nothing real to absolute beings or, if it adds anything, it is much less distant from other accidents and has greater affinity with them than accidents have among themselves.

11. The other example was act and potency. If these are taken for "being in act" and "being in potency," they are not properly and positively diverse beings, but indicate different states of the same being, as was explained above; and therefore that division in this sense serves not so much to declare diverse natures of beings (which is our intent here) as to explain the common notion of created being itself, which of itself does not have being in act; and so that division was treated above along with the account of created being itself. If, however, act and potency are taken properly for the power of acting or receiving and the act of either, then those members are not maximally distant from each other, for often potency and act belong to the same genus; nor do those two members in that sense adequately divide being, for not every being is act or potency in that proper signification. Granted, if "act" is taken broadly for any formal constitutive (whether it be a proper form or a mode or terminus), and "potency" for any principle of acting or receiving, then indeed any being can be reduced to one of those members. Still, they do not declare the proper and intrinsic notion of each being as well as the notions of substance and accident do, nor do they establish so great a diversity among the beings themselves, as has been said.

12. The other example was the division into complete and incomplete being, which we admit divides being adequately and immediately. Nevertheless, it is not so apt for the doctrine at hand as the division into substance and accident. For both in accidents and in substances there can be, respectively, complete and incomplete beings; and there is greater affinity between an incomplete substantial being and a complete substance than between it and any accident; and conversely, there is greater diversity between any substance and accidents than between complete and incomplete substances among themselves. There is, moreover, another general reason: these divisions of being are ordered to distinguishing the categories or genera of things and to declaring their essences; and for this end the division of being into substance and accident is far more apt than the

division into complete and incomplete. Indeed the notion of complete and incomplete being can scarcely be exactly stated unless the prior division is presupposed. For what in one genus is incomplete may be a more perfect being than what is complete in another; and what in one genus is complete in the proper notion of that genus is simply incomplete in the notion or latitude of being. Therefore that division is not necessary, but is better explained within each particular genus of beings.

### *First Doubt Concerning the "Modes" of Things, Touching the Third Reason for Doubt*

13. The third difficulty suggests certain brief doubts. The first is whether a mode of a being that is by nature distinct from the thing of which it is the mode is included under this division, and to which member it belongs. Because of the argument adduced, one might suppose that such modes are not contained under the divided whole of this division, and therefore that it is not necessary that any of the dividing members should apply to them. For these modes do not have their own entity and reality, and therefore cannot be called beings but only modes of beings; since the divided whole in this division is being, it will not include these modes, and thus they will be neither accidents nor substances. This way of speaking, however, is false. For it is agreed by Aristotle and other philosophers that many items numbered among accidents are merely modes of beings, such as figure, place (ubi), and others of this sort, which we shall consider in their own places. The reason is that created being, insofar as it is absolutely distinguished from the uncreated, includes whatever is not nothing but has some real essence or formal feature in the order of things. This whole is embraced by "creatable being," taken transcendentally and in its full latitude; therefore created being likewise encompasses all things that are not sheer nothing and are outside God. But these real modes are not nothing; rather they have their own real essences proportionate to

themselves; therefore they are included under the divided whole in this division.

14. Thus, in another way, such modes of things can be referred back to the genera of the things of which they are modes and with which they have a real identity, so that the mode of a substance is referred back to substance and is a substance at least incompletely; while the mode of an accident is an accident and is referred back to that genus of accident in which the very accident is found of which it is a mode. But this view is not true universally. For although at times it happens that a mode of a thing shares the same notion of substance or accident as the thing of which it is a mode, it is not always so. For figure is a mode of quantity and yet does not share the notion of quantity but that of quality; and similarly place (ubi) is a mode of quantity or of substance, and yet it is neither substance nor quantity, but constitutes a peculiar genus or category. And many think the same of categorial relations when they are founded immediately in substance, for they do not have real entities really distinct from others, but at most are certain modes of beings, and yet they constitute a new genus of accident.

15. Therefore two things must be explained: first, when a mode of being is a substance and when it is an accident; second, when that mode which is an accident is to be referred back to the category of another accident, and when it constitutes a new genus of accident. Concerning the first: in substances, that mode is substantial which pertains to the constitution and completion of the substance itself; on the contrary, that mode is accidental which presupposes the substance as completely constituted and affects it under some other aspect. Examples make this clear. The union of matter with substantial form, or of form with matter, is per se ordered to the constitution of a complete substance and is included in the intrinsic notion of composite substance; therefore such a mode is substantial. Likewise subsistence is the intrinsic terminus of substantial nature, completing and constituting the substantial supposit; therefore it too is a

substantial mode; and the same must be said of substantial existence, if that were a mode by nature distinct from the actual essence of substantial nature. Finally, theologians say similarly that the union of the humanity to the Word, although supernatural, is nevertheless a substantial mode, because it intrinsically concurs in constituting one composite person. The other part is also clarified by examples. In an angelic substance already complete in the notion of supposit by its own subsistence, there is the mode of local presence in this or that space or place; corresponding to that presence is local motion proportioned to the angel, which too is a mode of the subject in which it is found. Yet neither is a substantial mode, nor when they change is anything substantial judged to change in the angel; for neither pertains to the constitution or completion of angelic substance. The same, proportionally, is found in bodily substance, if local presence is understood not only in quantity but in the substance itself. In this way theologians say that the sacramental presence of Christ's Body in the Eucharist—being referred to the genus of local presence—is an accidental mode of that Body, because in no way does it pertain to its substantial constitution or completion. The same is true of the relation of identity which is founded immediately in substance (if we suppose these relations to be modes), for such a relation contributes nothing to the completion of substance; Adam was an equally perfect substance when there was no man like him, that is, of the same species, as later when others were produced.

16. The reason for each part can easily be given. A complete substance, since it is a being one in itself and absolute in its own genus, consists of nothing but substance or substances. Whatever therefore concurs intrinsically in the constitution of substance must be substance at least incompletely. Likewise, an incomplete substance is nothing other than either that same substance in some imperfect mode of being, or that which is a part or complement of substance. Hence every mode which thus concurs in the constitution of substance is an incomplete substance or substantial mode, and is not

an accident. Finally, it belongs to the notion of accident to presuppose its subject; therefore a mode that does not presuppose but completes the substance is not an accident. From this the other part is plain: once the substance is already fully constituted in its own genus, whatever is added to it—whether a thing or a mode—is its accident. But a mode that in no way pertains to the completion of substance by its very nature presupposes that substance as fully constituted in its own genus; therefore it is its accident. The major is clear both from the common notion of accident and because, if a mode accruing to a substance is not an accident but something substantial, then it further completes and, as it were, makes more integral the substance of which it is a mode; therefore such a mode does not presuppose the substance as fully constituted. Hence if it does presuppose it thus constituted, the mode will not be substantial but accidental. Lastly, no other reason can be given why some modes accruing to substance are accidental, except that as modes they do not pertain to its constitution or completion.

17. One case alone presents a special difficulty—the one touched upon in the argument above—namely, the dependence of substance, and especially that which is by way of creation. For this dependence does not intrinsically constitute the substance nor pertain to its completion; therefore in no way will it be a substance, even incompletely; and yet neither can it be an accident, for the reason there mentioned, namely, that it is not in a subject. This difficulty is general for every action or dependence, although it has a special ground in the dependence that is not "from a subject." We must speak of this expressly below when disputing about action and passion. For now, briefly, it is said that no dependence or becoming (fieri), as such, has the notion of an accident with respect to the terminus toward which it tends, but is rather a kind of mode that indirectly or by reduction pertains to the category of its terminus. In this consideration local motion is reduced to the category of place (ubi), alteration to quality; and perhaps in this way Aristotle treats motion in

the Post-predicaments. The reason is that it belongs to the notion of an accident to presuppose its subject, whereas it belongs to the notion of dependence or becoming not to presuppose its terminus, since it is a way toward it; therefore with respect to the terminus, dependence cannot have the notion of accident. Whether, when such dependence is in a subject and of a subject, it has the notion of an accident with respect to that subject, will be treated in the place mentioned. Still, from what has been said it is rightly inferred that that dependence which both tends to a substance and is not received in a subject does not have the notion of accident but of substantial mode. Consequently it must be said that it does not belong to the notion of a substantial mode that it intrinsically and in actual fact constitute the substance, but it suffices that it constitute it as a way toward it, or as its intrinsic becoming (fieri), and that it affect it in no other way. For every becoming, as such, is nothing other than its own terminus in an incomplete mode of being, so that heating (calefactio) is, as it were, an incomplete heat, and so with the rest.

18. From what has been said it is easy to answer the second part which we proposed in the second place, namely, when a mode that is an accident is reduced to another genus of accident or constitutes a new one. The same rule we laid down for substantial modes is to be applied here. Sometimes an accidental mode serves only for the completion of another accident, or for exercising its formal effect, and then the accidental mode does not constitute a new genus or category of accident, but is reduced to that to whose completion it pertains, since within that genus it is something incomplete. When, however, an accidental mode does not pertain to the completion or constitution of another accident but by itself affects substances in a peculiar way, whether immediately or through some intermediate accident, then of itself it has a special notion of accident and constitutes a new category or a proper genus within some category. Examples clarify the point. The actual inherence of quantity in a substance is a mode by nature distinct from quantity (since in the

sacrament of the Eucharist it is separated from it), and yet this mode does not constitute some peculiar genus of accident, but is reduced to the category of quantity, because it intrinsically pertains to the constitution of a quantum thing and to the exercise of the formal effect of quantity. Proportionally the same is true of the inherence of quality, which is reduced to the category of quality. Likewise the point, as an incomplete quantity, is referred to the genus of quantity, because it intrinsically belongs to the constitution of quantity of which it is a mode or terminus; indeed, even if perhaps a point has its own entity, nevertheless, because it is ordered only to terminating or uniting quantity, it is referred to it; much more, therefore, will a mode that is the complement of some accident be referred to that accident and will not constitute by itself its own genus of accident.

19. But figure, although a mode of quantity, is not referred back to the category of quantity, but constitutes a certain genus of quality; and ubi (place), similarly another mode of quantity, is not reduced to quantity but constitutes a new category. The reason cannot be other than this: such modes do not of themselves contribute to the formal effect of quantity nor to its integrity or constitution, but have a new and special way of affecting; therefore the same must be said of all similar cases. A general reason has already been touched upon: in accidents the same proportional rule holds as in substance. For just as that which composes or integrates a substance is an incomplete substance, whether it be a part or a mode of it, so that which completes or integrates an accident is something incomplete within that genus of accident, whether it be a part or a mode of it. As to the latter part: if a mode is accidental and is not a part or complement of an accident in its being, it must have its own proper way of affecting accidentally, which will constitute a proper genus of accident; for in its own order it is a complete accident and there is no genus of accident to which it can be referred as something incomplete in that order. This doctrine must be noted for distinguishing the categories of accidents and for giving their account and sufficiency; we shall dispute about

this later, and if any difficulty arises concerning this doctrine, it will be better resolved there.

### *What Distinction must Necessarily Intervene Between Substance & Accident*

20. In the confirmation of that third argument another doubt was indicated, namely, how great a distinction is required between accident and substance. Some think a proper and strict real disjunction is required, such as exists between things mutually separable. Thus Soncinas (VII Metaph., q. 36) and others have indicated, as we shall see when treating the categories of accidents, especially relation. But this is not universally true, as is clearer from what has just been said and will be still clearer from what will be said below concerning the individual categories or kinds of things. The brief reason now is that for the notion of accident it suffices that it be a mode by nature distinct from substance, affecting it entirely outside the genus of substance, as happens with ubi, for example, and anything else similar.

21. Others, to the contrary, hold that it is not of the notion of accident that it be distinct from substance by nature (that is, really or modally), but that it suffices that it be distinguished by a formal notion precisely by the intellect with a foundation in the thing—such as in the examples adduced in that confirmation. Thus in prime matter we distinguish the potency for receiving from the substance of matter, because the notion of potency denotes a different formal notion, although it may happen that on the side of the thing it is not distinct from the entity in which it is. Likewise, sometimes a substance is the proximate power for acting, whether by natural power (as is a probable opinion) or at least by obediential power; and this power is not on the side of the thing distinct from the substance itself, and yet formally it is an accident belonging to quality, for potency is a species of quality, and the power for acting is nothing other than a kind of

potency. Likewise the relation of specific substantial identity is formally an accident and yet is not something on the side of the thing distinct from substance. Finally, there is a pressing argument: in order that two categories of accidents be distinguished, a distinction on the side of the thing is not always necessary between them; a distinction of formal reason by the intellect suffices, as is clear in action and passion (and this will be said more fully below). Therefore, to distinguish accident from substance, a similar distinction suffices; the case is the same, since a distinction greater than categorial is not necessary.

22. Others think a distinction in the thing is necessary, at least modal. First, because the real notion of accident is not constituted by our mind but must exist in the thing; otherwise it would not be a real but a rational being. Where there is no distinction in the thing itself, the true notion of accident cannot consist in the thing; therefore, for a true notion of accident, there must be some real distinction on the side of the thing between it and substance. The minor is proved thus: otherwise no reason could be given why God's attributes, or his acts of will or intellect, are not true real accidents; for if identity does not stand in the way, nothing else does: for there too there is a distinction of formal reason founded in the thing and completed by the intellect. Second, if there is no distinction in the thing, then nothing in the thing belongs to another as an accident: the same cannot belong accidentally to itself, since nothing can be conceived as more essential to something than its identity with itself. Therefore without a distinction in the thing one cannot conceive the true notion of a real accident, for it belongs to an accident to belong to something. Or the reason may be formed otherwise: it belongs to the notion of accident that there be a real inherence, actual or aptitudinal; but there cannot be true real inherence of a thing in itself, but only complete identity according to reality; therefore without some distinction in reality a true notion of accident cannot be understood. Third, the point can be clarified thus: when the mind conceives the

same substance in different ways or concepts, it forms no concept distinct and adequate to the essence of that substance; therefore each of those concepts is inadequate to the substance according to its substantial and essential notion. Therefore the formal notion conceived in substance, if it is distinct from it only by reason, never has the true notion of an accident. The first antecedent is clear; for if any substance is conceived distinctly and adequately as it is in itself, it will be conceived by one concept only and according to one formal notion adequate and essential to it; for no formal notion can be more essential than that which is adequate to the entity of the thing and is not distinct from it in the thing itself. Therefore no form or mode can in the thing have the true notion of an accident unless by nature it is either really or modally distinct from the substance. And in this way one seems to understand what St. Thomas says (In I, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4): those things that fall under the genera of substance and accident are not the same in reality, as he more fully teaches in Contra Gentiles IV, c. 14.

23. Finally, others think a distinction must be used. For it is one thing to speak of a real and physical accident, another to speak of a logical or categorial accident. An accident in the former sense is what truly inheres in a thing and accrues to it accidentally; and this undoubtedly requires some distinction by nature, as the arguments just made show. In the latter sense, a categorial accident is what is said accidentally and contingently according to our mode of predication and conception, according to some special notion sufficient to constitute a categorial ordering; and such an accident does not always require an actual distinction in the thing, according to this view. I think this must necessarily be proven because of the argument made: to distinguish categories a distinction in the thing is not always necessary. That this is true of some kinds of categorial accidents as compared to substance, especially relation and quando (time), will be clear from the discussion of the categories. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that some denominations of the categorial accidents are taken

from things that are substances, such as "to be clothed," "to be gilded," and similar expressions. Moreover, by metaphysical abstraction and precision there are things outside a thing's essence which, on the side of the thing, are not actually distinct; therefore, by parity of reasoning, some things can be predicated accidentally according to a categorial distinction even if in reality they are not distinct from substance. Thus the arguments adduced for the other opinions can easily be resolved, even if not every example employed in them is true. All this will be understood more clearly and evidently from the discussion of the categorial accidents. For the present, comparing substance and accident, we are chiefly dealing with the accident that is true, physical, and real; otherwise the comparison could not be conveniently made.

## SECTION II

## WHETHER BEING IS DIVIDED ANALOGICALLY INTO SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT

1. We presuppose that "being" is not said equivocally of substance and accident. I find no diversity of opinion among the authors on this point; it is explicitly Aristotle's view (Metaphysics IV, c. 2 and other places cited below), and it necessarily follows from what has been said above about the one formal and objective concept of being; for an equivocal name corresponds to distinct concepts. It follows also from what was said about the object of this science: being in common could not be the object of metaphysics if it were merely equivocal. This likewise follows necessarily from what was said about the division of being into uncreated and created. If with respect to these it is not equivocal, much less will it be so with respect to accident and created substance; for there is far greater distance and less affinity between created and uncreated being than between accident and created substance. Hence the reasons given there can be applied here with equal force. As to Porphyry's statement, following

Aristotle (in the chapter On Species), that "being" is said equivocally of the first ten genera, Duns Scotus (In I, dist. 3) denies that this is found in Aristotle; and he does not regard Porphyry's authority. Next, it should be said that the ancients included analogues under equivocal terms, as is clear in Aristotle (Antepredicaments c. 4) and Augustine (Categories c. 2). This is what Aristotle meant in the places to be cited about the analogy of being, especially Sophistical Refutations I, c. 6, where, speaking of equivocal terms, he gives examples drawn from being. The question therefore remains concerning the analogy of created being with respect to substance and accident.

2. All those authors who make "being" univocal to God and creatures consequently say that created being is univocal to substance and accident: Scotus (In I, dist. 3, q. 1; and In III, dist. 8, q. 1), Gabriel (In I, dist. 2, q. 4), and others, both Scotists and Nominalists. The grounds for this view are almost the same here as in the question about God and creatures; and they immediately prove that created being expresses one formal and objective concept common to substance and accident. For it may happen that we know for certain that something is a created being and then inquire whether it is a substance or an accident. Likewise we investigate substances through their accidents, which we do by beginning with those points in which a substance formally agrees with an accident, and then investigating their distinction or difference. For if substance and accident agreed in no formal concept, by the force of accident we could form no concept of substance, neither a proper concept (that is obvious) nor a common one (if such a common concept is not admitted); therefore a common concept must be admitted, and if any concept is common, most of all the concept of being. Likewise, substance and accident are somewhat alike in the notion of created being; for both accident and substance have their own being, whereby they are intrinsically beings. Likewise created being can be the object of science and the middle or the extreme of a demonstration, and from it a universal proposition and a contradiction can be formed—all signs of a single formal and

objective concept common to both. From this the authors conclude further that created being is univocal, since it is said of substance and accident according to the same name and the same notion—which is the definition of univocals.

*Opposed, Later View*

3. The more common view is that being is analogous to substance and accident. This is thought to be Aristotle's view (Metaphysics IV, c. 2; VII, c. 2 and 4; Ethics I, c. 6); in these places St. Thomas, Averroes, Alexander and others teach the same. Porphyry also holds it (On Species), where Albert, Ammonius and others follow him. And St. Thomas very frequently, as do all his disciples, teaches this view, as I have reported. This view, speaking absolutely, must be proved. The reasons by which many Thomists confirm it cannot be admitted by us, for they aim to exclude one objective concept of being. The first is that "being" is said immediately of substance and of all the accidents; this repugnant to a univocal name, since a univocal term signifies immediately one notion, precise, abstract, and common to those of which it is said univocally.

4. The second reason is that if an accident were univocally a being, it would not be defined through substance, contrary to Aristotle (Metaphysics VI, c. 1). The consequence is clear: things that agree univocally in some notion agree in the same definition; hence one cannot be defined through the other.

5. The third reason is that if being were univocal with respect to substance and accidents, it could be placed in their definitions. For it is always allowed to place in a definition all the common notions into which the proximate genera can be univocally resolved; and in place of a name inserted in a definition one may insert its definition, as Aristotle teaches (Topics II, c. 2). But the consequent is against the same Aristotle (Metaphysics VIII, text 17), and plainly false and contrary to universal usage. The reason may be either that being is

neither a genus nor a difference, or at least that "being," when joined to other predicates, adds nothing to them (as Aristotle says, Metaphysics IV, c. 2), so that it would be a superfluous tautology to add "being" to the other terms of definitions. A fourth reason is often brought forward: if being were univocal, it would be a genus, since it would be a universal—one in many and predicated of many; and there could be no other kind of universal than a genus, as is easily seen by going through the rest; and because it would be predicated of many things differing in species. But the consequent is false; otherwise the categories would not be primarily diverse, nor would there be ten supreme genera of things, and differences contracting "being" could be given—this being of the essence of a genus. But this is impossible, as Aristotle shows (Metaphysics III, text 10), because a genus is outside the notion of a difference, whereas "being" cannot be outside the notion of anything.

### *Weighing the Reasons for the Latter View*

6. Nevertheless, these reasons do not seem effective to me. The first, as I said, tells not only against the univocity of "being" but also against the unity of its concept. For if "being" has one concept, it must signify it immediately—unless perhaps the talk is about a middle that is in reality precise with respect to the inferiors, or at least that can be so precise in reason that it has contracting differences in which it is not included—whereas the concept of being is not thus precise with respect to its inferiors, as I said above, even though absolutely speaking it is a middle notion distinct in reason from substance and accident. And if "middle" is taken in that earlier strict way, it will easily be denied that it belongs to a univocal term to signify immediately a nature abstracted and precise in that way from its inferiors; it is enough that it signify a notion common and equally found in the inferiors, however it be common. For no more can be concluded from the idea of univocity; and from the discussion in this section it will by

various examples be clear that that kind of precision and abstraction is not necessary for univocity.

7. The second reason could perhaps be effective in some sense, as we shall see below. Yet as it is proposed it can be dissolved by distinguishing the consequent there inferred. Either the discussion concerns accident as it is a being, or as it is an accident. In the former sense, the consequence must be granted: it is most true that in the definition of accident as a being substance is not included, but only that which belongs to the notion of being insofar as it is being—even though Cajetan (De Ente et Essentia, q. 3) thinks otherwise and cites Antonius Trombetta saying the same. From which he argues well ad hominem against him; but absolutely speaking it is false. For there is more in the notion of accident as accident than in the notion of accident as being; but it is with respect to substance precisely that it is said as accident, not as being; therefore as such it is not defined through substance. Likewise being as being has its own notion, in which substance is not placed, as was declared above; but accident precisely taken insofar as it is being is constituted by that formal notion of being; therefore. Finally, this follows evidently from the unity of the objective concept of being—against which that reason would equally proceed in this sense. From this, however, univocity does not follow, as will soon be seen and as was already explained at length above when treating the analogy of being to created and uncreated. In the latter sense, however, the consequence is denied: accident, though not from the common notion of being, yet from the proper notion of accident as such needs to be defined through substance, because it is the being of a being. If you say this too repugns the univocity of being, I reply that perhaps this is true; for this reason I said that this argument could be effective; yet it is not rightly proved by the reason there given, namely that things agreeing univocally have the same definition—for this is true if they are defined precisely under the aspect in which they agree, not under their proper aspects.

8. The third reason tells not only against the univocity of being but also against the unity of its concept—or rather (to speak more truly) it tells against neither, but proposes a difficulty which has a place in every opinion. For whether being is univocal or analogous, and whether it expresses one concept or not, nonetheless it is true that substance is being in itself and accident is being in another. Why then, in the definition given through substance or accident, will it not be permitted to put in place of "substance" the phrase "being in itself," and in place of "accident" the phrase "being in another"? If an angel is defined as "created intellectual substance," why may it not be said to be "created intellectual being-in-itself"? Again, there is the same difficulty for the nine first genera of accidents. Each is defined—or rather described—as an accident that thus affects substance. Why then could it not be defined as "a being-in-a-substance thus affecting it"? And about lower accidents the same question can be asked: why, just as they are defined through their supreme genera, can they not be defined through the descriptions of those genera in which "being" or "accident" is inserted? The inconveniences proposed in the third reason against this way of defining do not seem of weight. For although a sufficient definition is given through the proximate genus and difference, still it can also be given through the remote genus and all the intermediate differences; and for the same reason, in place of the supreme genus a transcendent predicate with a determining mode could be inserted. Nor would a tautology be committed, just as it is not committed when we say "substance is being-in-itself"; rather what "substance" says confusedly is explained more distinctly. And although "being" is included in the very mode "in-itself" and in all lower differences, nevertheless for avoiding tautology a different mode of signifying and conceiving is enough—by way of determinable and determinate.

9. These points are set forth not to conclude that "being" must be explicitly placed in definitions, but to show that the same difficulty arises whatever the view concerning the analogy of being. If

being is not to be placed in definitions, this is not because it is analogous, but because it is transcendent. Wherefore, when Aristotle denies that being is placed in definitions, he is speaking of proper definitions composed of genus and difference—in which regard it must also be said that the supreme genera cannot be defined; hence transcendentals do not belong to the definitions of things. In addition, it is judged superfluous; for when anything is defined, it is presupposed that it is a being; the question "what is it?" presupposes the question "is it?" If someone wished, in order to explain the whole thing most distinctly, to insert in place of "substance" (and proportionally the same for "accident") whatever description of it he could, he would indeed be prolix and over-scrupulous and would mix description with proper definition; yet he would say nothing false or absurd, as the argument, in my judgment, shows—even if being is analogous, indeed even if it expressed no single concept.

10. To the fourth reason the consequence is denied. Even if being were univocal, it might not be a genus, because it does not express one concept wholly precise from its differences, but is included in them; and therefore it does not provide a proper metaphysical composition of which the genus is, as it were, a potential part. Hence many probably think that "accident" is univocal and yet not a genus; and "motion" likewise is said univocally of action and passion; and "being" itself may be univocal with respect to some things, though not with respect to all—about which examples I shall speak later. In this number one may place "person" or "uncreated relation," as common to the three divine persons or relations; for it is said univocally of them—what kind of analogy could be devised here?—and it is predicated in quid, if we speak formally of the quiddity of person or relation as such, and yet it is not a genus, since it cannot have contracting differences; and these two (genus and specific difference) are, as it were, correlatives. Therefore a univocal predicate, even predicated in quid, extends more widely than genus. Consequently it should be said that such a univocal predicate is not

"universal" in the sense in which Porphyry treated universals—those placed in the categories or serving to coordinate and distinguish the categories. Whether such a predicate can be called "universal" in a broader sense will be a question about a way of speaking, which is of little or no relevance to the present subject.

### *Resolution*

11. Therefore the ratio of the analogy of created being with respect to accident and substance must be taken from the same principle by which we explained the analogy of being to God and creature: namely, because being, of itself and essentially, demands this order—that it descend first to substance and then to accident, to substance by itself, to accident on account of substance and through a relation to it.

### *What Kind of Analogy is Involved Here*

12. To explain this, one may first doubt whether this analogy is one of proportionality or of attribution (proportion). Many think it to be only an analogy of proportionality, with Cajetan and others. Indeed, those who deny that "being" expresses one concept are compelled to say this—unless they want to say that an accident is a being by mere extrinsic denomination, which is most absurd. Others admit both kinds of analogy here. For my part, I think we should say here what we said of being common to God and creatures: that there is not properly an analogy of proportionality here, but only of attribution. Not that the proportion cannot be considered by us—namely that as substance is related to its own being, so accident is related to its own; for just as in reality there is such a proportion, so it can be considered by us—but that accident is neither a being nor denominated a being because of this proportion, but because of the intrinsic being by which it is constituted in the order of beings.

13. This can be confirmed by the same arguments we used above in explaining the analogy of being to God and creatures. A term analogous according to proportionality signifies its significata by a double imposition: one proper, the other by transfer and metaphor, on account of some likeness or proportion. But the name "being" does not in this way signify accident, but by a single imposition by which it was imposed to signify whatever has being in any way. Therefore this is an analogy of attribution; and thus Aristotle explains it (Ethics I, c. 6), where he says that being is analogous and said "prior and posterior," because what is per se, namely substance, is by nature prior to that which is said "of something to something," that is, to substance itself, as accident is. And in Metaphysics IV, c. 2, he says that being is said in many ways, "but with reference to one"; and he compares it with "healthy," which is an analogue of attribution. He repeats the same in Book VII, c. 4; XI, c. 3; and XII, c. 4, where he also declares that there is a certain proportionality between the principles of accident and of substance; yet he does not say that the analogy of being consists in this proportionality, but in attribution. St. Thomas is to be understood in the same way (In III, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 1), where he proposes the same proportionality; but elsewhere he expressly explains that this analogy is only an analogy of attribution, especially Contra Gentiles I, c. 34.

### *What Sort of Attribution This Is*

14. Second, one may doubt what kind of analogy of attribution created being has to substance and accident. Briefly, from what was treated above it must be said that there are two analogies of attribution: one taken from the same form which is intrinsically found in one of the analogates, in the rest only by extrinsic denomination; the other which expresses a formal notion intrinsically found in all the analogates, yet with an order or relation among them. In our case the latter, not the former, is involved. For an accident is not a being by extrinsic denomination from a substance, but by its intrinsic entity

according to which it has its own proper being; it is a clear contradiction that something be a real being through an extrinsic denomination alone, since an extrinsic denomination of itself posits nothing in the denominated thing. Likewise, we showed above that "being" immediately signifies one objective concept whose formal ratio is found intrinsically in all beings, and by the force of which they are included under the signification or analogy of being. Therefore this is an analogy with an intrinsic relation or inclusion of the formal notion of being both in accident and in substance. Hence the analogy can consist in nothing other than this: that that same formal notion of being does not descend to accident and substance altogether equally and indifferently, but with a certain order and relation which it of itself requires—namely, that it be in substance absolutely and first, but in accident only with a relation to substance.

15. Thus Scotus's argument is solved. He rightly proves that "being" signifies substance and accident by the same formal and objective concept; but we deny that this suffices for proper univocity, unless it is also perfectly one in its relation and indifference to its inferiors. In this respect the unity of the concept of being differs from the unity of a genus. A genus, although it is unequally perfect in the species (by reason of the unequal differences), whence it is said to be physically or in reality equivocal or analogous, nevertheless taken in itself not only abstracts from that inequality but also from any order of one to another, because it does not descend to one species by means of the other or through any relation to it; therefore metaphysically it is perfectly univocal. It is otherwise with "being," for the contrary reason. It further adds that the inequality of a genus as it exists in the species arises solely from the contracting differences, which formally and precisely do not include the genus itself, and consists only in diverse degrees of perfection; whereas the modes by which created being is determined to the being of substance or accident intrinsically include being itself. Therefore being is said in some sense "of itself" to have that inequality which it has in substance and accident. And this

inequality does not consist in some difference in perfection only, but in a mode of participation so diverse that in substance it is absolute and simple, but in accident it is diminished and through a relation to substance.

16. From this we also understand that this analogy differs from others, because it exists in the very thing and by its force is conveyed to the name without any "negotiation"[47] by our intellect, but merely by the imposition of such a name to signify such a formal notion which of itself regards many only with an order and relation among them. Hence the name is analogous because it signifies an analogous notion—that is, one not perfectly one nor equally indifferent. But other analogies, in which the secondary significata are such only by extrinsic denomination, depend especially on the imposition and attribution of our intellect; for the form signified by the name is of itself found only in one analogate and does not express an intrinsic relation to another, but our intellect, considering some extrinsic relation, transfers the name and completes the analogy.

### *Whether an Accident is Absolutely a Being*

17. Third, one may doubt whether the analogy is so great that, because of it, we must absolutely deny that an accident is a being, unless with some addition—namely that it is a being "in a qualified sense," or the being of a being (entis ens), as Aristotle speaks (Metaphysics VII, texts 2 and 15). Some seem to hold that the expression "An accident is a being," taken absolutely, is false. Soto seems to indicate this (Antepredicaments c. 4, q. 1), in the proofs of conclusion 3; and after conclusion 4, in solving an argument, he finds I know not what difference here between the analogy of being to a creature with respect to God and to an accident with respect to

[47] negotiatione (1960); negatione, alit. "We prefer negotiatione to negatione, as appears in most editions, because the word seems more exact." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 248.

substance: for of a creature, he says, it is said simply that it is a being; of an accident, by no means, but only in a qualified sense.

18. Nevertheless, it must be said that, notwithstanding this analogy, "being" can be predicated of an accident absolutely and without addition. This is clear first from the common way of conceiving and speaking among all philosophers, who say simply that only real beings are constituted in the categories, and that quantity or quality are real beings. Likewise, for this reason "being" can be the middle and the extreme of a demonstration, and from it a true division and contradiction can be formed. Hence the same Soto, at the end of that question, denies the proposition "Every being is a substance," and rightly so; for if every being were a substance, being would not be rightly divided into substance and accident. From this it follows plainly that this proposition is true: "An accident is a being." For if not every being is a substance, then some being is a non-substance; therefore some being is an accident. What else could that being be which is not a substance? Therefore, by simple conversion, an accident too is a being. Further: what difference can be assigned here between a creature with respect to God and an accident with respect to substance? A creature is said to be a being absolutely because it has its intrinsic being by which it formally exists, as God has his by his own being—though not equally nor independently, as the authors of the contrary opinion teach. But an accident also has its intrinsic being by which it formally exists, though not as perfectly nor as independently as a substance; therefore the same proportional account obtains here. As, then, "a man is a being" is said, notwithstanding the analogy to God, so too "a quality is a being" is said, notwithstanding the analogy to substance.

19. Nor did Aristotle ever deny this, but only said that accidents have that they are beings only "in a substance," that is, as the beings of a being (entis entia), as St. Thomas explains in the cited place (Metaphysics VII). When it is said that an accident is a being, it is not excluded that it is the being of a being; it is only not expressed.

You may object: analogues taken absolutely stand for their primary signification; therefore, when an accident is said to be a being absolutely, strictly it signifies that it is a substance. I reply that this axiom holds in analogues which, by diverse impositions, signify several things—one properly, another metaphorically—or one intrinsically, another only by extrinsic denomination; not in those which immediately signify one formal notion intrinsically found in many, as is evident in the analogy of being to God and creatures. The reason is clear: since such a notion is the immediate signification of the word and that notion is found properly and intrinsically in all the analogates, it can be predicated simply of all. Nor can it stand in the way that it is not found with the same order or perfection in each, because this is not excluded by that predication; it merely affirms that such a notion—namely of being, as such—is found in an accident, which is true.

### *Whether, Compared among Themselves, Accidents Are "Beings" Univocally*

20. Fourth, one may doubt whether created being is said univocally of accidents when compared among themselves—even if it is analogous when compared to substance. It seems impossible that the same word, by the force of the same imposition and signification, be both analogous and univocal even with respect to different things. Therefore if "being," absolutely taken, is analogous, it cannot be univocal with respect to accidents—even when they are compared among themselves. Many indeed think thus, especially those who are compelled to philosophize in this way because they deny that created being immediately signifies any notion common either to substance and accident together or to accidents among themselves, but immediately signifies the ten supreme genera. From this it plainly follows that it cannot be univocal even to the categories of accidents, since it belongs to a univocal term to signify immediately a common

notion. Fonseca, however, who is of this opinion (lib. IV Metaph., c. 2, q. 1, sect. 5), affirms that although being is analogous with respect to those of which it is said immediately, nevertheless it is univocal with respect to some things that are contained under the same genus or species—e.g., of a man and a horse, or of two men; and the same would hold for two colors or other accidents and qualities. If you object that, if being, absolutely taken, does not express one notion, it cannot be of the same notion in comparing any things—and thus cannot be univocal—he replies by denying the assumption: since "being" expresses not one notion but many, it can be univocal by one of them—for example, by the notion of substance or of quality. But then it is not "being" that is univocal, but "substance" or "quality." For it is not true that "being" signifies substance or quality under their proper notions. In this respect "being" is not on a par with other analogues or equivocal terms: the latter do not signify many things by one imposition, but by several; and so by each imposition they signify a single significatum according to its proper notion. But "being" signifies substance, quality, etc., by the force of one imposition; therefore it is impossible that it signify each singly according to its proper notion (a point also confirmed at length earlier on other grounds).

21. We must proceed otherwise, then, according to our principles, and say that that judgment is indeed true, but should not be so restricted. The reason for the first part is that although "being" regards substance and accident with the relation and order that grounds the analogy, it regards two substances—especially complete and integral ones—equally, without such an order; therefore with respect to them it has no ratio of analogy. The same reasoning applies equally to two accidents that have no relation to each other, because, in the way in which each of them is a being, it has its own being without relation to the other; therefore no ratio of analogy can be framed in "being" with respect to them; since it is common to them and not analogous, it will be univocal.

22. From this the other part is made clear—namely that this univocity is not to be restricted to things contained under the same genus or species, but can also hold between things in diverse categories—for example, between quantity and quality, which are contained under no common genus. The proof is the same: "being" expresses a notion common to them and not by way of a relation of one to another; therefore it regards each equally; therefore no ratio of analogy intervenes there. Indeed, even if someone were to contend that "being" is said of quality and quantity, not because of a common notion nor by attribution but because of proportionality—namely because as quantity is related to its own being, so quality is to its own —even if, I say, someone maintained this, he could not explain a true proper analogy in "being" with respect to quality and quantity (that is, an analogy in which the name would be said first of one rather than of the other). For neither quantity nor quality has that it is a being because of its proportion to the other—there is no greater reason on one side than the other—but each is absolutely a being through its own being, on which proportion is founded as a kind of relation; yet this does not suffice for analogy unless either it be so improper that it does not suffice for formal agreement, or unless together with formal agreement (which here cannot be denied, as I showed above) some other relation or dependence intervene. For a similar relation or proportionality is found also among univocals—indeed the more proper and exact it is, the greater the univocity. As man is related to his sensible difference, so is the lion to his, and so forth.

23. Perhaps someone might invent or reply that in this comparison of being to quantity, for instance, and to quality, there is neither univocity nor analogy but equivocation. He might take an argument from other analogues, whether of attribution or of proportionality. "Healthy," although said analogically of urine and of medicine with respect to the animal, seems to be said equivocally with respect to these two among themselves; for it is not said univocally—this is obvious, since it signifies nothing common to them—nor

analogically, because it is not said of one by relation to the other. Likewise "lion" seems to be said equivocally of Christ and of the devil, although it is said analogically of each by comparison to the true lion. And that analogy seems to be of proportionality, because the transfer of the word seems founded on the comparison of Christ, for example, and a lion with respect to each one's fortitude; for as a lion is related in his acts to his fortitude, so Christ to his. Yet because this proportion is considered in a far different way and in diverse things in Christ and in the devil, therefore with respect to these the term seems equivocal; and the same can be easily considered in other metaphorical transfers.

24. But whatever be the case about other improper or metaphorical analogues—in which it is true, without doubt, that there is no univocity with respect to extremes which share the same name because of different relations or proportions (and the question whether this should be called equivocation or at least a mediated analogy is a matter of usage)—in the present case this cannot be said. For, as I said, if we consider proportionality here, it is not improper or metaphorical, but with a formal agreement sufficient for the name to signify all these under the same common notion. If the discussion is about attribution, although quantity and quality express different relations to substance, nevertheless they are not denominated beings from those relations as diverse, but only insofar as they are similar in the notion of "being." Accordingly, a more suitable example is "healthy," as said of many medicines. Although "healthy" is analogical with respect to the animal, it is univocal with respect to diverse medicines, because it is said of them by the same notion and equally primarily; and although there are different ways of producing health in them, nevertheless they do not take the denomination "healthy" from those ways as different, but only as they agree in the common notion of causing health. Finally, the latter point is confirmed: even whiteness and blackness, for example, have different relations to substance—and even substances themselves (man and horse, for instance) have different specific modes of being—and nonetheless "being" is said

univocally of them, because the notion of "being," as such, neither explains nor requires that diversity; and therefore, despite it, "being" has its formal or objective unity, which, if any relation of one to the other or dependence be removed, is sufficient for univocity. But all this can be found in some of the first genera of accidents, if "being" is compared to them taken precisely; therefore.

25. In reply to the argument to the contrary, it is not inconvenient that the same name be both analogous and univocal with respect to different things, as was said of "healthy" with respect to the animal and to medicine, or with respect to medicines among themselves—and a fortiori it can be both equivocal and univocal, as "dog" with respect to an animal and a star, and with respect to several barking animals. The reason is that what with respect to some signifies diverse notions, or a common notion with order and relation, can with respect to others signify the same notion without any order or relation among the inferiors. I grant, however, that there is a difference: in other equivocal or analogous terms, a name does not have analogy and univocity, even with respect to different things, by the force of the same imposition, but by one imposition it has univocity and by several it has analogy or equivocation, because that multiplicity of signification is founded only on multiple imposition or on metaphorical transfer. But "being," by the force of one and the same imposition, has both with respect to different comparisons: for it does not signify many things by many impositions, but by one objective notion found in many, which in some is found with an order and relation to each other, in others without such order or relation. You will ask whether this univocity of "being" with respect to accidents among themselves is universal with respect to all the genera of accidents, or only to some. I answer that this depends on a similar question about "accident" in common—whether it is univocal to all—which we shall treat below.

## Section II

### *Whether "Being" is Univocal to All Aubstances*

26. Fifth, one may doubt whether "being," said of substance and of all that are contained under substance, is univocal with respect to them, or whether it admits some analogy. On the resolution of this doubt depends our knowledge of the first analogate or the principal signification in this analogy of created being with respect to substance and accident. It may seem that "being" is univocal to all substances, because in that partition substance is the first analogate; therefore whatever participates in the notion of substance participates in the notion of the first analogate; therefore it participates in the notion of being, simply or principally; therefore univocally. On the contrary: substance itself, as distinguished from accident in this division, is not univocal with respect to all that are contained under it; therefore neither can "being" be univocal with respect to them. The consequence is clear both from parity of reason and because the notion of created being is primarily suited only to those beings that are substances simply. The antecedent is clear: substance, as it is distinguished in this division against accident, abstracts from complete and incomplete; taken thus it is not a univocal predicate but an analogous one, because an incomplete substance is a substance only in a qualified sense—a matter we shall treat in the next disputation. And this latter part seems more in conformity with the truth. To confirm it, one can apply the ground posited with respect to substance and accident: namely that a complete substance primarily and per se has its own being, whereas an incomplete substance has the whole of its being in an order to a complete substance. Therefore "being," of itself, requires this order: that it be found primarily in a complete substance, and then in an incomplete one in an order to the complete; hence it is said of these according to the same ratio of analogy.

27. From this one might consequently think that the primary signification of this analogue is not substance in common, abstracting from complete and incomplete, but substance simply—which alone is complete substance. This is true if the discourse concerns the whole latitude of created being absolutely taken. But if the discourse concerns the whole signification insofar as it is referred to these two members—substance and accident, as in this division—then we must say that substance as such, in all its abstraction, is the first analogate; otherwise in this bipartite division, as such, the primary signification could not be designated. For this it is not necessary that the first analogate be univocal with respect to all that are included under it, nor even that "being" be said univocally of them; it is enough that "being" be said primarily of substance absolutely and simply when compared with accidents, so that, though when compared with substances it is said earlier of one than of another, nevertheless that very secondary signification within the latitude of substance is primary with respect to accidents.

28. You will say that from this it follows that, comparing "being" only to incomplete substances and accidents, it is said of them analogically—and primarily of incomplete substances. The consequent seems false first because an incomplete substance is not capable of accidents; hence accident has no relation and does not of itself depend except on a complete substance; therefore only in relation to that is it an analogate under "being." Next, it would follow that any accident is analogically a being with respect to any incomplete substance; and this too seems false—both because an accident often has no subordination or dependence upon this or that mode or difference of substance, and most of all because some accident seems simply a nobler being than some incomplete substance —for example, intellect seems a more perfect being than prime matter or the form of a stone; and grace seems far nobler.

29. A first response may be to concede the first consequence; for the analogy between "accident in common" and "substance in

common," abstracting from complete and incomplete, cannot be understood otherwise than by taking it that the notion of being is primarily suited to substance, not only as it is this or that, but also of itself and in its precise and common notion. Hence it seems that every being in which that ratio of substance as such is found is more principally a being than an accident.

30. To the first objection we deny that incomplete substance is not capable of accidents. The rational soul is an incomplete substance and in itself receives accidents; and prime matter, according to a probable opinion, receives quantity. If some incomplete substance by itself is not capable of accidents, it will have this from its own mode of being, not from the common notion of incomplete substance. Hence, secondly, although an incomplete substance does not of itself and first receive accidents, a complete substance does not receive them except insofar as it consists of incompletes, whether physically or metaphysically, according to the kind of composition it has; and this suffices for the notion of "being" to regard substance absolutely, whether complete or incomplete, prior to accident. As to the second objection, we concede the consequence. To the first part of its objection we reply that, for "being" to be analogous to any accident with respect to any substance, it is not necessary that such an accident, according to its particular notion, express a relation to that particular substance; it suffices that the notion of substance in itself be prior to that of accident, and that the former constitute by itself a being simply, not the latter—even if in the particular case this accident expresses a relation to this substance and not to another. Thus "healthy" is said analogically of any sign with respect to the animal, although in the particular this sign indicates health in this animal and not in another. Add that the same argument can be made for an accident with respect to complete substance, since not every accident expresses a relation to every complete substance.

31. The second objection may seem more difficult, because the whole order of accidents surpasses the whole order of created

substance in nobility—even complete substance. Not that all accidents surpass all substances, but that some accidents seem nobler than some substances, and conversely; indeed, comparing the greatest to the greatest, it seems that the most noble accident surpasses the most perfect substance. For as theologians teach (and we have often indicated in this work), created substance cannot be supernatural nor of the divine order, but an accident can be supernatural and of the divine order; such an accident will surpass in perfection even the supreme created substance. And indeed, one who judges intellect to be more perfect than matter or the form of a stone will readily be led to believe it more perfect than the whole substance of the stone. For this reason a more general way of responding can be given: although an accident in common is analogically a being with respect to substance, nevertheless there can be some accident that is simply more perfect than some created substance—just as it sometimes happens that a species contained under a less noble genus is simply more perfect than one contained under a nobler genus (as is presupposed in dialectic and will be touched upon below). According to this view, the analogy can arise from imperfection and subordination under the common notion, even if in their particular notions there is an excess of perfection in the lower analogate. Thus, although substance as such is nobler than accident, not everything contained under "substance" is absolutely a nobler being than everything contained under "accident." This response does not seem altogether improbable, especially if under the general name "substance" we also include substantial modes. Who would doubt that grace is a more perfect being than a mode of substance or the union of substantial form to matter?

32. But speaking of proper, complete, and perfect substances, there should be no doubt that the whole genus of created substance is more perfect than accident; consequently the most noble created substance exceeds the most noble accident. Otherwise, what kind of analogy would there be? Hence it follows that a perfect substance,

even if it be of the natural order, is simply more perfect than any of its accidents—even the most perfect accident in its order. For however great a perfection such an accident seems to have, it is only an ornament of such a substance, essentially ordered to the perfection of that substance; and the whole perfection of that accident does not transcend the order of quality, which is imperfect in comparison with substance. For the same reason, I think it probable that, although such an accident may surpass substances secundum quid (either all or most of them), whether in its mode of being or in some power of acting or in some other effect, nevertheless in degree of entity any substance is simply more perfect than any accident; indeed the substance is simply a being, the accident a being secundum quid. For the being of substance—because by its very nature it subsists—is nobler and participates more in the perfection of the divine being than does the being of accident. Hence, whatever perfection an accident may seem to have, it always has it measured and limited by the imperfect mode of being proper to accident.

### *Other Divisions of Created Being are Explained*

33. Finally, from what has been said about this division, one may easily judge what should be said about the other divisions of being touched on in the preceding section. We said that being can be divided into absolute and relative, into incomplete and complete or perfect and imperfect. About all these one may doubt whether they are univocal or analogous divisions; that they are not equivocal is clear from what has been said. Briefly, it must be said that all these divisions are analogous. Some give as a reason that in all of them the divided whole does not have unity in a formal or objective concept, but only in the word; but we have shown this to be false. Others give as a reason that in all of them the divided whole cannot be contracted or terminated by differences in which it is not included. But this does not always impede univocity, as I have shown above and shall say below

when treating accident. The reason must be taken from what was said in the preceding division: in all the divisions mentioned there is somehow included, or the foundation of its analogy is included, the division into substance and accident. This is briefly made clear in one or another of the divisions. The division of created being into absolute and relative—in one member—includes substance together with many genera of accident; in the other, only a certain imperfect genus of accidents. Thus the division must be understood concerning categorial relation and accidental relation; otherwise there will be no created being that is wholly absolute with respect to transcendental relation. Hence, at least because absolute being as such is found most perfectly in substance, that division must be analogous; and "being," by its nature, requires to be determined to the absolute before the relative. Whether among accidents themselves, absolute and relative, the same analogy intervenes, we shall say more suitably below when treating accident.

34. Again, in the division of being into incomplete and complete, if one member is taken properly and strictly for essentially complete being, it includes only integral substance; the other includes both accidents and incomplete substances insofar as they agree among themselves in a certain negation or imperfection. Therefore there is no doubt that "being" is said by priority of complete being over incomplete being. If "complete being" is not taken thus strictly but more generally for a being "complete" as it were relatively—that is, having the complement which in its genus or category it requires—then even in this sense complete being is prior to incomplete being, both absolutely (because it expresses the notion of being which is primarily realized in perfect substance) and relatively (because the whole being of the incomplete is for the sake of the complete). In this sense, however, the division is very improper. For complete being so taken is not only not univocal (since of itself it is common to substance and accident), but it also seems rather to express an analogy of proportionality than of attribution. For an accident is not called a

"complete being" except by an imperfect imitation of substance, not by a proper formal agreement but by a proportionality. And if there is any formal agreement there, it seems to be rather one of reason than of reality—namely, in the metaphysical composition from genus and difference; for in physical complement and perfection they do not really agree.

35. You will say: although this is true of an accident taken in the abstract, nevertheless in the concrete it seems to be physically a complete being and to have a real and physical composition; indeed on this account it seems to have a univocal agreement with complete substance, since it includes the entire perfection of the latter and adds something. I reply: if such a being is taken formally as accidental, it does not express completeness in the genus of being, but incompleteness and imperfection. If it is taken as consisting of substance and accident and including both, then it falls short of the notion of complete being, because it is one not per se but per accidens, and in this respect it has no univocal agreement with a complete substance. Many other things could be said about this division, but they will be more conveniently given in particular when we dispute about substance and accident. And by means of these points it will be easy to judge the other similar divisions.

# DISPUTATION XXXIII

## ON CREATED SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL

Having explained the division of being in general, we must speak of the proper notions of created substance and accident. And since substance is more worthy, the consideration of it is prior. Aristotle treated it partly in the Dialectic—in the category of substance—and partly in Metaphysics V, chapter 8. In those places he sets forth the category of substance, and, having recourse to certain divisions, he explains its account and assigns some of its properties. In Metaphysics VII and VIII he disputes at length about substance; yet in book VII he chiefly treats substance insofar as it signifies the essence of a thing, under which signification he also includes accidents analogically; and thus Aristotle in that book chiefly treats substance in relation to definition, which is almost common to dialecticians, as he himself admits there. But in book VIII he treats proper substance, and especially material substance and its parts, namely matter and form. For our part, we shall first speak of substance in general (and we treat of the created, so that it will not be necessary always to repeat that), then of spiritual substance, and afterwards of material substance, as much as the nature of metaphysical doctrine will allow. Now the essential notion of substance in general cannot be declared by us except through its order to subsistence, or to the created supposit (suppositum), since both the name substance is taken from

"subsisting" or "standing under," and the very notion of substance is exercised only in supposits themselves and is known by us through them. Therefore, in the present disputation, we shall declare only the common notion of substance, after proposing certain divisions, explaining for the most part those things which Aristotle handed down in the category of substance. In the following disputation we shall speak about the substantial supposit and its formal constituent. When these have been understood, the essential notion of created substance will become clearer.

## SECTION I
## WHAT SUBSTANCE SIGNIFIES, AND HOW IT IS DIVIDED INTO INCOMPLETE AND COMPLETE

### *The Etymology of the Word Explained*

1. There are two etymologies of the word substance, namely either from "subsisting" (subsistendo) or from "standing under" (substando). The former was given by Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 4, at the end, where he says: "Just as from that which is to be, we call it essence (essentia), so from that which is to subsist (subsistere), we say substance." Isidore also indicates this in Differences I, c. 4, where he says: "Substance is that which is not from another, but is always from itself, that is, that which subsists by its own power in itself." Aristotle indicated the latter in the Categories, chapter on substance, and in Metaphysics V, c. 8, where he says: "All these things are called substance from this, that they are not predicated of a subject, but the other things are predicated of them." Hence Isidore, Etymologies II, c. 26 (which is on Aristotle's categories), says on Aristotle's authority: "Substance is that which is properly and principally said to stand under;" and Augustine, Categories c. 5, says that substance in Greek is

called ὑποκείμενον. Now the two verbs substare and subsistere can be taken in the same and in different senses. To stand under (substare) is the same as "to be under others as their support and foundation," or as "subject," whether this be according to the thing—inasmuch as substance stands under accidents—or according to reason—inasmuch as first substance stands under second substance, which is otherwise called the subject of inherence or of predication; and the latter alone does not suffice for the notion of substance without the former, since even a singular accident can stand under the universal in predication. Indeed, the former must be understood also of standing under accidents primarily and as "that which" (ut quod); for even one accident can stand under another as "by which" (ut quo), not however as "that which" (ut quod), since it needs itself to be sustained by another. Aristotle signified all this by that negation, "not to be in a subject." For substance stands under accidents in such a way that it does not need a similar support. This the very verb substare also includes; for it signifies a thing to be so firm and constant in itself that it can sustain another. According to this interpretation, in the verb substare and in the name substance taken from it, two notions or properties are indicated: one is absolute—namely, to be in itself and through itself—which, because of its simplicity, we declare by the negation "not to be in a subject"; the other is, as it were, relative—namely, "to sustain accidents."

2. And this seems the first etymology of the name, if we consider its imposition, which proceeds from our cognition; for we arrive at the knowledge of substance from accidents and first conceive it by the relation of standing under. But if we consider the thing itself in itself, the other condition or notion is simply prior and, indeed, sufficient of itself for the notion of substance without the latter. Hence in God the most perfect notion of substance is found, because he is supremely in himself and through himself, even if he does not stand under accidents. Indeed, if—whether by possible or impossible supposition—some created thing could be made incapable of

accidents and by its nature in need of no subject for existing, it would be a perfect substance without the property of standing under, though not without the condition of being in itself or through itself. Therefore this latter notion is prior and essential; we shall explain it in the course of this and the following disputation. The other, however, is apprehended by us metaphysically, as a property concomitant with every finite substance by reason of its limitation and imperfection, as was touched upon in the preceding disputation. What it is in the thing —both in aptitude, that is, with respect to the power of receiving accidents, and in act with respect to the union or sustaining of those accidents—was said above when treating of the material cause of accidents, Disputation XIV.

3. Nearly all of this can be accommodated to the other etymology, from the verb subsistere, although the signification of this verb is more equivocal. To subsist (subsistere), in its most proper signification, is nothing other than "to remain" or "to set one's foot" somewhere—a signification that is irrelevant to the matter at hand. From there the verb was extended to signify the same as "to exist" or "to persist in being," according to Job 7: "If you seek me early, I shall not subsist"; and 8: "The tent of the impious will not subsist," that is, "it will vanish." Hence in Aristotle, subsistere sometimes signifies the same as "to be truly," and is opposed to what is "to be only in appearance or show"; thus he wrote in the book On the World to Alexander that "the things seen in the air, some exist only in appearance, some have subsistence[48]." Although Alcionius renders by the verb substare in this way: "The things observed to us from the air[49], some appear, some subsist (substare)," where he also set the verb substare in the aforesaid signification. According to this Dionysius also said, Divine Names c. 4: "evil does not subsist," or "does not have hypostasis," that is, any true being. According to this signification, the

[48] subsistentiam, 1960; alit. substantiam. "substantiam in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 268.

[49] observantur, 1960; alit. obversantur. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 268.

name substance would not be derived from this verb; for in this way to subsist is common to accidents, which have true real being. Yet the name substance corresponds more to this signification in another sense, namely when it generically signifies whatever essence of a thing, as Aristotle hinted in the said book V and more broadly in Metaphysics VII; and in the Antepredicaments, c. 4, when he said that univocals agree not only in name but also in the notion of substance, that is, in the essential notion indicated by the name. But we are not now treating substance in this signification, but insofar as it is distinguished from accident. The verb subsisto can have yet another signification which its very composition bears on its face—namely, that to subsist is "to be under others" as their foundation, in which way a base is said to subsist to a column; and in this way the verb subsisto signifies almost the same as substo, and thus the etymology of substance is the same, whether it be said to be taken from the one verb or the other, although the term itself seems more properly derived from substare. For from subsisto rather the word subsistence (subsistentia [rather than substance][50]) has been derived. That word —though not very Latin—has nevertheless been used by philosophers and theologians; of its signification and the thing signified we shall speak more broadly below. For now it is enough to know that by it is signified the proper notion of being in itself and through itself, by which property the proper notion of substance has been declared by us. These suffice concerning the etymology of the word, in which it has been noted in passing what we understand by "substance," at least as to the meaning of the name; the thing itself must gradually be explained at greater length.

## *The Division of Substance into Complete & Incomplete*

[50] [quam substantia] "Words omitted in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. V. p. 269.

4. About substance, then, taken in this broad sense, insofar as it is distinguished from accident, a doubt can be raised about how far its commonness extends and by what or how it is distributed into different members. The reason for the difficulty is that outside substance, so taken, nothing remains except accident; but substance cannot be contracted or divided per se by accidents. To explain this doubt, the division of substance into incomplete and complete was invented. In this partition the divided is substance in the aforesaid signification, taken in the widest way, as is clear from what was said. It is not divided in the manner of a genus; for that could not be, as the argument rightly proves, because it cannot have differences that are outside its notion—that is, differences that are not at least incomplete substances, within which the common notion of substance, as the divided of that partition, is included. Therefore substance is there divided in the manner of a transcendental through intrinsic modes in which it is itself included—modes that do not indicate a proper composition, even a metaphysical one, but only a more express conception of this or that notion of substance, entirely in the same way in which above we explained the determination or division of being by various intrinsic modes.

5. A complete substance, then, is said to be that which is, or is understood, after the manner of a whole or an integral substance—what alone is sometimes called "substance" almost by antonomasia. Thus Aristotle, in the Categories chapter on substance, denies that differences are substances, in such wise that a highest genus of substance can be assigned which would have differences within which it is not formally included. An incomplete substance is said to be any that is a part of substance or is conceived after the manner of a part, as matter and form are parts of substance, according to Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, c. 2, and On the Soul II, c. 1; substantial differences also are in this way substances, according to Aristotle, Physics I, c. 6; for substance cannot be constituted per se from things that are altogether not substances.

## *On Physically Complete or Incomplete Substance*

6. From this explanation it is understood that substance can be called complete or incomplete in two ways, namely physically or metaphysically. Physically, a substance will be called incomplete which is a physical part or substantial mode or terminus of a substance, contributing in some way to its completion. Thus, first, one can call "incomplete substance" the substance in becoming, that is, the substantial coming-to-be itself, insofar as it is a way toward a terminus, or its dependence on its cause; for every motion, insofar as it is a way to its terminus, is wont to be called an incomplete being, as one can see in St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaestiuncula 2. Next, form and matter—which are the physical parts of substance—are physically incomplete substances. Likewise the whole nature, whether composed of matter and form or simple as an angelic nature, when compared to the supposit, is an incomplete substance; for it is related to the supposit as a part or as a form, which is further completed and terminated by subsistence. Hence, subsistence itself is an incomplete substance, or something incomplete physically, in the genus of substance. It is true that in this last example there can be a different usage in the words, because the composition of nature and supposit is wont to be called metaphysical, not physical; and for that reason nature and suppositality can be said to be metaphysically rather than physically incomplete substances—where this denomination is taken only from an order to the science. Since it is proper to metaphysics to consider the composition of nature and supposit, therefore that composition was called "metaphysical," for it in itself abstracts from matter and is common to immaterial substances; and in the same sense those components can be said to be metaphysically incomplete, so that they be distinguished from the proper way in which matter and form are said to be incomplete. We, however, take

that denomination broadly; for we call physical whatever exists in the thing itself without an operation of the intellect. And thus we call that substance physically incomplete whose entity, in the thing itself, does not have whatever is necessary for substance's completion within the genus of substance. By contrary reason, a physically complete substance will be that which includes every perfection necessary for the integrity or completion of substance—something that is more conveniently explained by us through negations, namely that a physically complete substance is one which is not of itself ordered toward the real composition or constitution of another substance; for by that very fact it is necessary that such a substance have in itself whatever is necessary for the complete constitution of a substance.

### *Whether a Complete Substance is Always Composite*

7. From this you will gather incidentally, first, that it is not of the essence of a complete substance that it be composite; for if some substance by its simple entity has whatever is necessary for perfect substantial being, without dependence on or relation to another, such a substance will be complete even if it is not composite—indeed, it is complete in a more perfect way than if it were composite. Thus the angelic nature, considered as nature or essence, is complete more perfectly than humanity, even though it is not composite as the latter is but simple; and the same must be understood of substance in general. Accordingly, although a physically incomplete substance necessarily implies an order to composition or to the substance that is completed by composition (for this is why it is incomplete: because it is ordered to someone's complement), conversely a physically complete substance does not necessarily imply a relation to an incomplete substance, such that it be constituted from it, because it can be complete by itself through its eminent and simple entity.

8. But these claims are true of "complete substance" taken in the most abstract way, not of created substance. For God alone is a complete substance without any composition; and this is true not only of the divine person, but also of God as he is God here and can be abstracted from the three persons. For this God is physically, that is, in reality, a complete substance, because by himself he is essentially subsisting and of himself needs nothing for a consummate and absolute perfection of substance; for although he is communicated to the three persons, nevertheless he is neither really distinguished from them nor, on account of any dependence, does he subsist in them so as to receive from them any complement, but only so as to communicate his infinite perfection to them essentially and in a supreme identity, as I argued at length in Volume I, Part III, Disputation XI. In creatures, however, a complete substance is never found without real composition. For it is one thing to speak of the complement of substance in the notion of nature or essence, and another to speak of it in the notion of substance according to the whole that, within the genus of substance, requires its complement. In the former way it is proper to material substance not to have a complete essence without the physical composition of that very essence, as we shall later see. But in created substances as such it is not repugnant that they have the complement of essence without real composition of that same essence. Indeed, this is found in all immaterial substances that are not forms of bodies. It is otherwise for the absolute and simple complement of substance in that genus; for no created substance has this without real composition—at least out of nature and subsistence. Why this is so is not easy to explain by natural reason; nevertheless we shall try to offer some account in the following disputation below, when treating of that composition. Therefore, in describing a physically complete created substance, it can best be said to be that which is composed of a complete nature and its ultimate terminus, or that which consists of, and is composed from, the several or all incomplete substances that it needs in order to be consummate in its

being. But what these requisites are for such a complement—and consequently what absolutely a complete substance is—cannot be understood exactly until we declare the distinction between nature and supposit and the proper notion of each. For that reason I omit here the arguments and objections that could be made against the foregoing claims, because they will be better presented there.

### *How Complete & Perfect Substance Compare*

9. One may only ask whether a physically complete substance is the same as a perfect substance, and consequently whether a substance that is mutilated or diminished with respect to the integrity that its species requires should be called a complete substance or not. First we must exclude accidental perfection, by which a substance can be denominated "perfect." For since, according to Aristotle, the perfect is "that to which nothing is lacking," then a created substance will most of all be denominated perfect when nothing—whether substantial or accidental—is lacking. And in this sense it is clear that it is not necessary for a substance to be perfect in order to be complete, because this complement is required only within the genus of substance. We must therefore stop at substantial perfection; and this can be twofold: one belongs properly to the essence or nature as such; the other belongs to the supposit or to subsistence. And each is necessary for the notion of a complete substance, as has been said. To these a third perfection can be added, namely integral perfection, which, although it appears accidental with respect to quantity, nevertheless, by reason of the parts of substance which necessarily underlie quantity, can be called "substantial." This perfection is not owed from the common notion of substance as such; for substance as substance—even created substance, about which we are speaking—abstracts from composition out of integral parts; hence a complete substance as such does not positively and per se require any complement of integral parts.

10. Indeed, not every substance that consists of such parts demands some determinate perfection in this integral whole in order to be a complete substance, as is evident in homogeneous material substances, which demand no determinate magnitude for their integral perfection; and for that reason they are complete substances even if they are minimal. They only require, as it were negatively, not to be actually integral parts composing some substance that is per se one. For a drop of water, if it is disjoined[51] from other water, is counted a physically complete substance; but if it is actually conjoined and composes another, it is counted incomplete, because it is only a part. Therefore, for the notion of a complete substance it is required that it be a certain whole, not a part, and thus that it be, as it were, enclosed and terminated by its own proper boundaries.

11. You will say: therefore the separated drop of water will not be a complete substance, because although it is not actually a part, it is apt to be a part—and that suffices for the notion of an incomplete substance. For the rational soul, even when separated, is an incomplete substance, because although actually it does not compose a whole, yet by aptitude it is of itself a part. I reply by denying the inference. For the separated drop of water is not positively, so to speak, a part—even by aptitude—but only negatively. It does not by its nature demand conjunction to other water; it has in itself the entire essence of water, and its own supposit, and its intrinsic terminus; nor is it repugnant for it to be conjoined to other water. For that reason, so long as it is not conjoined, it retains the status and denomination of a complete substance. With the soul, however, the matter is otherwise. For although it is separated, it is a part by a positive aptitude and nature, and not merely by non-repugnance. It is a part not integral but essential; it has an incomplete essence, by its nature appointed to complete another; and therefore it is always an incomplete substance.

12. You will say: therefore the divine Word, although of itself it is a complete substance because it does not demand to be united to

[51] disiuncta, 1960; distincta, alit. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 274.

another or to be composed with another, nevertheless while it is actually united to the humanity, will not be a complete substance, because it truly composes with the humanity one complete substance. I reply by denying the inference. First, because it is united to the humanity in such a way that it in no way depends on it, neither in its being nor in any mode of being. Next, because when it is united to the humanity it is not changed in itself; and thus it loses nothing on account of which it would cease to be as complete a substance as it was before. By contrast, water, when it is united to water, is changed in itself and loses the proper intrinsic terminus that it previously possessed and acquires a common terminus, by which the parts of the water in some way depend on each other; and therefore it also changes its state and loses the appellation of a complete substance.

13. Only material heterogeneous substances remain, which require both a certain number of parts and in single parts a determinate magnitude in order to have perfect and substantial integrity. In these, the question seems to be verbal—whether a substance that is not sufficiently complete or augmented should be called a complete substance in its proper and specific denomination. From one side it seems it should be called a complete substance, because it is directly placed in the category and is an individual or supposit of such a species. And thus, according to this reason, it seems that "complete substance" is not the same as "perfect" or "integral." On the other side, such a substance seems to be incomplete, because it has not yet arrived at its consummated substantial state, which it demands by its nature; hence it is per se ordered to compose or complete one substance with the other parts that are lacking to it. Perhaps we shall not speak inaptly if we say that such a substance is metaphysically—or rather logically—complete, but physically incomplete. The reason for the former claim is that it has every metaphysical composition that can be found in a complete substance; and because all substantial predicates are predicated of it simply. And thus the earlier reasons rightly prove this part. The latter reasons prove the other part: that in

reality some substantial physical complement is lacking to such a substance; and therefore it can be called physically incomplete.

14. From these things, by the way, one must gather and note that this predicate "to be a complete substance" is not essential; for although it includes and implies a complete essence, it nevertheless requires something beyond that which is not always essential—such as subsistence, or a mode of existing without union to another as an integral part, or at any rate the having of the complement of all integral parts, according to that last denomination. From this there remains sufficiently explained the division—frequent in Aristotle—of substance into matter, form, and composite, as I noted around Metaphysics VII, c. 3. For that is a certain division of substance in general—yet not according to the whole commonness of substance, but only of material substance, if by the name form we understand the proper informing form; but if it be extended to subsisting forms, the division will be more general. By the name of composite we could also understand only the nature composed of form and matter; and thus it will be only the division of material substance, insofar as it signifies the substantial essence or nature—complete or incomplete. Or the whole material supposit might be included under the name composite; and thus the divided will abstract from "complete and incomplete substance," yet in such a way that it does not include substantial modes, but only entities.

### *On Metaphysically Complete & Incomplete Substance*

15. It remains to speak of the other sense of the division—namely, of metaphysically or logically complete or incomplete substance. This distinction properly has a place only in created substances, of which we are now speaking; for only in them is there a proper metaphysical composition from genus and difference, from which that division arose. Therefore a metaphysically incomplete

substance is that which is conceived after the manner of a metaphysical part—such as, for example, a difference. A complete substance is said to be that which is entire and total substance—such as, for example, the ultimate species.

16. But, so the account of each may be better declared, first one may doubt whether the most general genus of substance itself ought to be counted a complete or incomplete substance, speaking metaphysically. For it cannot abstract from these; we have already shown that substance, thus taken abstractly, cannot be a genus. The first genus of substance seems not able to be called a metaphysically complete substance; for the same thing seems to be a metaphysically complete substance as a substance composed of genus and difference; [but that genus does not consist of genus and difference][52]. Second, every substantial difference is an incomplete substance for this reason: it does not express a concept metaphysically composite but simple, apt of itself to compose, after the manner of form, a metaphysically complete substance. But in a similar way the most general genus of substance expresses a simple concept, apt of itself to compose a metaphysically complete substance, after the manner of potency. Therefore it too is an incomplete substance. This is made clearer, third, as follows: no substance directly contained under that supreme genus has that it is a complete substance by force of that genus alone; it is necessary that a difference be added by which it be completed. Therefore it is a sign that that genus, taken precisely, is not a complete substance; otherwise by force of that alone any substance would have the notion of a complete substance.

17. And from this one may further doubt whether the intermediate genera or the subalternate species of substance ought to be considered complete substances. For the argument just made seems to hold equally of them as of the supreme genus, because no lower substance is counted complete by force of the genus alone—

[52] [sed illud genus… genere et differentia], 1960. "The words in brackets are missing in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 277.

even of the proximate genus—unless a difference be added. This is made clearer further: although intermediate genera are composed of genus and difference—in which they differ from the supreme genus—nevertheless they are not completely composed, so to speak, but are constituted in a certain grade, in which they are per se ordered to further composition and to the complement of substance. Therefore they are not formally complete substances. The consequence is plain, both from what has been said about a physically incomplete substance—since the same proportional account must be kept: just as, therefore, the hand, which is per se ordered to the physical complement of another, is physically incomplete, so that which is per se ordered to the constitution of a metaphysically complete substance is metaphysically incomplete; and also because, if the substance consisting of genus and ultimate difference is complete, then those out of which it is composed are incomplete. For just as a whole consists of parts, so a complete substance consists of incomplete things. Finally this is illustrated by a physical example. If we should imagine true the opinion asserting that matter first composes with a "form of corporeity" and then is actualized by another form, there is no doubt that that composite of matter and the form of corporeity would have to be called a physically incomplete substance; and the same would have to be said of the composite by the sensitive soul, if it be imagined to be in reality distinct from the rational. But in this way an intermediate genus stands with respect to a further difference or species, as regards metaphysical complement; therefore it is a metaphysically incomplete substance.

18. If this reasoning has force, it further follows that not even the ultimate species, but only the individual, is a metaphysically complete substance. For although the ultimate species—man, for example—can perhaps be called a complete substance as regards the complement of nature or essence, nevertheless it is not a complete substance simply and in an unqualified way in the notion of substance, because it needs a further metaphysical complement in order to be

absolute and consummate in the notion of substance. Likewise, even an individual metaphysically and per se is composed of the ultimate species and a substantial individual difference; and each of these parts is per se ordered to the complement of the individual. Therefore each also is a metaphysically incomplete substance, speaking simply.

19. Because of these arguments someone may be inclined to think that only first substance is metaphysically complete. Fonseca hints at this opinion in Metaphysics V, c. 7, q. 7, sect. 2, where he says that only the individual is an ens simply complete, while genera and species are indeed complete because they are predicated in quid of the individual, yet they are only complete in a certain respect, because they per se pertain to the constitution of the individual. But when he says these are "complete in a certain respect," he seems to think they are rather incomplete. And this seems to be proved by the reason he gives—namely, because they per se pertain to the composition of something. That they are predicated in quid seems to be irrelevant for calling them complete even in a certain respect; for a being is not called complete because of a relation to another of which it is predicated, nor because of a mode of predication, but because of what it is in itself. Hence, if in itself it be plainly constituted in the notion of substance, it will be a complete substance simply; if not, it will be incomplete. Thus in those two terms "complete" and "in a certain respect" a repugnance seems to be involved; for that very qualification destroys the notion of the complete. Either that qualification subtracts or diminishes something of the true complement of substance, or it does not. If it does not subtract, it will be a complete substance simply, and not merely in a certain respect. If it does subtract, it will be simply an incomplete substance; for the notion of the incomplete is immediately constituted by the lack of whatever is required for the complement. Hence that way of speaking seems to have been invented only to render some account for which these genera are placed in the straight line of the predicament, whereas differences are not; and here seems to look that distinction that the genus is predicated in quid,

while the difference is predicated as quality; but that distinction seems irrelevant for explaining the account of a complete or incomplete being.

20. Wherefore it must be said that the species and genera of substances are simply complete substances. This seems to be supposed by Aristotle in the chapter on substance, where first he distinguishes substance into first and second; later, in text 5, he excludes differences from the notion of substance—which he could do for no other reason than because they are incomplete substances; therefore he supposes that first and second substances are complete substances. Next, this is confirmed by the reason that genera and species are placed in the straight line of the category of substance, whereas differences are not; this is a sign that those are complete substances. Third, because if the discourse made above had been efficacious, it would prove that every concept of substance abstracted from individuals is a concept of an incomplete substance; hence it would involve a contradiction in terms to divide substance into incomplete and complete, because the divided would necessarily have to be an incomplete substance, since it abstracts from individuals; therefore one of the dividing members would be repugnant to it, or one will have to say that only the signification of the name is divided. Nay, even in the very concept of complete substance a repugnance would be involved, because that concept, too, is common. But perhaps this argument could be dissolved, as we shall see in a similar case in the next section, where its force will be made clearer. Fourth, substance, which is the most general genus, is a complete substance; therefore, a fortiori, all lower ones are. The antecedent is proved thus: unless it be so, it cannot be a genus, because it will be unable to have differences outside its own notion; for the differences by which it is contracted are also incomplete substances.

21. Fifth, the thing itself is explained thus. Every substance placed in the straight line of the category is conceived after the manner of a total and entire substance and includes—whether distinctly or

confusedly—whatever is necessary for the complement of substance; therefore it is a complete substance. You will say: to include confusedly is to include only "in potency"; but for the notion of a complete substance it is not enough to include in potency the complement of substance, but in act—otherwise prime matter would be a complete substance. I reply that to include "confusedly" is not to include "in physical and real potency" and truly passive—as prime matter is—but it is said to be "in potency logically," or "according to reason," which potency does not exclude that the thing conceived be in act a complete substance and in act include whatever is necessary for such a complement, although that whole is not conceived distinctly by such a concept but confusedly—yet after the manner of a whole, and thus after the manner of a complete substance. For a complete substance is nothing other than a total and entire substance. The antecedent is plain from the very mode of conceiving and predicating; for "man" is nothing other than the individuals themselves—as like to one another—confusedly conceived as one; and thus, at least confusedly, he includes the whole individual substance; and the same applies, proportionally, to higher predicates. And for this reason the higher can be predicated of the lower, because they signify the whole that is in them. Hence, since they otherwise signify that very whole after the manner of "what subsists," or "what exists as that which is," they also signify it after the manner of a complete and total substance.

22. From this it is easy to understand the difference between substantial genera and substantial differences. For a difference is conceived after the manner of form, and thus it is not predicated in quid but as a quality, and rather after the manner of an adjunct than after the manner of substance; and therefore, although in reality it is a complete substance (for it is not other than the very species), nevertheless, metaphysically and according to our mode of conceiving, it is rightly excluded from the notion of complete substance. A genus, however, is conceived after the manner of a whole

subsisting; and therefore it is predicated most properly after the manner of substance, and at least confusedly it signifies the whole substance of the thing; for that reason it is not excluded from the notion of a complete substance—not physically, because in reality it is not other than the entire substance of the thing, nor metaphysically, because it is sufficiently conceived after the manner of a whole. In this way, explained thus, this view does not differ from the opinion of Fonseca. Although the account of a complete being does not consist in its being predicated in quid, nevertheless from the mode of predication one rightly infers that that which is predicated thus is conceived after the manner of a whole and complete being. These genera or species are said to be complete in a certain respect not because they are simply incomplete, but because in their concepts the whole complement of substance is included only confusedly and not distinctly and expressly; and thus that qualification "in a certain respect" does not diminish or take away the account of a complete being, but it merely indicates that it is not the most perfect that can be. Therefore it must not be taken in such a way as to deny that second substances—simply and without addition—are complete substances.

23. The arguments to the contrary can easily be answered from what has been said. To the first, the assumption is denied—namely, that a metaphysically complete substance is the same as a substance composed of genus and difference. For it can also be a substance conceived simply, provided it is conceived after the manner of a whole and entire substance. To the second, the difference already assigned between the concept of a difference and that of a substantial genus suffices. To the third, I concede that no particular substance is a complete substance by force of the genus alone, taken precisely—whether that be the supreme genus, or an intermediate or proximate one. Indeed, neither by force of the species alone; for no common predicate can constitute a complete substance without the lower predicates that contract down to individuation. Nay, neither can the common notion exist unless contracted and made individual. Yet I

deny that it follows from this that these predicates are not metaphysically complete substances; for it is not necessary that such a substance, in its concept, actually include whatever in the thing itself is necessary for the complement of substance. It is enough that it include it confusedly and in potency after the manner of a whole subsisting. Wherefore, just as dialecticians say that a genus conceived precisely after the manner of a part is not predicated of the species, but after the manner of a whole, so we can concede that these genera, conceived precisely after the manner of parts, are not complete substances; but as they are conceived after the manner of a whole, they are complete substances. And in this latter way—commonly and absolutely speaking—they are conceived and established in the line of the category. And only this is proved by the remaining discourses adjoined to that argument: for they all proceed about the genus considered precisely as a metaphysical part, not as it somehow, at least confusedly, signifies the whole substance of the thing and after the manner of a whole.

### *What Sort of Division that Into Complete & Incomplete Substance Is*

24. From the things said in the explanation of this division, it is easy to understand what sort of division it is. One must speak of it differently if the members are taken according to a metaphysical consideration than if they are taken according to physical realities. In the former way it cannot be the division of an analogate into its analogates; rather it seems to be like the division of a subject into rational accidents, or a division by various denominations taken from our mode of conceiving. For "man" and "rational" are not two substances but one; under the concept "man" it is said to be a complete substance, and under the concept "rational" it is said to be metaphysically incomplete. Hence there cannot be an analogy here in the true and real notion of substance; therefore there intervenes only a

diverse relation of reason, or a diverse denomination from our way of conceiving. If sometimes a complete and an incomplete substance differ in reality—as "horse" and "rational"—this does not arise from a formal opposition of the members, but from a material diversity of entities. Hence it results that some substance incomplete in this way is in reality much more perfect than another that is complete—although the mode of conceiving is different and, as to its genus, less perfect. From this also it follows that what is metaphysically an incomplete substance may be physically complete—as "rational," for example—because in reality it is not distinguished from the whole substance of the thing, but only in our mode of conceiving.

25. If, however, the members are taken according to the physical notion of complete and incomplete substance, the division can seem to be analogical, according to what was said above in a similar division of complete and incomplete being. And in one sense this appears true; in another it does not seem necessary, for that division is virtually manifold and ambiguous. Hence it cannot simply and without distinction be answered. For a substance can be understood to be physically incomplete solely by the lack of some integral part; and in that way it is clear that no analogy intervenes between it and a complete substance. Again, in another and quite usual way, some substance is said to be incomplete solely by the lack of some substantial mode, as humanity, for example, lacking its proper subsistence. And a substance incomplete in this way is most probably not analogically but univocally "substance"—as humanity, for example, with respect to a human being—because it includes the whole essence and the whole substantial entity of a human being and is simply an ens per se, in the sense in which per se expresses the essential account of substance—as we shall explain below. Only a certain modal complement is lacking; and this does not seem sufficient to constitute an analogy. It must be observed, however, that just as "humanity" is not the "human being," so neither can it be called "substance" in the way in which "substance" is the most general genus;

for in that way it is taken with the force of a concrete and as signifying something subsisting—at least in a confused and common way—and therefore it cannot be predicated of a nature conceived abstractly. Yet "substance," as divided into complete and incomplete, is taken more broadly. And in this way we say it is probable that it is said univocally of humanity and of a human being.

26. Finally, some substance can be called essentially incomplete; and in this sense the division seems analogical. At the lowest level in that order stands what is only a substantial mode; it can hardly be called a substance—such as dependence or substantial becoming, or the mode of union and subsistence. Next are included the essential parts of substance, such as matter and form, which seem to participate more in substantial entity; nevertheless, in relation to the complete substance they seem to be analogically substances, for the reasons touched upon above about complete and incomplete being and about substance and accident. Only we must observe that this analogy is such that, by its very nature, the complete substance is more excellent than the incomplete; and that the latter has all its being on account of the former—if the members are taken relatively and proportionally. Nonetheless, it can happen that some incomplete substance is simply more noble and excellent intensively than some complete one. For the rational soul is simply nobler than earth or fire —although those are complete substances and the soul is incomplete. Those substances surpass the soul only in matter, which is the most imperfect thing in the order of substance; whereas the soul surpasses such entities in the formal difference and in grade and order of substance, since it is spiritual and intellectual—a superiority far more outstanding in intensive perfection.

27. Indeed, it is probable that some substantial mode is more perfect in its entity than any other purely created complete substance —namely, the hypostatic union, which, in the human nature, is only a certain substantial mode; yet it brings a greater excellence than is found not only in a human being but even in an angel—not only

because of the very supposit of the divine Word to which it unites the humanity, but also on the part of that created and supernatural mode which it posits in the humanity itself. Nevertheless, this mode is not a complete substance, but the means or bond by which a complete substance arises—Christ, God and man. According to this view it must consequently be said that, although that mode is called analogically a substance as far as the proper formal notion signified by that word is concerned, nonetheless as to the thing itself it is something more perfect and nobler than the most proper created substance.

28. Nor is this unfitting, because it is enough that it be less perfect than the complete substance that is constituted through such a mode—a substance that is not purely created but wondrously composed of a created and an uncreated reality. And for this reason one cannot take from here an argument such that the same be said of grace or of another created and supernatural accident compared with a natural created substance; for by means of an accident no per se one being arises, nor any substance, and it always remains in the order of a being in a certain respect. Although these things have been said probabiliter, they are not certain; for every union, precisely because it is only a certain mode of the thing that is united, seems to be of itself an entity of diminished and, as it were, relative sort. And therefore, although the hypostatic union, by reason of the terminus to which it is ordained, has a certain infinite excellence and dignity, nevertheless, considered in itself and in the physical genus, it does not seem so perfect an entity as a complete substance—especially an intellectual one. But these matters pertain more to theological consideration.

## SECTION II

## WHETHER SUBSTANCE IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO FIRST AND SECOND

## Section II

1. Aristotle presupposes this division in the Categories, chapter on Substance, handing down the account and difference of each member and the common description of the divided thing, which he signified in these words: "It is common to all substance not to be in a subject." It is therefore necessary in the present to declare the partition carefully, so that by running through the individual members we may set forth the entire notion of substance exactly.

### *What is the Divided in This Division?*

2. First, it can be doubted whether the divided in this division is only an equivocal or analogical word, or some objective concept common to first and second substance. The reason for the difficulty is that first substance is nothing other than "singular substance," whereas second substance is "universal substance," that is, abstracted from individuation. But no real objective concept can be common to the universal and the individual—except the very concept of the common substance; therefore in this division no objective and real concept can be divided. The consequence is evident, because the divided cannot coincide with one of the dividing members. The major premise is gathered clearly enough from Aristotle in the place cited, and will be clearer from what follows. The minor is easily made clear by induction and by reason. "Peter" and "man" have nothing in common except the concept "man"; nor "man" and "animal," except the concept "animal." In general, every lower and higher term are related thus, and first and second substance are subordinated to each other in the same way. The reason is that the lower concept includes within itself the whole higher concept, and adds to it its determination or difference; therefore it cannot have any agreement with it except in the very common concept—which is identity rather than agreement; for "agreement" in the present signifies "similarity." "Peter" and "man" are not similar, but one. This is confirmed; otherwise there would be a regress to infinity in these concepts; for if "man" and "animal" agreed in some third

concept, from that concept and from the concept "animal" likewise a third distinct concept could be abstracted (since they are related as higher and lower), and the same argument can be made of that fourth concept with respect to the third, and so on to infinity.

3. Second, from this it can be doubted whether this division is a division of reality or of reason. That it is of reality seems to be taken from the very common notion of substance, which is either "not to be in a subject," that is, "to be per se," or "to stand under accidents" —a real notion; and from the notion of first substance, which is "to stand under accidents first, per se, and immediately." On the contrary, first and second substance do not differ in reality; therefore the division cannot be real. Likewise, "second substance" is not a dividing member insofar as it is "substance," but insofar as it is "second substance"; but as such it adds nothing real apart from "substance" itself; therefore the division cannot be of reality but only of reason.

4. Third, one may doubt to which of these members the notion of substance belongs primarily. Aristotle indicates that it belongs primarily to first substance; for he says that this is properly and chiefly and most of all substance, because it is what subsists and underlies first, and whatever in any way subsists or underlies participates in that through the first substance. "For this reason," says Aristotle, "if first substances are taken away, it is impossible that anything remain." On the contrary, second substance is essentially substance; but the essential notion belongs earlier to the species or the genus than to the individual. For just as Peter is an animal because "man" is an animal—and not conversely—so he is a substance because "man" is a substance. Therefore the notion of substance belongs earlier to second substances; and it can belong more immediately to nothing than to the supreme genus. Nay, even if we speak of substance under the notion of standing under, it seems to belong first to second substance. For although as regards common accidents first substance seems to stand under first—since these accidents do not belong to the species except by reason of some individual—nevertheless as regards

proper accidents, the opposite seems to be the case. For "risible," for example, belongs earlier to "man" than to "Peter"; for Peter is risible because he is a man, not conversely. Since proper accidents are first of all, and around them the office of "standing under" is exercised first, it seems—everything considered—that this notion of "standing under" also belongs first to second substance. On the other hand, it appears that each substance is equally first "substance," without any order, not only because in reality they are the same, but also because they univocally share the notion of substance; for both first and second substance are directly placed in the category of substance, which could not be unless each were univocally a substance.

5. Regarding the first doubt, no one, I think, will suppose that this is a partition of a merely equivocal word; for from what has been said, and from Aristotle himself, it is clear that in it not only the name but also the notion of substance is in some way common to each member. Therefore what Ammonius says in the Categories—that this is not a division but only an ordering of things enumerated, as if someone by enumerating should say that "in discourse there are letters, syllables, and words," or "in an army there are leaders and soldiers," and so on; thus, he says, Aristotle did not divide but only enumerated "first and second substances" under the category of substance—this, I say, is not proved; for either it does not explain the matter, or it is equivalent to saying that the partition is of a merely equivocal word. It is proved thus. For it cannot be denied that the name substance is common to first and second substance. It is also clear that Aristotle meant to include each under that word; therefore, if that is only an enumeration of things contained under the same name without any further division, it will be the partition of an equivocal name—since such a partition requires nothing else. But that is false, as I said—and Ammonius himself admits it, because of the reason made above, namely that Aristotle proposed the notion of the name, which is common to both members.

6. This being supposed, some said that first substance and second substance are names of second intention and formally signify a certain "accident of reason," namely the ratio of subject and substantial predicate, as Soto holds in his Logic, chapter on Substance; or the intention of universal and singular substance, as Cajetan and the Louvain masters think, who consequently say that "an accident is divided into accidents" there—which must be understood with respect to substance, to which it "accidentally" befalls to be universal or singular, or to be located in the straight line of the category. Formally, however, comparing the divided to the members dividing as such, it will rather be a division of a genus into species, as is the division of "universal" into the five universals. For if an accident is divided into accidents per se contained under it—as "colored" into "white" and "black"—the division will be per se and essential, not accidental or "by accidents" with respect to the divided. Soto, however, judges the division to be of a subject into accidents of reason, because there can be no common intention for the intention of subject and of predicate. Although we grant that the division can have that sense, nevertheless it is not true—nor rightly proved by that reason—that it cannot be otherwise. For if the notions of subject and predicate are taken properly with an order to the proposition, they have the common intention of the extreme of a proposition, which in words we call the term or name. If "subject" and "predicate" are taken more broadly for the subjicible and the praedicable, which are proportionally related to the universal and the singular, then they can have the common intention of correlatives, which is founded in such abstraction or comparison of the intellect, although perhaps it does not have an incomplex common term by which it is signified; and in the present case it can be called "apt to be placed in the straight line of the category of substance," which formally signifies an intention of reason. And in this way the difficulty touched upon in the first doubt is easily resolved: for that lower and higher predicates subordinated per se agree in some being of reason presents no difficulty. But if it be said

to be a division of a real subject into accidents of reason, then either it must be said that the "divided" is not one except by a kind of aggregation—namely, "things placed in the straight line of the category of substance"—or at least it remains to be declared under what real and objective notion that "divided" is one.

7. Moreover, this interpretation of the aforesaid division by second intentions is likely and adapted to dialecticians; yet for the metaphysical matter which we are treating now it is not sufficient. Nor does it seem altogether adapted to Aristotle's mind. For he did not declare the notion of substance— which he supposed to be found in first and second—by some relation of reason nor by a denomination taken from our concepts, but by a real property of subsisting "in itself," which he declared by that negation, "not to be in a subject." For it cannot rightly be said that he took that negation also with an order to second intentions, as if "not to be in a subject" were the same as "not to be predicated of a subject." For in that sense it would be false to say that it is "common to all substance not to be in a subject"; for this would not belong to second substances, since they are predicated of first or of lower substances. Hence Aristotle expressly distinguishes "to be in a subject" and "to be said of a subject"—the latter being "to be predicated," the former "to inhere." Of second substances he says they are not "in a subject," though they are "said of a subject." Therefore he takes that negation to describe a property of substance—the property of being per se. Next, "to underlie accidents" is a real property and not a second intention, as is evident per se from the terms and from Aristotle's text; for this is why he said that, first substances being corrupted, nothing can remain—because in them second substances really exist and accidents inhere. Therefore "to underlie accidents" is taken with an order to real existence and as a real property. Likewise, "to underlie," referred to second intentions or to the operations of the mind, seems to be nothing but "to be subjected in a proposition"; but in that way not only substances but also some accidents are subject for other accidents; and second substances are not always subject in this

way because of first substances—especially in propositions that do not assert actual existence, as we shall declare below. Likewise it has been shown that "to be in a subject" is taken by Aristotle really and according to real being; the correlative of this is "to subsist" for the accidents that inhere. Therefore this property is real; and by this first and second substance are divided—inasmuch as they participate in that property in different ways—hence not by second intentions, but by an order to real properties are first and second substance distinguished.

8. Add that, with an order to second intentions, it is scarcely intelligible how first substance should be called "more substance" than second, as Aristotle speaks. For if first substance signifies the intention of subject and second the intention of predicate, as Soto says, in what is the comparison made? For it must be made with respect to some common property; but the accounts of predicate and of subject are diverse; and Soto himself says they have no common intention. And even if they had, they would share it equally; for "predicate" is as much an extreme of a proposition as "subject." The same argument can be made if those intentions are said to be universal and singular, or praedicable and subjicible, and that they are divided under the common intention of "fit to be placed in the straight line of the category of substance"; for this intention, too, belongs as much and as first to second substances as to first ones. Whence, with respect to this, it would be more plausible to say that the intention of subject is divided, and that this intention belongs "more" and "earlier" to first substance than to second. But even this is not credible; for "to be the subject of predication" expresses only an intention of reason; but that is not sufficient to explain the notion of substance, for it is common to accidents—as the same reasoning applies to all the intentions numbered above. Moreover, that intention of "subject" does not always belong to second substances through first ones—especially in per se propositions, which abstract from actual existence. Therefore, besides the intentions of reason, something must be added to explain

the aforesaid division and the distinction and comparison of the dividing members among themselves.

9. Accordingly, it can be said otherwise: in this division, substance is divided as possessing this real property of subsisting per se; but it is divided according to the diverse modes by which this property belongs to first and second substances. Cajetan touched on this opinion in the category of substance, yet in a sense very different from the one we intend. For he says that first substance is constituted by a positive mode of subsisting particularly; second substance is not constituted by a positive mode, but by the lack of the mode of subsisting particularly. Hence he does not assign the divided as common according to some real property, but only according to a property of reason—namely, as "a thing which is directly placed in the straight line of the category of substance." This exposition is not much to my liking; for according to it one cannot explain under what real notion first and second substance agree, according to which each is called "substance" and the first more than the second; and for other reasons I shall indicate immediately.

10. Therefore it is said otherwise: that substance is divided under the notion of "subsisting per se" and "underlying others." For we said above that substance can be called such from either property. Each of these properties must belong both to second and to first substance, if each is to be a substance. They differ, however, in the mode of participating in those properties—not that one participates and the other does not (this would be repugnant to a division, which would be to exclude one member from participating in the divided), but because the one—namely first substance—has those properties first and per se; this follows from the fact that singular, individual substance is at issue. For just as singulars are those which exist first per se, so too they subsist first per se and sustain accidents. The other—second substance—participates in those properties only through the first. That it participates is evident, both because it is a substance and because under it it contains the first substance, and in it it exists

intimately and essentially. Hence it is necessary that what belongs in the thing to first substance belong also to second substance—at least through the first. That those properties belong to second substance in no other way than through first is evident, because it does not exist except in the first; for it does not subsist per se, separate. And therefore St Thomas rightly says, De potentia q. 9, a. 1 ad 5: "Subsistence is attributed to genera and species not because they subsist (namely outside individuals), but because individuals subsist in their natures." Thus, therefore, the said division is easily explained —and it will be made clearer by the reply to the doubts and arguments proposed at the beginning.

11. To the first doubt the reply can be given in two ways. First, that the divided is some objective and real concept common to first and second substance—not, to be sure, common according to some essential, specific or generic grade (for in that way nothing can be common to per se subordinated predicates, as that discourse rightly proves), but common according to a participation or denomination taken from a certain property of singular substance, which property in some way redounds to universal substance. Such a property is "to subsist" or "to underlie," which formally do not express the essence of substance—as was indicated above in explaining the notion of "underlying," and as will be said below about actual subsistence—but express certain properties or conditions of substance which belong first per se to singular substance, and in their own way affect[53] it, but consequently also affect genera and species of substances, insofar as they are in singulars. In this way it is not repugnant that something be common to singular and universal substance. Especially because this commonness—although, with respect to the distinction of the members, it is of reason—nevertheless, as regards the very agreement, if carefully considered, is not so much of reason as of reality, that is, it is not by a mere similarity from which a common concept is

[53] afficiunt, 1960; efficiunt, ed. Vivès. "In the Vivès and other editions the term 'efficiunt' appears erroneously." Cf. BHV, t. V, p. 294.

abstracted according to reason, but it is by a real participation of the same subsistence. For "man" and "Peter" are indeed distinguished by reason; yet "man" is said to subsist in Peter in such a way that the same real subsistence of Peter is also the real subsistence of human nature; and similarly, by the same capacity or power by which Peter underlies whiteness, "man" also underlies it. Just as "to exist" can be said to be common to singular and universal predicates—not by a community of reason and abstraction, but of thing—because the same numerically one existence by which the singular exists is also that by which the universal exists. According to this mode, therefore, it is not difficult to understand the divided common to first and second substance.

12. You will say: the very concept "substance," by the fact that it is common, is something abstracted from singulars and consequently is second substance; therefore it will be repugnant to divide it into first and second. I reply: although it is common, it is not second substance, because it is not common as a specific or generic essential grade; nor is it abstracted according to reason from any essential agreement among complete substances—which is of the essence of second substance—but it is common by a denomination from the same property; and this seems to pertain to a certain mode of analogy, as I shall declare in the second and third doubt. I add also that the very concept of first substance is common to all first substances; for although first substance is really singular and individual, nevertheless formally the very ratio of "first substance" can be abstracted as common, although that common ratio is not a second substance, for the reason just stated. In a similar way some ratio of substance can be common to first and second; nor does this contradict the notion of first substance, because its formal ratio is communicable, although the thing is incommunicable. All the more because the singularity of first substance does not exclude communication with second substance in the same entity and essence, and consequently in the same property; and such communication suffices to constitute the divided of this division, as has been explained.

13. This way of speaking is easy and true. Nevertheless, it could also be said that the divided is "substance" conceived under the essential notion of substance; and just as it can be conceived either as made singular, or as abstracted from singularity, so it can also be divided into first and second substance. Thus it is commonly said that human nature "in itself" is neither singular nor universal; whence it can be divided according to that twofold state or mode of being—the one of reason, the other of reality. You will say first: therefore the substance that is divided here will be the very most general genus of substance—which is impossible, because the most general genus is only "second substance," not "first." The inference is evident; for the substance that is the most general says nothing other than "the essence of substance" or "that which has the essence of substance," just as "human nature," conceived "in itself," is nothing other than the very species "human." Likewise, "man," although he can be conceived "in himself," that is, "singularly," nevertheless cannot be divided into first and second; therefore neither can "substance" be divided in this way, if it is taken for the substantial nature itself in concrete. Add that, if man were to be divided into first and second, rather the universal man would be called the first man than the singular—just as a Platonic Idea, if it existed, would be more "man" than individuals. I reply to the first by simply denying the inference. For the "substance" which is divided into first and second expresses explicitly only "that which has a substantial essence or nature." This ratio is also included in the actual concept of the most general genus of substance; nevertheless in a different way. For "substance," as it is the most general, not only prescinds from the state of the singular and individual, but it expresses a certain universal unity[54], by reason of which "substance," as it is the most general, cannot be understood as singular; whereas "substance," as it is divided into first and second, expresses precisely the formal unity of substance—indifferent to singularity and universality. Just as humanity, which is said "in itself" to be indifferent and neither

[54] unitatem, 1960; veritatem, alit. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 296.

universal nor particular, does not express an essence other than the human species, yet it expresses another mode of conceiving. Likewise "substance," as genus, expresses a concept precise from all the differences of substance; but "substance," as divided, does not express so precise a concept; rather, as it results from any substantial difference—inasmuch as it is common to all—it constitutes a complete substance. In this sense the "essence of substance" is as it were a transcendental from the supreme genus down to the individuals of substance. In this way St Thomas said, In I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1: "Whatever is in the genus of substance can be called ousia, whether it be universal substance or particular substance." To the other part I reply by denying the similarity. For "man" and "Peter" do not have any special property under which one perceives that relation or denomination of "first" and "second"—except in the notion of subsisting or standing under, with respect to which they are called first or second substance. For that property does not belong per se first to "man" as such, but insofar as he is substance. And thus I said above that the ratio of first and second substance is not sufficiently explained by the relation of singular and universal unless a different relation to this property of subsisting or standing under be adjoined.

### *What the Dividing Members are Like?*

14. To the second doubt it must be said, first, that this division—so far as the distinction of the members goes—is of reason only and not of reality. This the argument there made sufficiently proves, for the members are not distinct in reality—not really nor by a distinction of the nature of the thing—as is sufficiently clear from what we have said about the distinction of a universal nature from individuals. Next, I add that not only is the distinction of reason, but the dividing members include some relation or intention of reason. It often happens that a distinction is of reason and yet the members are altogether real—as with mercy, justice, and other divine attributes.

Sometimes it happens that the members that are distinguished by reason, although materially or really existing on the part of the thing, yet—as they are distinguished by reason—include some relation or denomination that they do not have except through reason. In this way we say first and second substance stand in this division. I show this first from the very words. For "first substance," as first, connotes a relation to "second," and conversely "second" to "first"; but this relation cannot be real, but only of reason. For it is a relation of a kind of order; but between those which are not distinct in reality but only by reason there cannot be a real order, but only one of reason. Second, from the thing itself and from the definitions of first and second substance. "First substance" is said to be that which subsists or underlies first per se; "second substance," that which subsists or underlies secondarily or through the first. Although to "subsist" or "underlie" belong really to first and second substances, nevertheless that to one they belong primarily and to the other secondarily—or to one per se and to the other through another—is not in reality but in the order to our concepts. For in reality there is not one thing and another, but one only; nor is there a "mediate" and "immediate" "subsisting" or "underlying," because where there is no distinction in reality, there can be no medium. Therefore the notion of first or second substance, in all that it includes, is not in the thing itself, but is completed by reason.

15. You will say: therefore this exposition coincides with the earlier view which was rejected above. I reply: in part indeed it agrees with that, and for that reason we did not wholly reject it, but said it did not explain the matter sufficiently. Again, we differ from it because we do not explain the division by the intention of singular and universal, nor by the intention of subject and predicate, but only by the relation of order, that is, by the relation of "first" and "second" in the notion of underlying or subsisting. Hence we do not understand the notion of subsisting or underlying with an order to the intentions or predications of reason alone, but as a real property of "underlying";

and we posit the intention or relation of reason only in the relation of "first" or "second" "underlying."

16. Whence we may further observe that substance can be called first in two ways: positively, by relation to second—in which sense our earlier claims have been proceeding; and negatively, by the negation of something prior. And in this sense the notion of first substance is real and includes no relation or intention of reason; and, speaking metaphysically, this seems to be the proper and usual acceptation of "first substance." For it is that which subsists or underlies in such a way per se that in subsisting or underlying there is nothing prior to it. But all this it has in the thing itself; and by the negation of "something prior" that positive is declared which first substance has by virtue of its own proper and intrinsic positive mode of being. In second substance, however, there is no such twofold acceptation; for nothing is denominated "second" by mere negation, but it necessarily includes an order to that which is "first." Therefore, although first substance under some notion can not improperly express a real concept not including any relation of reason, nevertheless second substance—under the notion of "second substance"—is necessarily completed by reason. For although the thing which is second substance is real, nevertheless that it is "second" it does not have in reality but in the order to our mode of conceiving. Hence the notion of first substance can truly and properly be attributed to God in some sense—as I shall say in the next section; the notion of second substance has no place at all in God, because in him there is no abstraction of the common nature from the proper individual of substance. Accordingly, the consideration of second substance as such pertains more to the logician than to the metaphysician; and for that reason we shall say nothing more about it —especially because, besides what was said above about universals, scarcely anything remains to be said about it. We shall, however, speak in the last section of the next disputation about the essential notion of substance, which is found both in second and in first substance. First,

however, we shall consider first substance as it is first, as regards the negation of something prior, or as regards the positive mode which grounds that negation; for that chiefly pertains to the present doctrine. Of the relation of reason of the first to the second, there is nothing for us to say; that must be remitted to dialecticians, for it serves to coordinate the categorial line and the various modes of predication. And therefore Aristotle—as Cajetan noted—said nothing of that division in the Metaphysics. It has seemed necessary for us to treat of it in order to declare the notion of first substance insofar as it is real and metaphysical.

### *Whether First Substance is More "Substance" than Second*

17. To the third doubt, Aristotle's opinion is clear: the notion of substance—as it is divided here—belongs first and per se to first substances. How, however, and under what notion, this is to be understood is not declared by all in the same way. Some distinguish "substance" as said from the property of subsisting, or from the property of underlying. In the former way, they say, the notion of substance belongs earlier to second than to first; in the latter way, conversely, earlier to first than to second. The reason is that the former property is the very essence of substance—which belongs to first through second; the latter property is accidental, and therefore it belongs per se first to first substance, and through it to second. They say Aristotle spoke of substance under the notion of underlying, according to the most proper etymology of the name, because that notion is better known to us; and for that reason first substance is called most of all substance. This view can be taken from Boethius, On the Two Natures, somewhat near the beginning, where he says: "Genera and species subsist only; individuals not only subsist but also underlie (i.e., substare)." This must necessarily be understood according to the first notions of subsisting and underlying; for second

substances too underlie in the first. Hence St Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2 ad 4, interpreting this place of Boethius, says: "Boethius says that genera and species subsist insofar as it befits some individuals to subsist on account of their being comprehended under genera and species in the category of substance." If, therefore, it befits individuals to subsist because they are under second substances, then it will befit second substances earlier. And clearly the same St Thomas in In I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 2 ad 21 says: "Although genera and species do not underlie except in individuals, nevertheless subsistence properly belongs to them; and they are called 'subsistences'—although the particular is also so called, yet 'later', just as species are called 'substances'—but second ones." And In I Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4 he says that "subsistence and essence belong earlier to genera and species than to individuals," according to Boethius.

18. Nevertheless, it must be said that first substance is "most" and "earlier" substance not only in the notion of underlying but also in the notion of subsisting—speaking formally of actual subsistence, as the very word "to subsist" properly sounds. Thus all the interpreters of Aristotle think, and it is manifest. For that subsists earlier to which it belongs "to exist and to operate"; but these belong earlier to singulars, as Aristotle taught in the beginning of the Metaphysics; therefore. Likewise, we shall show below that subsistence, properly taken, is a mode or terminus of a singular and individual nature, so that just as an accident cannot affect a common nature except insofar as it exists in a singular nature, so neither can subsistence terminate a common nature except as made singular; therefore—just as to underlie—so also to subsist belongs per se first to first substance, and to second because of the first. Hence St Thomas, De potentia q. 9, a. 1 ad 4, simply says that "nothing subsists except individual substances"; and in ad 5 he says that Boethius in the place cited speaks according to Plato's opinion, who posited genera and species to be certain forms separate, subsisting, stripped of accidents. And similarly, in the place of the Summa cited, he says that species and genera do not subsist, except

according to Plato's opinion, who posited the species of things to subsist separately from singulars. Yet even those negative propositions must be understood in a sane way—namely, that genera and species do not subsist outside singulars, that is, per se first; not that it be excluded that they subsist in the singulars.

19. Wherefore I scarcely find a true account of the difference Boethius proposed between subsisting and underlying, such that second substances are said to subsist and not to underlie. For outside individuals they neither subsist nor underlie; and in individuals and through individuals they both subsist and underlie. Therefore there is no difference in the thing. As to our mode of understanding, one can say that genera and species—inasmuch as they are conceived abstractly from individuals—are abstracted from the notion of underlying accidents, but not from the notion of subsisting. For just as Plato—as Aristotle interprets him—posited Ideas subsisting but not underlying, so the mind, when it abstracts second substances, conceives them after the manner of things subsisting, not after the manner of things underlying; for it abstracts them from accidents and considers naked essences. It does not, however, conceive them as subsisting thus separated outside individuals; the mind does not compose then, otherwise it would conceive something false; rather it conceives "man," for example, in a simple way after the manner of something subsisting, abstracting it from the individual and from particular subsistence. The mind of St Thomas is sufficiently clear from other places cited; yet sometimes he seems to use the word "subsistence" equivocally. Properly, it signifies the actual mode of existing per se, or the terminus of a substantial nature—in which sense we have spoken of it. Sometimes it signifies nature and essence, which is the root of such a mode of subsisting—in which sense below we shall say that the essential notion of substance consists. And in that sense St Thomas sometimes says that the notion of "subsistence" belongs per se first to genera and species and through them to individuals. The argument made to the contrary proves this too—that

the essential notion of substance belongs per se first to second substances, but not the act of subsisting itself—since this is not essential, as we shall say below.

20. And indeed this must be said regarding the real act of underlying, even with respect to proper passions (which was touched upon in the third doubt). For if we consider only the necessary connection between essence and property, the property is said to belong per se first to the species—that is, to second substance, not to first; the sense of which is that the adequate account of such a property is the essence itself considered in itself and not by reason of individuation or a particular mode of subsisting. And in the same sense we say that "Peter is risible because he is a man," and not conversely; for by this locution alone we signify that this property is common to Peter with other humans, and that it has a necessary connection with the essence of "man" as such. But if we speak of the actual inherence or sustaining of the accident—even of a proper accident—this always belongs per se first to the individual and first substance. Thus "risibility" in the thing adheres earlier according to reason to Peter than to "man," because just as "to be" and "to act," so "to receive" belongs first and per se to singulars and subsistents.

### *Whether the Division is Analogical*

21. But you may ask (as was also touched upon at the end of the third doubt) whether this order, according to which we say that "to subsist" or "to underlie" belongs first to first substances, is sufficient to constitute an analogy, so that second substance is said to be "substance" only analogically. Commonly it is so thought, as Albert held in the Categories, tract I, c. 3, whom Cajetan and others followed. The reason is that this property—"to subsist" or "to underlie"—belongs earlier to first than to second substance. But since we have shown that this order is not real but only of reason, it is most probable that it is not sufficient to constitute an analogy. Especially because it is

not necessary that what belongs to one by reason of another should belong analogically, if it truly and properly and absolutely belongs to it; thus, for example, "to be extended" belongs to whiteness by reason of quantity, and yet it does not belong to it analogically. So, therefore, with greater reason, although second substance is said to subsist by reason of first, nevertheless it will be said to subsist or to underlie univocally. Especially since that "reason" or medium is only distinct by reason; for in the thing, just as "man" and "Peter" are the same, so they equally subsist or underlie.

22. Unless perhaps someone should say that although the nature which is second substance is, in virtue of the substrate, properly and univocally "substance," nevertheless, formally and as it is "second substance," it is analogically "substance," because as such it neither subsists nor underlies. But this is not rightly said. For if the discourse be about the intention or relation of "second substance," and that be reduplicated when one says "substance as second," then that is not only not "substance," but not anything real. That "to be substance" is not said of that nature by reason of the intention, but of that which we conceive under that intention or relation; and this we say is truly and properly and univocally "substance," nor is an analogy to be set up because of a mere distinction or relation of reason—though the matter is of little moment. Likewise, according to reason we conceive that the essential notion of substance belongs per se first to the nature considered in itself and through it to individuals. We apprehend the same order in proper passions as to their necessary connection; yet we do not for that reason conceive any analogy there. The same, therefore, will hold in the present case. Likewise, actual existence also belongs to second substances through first or in first; yet no one said that it belongs to them analogically. Finally, no ratio of true analogy is found here, because second substance is not called "substance" by proportion or relation to first, but because it is per se, that is, because "it is not in a subject," as Aristotle said.

23. Therefore what Aristotle said—that first substance is most of all and most properly "substance"—need not be understood of an analogy, but only because it belongs first and per se to it—even according to our conception or distinction of reason. Just as he also says that among second substances the species exceeds the genus; nevertheless no analogy intervenes between them. Finally, if someone should insist that by these reasons it is proved that there is indeed no analogy intervening here which is founded more or less perfectly in the very being of things, yet that there intervenes an analogy according to reason and in the first imposition of the name, it is not necessary to quarrel with him. For there can scarcely be here a question about the thing, but only about the imposition of the name substance.

24. Lastly, one can here inquire whether this division has place only in composite substances, or also in simple or immaterial ones. Almost all the Greeks think it has place only in composite substances. But that this is false will be clear from Disputation XXXV, where we shall show that spiritual individual substances are contained under the genus of substance.

25. Again one may doubt whether only in the entire substance—or also in the parts, namely matter and form—first and second substance can be distinguished. On this matter Simplicius, in Praedicamentis, c. on Substance, reports a certain opinion of Boethius, saying that the notion of first substance belongs to prime matter and to the composite, not however to the form. His reason was that to those two—and not to this—belongs Aristotle's definition, namely: "First substance is that which is neither in a subject nor said of a subject." This opinion can be confirmed; for prime matter both subsists and underlies—both substantial forms and also accidents. Form, however, is in a subject, namely in prime matter. This reason has scope, at most, for material forms, for the rational form, since it does not depend on matter, cannot be said to be in it as in a subject. Simplicius, however, adds that even material forms are not "in a subject," because that is said to be "in a subject" which is so in it as not

to be a part; whence he judges that even the substantial form can have the notion of first substance; for Aristotle in the category of substance says that the parts of substance are substances. But metaphysical writers absolutely deny that matter and form have the intention of universal or singular; and consequently they will deny that in them there is found the notion of first or second substance, as Soncinas, on Metaphysics VII, q. 39. I omit his reasons, because they only pertain to manner of speaking.

26. The present question can be taken both with respect to the word and with respect to the thing. As to the thing, the question is whether matter and form are in some way contained under the category of substance. And in this, Boethius was mistaken, if what Simplicius reports is true; for he completely excluded form from the notion and the category of substance, saying that it is a quality or something of that sort—plainly against Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, chapter 3, and De Anima II, chapter 1, where he distinguishes substance into matter, form, and composite. Moreover, in Disputation 15 we showed that a substantial form is necessary and is not an accident, and we explained how its informing differs from the inherence of an accident.

27. The question, however, is largely verbal: does the division of substance into primary and secondary apply only in the case of the composite, or also in the parts? On this point one should say that, speaking strictly of primary substance and proportionally of secondary, the division applies only to complete substance which is situated on the direct categorical line. For this division was given in order to establish that line, by assigning, as it were, its foundation—namely, primary substance. Further, complete substance is what properly subsists, acts, and serves as an underlying subject, and it is that of which accidents are properly predicated. Yet, taken more broadly, with respect to the name "substance," there is no doubt that those two members are found, according to a certain proportional participation, also in matter and form. For the rational soul, for

instance, is a substance, and, simply speaking, it is not an individual and singular substance. Hence, although it is not in a subject, it is said of a subject—for example, of this or that rational soul. But this rational soul is singular in such a way that it is neither in a subject nor is it predicated of a subject; therefore, with proportion preserved, the same division has a place in it. And proportionally the same holds for matter, which can be conceived also under a universal aspect, whether generic or specific, and as this individual matter or this body. Aristotle clearly indicated as much in the category of substance: when he had said that "not being in a subject" is common to every substance, he declares that this also belongs to the parts of substance, since they are substances; he thereby implies that, in the way in which they are substances, they too can be called primary and secondary. Finally, the same is true of the intentions "universal" and "singular." For although, as they are taken along the direct categorical line, they are found only in complete things, nonetheless, more broadly and proportionally speaking, they are also found in parts, as is evident from our common ways of conceiving, predicating, and dividing, and as was also noted above. And according to this way of speaking, primary and secondary substance can be said not only of the complete but also of the incomplete. It is true, to be sure, that it is less improper to attribute the name "primary substance" to prime matter than to material forms, because matter in some way subsists, whereas material forms do not subsist (as we shall see below). Setting aside, however, these improper ways of speaking, we must explain the notion of primary substance in complete substances; and in this sense we shall always use this term. Incidentally, we shall also explain how the notion of substance is participated in the parts of substance.

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